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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE

FROM A. D. 1807 TO A. D. 1814

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.

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OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

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HAVING described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the narrative of Soult's operations, thus following the main stream of action; for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize the provinces already overrun by the Emperor, or to war down the remnants of the Spanish armies, but the Duke of Dalmatia's task was to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to trace him through the remainder of a campaign, in which, traversing all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war, he left broad marks of his career, and certain proofs that he was an able commander and of a haughty resolution in adversity.

It has been observed, in a former part of this work, that the inhabitants of Coruña honorably maintained their town until the safety of the fleet which carried Sir John Moore's army from the

Spanish shores was secure; they were less faithful to their own cause. Coruña might have defied irregular operations, and several weeks must have elapsed before a sufficient battering train could have been brought up to that corner of the Peninsula; yet a short negotiation sufficed to put the French in possession of the place on the 19th of January, and the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately organized from the resources of Coruña.

The harbor of Ferrol contained eight sail of the line, and some smaller ships of war. The fortifications were regular; there was an abundance of artillery, ammunition, and a garrison of seven or eight thousand men, consisting of soldiers, sailors, citizens, and armed countrymen, but their chiefs were treacherous. After a commotion, in which the Admiral Obregon was arrested, his successor, Melgarejo, surrendered upon somewhat better terms than those granted to Coruña; and thus in ten days were reduced two regular fortresses, which with more resolution might have occupied thirty thousand men for several months.

While yet before Ferrol the Duke of Dalmatia received the following despatch, prescribing the immediate invasion of Portugal:*

"Before his departure from this place (Valladolid), the Emperor, foreseeing the embarkation of the English army, drew up instructions for the ultimate operations of the Duke of Elchingen and yourself. He orders that when the English army shall be embarked, you will march upon Oporto with your four divisions; that is to say, the divisions of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet, the dragoons of Lorge and La Houssaye, and Franceschi's light cavalry, with the exception of two regiments that his Majesty desires you to turn over to the Duke of Elchingen, in order to make up his cavalry to four regiments.

"Your '*corps d'armée*,' composed of seventeen regiments of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, is destined for the expedition of Portugal, in combination with a movement the Duke of Belluno is going to effect. General Loison, some engineers, staff and commissariat officers, and thirteen Portuguese, all of whom belonged to the army formerly in Portugal under the Duke of Abrantes, have received instructions to join you immediately, and you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. This is the 21st of January, and it is supposed you cannot be at Oporto before the 5th of February, or at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time, namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the '*corps d'armée*' of the Duke of Belluno, composed of his own three divisions, of

* S. MSS.

the division of Leval, and of ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming a body of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida, to make a strong diversion in favor of your movement, and in such a mode as that he can push the head of a column upon Lisbon if you find any great obstacles to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed will not be the case.

“General Lapisse’s division of infantry, which is at this moment in Salamanca, and General Maupetit’s brigade of cavalry, will, when you shall be at Oporto, receive the Duke of Istria’s orders to march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where this division will again be under the command of the Duke of Belluno, who will send it instructions to join him at Merida: I let you know this that you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your left flank, as far as Abrantes. Such are the last orders I am charged to give you in the name of the Emperor: you will have to report to the King and receive his orders for your ulterior operations. The Emperor has unlimited confidence in your talents for the fine expedition that he has charged you with.

“ALEXANDER, *Prince of Neufchâtel, &c.*”

It was further intended by Napoleon that, when Lisbon fell, Marshal Victor should invade Andalusia upon the same line as Dupont had moved the year before; and like Dupont he was to have been assisted by a division of the second corps, which was to cross the Guadiana and march on Seville. Meanwhile the Duke of Elchingen, whose corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry, and by the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near twenty thousand men, was to maintain Galicia, confine the Asturians within their own frontier line, and keep open the communication with the second corps. Thus, nominally eighty thousand, and in reality sixty thousand men, were disposed for the conquest of Lisbon, and in such a manner that forty thousand would, after that had been accomplished, have poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, at a time when neither Portugal nor Andalusia was capable of making any resistance. It remains to show from what causes this mighty preparation failed.

The gross numbers of the second corps amounted to forty-seven thousand;* but General Bonnet’s division remained always at Santander, in observation of the eastern Asturian frontier, eight thousand were detached for the service of the general communications, and the remainder had, since the 9th of November, been fighting and marching incessantly among barren and snowy mountains; hence, stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men

* Muster-rolls of the French army, MS.

were in hospital. The force actually under arms did not exceed twenty-five thousand men, worn down with fatigue, barefooted, and without ammunition. They had outstripped their commissariat, the military chest was not come up, the draft animals were reduced in number and attenuated by fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken by continual usage, the artillery parc was still in the rear;* and as the sixth corps had not yet passed Lugo, two divisions of the second corps were required to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to obey the Emperor's orders was consequently impossible, wherefore Soult, taking quarters at St. Jago de Compostella, proceeded to re-organize his army.

Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder found in Coruña; shoes were obtained partly by requisition, partly from the Spanish magazines, filled as they were with stores supplied by England; the artillery were soon refitted, and the greatest part of the stragglers were rallied. In six days, the Marshal thought himself in a condition to obey his orders, and, although his troops were still suffering from fatigue and privation, marched, on the first of February, with nineteen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery; but, to understand his operations, the state of Galicia and the previous movements of Romana must be described.

When the Spanish army, on the 2d of January, crossed the line of Sir John Moore's march, it was already in a state of disorganization. Romana, with the cavalry, plunged at once into the deep valleys of the Syl and the Minho, but the artillery and a part of his infantry were overtaken and cut up by Franceschi's cavalry; the remainder wandered in bands from one place to another, or dispersed to seek food and shelter among the villages in the mountains. General Mendizabel, with a small body, halted in the Val des Orres, and placing guards at the Puente de Bibey, a point of singular strength of defence, he purposed to cover the approaches to Orense on that side;† but Romana himself, after wandering for a time, collected two or three thousand men, and took post, on the 15th, at Toabado, a village about twenty miles from Lugo. Meanwhile Ney arrived at that place, having detached some cavalry from Villa Franca to scour the valleys on his left, and also sent Marchand's division by the road of Orense to St. Jago and Coruña. Marchand dispersed Mendizabel's troops on the 17th, and after halting some days at Orense, where he established a hospital, continued his march to St. Jago.

The defeat of Mendizabel and the subsequent movements of Marchand's division completed the dispersion of Romana's army;

* S. Journal of Operations of the Second Corps, MS. † Appendix 2.

the greatest part, throwing away their arms, returned to their homes, and he himself, with his cavalry, and the few infantry that would follow him, crossed the Minho, passed the mountains, and, descending into the valley of the Tamega, took refuge, on the 21st, at Oimbra, a place on the frontier of Portugal, close to Monterey, where there was a small magazine, collected for the use of Sir John Moore's army. In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, he entered into communication with the Portuguese General Silveira, and with Sir John Cradock, demanding money and arms from the latter; he endeavored also to reassemble a respectable body of troops, but Blake and other officers deserted him, and these events and the general want of patriotic spirit drew from him the following observation:—"I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap, prostrates the minds of these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they sacrifice their country and compromise their commander."

The people of Gallicia, poor, scattered, living hardly, and, like all mountaineers, very tenacious of the little property they possess, disregarded political events which did not immediately and visibly affect their interests. They were, with the exception of those of the seaport towns, but slightly moved by the aggression of the French, as long as that aggression did not extend to their valleys; and hence, at first, they treated the English and French armies alike. Sir David Baird's division, in its advance, paid generously for supplies, yet it was regarded with jealousy and defrauded. Soult's and Moore's armies, passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with terror, and the people fled from both. The British and German troops that marched to Vigo, being conducted without judgment, were licentious, and as their number was small, the people murdered stragglers, and showed without disguise their natural hatred of strangers. On several occasions, parties sent to collect cars for the conveyance of the sick, had to sustain a skirmish before the object could be obtained; and five officers, misled by a treacherous guide, were scarcely saved from death by the interference of an old man, whose exertions, however, were not successful until one of the officers had been severely wounded in the head. On the other hand, General Marchand discovered so little symptoms of hostility, during his march to Orense, that he left his hospital at that town without a guard, under the joint care of Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of humanity were faithfully discharged by the former without hindrance from the people.

This quiescence did not last long: the French generals were obliged to subsist their troops, by requisitions extremely onerous to

a people whose property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many abuses and excesses which always attend this mode of supplying an army soon created a spirit of hatred that Romana labored incessantly to increase, and he was successful; for, although a bad general, he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the task of exciting a population. Moreover, the monks and friars labored to the same purpose; and, while Romana denounced death to those who refused to take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition;* and all this was necessary, for the authority of the Supreme Junta was only acknowledged as a matter of necessity—not of liking. Galicia, although apparently calm, was, therefore, ripe for a general insurrection, at the moment when the Duke of Dalmatia commenced his march from St. Jago de Compostella.

From that town several roads lead to the Minho; the principal one running by the coast line crosses the Ulla, the Umia, the Vedra, and the Octaven, and passes by Pontevedra and Redondela, to Tuy, a dilapidated fortress, situated on the Spanish side of the Minho. The second, crossing the same rivers near to their sources, passes by the Monte de Tenteyros, and, entering the valley of the Avia, follows the course of that river to Ribidavia, a considerable town, situated at the confluence of the Avia with the Minho, having a stone bridge over the former, and a barque ferry on the latter river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, connects St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense another road passes along the right bank of the Minho, and connects the towns of Ribidavia, Salvatierra, and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small fortress at the mouth of the Minho.

As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one convenient for the artillery, was that leading by Redondela and Tuy, and from thence by the coast, the Duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of passing the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia;† wherefore on the 1st of February Franceschi, followed by the other divisions in succession, took the Pontevedra road, and at Redondela defeated a small body of insurgents, and captured four pieces of cannon, after which Vigo surrendered to one of his detachments, while he himself marched upon Tuy, and took possession of that town and Guardia. During these operations La Houssaye's dragoons, quitting Mellid, had crossed the Monte de Tenteyro, passed through Ribidavia, and taken possession of Salvatierra, on the Minho; and General Soult, the Marshal's brother, who had assembled three thousand stragglers and convalescents, between Astorga and Carrión, received orders to enter Portugal by Puebla de Senabria, and thus join the main body.

* Romana's Manifesto.

† S. Journal of Operations, MS. See Plan 4.

The rainy season was in full torrent, every stream and river overflowed its banks, the roads were deep, and the difficulty of procuring provisions great. These things, and the delivering over to Marshal Ney the administration of Ferrol and Coruña, where the Spanish government and Spanish garrisons were not only retained but paid by the French, delayed the rear of the army so long that it was not until the 15th or 16th that the whole of the divisions were assembled on the Minho, between Salvatierra, Guardia, and Redondela.

The Minho, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms the frontier of Portugal, the banks on both sides being guarded by a number of fortresses originally of considerable strength, but at this time all in a dilapidated condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was opposed by Valenza, which was garrisoned, and the works in somewhat a better condition than the rest; Lapella, Moncao, and Melgaço, completed the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this moment was the Minho itself, which, at all times a considerable river, was now a broad and raging flood, and the Portuguese *ordenanzas* and militia, who were in arms on the other side, had removed all the boats. Nevertheless Soult, after examining the banks with care, decided upon passing at Campo Saucos, a little village where the ground was flatter, more favorable, and so close to Caminha that the army, once across, could easily seize that place, and the same day reach Viana on the Lima, from whence to Oporto was only three marches.

To attract the attention of the Portuguese, La Houssaye, who was at Salvatierra, spread his dragoons along the Minho, and attempted to push small parties across that river, above Melgaço; but the bulk of the army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Campo Saucos, and a detachment seized the small seaport of Bayona, in the rear. A division of infantry, and three hundred French marines released at Coruña and attached to the second corps, were then employed to transport some large fishing boats and some heavy guns from the harbor and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. This was effected by the help of rollers over more than two miles of rugged and hilly ground; it was a work of infinite labor, but from the 11th to the 15th, the troops toiled unceasingly, and the craft was launched in a small lake at the confluence of the Tamuga river with the Minho.

In the night of the 15th the heavy guns were placed in battery, and three hundred soldiers being embarked, the boats manned by the marines, dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, and endeavored to reach the Portuguese side of the latter river

during the darkness; yet, whether from the violence of the flood, or want of skill in the men, the landing was not effected before daybreak, and the *ordenanzas* fell with great fury upon the first who got on shore; the foremost being all slain, the others pulled back, and regained their own side with great difficulty. This action was infinitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had a surprising influence on the issue of the campaign. It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably have been expected that a tumultuous assemblage of half-armed peasants, collected on the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight of many boats filled with soldiers, some pulling across and others landing under the protection of a heavy battery that thundered from the midst of a multitude of troops, who clustered on the heights, or thronged to the edge of the opposite bank in eager expectation. It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled an attempt that, being successful, would have insured the fall of Oporto by the 21st of February, which was precisely the period when, General Mackenzie's division being at Cadiz, Sir John Cradock's troops were reduced to almost nothing; when the English ministers only waited for an excuse to abandon Portugal; when the people of that country were in the very extremity of disorder; when the Portuguese army was a nullity, and when the Regency was evidently preparing to receive the French with submission. It was the period also, when Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the Emperor's orders, and consequently, Lapisse and Victor could not have avoided to fulfil their part of the plan for the subjugation of Portugal.

The Duke of Dalmatia's situation was now, although not one of imminent danger, extremely embarrassing, and more than ordinary quickness and vigor were required to conduct the operations with success. Posted in a narrow, contracted position, he was hemmed in on the left by the Spanish insurgents, who had assembled immediately after La Houssaye passed Orense, and who, being possessed of a very rugged and difficult country, were, moreover, supported by the army of Romana, which was said to be at Orense and Ribidavia.* In the French General's front was the Minho, broad, raging, and at the moment impassable, while heavy rains forbade the hope that its waters would decrease. To collect sufficient means for forcing a passage would have required sixteen days, but long before that period, the subsistence for the army would have entirely failed, and the Portuguese, being alarmed, would have greatly augmented their forces on the opposite bank. There remained then only to retrace his steps to St. Jago, or breaking through the

* See Plan 4.

Spanish insurgents, to ascend the Minho, and open a way into Portugal by some other route.

Soult's attempt to pass the river had been baffled on the 15th of February, and on the 16th he was in full march towards Ribidavia upon a new line of operations, and this promptitude of decision was supported by an equally prompt execution. La Houssaye, with his dragoons, quitted Salvatierra, and keeping the edge of the Minho, was galled by the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite bank; and before evening, he twice broke the insurgent bands, and, in revenge for some previous excesses of the peasantry, burnt the villages of Morentan and Cobreira: meanwhile the main body of the army, passing the Tea river at Salvatierra and Puente d'Arcos, marched, by successive divisions, along the main road from Tuy to Ribidavia.

Between Franquera and Canizar the route was cut by the streams of the Morenta and Noguera rivers, and behind those torrents, eight hundred Gallicians, having barricadoed the bridges and repulsed the advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon their defence. The 17th, at daybreak, the leading brigade of Heudelet's division forced the passage, and pursued the Spaniards briskly, but, when within a short distance of Ribidavia, the latter rallied upon eight or ten thousand insurgents, arrayed in order of battle, on a strong hill, covering the approaches to that town. At this sight the advanced guard halted until the remainder of the division and a brigade of cavalry were come up, and then, under the personal direction of Soult, the French assailed and drove the Gallicians, fighting, through the town and across the Avia. The loss of the vanquished was very considerable; the bodies of twenty priests were found amongst the slain, and either from fear or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted Ribidavia.

The 18th, a brigade of infantry scouring the valley of the Avia, dispersed three or four thousand of the insurgents, who were disposed to make a second stand on that side; a second brigade, pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close to that place, and being joined the same evening by the infantry who had scoured the valley of the Avia, and by Franceschi's cavalry, on the 19th entered Orense in time to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being cut. La Houssaye's dragoons then took post at Maside, while the remainder of the horse and Laborde's infantry united at Ribidavia; the artillery were however still between Tuy and Salvatierra, under the protection of Merle's and Mermet's divisions. Thus, in three days, the Duke of Dalmatia had, with admirable celerity and vigor, extricated his army from a contracted unfavorable country, strangled a formidable insurrection in its

birth, and at the same time opened a fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and an easy passage into Portugal.

The 20th, a regiment being sent across the Minho, by the ferries of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated the insurgents of the left bank, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post on the heights of Merea. The army, with the exception of the division guarding the guns, was concentrated the same day at Orense; but the efforts of the artillery had been baffled by the difficulties of the road from Tuy to Ribidavia, and this circumstance, viewed in conjunction with the precarious state of the communication, a daily increasing sick-list, and the number of small detachments required to protect the rear, seemed to forbid the invasion of Portugal. A man of ordinary genius would have failed. The Duke of Dalmatia with ready boldness resolved to throw the greatest part of his artillery and the whole of his other encumbrances into Tuy, as a place of arms, then relinquishing all communication with Gallicia, for the moment, to march in one mass directly upon Oporto; from whence, if successful, he proposed to re-open his communication with Tuy, by the line of the coast, recover his artillery, and re-establish a regular system of operations.

In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the lightest guns and six howitzers, with a proportion of ammunition-wagons, were, with infinite labor and difficulty, transported to Ribidavia; the remaining thirty-six pieces and a vast parc of carriages, carrying ammunition and hospital and commissariat stores, were put into Tuy, where General La Martiniere was left with an establishment of artillery and engineer officers, a garrison of five hundred men fit to carry arms, and nine hundred sick.* All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments, coming from St. Jago, and the military chest, which was still in the rear, guarded by six hundred infantry, were likewise directed upon Tuy; the gates were shut, and La Martiniere was abandoned to his own resources.

The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now forwarded to Orense, and the Marshal's quarters were established at the latter town on the 24th, but other obstacles were to be vanquished before the army could commence the march into Portugal. The gun-carriages had been so shaken in the transit from Tuy to Ribidavia that three days were required to repair them; it was extremely difficult to obtain provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants were still in arms, nor were they quelled until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on the Monte Blanco, in the Val d'Ornes, and up the valley of Avia, in which the French wasted time, lost men, and expended ammunition that could not be replaced. Soult endeav-

* Journal of Operations, MS.

ored to soften the people's feelings by kindness and soothing proclamations; and as he enforced a strict discipline among his troops, his humane and politic demeanor, joined to the activity of his movable columns, abated the fierceness of the peasantry.* The inhabitants of Ribidavia soon returned to their houses; those of Orense had never been very violent, and now becoming friendly, even lent assistance to procure provisions. It was not, however, an easy task to restrain the soldiers within the bounds of humanity. The frequent combats, the assassination, the torturing of isolated men, and the privations endured, had so exasperated the French troops, that the utmost exertions of their General's authority could not always control their revenge.

While the Duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing for a formidable inroad, his adversaries were a prey to the most horrible anarchy. The Bishop, always intent to increase his own power, had assembled little short of fifty thousand armed persons in Oporto, and commenced a gigantic line of intrenchment on the hills to the northward of that city. This worse than useless labor so completely occupied all persons that the defence of the strong country lying between the Duero and the Minho was totally neglected, and when the second corps appeared on the bank of the latter river, the northern provinces were struck with terror; then it was that the people, for the first time, understood the extent of their danger; then it was that the Bishop, aroused from his intrigues, became sensible that the French were more terrible enemies than the Regency. Once impressed with this truth, he became clamorous for succor; he recalled Sir Robert Wilson from the Agueda, he hurried on the labor of the intrenchments, and he earnestly pressed Sir John Cradock for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and a reinforcement of British soldiers. Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his orders; but the British General, although he refused to furnish him with troops, supplied him with arms, and very ample stores of powder, sending artillery and engineer officers to superintend the construction of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrangements for a reasonable system of operations.†

The people were, however, become too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or even advised, and the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubordination, universal and hopeless confusion prevailed. Don Bernardin Freire was the legal commander-in-chief of the Entre Minho e Douro, but all the generals claimed equal and independent authority, each over his own force; and this was, perhaps, a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor were at that period almost synonymous; to obey the orders

* Appendix 9. † Appendix 82, §§ 1-6. Vol. I. See Plan 2.

of a superior against the momentary wishes of the multitude was to incur instant death. Nor were there men wanting who found it profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and direct its blind vengeance against innocent persons adverse to the prelate's faction, which was not without opponents even in Oporto.

Such was the unhappy state of affairs, when the undisciplined gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the *ordenanzas* and the militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful insubordination, and there were no arrangements made for the regular distribution of provisions, or of any one necessary supply. Among the troops despatched from Oporto was the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred strong, well armed, well equipped, and commanded by Baron Eben, a native of Prussia, who, without any known service to recommend him, had suddenly attained the rank of Major in the British service. This man, destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been left at Oporto when Sir Robert Wilson marched to Almeida; his orders were to follow with the second battalion of the legion, when its clothing and equipment should be completed; but he retained the troops, to push his own fortune under the prelate's auspices.

General Freire, having reached the Cavado, was joined by fourteen or fifteen thousand militia and *ordenanzas*; fixing his headquarters at Braga, he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salomonde and Ruivaens, in his front, and, unfortunately for himself, endeavored to restrain his troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion of command was heinously resented. Freire, being willing to uphold the authority of the Regency, had been for some time obnoxious to the Bishop's faction; already he was pointed to as a suspected person, and the multitude were inimically disposed towards him.

Meanwhile, General Silveira, assuming the command of the *Tras os Montes*, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication with the Marquis of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, had been joined by his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of nine or ten thousand men. Silveira's force was about four thousand, half regulars, half militia, and he was accompanied by many of the *ordenanzas*; but here, as elsewhere, all were licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their General; moreover, the national enmity between them and the Spaniards having overcome their sense of a common cause and common danger, the latter were evilly treated, and a

deadly feud subsisted between the two armies.* The generals, indeed, agreed to act in concert, offensively and defensively, yet neither of them was the least acquainted with the numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists; and it is a proof of Romana's unfitness for command that he, having the whole population at his disposal, was yet ignorant of everything relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know. The whole of the French force in Galicia, at this period, was about forty-five thousand men, Romana estimated it at twenty-one thousand; the number under Soult was about twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed it to be twelve thousand; and among these he included General Marchand's division of the sixth corps, which he always imagined to be a part of the Duke of Dalmatia's army.

The Spanish General was so elated at the spirit of the peasants about Ribidavia, that he anticipated nothing but victory; he knew also that on the Arosa, an estuary running up towards St. Jago de Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had risen, and being joined by all the neighboring districts, were preparing to attack Vigo and Tuy; hence, partly from his Spanish temperament, partly from his extreme ignorance of war, he was convinced that the French only thought of making their escape out of Galicia, and that even in that they would be disappointed. To effect their destruction more certainly, he also, as we have seen, pestered Sir John Cradock for succors in money and ammunition, and desired that the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with a thousand British soldiers.† Cradock, anxious to support the cause, although he refused the troops, sent ammunition and five thousand pounds in money, but before it arrived Romana was beaten, and in flight.

The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, amounting to sixteen thousand regulars and militia, besides *ordenanzas*, were posted in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega, extending from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a distance of more than fifteen miles. This was the first line of defence for Portugal. Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five thousand men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the Cavado and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova; but of these twenty-five thousand only six thousand were armed with muskets, and it is to be observed that the militia and troops of the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name, save that their faulty discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them less active and intelligent as skirmishers, without making them fit for battle. The Bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble, formed the third line, occupying the intrenchments that

* Appendix 2, § 3.

† Cradock's Correspondence, MS.

covered Oporto. Such was the state of affairs, and such were the dispositions made to resist the Duke of Dalmatia; but his army, although galled and wearied by continual toil, and, when halting, disturbed and vexed by the multitude of insurrections, was, when in motion, of a power to overthrow and disperse these numerous bands, even as a great ship, feeling the wind, breaks through and scatters the gun-boats that have gathered round her in the calm.

CHAPTER II.

Soult enters Portugal—Action at Monterey—Franceschi makes great slaughter of the Spaniards—Portuguese retreat upon Chaves—Romana flies to Puebla Senabria—Portuguese mutiny—Three thousand throw themselves into Chaves—Soult takes that town—Marches upon Braga—Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and Venda Nova—Tumults and disorders in the Portuguese camp at Braga—Murder of General Freire and others—Battle of Braga—Soult marches against Oporto—Disturbed state of that town—Silveira retakes Chaves—The French force the passage of the Ave—The Portuguese murder their General Vallonga—French appear in front of Oporto—Negotiate with the Bishop—Violence of the people—General Foy taken—Battle of Oporto—The city stormed with great slaughter.

SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

THE Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes, lying together, form the northern part of Portugal; the extreme breadth of either, when measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy miles.

The river Tamega, running north and south, and discharging itself into the Douro, forms the boundary line between them; but there is, to the west of this river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges, which, under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and Sierra de Santa Catalina, form a second barrier, nearly parallel to the Tamega, and across some part of these ridges an invader, coming from the eastward, must pass to arrive at Oporto.

Other sierras, running also in a parallel direction with the Tamega, cut the Tras os Montes in such a manner, that all the considerable rivers flowing north and south tumble into the Douro. But as the western ramifications of the Sierras de Gerez and Cabrera shoot down towards the sea, the rivers of the Entre Douro e Minho discharge their waters into the ocean, and consequently flow at right angles to those of Tras os Montes. Hence it follows, that an enemy penetrating to Oporto, from the north, would have to pass the Lima, the Cavado, and the Ave, to reach Oporto; and if, com-

ing from the east, he invaded the *Tras os Montes*, all the rivers and intervening ridges of that province must be crossed, before the *Entre Minho e Douro* could be reached.

The Duke of Dalmatia was, however, now in such a position, near the sources of the Lima and the Tamega rivers, that he could choose whether to penetrate by the valley of the first into the *Entre Minho e Douro*, or by the valley of the second into the *Tras os Montes*, and there was also a third road, leading between those rivers through Montalegre upon Braga; but this latter route, passing over the *Sierra de Gerez*, was impracticable for artillery.

The French General had, therefore, to consider—

1. If, following the course of the Lima, he should disperse the insurgents between that river and the Minho, and then recovering his artillery from Tuy, proceed against Oporto by the main road leading along the sea-coast.

2. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, and then continuing his route to Villa Real, near the Douro, take the defences of *Tras os Montes* in reverse; or, turning to the right, cross the *Sierra de Cabrera* by the pass of Ruivaens, enter Braga, and so go against Oporto.

The first project was irregular and hazardous, inasmuch as Romana and Silveira could have fallen upon the flank and rear of the French during their march through a difficult country; but as the position of those generals covered Chaves, to attack them was a preliminary measure to either plan, and with this object Soult moved on the 4th of March. The 5th, his van being at Villa Real and Peneverde, he sent a letter by a flag of truce to Romana in which, after exposing all the danger of the latter's situation, he advised him to submit; no answer was returned, nor would the bearer have been suffered to pass the outposts, but that Romana himself was in the rear, for he dreaded that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of his conduct, and, perhaps, cause his patriotism to be undervalued.*

This failing, three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry marched the next morning against Monterey, while La Houssaye's dragoons, taking the road of Laza, covered the left flank, and pushed parties as far as La Gudina, on the route of Puebla de Senabria. The fourth division of infantry remained at Villa del Rey, to cover the passage of the sick and wounded men from Orense; for the Duke of Dalmatia, having no base of operations, transported his hospitals and other encumbrances from place to place as the army moved; acting in this respect after the manner of the Roman generals when invading a barbarous country.

* Sir J. Cradock's papers, MS.

As the French advanced, the Spaniards abandoned their positions in succession, spiked the guns in the dilapidated works of Monterey, and after a slight skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla de Senabria; but Franceschi followed close, and overtaking two or three thousand as they were passing a rugged mountain, assailed their rear with a battalion of infantry, and at the same time leading his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, and obliged it to halt.* The Spaniards, trusting to the rough ground, drew up in one large square to receive the charge. Franceschi had four regiments of cavalry, each regiment settled itself against the face of a square, and then the whole, with loud cries, bore down swiftly upon their opponents; the latter, unsteady, irresolute, dismayed, shrunk from the fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps. Those who escaped the horses' hoofs and the edge of the sword became prisoners, but twelve hundred bodies were stretched lifeless on the field of battle, and Franceschi continued his movements on La Gudina.

Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the rear of Verim, when his vanguard was attacked, and there was nothing to prevent him from falling back to Chaves with his main body, according to a plan before agreed upon between him and Silveira;†but either from fear, or indignation at the treatment his soldiers had received at the hands of the Portuguese, he left Silveira to his fate, and made off with six or seven thousand men towards Bragança; from thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained the valley of the Syl. Meanwhile, two thousand Portuguese infantry, with some guns, issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march at the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet having passed Monterey, Laborde was approaching that place; a slight combat ensued, the Portuguese lost their guns, and were driven down the valley of the Tamega as far as the village of Outeiro, within their own frontier.* This defeat, and the flight of Romana, had such an effect upon the surrounding districts that the Spanish insurgents returned in crowds to their habitations and delivered up their arms. Some of the clergy, also, changing their opinions, exhorted the people to peace, and the prisoners taken on the 6th, being dissatisfied with Romana's conduct, and moved by their hatred of the Portuguese, entered the French service.

These affairs occupied Soult until the 9th, during which period his outposts were pushed towards Chaves, Montalegre, and La Gudina, but the main body remained at Verim to cover the arrival of the sick at Monterey, while Silveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

† Appendix 2, § 3.

deserted by Romana, fell back on the 7th to a strong mountain position, one league behind Chaves, from whence he could command a view of all the French movements as far as Monterey; his ground was advantageous, but his military talents were moderate, his men, always insubordinate, were now mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed to join the French. He wished to abandon Chaves, but his troops resolved to defend it, and three thousand five hundred men actually did throw themselves into that town, in defiance of him; for he was already, according to the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor and declared worthy of that death which he would inevitably have suffered, but that some of his soldiers still continued to respect his orders.

The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to Monterey, and as Romana's movement was known to be a real flight, and not made with a design to create fresh insurrections in the rear, the French troops were again put in motion towards Chaves;* Merle's division however remained at Verim to protect the hospital, and Franceschi's took the road of La Gudina, as if he had been going towards Salamanca. A report that he had actually entered that town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that Soult would not pass the Portuguese frontier at Chaves; but Franceschi quickly returned, by Osonio and Feces de Abaxa, and being assisted by Heudelet's division, invested Chaves on the left bank of the Tamega, while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, and Lorge, descending the right bank, beat the Portuguese outposts, and getting possession of a fort close under the walls, completed the investment of the town. The place was immediately summoned to surrender, but no answer was returned, and the garrison, like men bereft of their wits and fighting with the air, kept up a continual fire of musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered on receiving a second summons, more menacing than the first. The 13th the French entered the town, and Silveira retired to Villa Real.

The works of Chaves were in a bad state; few of the fifty guns mounted on the ramparts were fit for service, but there was a stone bridge, and the town was in many respects more suitable for a place of arms than Monterey; wherefore the sick were brought down from the latter place, and a hospital was established for twelve hundred men, the number now unfit to carry arms. The fighting men were reduced to twenty-one thousand, and Soult, partly from the difficulty of guarding his prisoners, partly from a desire to abate the hostility of the Portuguese, permitted the militia and *ordenanzas* to return to their homes, after taking an oath

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

not to resume their arms; to some of the poorest he also gave money and clothes, and he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular troops taken in Chaves.

This wise and gentle proceeding was much blamed by some of his officers, especially by those who had served under Junot.* They desired that Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison put to the sword, for they were imbued with a personal hatred of the Portuguese, and being averse to serve in the present expedition, endeavored, as it would appear, to thwart their General; yet the prudence of his conduct was immediately visible in the softened feelings of the country people, and the scouting parties being no longer molested spread themselves, some on the side of Bragança and Villa Real, others in the Entre Minho e Douro.† The former reported that there was no enemy in a condition to make head in the Tras os Montes, but the latter fell in with the advanced guard of Freire's army at Ruivaens, on the road to Braga.

From Chaves Soult could operate against Oporto, either by the Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho e Douro; the latter presented the strongest position, but the road was shorter and more practicable for guns, than that by the valley of the Tamega, and the communication with Tuy could be sooner recovered; hence, when the scouts brought intelligence that a Portuguese army was at Braga, the French General decided to penetrate by that line.‡

The road from Chaves to Braga entered a deep and dangerous defile, or rather a succession of defiles, which extended from Venda Nova to Ruivaens, and re-commenced after passing the Cavado river; Freire's advanced guards, composed of *ordenanzas*, occupied those places, and he had also a detachment under Eben on the road of Montalegre; he, however, recalled the latter on the 14th; on the 16th Franceschi forced the defile of Nova, and the remainder of the French army being formed in alternate masses of cavalry and infantry, began to pass the Sierra de Cabrera; meanwhile Lorge's dragoons, descending the Tamega, ordered rations for the whole army along the road to Villa Real, and then, suddenly retracing their steps, rejoined the main body.

The 17th, Franceschi, being reinforced with some infantry, won the bridge of Ruivaens, and entered Salamonde; the Portuguese, covered by Eben's detachment, which had arrived at St. Joa de Campo, then felt back on the Pico de Pugalados, close to Braga, and Franceschi took post at Carvalho Este, two leagues in front of that city.

* Noble's Campagne de Galice.

† S. Journal of Operations, MS.

‡ Ibid.

Soult now, expecting to reach Braga without further opposition, caused his artillery, guarded by Laborde's division, to enter the pass of Venda Nova ; but the *ordenanzas*, reinforced by some men from the side of Guimaraens, immediately re-assembled, and clustering on the mountains to the left of the column of march, attacked it with great fierceness and subtlety.

The peasants of the northern provinces of Portugal, unlike the squalid miserable population of Lisbon and Oporto, are robust, handsome, and exceedingly brave ; their natural disposition is open and obliging, and they are, when rightly handled as soldiers, docile, intelligent, and hardy. They are, however, vehement in their anger ; and being now excited by the exhortations and personal example of their priests, they came rushing down the sides of the hills, and many of them, like men deprived of reason, broke furiously into the French battalions, and were there killed. The others, finding their efforts unavailing, fled, and were pursued a league up the mountain by some battalions sent out against them ; yet they were not abashed, and making a circuit behind the hills, fell upon the rear of the line of march, killed fifty of the stragglers, and plundered the baggage. Thus galled, the French slowly, and with much trouble, passed the long defiles of Venda Nova, Rivaens, and Salamonde, and gathered by degrees in front of Freire's position.*

That General was no more ; and his troops, reeking from the slaughter of their commander, were raging like savage beasts, at one moment congregating near the prisons to murder some wretch within, at another rushing tumultuously to the outposts, with a design to engage the enemy. The *ordenanzas* of the distant districts also came pouring into the camp, dragging with them suspected persons, and adding to the general distraction.†

The unfortunate Freire, unable to establish order in his army, had resolved to retreat, and in pursuance of that design, recalled Eben on the 14th, giving directions to the officers at the different outposts in front of Braga to retire at the approach of the enemy. This, and his endeavor to prevent the waste of ammunition, gave effect to a plan which had been long prepared by the Bishop's faction for his destruction. In passing through Braga, he was openly reviled in the streets by some of the *ordenanzas* ; and as the latter plainly discovered their murderous intention, he left the army ; he was however seized on the 17th, at a village behind Braga, and brought back : what followed is thus described by Baron Eben, in his official report to Sir John Cradock :

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

† Eben's Report, MS. Sir J. Cradock's Papers.

"I did not reach Braga until nine o'clock in the morning of the 17th. I found everything in the greatest disorder; the houses shut, the people flying in all directions, and part of the populace armed with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets, I was greeted with loud *vivas*. Though the people knew me, I could not guess the meaning of this. At the market-place, I was detained by the rapidly increasing populace, who took the reins of my horse, crying out loudly, that they were ready to do anything to defend the city; requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest terms of their General. I promised them to do all in my power to aid their patriotic zeal; but said that I must first speak to him. Upon this, they suffered me to proceed, accompanied by about a hundred of them; but I had not got far on my way to his quarters, when I saw him on foot, conducted by a great armed multitude, who suffered no one to pass, and on my attempting it, threatened to fire. I was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse, and this the people applauded. Two men had hold of the General's arms, his sword was taken from him, and the people abused him most vehemently. On my way back to the market-place, they wanted to shoot me, taking me for General Freire; but I was saved by a soldier of the legion, who explained the mistake. When I reached the market-place, I found about a thousand men drawn up: I communicated to them my determination to assist them in their laudable endeavors to defend themselves, provided they would first permit me to speak to the General, for whose actions I promised to be answerable as long as I should be with him. I had ordered a house to be got ready for my reception, where the General arrived, accompanied as before; I saluted him with respect, at which they plainly discovered their disapprobation. I repeated my proposal, but they would not listen to it. I perceived the danger of the General, and proposed to take him to my quarters. My adjutant offered him his arm: when I spoke to him, he only replied, 'Save me!'

"At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded by thousands, and heard the loud cry of 'Kill! kill!' I now took hold of him, and attempted to force my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly wounded him with the point of his sword, under my arm. He collected all his strength, rushed through them, and hid himself behind the door of the house. The people surrounded me, and forced me from the house. To draw the attention of the people from the General, I ordered the drummers to beat the alarm, and formed the *ordenanzas* in ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, where the General still was. As a last attempt to save him, I now proposed that he should be conducted to prison, in

order to take a legal trial. This was agreed to, and he was conducted there in safety. I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the people demanded to be led against the enemy, now rapidly advancing, in number about two thousand. I again formed them, and advanced with them; but soon after, I heard the firing again, and was informed that the people had put the General to death with pikes and guns. I was now proclaimed General."

When this murder was perpetrated, the people seemed satisfied, and Eben, announcing the approach of a British force from Oporto, sent orders to the outposts to stand fast, as he intended to fight; but another tumult arose, when it was discovered that an officer of Freire's staff, one Villaboas, was in Eben's quarters. Several thousand *ordenanzas* instantly gathered about the house, and the unhappy man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the door, the mob all the time shouting and firing volleys in at the windows.* Yet, when their fury was somewhat abated, they obliged their new General to come out and show that he had not been wounded, and expressed great affection for him.

In the course of the night, the legion marched in from Pico de Pugalados, and the following morning a reinforcement of six thousand *ordenanzas* came up in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars also arrived in the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like the Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of military arrangements, leaving their weapons in store, and bringing their encumbrances to the field of battle. In the evening the corregidor and two officers of rank, together with many persons of a meaner class, were brought to the town as prisoners and put in jail, the armed mob being with difficulty restrained from slaying them on the way thither. In this distracted manner they were proceeding when Franceschi arrived at Carvalho on the 17th; and, surely, if that bold and enterprising soldier could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing, or known the real state of affairs, he would have broken into the midst of them with his cavalry; for, of the twenty-five thousand men composing the whole of the Portuguese force, eighteen thousand were only armed with pikes; the remainder had wasted the greatest part of the ammunition, and the powder in store was not made up in cartridges.† But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding it were occupied by what appeared a formidable multitude; hence Franceschi, although reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and slight skirmishes, to alarm his opponents, and to keep them in play until the other divisions of the French army could arrive.

* Eben's Report, MS.

† Cradock's Papers, MS. S. Journal of Operations, MS.

While these events were passing at Braga, Silveira again collected a considerable force of militia and *ordenanzas* in the *Tras os Montes*, and Captain Arentschild, one of the officers sent by Sir John Cradock to aid the Bishop, also rallied a number of fugitives at Guimaraens and Amarante. In Oporto, however, the multitude, obeying no command, were more intent upon murder than upon defence.

Eben's posts extended from Falperra, on the route of Guimaraens to the Ponte Porto, on the Cavado river; but his principal force was stationed on a lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufé, which, at the distance of six or seven miles from Braga, crossed the road to Chaves. The left or western end, overhanging the river Cavado, covered the detachment guarding the Ponte Porto. The right was wooded and masked by the head of a deep ravine; but beyond this wood the ridge, taking a curved and forward direction, was called the Monte Vallonga, and a second mass of men was posted there, but separated from those on the Monte Adaufé by an interval of two miles, and by the ravine and wood before mentioned. A third body, being pushed still more in advance, crowned an isolated hill, flanking the Chaves road, being intended to take the French in rear when the latter should attack the Monte Adaufé.

Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from it by a valley three miles wide, the ridge of Falperra was guarded by detachments from Guimaraens and from Braga.

The road to Braga, leading directly over the centre of the Monte Adaufé, was flanked on the left by a ridge shooting perpendicularly out from that mountain, and ending in a lofty mass of rocks which overhangs Carvalho Esté. But the Portuguese neglected to occupy either these rocks or the connecting ridge, and Franceschi seized the former on the 17th.

The 18th, Soult arrived in person, and, wishing to prevent a battle, released twenty prisoners, and sent them in with a proclamation couched in conciliatory language, and offering a capitulation; the trumpeter who accompanied them was however detained, and the prisoners were immediately slain. The next day Eben brought up all his reserves to the Adaufé, and the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of Monte Vallonga took possession of Lanhoza, a village half-way between that hill and the rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th.

Two divisions of French infantry being now up, Soult caused one of them and the cavalry to attack Lanhoza, from whence the Portuguese were immediately driven, and, being followed closely, lost their own hill also. The other French division took post, part in Carvalho, part on the rocky headland, and six guns were carried

to the latter during the night. In this position the French columns were close to the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a slight movement in advance, separate Eben's wings. The rest of the army was at hand, and a general attack was arranged for the next morning.

BATTLE OF BRAGA.

The 20th, at nine o'clock, the French were in motion: Franceschi and Mermet, leaving a detachment on the hill they had carried the night before, endeavored to turn the right of the people on the Monte Vallonga.

Laborde, supported by La Houssaye's dragoons, advanced against the centre by the ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé.*

Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron of cavalry, attacked Eben's left, with the view of seizing the Ponte Porto.

The Portuguese opened a straggling fire of musketry and artillery in the centre; but, after a few rounds, the bursting of a gun created a confusion from which Laborde's rapidly advancing masses gave them no time to recover.† By ten o'clock the whole of the centre was flying in disorder down a narrow wooded valley leading from the Adaufé to Braga; the French followed hard, and having discovered one of their men, who had been a prisoner, mutilated in a dreadful manner and still alive, they gave no quarter. Braga was abandoned, and the victorious infantry passing through, took post on the other side, while the cavalry continued the havoc for some distance on the road to Oporto; yet, so savage was the temper of the fugitives that, in passing through Braga, they stopped to murder the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail; then casting the mangled bodies into the street, continued their flight.‡ Meanwhile the centre was forced, and Heudelet, breaking over the left of the Monte Adaufé, descended upon Ponte Porto, and after a sharp skirmish, carried that bridge and the village on the other side of the Cavado.

Franceschi and Mermet found considerable difficulty in ascending the rugged sides of the Monte Vallonga, but having, at last, attained the crest, the whole of their enemies fled, and the two generals crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens, and cut off that line of retreat; but they fell in with the three thousand Portuguese posted above Falperra, and these men, seeing the cavalry approach, drew up with their backs to some high rocks, and

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

† Eben's Report, MS.

‡ S. Journal of Operations, MS.

opened a fire of artillery. Franceschi immediately placed his horsemen on either flank, a brigade of infantry against the front, and, as at Verim, making all charge together, strewed the ground with the dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly at this point, and Franceschi acknowledged it. The vanquished lost all their artillery and above four thousand men, of which four hundred only were made prisoners. Some of the fugitives, crossing the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, others retired to Oporto; but the greatest number took the road of Guimaraens, during the fight at Falperra. Eben appears, by his own official report, to have been at Braga when the action commenced, and to have fled among the first, for he makes no mention of the fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish at Ponte Porto, and his narrative bears every mark of inaccuracy.*

Braga was at first abandoned by the inhabitants; they returned however the next day, and when the French outposts were established, General Lorge, crossing the Cavado, entered Bacellos; he was well received by the corregidor, for which the latter was a few days afterwards hanged by the Portuguese General Botilho, who commanded between the Lima and the Minho. At Braga provisions were found, and a large store of powder, which was immediately made up in cartridges for the use of the French; the gun-carriages and ammunition-wagons, which had been very much damaged, were again repaired, and a hospital was established for eight hundred sick and wounded. Hence, it may be judged, that the loss sustained in action since the 15th, was not less than six hundred men.

The French General, having thus broken through the second Portuguese line of defence, could either march directly upon Oporto, or recover his communication with Tuy. He resolved upon the former—1. Because he knew, through his spies and by intercepted letters, that Tuy, although besieged, was in no distress; that its guns overpowered those of the Portuguese fortress of Valença on the opposite bank of the Minho, and that the garrison made successful sallies. 2. Because information reached him that sixty thousand men, troops of the line, militia, and *ordenanza*, were assembled in the intrenched camp covering Oporto, and his scouts reported also that the Portuguese were in force at Guimaraens, and had broken the bridges along the whole course of the Ave. It was essential to crush these large bodies before they could acquire any formidable consistency; wherefore Soult put his army again in march, leaving Heudelet's division at Braga to protect his hospitals against Botilho. Meanwhile Silveira struck a great blow; for

* Sir J. Cradock's Papers, MS.

being reinforced from the side of Beira he remounted the Tamega, invested Chaves on the day of battle at Braga, and the 28th forced the garrison, consisting of one hundred fighting men and twelve hundred sick, to capitulate, after which he took post at Amarante, while Soult, ignorant of the event, continued his march against Oporto in three columns.

The first, composed of Franceschi's and Mermet's divisions, marched by the road of Guimaraens and San Justo, with orders to force the passage of the upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pombeiro; the second, consisting of Merle's, Laborde's and La Houssaye's divisions, was commanded by Soult in person, and moved upon Barca de Trofa; the third, under General Lorge, quitting Bacellos, made way by the Ponte d'Ave.

The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed, and the left column was fought with in front of Guimaraens, and at Pombeiro, and again at Puente Negrellos. The last combat was rough, and the French General Jardon was killed. The march of the centre column was arrested at Barca de Trofa, by the cutting of the bridge, but the Marshal, observing the numbers of the enemy, ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at San Justo; not however without the help of Franceschi, who came down the opposite side of the river, after the fight at Ponte Negrellos.

When the left and centre had thus crossed, Colonel Lallemand was detached with a regiment of dragoons to assist Lorge, who was still held in check at the Ponte Ave; Lallemand was at first beaten back, but, being reinforced with some infantry, finally succeeded, when the Portuguese, enraged at their defeat, brutally murdered their commander, General Vallonga, and dispersed. The whole French army was now in communication on the left bank of the Ave; the way to Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops were finally concentrated in front of the intrenchments covering that city.

The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves, and the defeat at Braga, had so damped the Bishop's ardor that he was, at one time, inclined to abandon the defence of Oporto; but this idea was relinquished when he considered the multitudes he had drawn together, and that the English army was stronger than it had been at any previous period since Cradock's arrival; Beresford, also, was at the head of a considerable native force behind the Mondego, and, with the hope of their support, he resolved to stand the brunt. He had collected, in the intrenched camp, little short of forty thousand men, and among them were many regular troops, of which two thousand had lately arrived under the command of General Vittoria. This officer had been sent by Beresford to aid Silveira,

but when Chaves surrendered, he entered Oporto. The hopes of the people, also, were high, for they could not believe that the French were a match for them; the preceding defeats were attributed, each to its particular case of treason, and the murder of innocent persons followed as an expiation. No man but the Bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice of the mob, and he was little disposed to do so, while Raymundo, and others of his stamp, fomented their fury, and directed it to gratify personal enmities. Thus, the defeat of Braga being known in Oporto, caused a tumult on the 22d, in which Louis D'Olivera, a man of high rank, who had been cast into prison, was, with fourteen other persons, haled forth, and despatched with many stabs; the bodies were then mutilated and dragged in triumph through the streets.

The intrenchments, extending, as I have said, from the Douro to the coast, were complete, and armed with two hundred guns. They consisted of a number of forts of different sizes, placed on the top of a succession of rounded hills, and where the hills failed, the defences were continued by earthen ramparts, loopholed houses, ditches, and felled trees.* Oporto itself is built in a hollow, and a bridge of boats, nearly three hundred yards in length, formed the only communication between the city and the suburb of Villa Nova; this bridge was completely commanded by fifty guns, planted on the bluff and craggy heights that overhung the river above Villa Nova, and overlooked, not only the city, but a great part of the intrenched camp beyond it. Within the lines, tents were pitched for even greater numbers than were assembled, and the people running to arms, manned their works with great noise and tumult, when the French columns, gathering like heavy thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp.

The Duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While at Braga he had written to the Bishop, calling upon him to calm the popular effervescence; now, beholding the extended works in his front, and reading their weakness even in the multitudes that guarded them, he renewed his call upon the prelate, to spare this great and commercial city the horrors of a storm. A prisoner, employed to carry this summons, would have been killed, but that it was pretended he came with an offer from Soult to surrender his army; and notwithstanding this ingenious device, and that the Bishop commenced a negotiation, which was prolonged until evening, the firing from the intrenchments was constant and general during the whole of the 28th.

The parley being finally broken off, Soult made dispositions for a general action on the 29th. To facilitate this he caused Merle's division to approach the left of the intrenchment in the evening of

* Plan 3.

the 28th, intending thereby to divert attention from the true point of attack; a prodigious fire was immediately opened from the works, but Merle, having pushed close up, got into some hollow roads and inclosures, where he maintained his footing. At another part of the line, however, some of the Portuguese pretending a wish to surrender, General Foy, with a single companion, imprudently approached them, when the latter was killed, and Foy himself made prisoner and carried into the town. He was mistaken for Loison, and the people called out to kill "*Maneta*," but with great presence of mind he held up his hands, and the crowd, convinced of their error, suffered him to be cast into the jail.

The Bishop, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, had not resolution to brave the danger himself. Leaving Generals Lima and Pareiras to command the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted the city, and crossing the river took his station in the Sarea convent, built on the top of the rugged hill which overhung the suburb of Villa Nova, from whence he beheld in safety the horrors of the next day. The bells in Oporto continued to ring all night, and about twelve o'clock a violent thunder storm arising, the sound of the wind was mistaken in the camp for the approach of enemies; at once the whole line blazed with a fire of musketry, the roar of two hundred pieces of artillery was heard above the noise of the tempest, and the Portuguese, calling to one another with loud cries, were agitated at once with fury and with terror. The morning, however, broke serenely, and a little before seven o'clock the sound of trumpets and drums, and the glitter of arms, gave notice that the French army was in motion for the attack.

BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO.*

The feint made the evening before against the left, which was the weakest part of the line, had perfectly succeeded; the Portuguese generals placed their principal masses on that side; but the Duke of Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest points of the works, being resolved to force his way through the town, and seize the bridge during the fight, that he might secure the passage of the river. His army was divided into three columns; of which the first, under Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese centre; the second, under Franceschi and Laborde, assailed their extreme right; the third, composed of Mermet's division, sustained by a brigade of dragoons, was in the centre. General Lorge was appointed to cut off a body of ordenanza, who were posted with some guns in front of the Portuguese left, but beyond the works on the road of Villa de Conde.

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

The battle was commenced by the wings; for Mermet's division was withheld until the enemy's generals, believing the whole of the attack was developed, had weakened their centre to strengthen their flanks. Then the French reserves, rushing violently forward, broke through the intrenchments and took the two principal forts, entering by the embrasures, and killing or dispersing all within them. Soult instantly rallied his troops, and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left wing in the rear, while two other battalions were ordered to march straight into the town, and make for the bridge. The Portuguese army, thus cut in two, was soon beaten on all points. Laborde carried in succession a number of forts, took fifty pieces of artillery, and, reaching the head of the city, halted until Franceschi, who was engaged still more to the left, could join him. By this movement a large body of the Portuguese were driven off from the town, and forced back to the Douro, being followed by a brigade under General Arnaud.

Merle, seeing that the success of the centre was complete, brought up his left flank, carried all the forts to his right in succession, killed a great number of the defenders, and drove the rest towards the sea. These last dividing, fled for refuge, one part to the fort of St. Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro. where, maddened by terror, as the French came pouring down upon them, they strove, some to swim across, others to get over in small boats; their General, Lima, called out against this hopeless attempt, but they turned and murdered him, within musket-shot of the approaching enemy, and then, renewing the attempt to cross, nearly the whole perished. The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dispersed the people on the side of Villa de Conde, and General Arnaud, hemming in those above the town, prevented them from plunging into the river also, as in their desperate mood they were going to do.

Nevertheless the battle continued within Oporto, for the two battalions sent from the centre having burst the barricades at the entrance of the streets, penetrated, fighting, to the bridge, and here all the horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumulated, and the calamities of an age compressed into one doleful hour. More than four thousand persons, old and young, and of both sexes, were seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some already on the bridge, others striving to gain it, all in a state of phrensy. The batteries on the opposite bank opened their fire when the French appeared, and at that moment a troop of Portuguese cavalry flying from the fight came down one of the streets, and, remorseless in their fears, bore, at full gallop, into the midst of the miserable, helpless crowd, trampling a bloody pathway to the river. Suddenly the nearest boats, unable to sustain the increasing weight, sunk, and the fore-

most wretches, still tumbling into the river as they were pressed from behind, perished, until the heaped bodies, rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the space left by the sinking of the vessels.

The first of the French that arrived, amazed at this fearful spectacle, forgot the battle, and hastened to save those who still struggled for life; and while some were thus nobly employed, others, by the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts of the bridge, crossed the river and carried the batteries on the heights of Villa Nova. The passage was thus secured, but this terrible destruction did not complete the measure of the city's calamities; two hundred men, who occupied the Bishop's palace, fired from the windows and maintained that post, until the French, gathering around them in strength, burst the doors and put all to the sword. Every street and house then rung with the noise of the combatants and the shrieks of distress; for the French soldiers, exasperated by long hardships, and prone, like all soldiers, to ferocity and violence during an assault, became frantic with fury when, in one of the principal squares, they found several of their comrades, who had been made prisoners, fastened upright, and living, but with their eyes burst, their tongues torn out, their other members mutilated and gashed. Those that beheld the sight spared none who fell in their way. It was in vain that Soult strove to stop the slaughter; it was in vain that hundreds of officers and soldiers opposed, at the risk of their lives, the vengeance of their comrades, and by their generous exertions rescued vast numbers that would otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and brutality of the moment. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder closed not for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle, those who were drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said that ten thousand Portuguese died on that unhappy day!* The loss of the French did not exceed five hundred men.

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

CHAPTER III.

Operations of the first and fourth corps—General state of the French army—Description of the valley of the Tagus—Inertness of Marshal Victor—Albuquerque and Cartoajal dispute—The latter advances in La Mancha—General Sebastiani wins the battle of Ciudad Real—Marshal Victor forces the passage of the Tagus, and drives Cuesta's army from all its positions—French cavalry checked at Miajadas—Victor crosses the Guadiana at Medellin—Albuquerque joins Cuesta's army—Battle of Medellin—Spaniards totally defeated—Victor ordered by the King to invade Portugal—Opens a secret communication with some persons in Badajoz—The peasants of Albuera discover the plot, which fails—Operations of General Lapisse—He drives back Sir R. Wilson's posts, and makes a slight attempt to take Ciudad Rodrigo—Marches suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the bridge of Alcantara—Joins Victor at Merida—General insurrection along the Portuguese frontier—The Central Junta remove Cartoajal from the command, and increase Cuesta's authority, whose army is reinforced—Joseph discontented with Lapisse's movement—Orders Victor to retake the bridge of Alcantara.

THE dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a variety of important operations; but before these are treated of, it is essential to narrate the contemporaneous events on the Tagus and the Guadiana, for the war was wide and complicated, and the result depended more upon the general combinations than upon any particular movements.

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS.

It has been already related that Marshal Victor, after making a futile attempt to surprise the Marquis of Palacios, had retired to his former quarters at Toledo; that the Conde de Cartoajal, who succeeded the Duke of Infantado, had advanced to Ciudad Real with about fourteen thousand men; that Cuesta, having broken the bridge of Almaraz, guarded the line of the Tagus with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry. The 4th corps remained at Talavera and Placentia, but held the bridge of Arzobispo by a detachment. The remainder of the French army was in Catalonia, at Zaragoza, or on the communication; the reserve of heavy cavalry had been suppressed, and the regiments dispersed among the *corps d'armée*; the whole army, exclusive of the King's guards, was about two hundred and seventy thousand men, with forty thousand horses, showing a decrease of sixty-five thousand men since the 15th of November.* But this included the imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and many detachments drafted from the corps—in all forty thousand men, who had been

* In *verbal* Muster-rolls, MS.

struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, with a view to the war in Germany. The real loss of the French by sword, sickness, and captivity, in the four months succeeding Napoleon's arrival in the Peninsula, was therefore about twenty-five thousand—a vast number, but not incredible, when it is considered that two sieges, twelve pitched battles, and innumerable combats had taken place during that period.

Such was the state of affairs when the Duke of Belluno, having received orders to aid Soult in the invasion of Portugal, changed places with the fourth corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to Cartoajal, and Victor stood against Cuesta. The former fixed his head-quarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera de la Reyna, the communication between them being kept up by Montbrun's division of cavalry, while the garrison of Madrid, composed of the King's guards and Dessolle's division, equally supported both. But to understand the connection between the first, second, and fourth corps, and Lapisse's division, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus.

That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a deep and long valley, walled up on either hand by lofty mountains. Those on the right bank are always capped with snow, and ranging nearly parallel with the course of the stream, divide the valley of the Tagus from Old Castile and the Salamanca country; the highest parts being known by the names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar, and Sierra de Gata. In these sierras the Alberche, the Tietar, and the Alagon take their rise, and ploughing the valley in a slanting direction, fall into the Tagus.

The principal mountain on the left bank is called the Sierra de Guadalupe; it extends in a southward direction from the river, dividing the upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura.

The communications leading from the Salamanca country into the valley of the Tagus are neither many nor good; the principal passes are—

1st. The way of Horcajada, an old Roman road, which, running through Pedrahita and Villa Franca, crosses the Sierra de Gredos at Puerto de Pico, and then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera.

2d. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel to, and a short distance from the first.

3d. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Placentia.

4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the Sierra de Bejar at the pass of Baños, descends likewise upon Placentia.

5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses the Sierra de Gata by the pass of Perales, and afterwards dividing, sends one branch to Alcantara, the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these

five passes the two last only are, generally speaking, practicable for artillery.

The royal roads, from Toledo and Madrid to Badajos, unite near Talavera and follow the course of the Tagus by the right bank as far as Naval Moral, but then, turning to the left, cross the river at the bridge of Almaraz. Now, from Toledo, westward, to the bridge of Almaraz, a distance of above fifty miles, the left bank of the Tagus is so crowded by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de Guadalupe, that it may be broadly stated as impassable for an army, and this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the operations on both sides. For Cuesta and Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable Sierra de Guadalupe, had no direct military communication; but Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could unite on either line of operations by the royal roads above mentioned, or by a secondary road which, running near Yebeles, crosses the Tagus by a stone bridge near Puebla de Montalvan, half way between Toledo and Talavera.

The rallying point of the French was Madrid, and their parallel lines of defence were the Tagus, the Alberche, and the Guadarama.

The base of Cartoajal's operations was the Sierra de Morena.

Cuesta's first line was the Tagus, and his second the Guadiana, from whence he could retreat by a flank march to Badajos, or by a direct one to the defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena.

The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, would not have furnished more than twenty-six thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, and they had no reserve. The two French corps, united, would have exceeded thirty-five thousand fighting men, supported by the reserve under the King. The French, therefore, had the advantage of numbers, position, and discipline.

Following the orders of Napoleon, Marshal Victor should have been at Merida before the middle of February. In that position he would have confined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena, and with his twelve regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all the flat country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. That fortress itself had no means of resistance, and certainly there was no Spanish force in the field capable of impeding the full execution of the Emperor's instructions, which were also reiterated by the King. Nevertheless, the Duke of Belluno remained inert at this critical period, and the Spaniards, attributing his inactivity to weakness, endeavored to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; for Cuesta was projecting offensive movements against Victor, and the Duke of Albuquerque was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the side of La Mancha. Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque's plans, but offered

him a small force with which to act independently. The Duke complained to the Junta of Cartoajal's proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose traces are to be found in every intrigue and every absurd project broached at this period, having supported Albuquerque's complaints, Cartoajal was directed by the Junta to follow the Duke's plans; but the latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, with a detachment of four or five thousand men.

ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL.

Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, marched with twelve thousand men and twenty guns towards Toledo. His advanced guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers, near Consuegra, but the latter retired without loss. Hereupon Sebastiani, with about ten thousand men, came up against him, and the leading divisions encountering at Yébenes, the Spaniards were pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, leaving guards on the river in front of that town. The French immediately forced the passage, and a tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally routed, with the loss of all his guns, a thousand slain, and several thousand prisoners; the vanquished fled by Almagro, and the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena. This action, fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called the battle of Ciudad Real, was not followed up with any great profit to the victors. Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners to the rear, and held his troops concentrated on the upper Guadiana, to await the result of Victor's operations; thus enabling the Spanish fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they were reinforced by levies from Granada and Cordova.

While these events were passing in La Mancha, Estremadura was also invaded; for the King, having received a despatch from Soult, dated Orense, and giving notice that the second corps would be at Oporto about the 15th of March, had reiterated the order for Lapisse to move on Abrantes, and for the Duke of Belluno to pass the Tagus and drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana. Marshal Victor, who appears to have been, for some reason unknown, averse to aiding the operations of the second corps at all, remonstrated, and especially urged that the order to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his division should arrive too soon, and without support, at Abrantes; but this time the King was firm, and, on the 14th of March, the Duke of Belluno, having collected five days' provisions, made the necessary dispositions to pass the Tagus.

The amount of the Spanish force immediately on that river was about sixteen thousand men, and Cuesta had also several detachments and irregular bands in his rear, which may be calculated at

eight thousand more.* The Duke of Belluno, however, estimated the troops in position before him at thirty thousand—a great error for so experienced a commander to make. On the other hand, Cuesta was as ill-informed; for this was the moment when, with his approbation, Colonel d'Urban proposed to Sir John Cradock that curiously combined attack against Victor, already noticed, in which the Spaniards were to cross the Tagus, and Sir Robert Wilson was to come down upon the Tietar. This also was the period that Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant that there were at least twenty-five thousand fighting men in the valley of the Tagus, without reckoning the King's or Sebastiani's troops, proposed that the twelve thousand British under Sir John Cradock should march from Lisbon to "drive the fourth French corps from Toledo," and "consequently," as he phrased it, "from Madrid." The first movement of Marshal Victor awakened Cuesta from these dreams.

The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as we have seen, held by the French, and their advanced posts were pushed into the valley of the Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona.

The Spanish position extended from Garbin, near the bridge of Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz—the centre being at Meza d'Ibor, a position of surprising strength, running at right angles from the Tagus to the Guadalupe. The head-quarters and reserves were at Deleytosa, and a road, cut by the troops, afforded a communication between that place and Meza d'Ibor.

On the right bank of the Tagus there was easy access to the bridges of Talavera, Arzobispo, and Almaraz; but on the left bank no road existed by which artillery could pass the mountains, except that of Almaraz, which was crossed, at the distance of four or five miles from the river, by the almost impregnable ridge of Mirabete.

The Duke of Belluno's plan was to pass the Tagus at the bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo, with his infantry and part of his cavalry, and to operate in the Sierra de Guadalupe against the Spanish right; while the artillery and grand parc, protected by the remainder of the cavalry, were to be united opposite Almaraz, having with them a raft bridge to throw across at that point.† This project is scarcely to be reconciled with the estimate made of Cuesta's force; for surely nothing could be more rash than to expose the whole of the guns and field stores of the army, with no other guard than some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, close to a powerful enemy, who possessed a good pontoon train, and who might, consequently, pass the river at pleasure.

The 15th, Laval's division of German infantry, and Lasalle's

* General Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

† Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MS.

cavalry, crossed at Talavera, and, turning to the right, worked a march through the rocky hills; the infantry to Aldea Nueva, on a line somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo; the cavalry higher up the mountain towards Estrella. The 16th, when those troops had advanced a few miles to the front, the head-quarters, and the other divisions of infantry, passed the bridge of Arzobispo; while the artillery and the parcs, accompanied by a battalion of grenadiers and the escorting cavalry, moved to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the 17th and 18th, for the appearance of the army on the heights at the other side, and then to move down to the point before indicated for launching the raft bridge.

Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened in person to Mirabete, and directing General Henestrosa to defend the bridge of Almaraz, with eight thousand men, sent a detachment to reinforce his own right wing, which was posted behind the Ibor, a small river, but at this season running with a full torrent from the Guadalupe to the Tagus.

The 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were driven, with some loss, across the Ibor. They attempted to re-form on the high rocky banks of that river, but being closely followed, retreated to the camp of Meza d'Ibor, the great natural strength of which was increased by some field-works. Their position could only be attacked in front, and this being apparent at the first glance, Laval's division was instantly formed into columns of attack, which pushed rapidly up the mountain, the inequalities of ground covering them in some sort from the effects of the enemy's artillery. As they arrived near the summit, the fire of musketry and grape became murderous, but at this instant the Spaniards, who should have displayed all their vigor, broke and fled to Campillo, leaving behind them baggage, magazines, seven guns, and a thousand prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded. The French had only seventy killed and five hundred wounded; and while this action was taking place at Meza d'Ibor, Villatte's division, being higher up the sierra, to the left, overthrew a smaller body of Spaniards, at Frenedoso, making three hundred prisoners, and capturing a large store of arms.

The 18th, at daybreak, the Duke of Belluno, who had superintended in person the attack at Meza d'Ibor, examined from that high ground all the remaining position of the Spaniards. Cuesta, he observed, was in full retreat to Tuxillo, but Henestrosa was still posted in front of Almaraz; wheretore Villatte's division was detached after Cuesta, to Deleytosa, and Laval's Germans were led against Henestrosa, and the latter, aware of his danger and already preparing to retire, was driven hastily over the ridge of Mirabete.

In the course of the night, the raft bridge was thrown across the Tagus; the next day the French dragoons passed to the left bank, the artillery followed, and the cavalry immediately pushed forward to Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had already fallen back to Santa Cruz, leaving Henestrosa to cover the retreat. The 20th, after a slight skirmish, the latter was forced over the Mazarna, and the whole French army, with the exception of a regiment of dragoons left to guard the raft bridge, was poured along the road to Merida.

The advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of light cavalry, under General Bordesoult, arrived the 21st in front of Miajadas, where the road dividing, sends one branch to Merida, the other to Medellin. A party of Spanish horsemen were posted near the town; they appeared in great alarm, and by their hesitating movements invited a charge; the French incautiously galloped forward, and, in a moment, twelve or fourteen hundred Spanish cavalry, placed in ambush, came up at speed on the flanks. General Lasalle, who from a distance had observed the movements of both sides, immediately rode forward with a second regiment, and arrived just as Bordesoult had extricated himself from a great peril, by his own valor, but with the loss of seventy killed and a hundred wounded.

After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired to Medellin without being molested, and Victor, spreading his cavalry posts on the different routes to gain intelligence and to collect provisions, established his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of some trade, and advantageously situated for a place of arms.* It had been deserted by the inhabitants and pillaged by the first French troops that entered, but it still offered great resources for the army, and there was an ancient citadel, capable of being rendered defensible, which was immediately armed with the Spanish guns, and provisioned from the magazines taken at Meza d'Ibor. Meanwhile, the flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, and delayed the passage of the artillery and stores; wherefore directions were given to have a boat-bridge prepared, and a field-fort constructed on the left bank of the Tagus, to be armed with three guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty men, to protect the bridge. These arrangements, and the establishment of a hospital for two thousand men at Truxillo, delayed the first corps until the 24th of March.

The light cavalry reinforced by twelve hundred *voltigeurs* being posted at Miajadas, had covered all the roads branching from that central point with their scouting parties, and now reported that a

* Journal of Operations, MS.

few of Cuesta's people had retired to Medellin; that from five to six thousand men were thrown into the Sierra de Guadalupe on the left of the French; that four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry were behind the river Garganza, in front of Medellin, and that everything else was over the Guadiana. Thus the line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and, consequently, the great road between Badajos and Seville was open to the French. But Victor was not disposed to profit from this, for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to Cuesta, and believed that he brought nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry; he therefore feared that Cuesta's intention was either to draw him into a difficult country, by making a flank march to join Cartojal in La Mancha; or by crossing the Guadiana above Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to rejoin his detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base of operations on the left flank of the French army. This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta nor his army were capable of such operations; his line of retreat was solely directed by a desire to join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by taking to a rugged instead of an open country. The Duke of Belluno lost the fruits of his previous success, by thus overrating his adversary's skill; instead of following Cuesta with a resolution to break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, was contented to advance a few leagues on the road to Medellin with his main body; sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe.

The 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, at the head of two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight hundred Spanish horse, posted on the right bank of the Guadiana, retired at his approach, and crossing that river, halted at Don Benito, where they were reinforced by other squadrons, but no infantry were to be discovered. The Duke of Belluno then passing the river took post on the road leading to Mingabril and Don Benito, and the situation of the French army in the evening was as follows:

The main body, consisting of two divisions of infantry, and one incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry, in position on the road leading from Medellin to Don Benito and Mingabril.

The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour Maubourg, at Zorita, fifteen miles on the left, watching the Spaniards in the Guadalupe.

The light cavalry at Merida, eighteen miles to the right, having

patrolled all that day on the roads to Badajos, Seville and Medellin.

Ruffin's division at Miajadas, eighteen miles in the rear.

But in the course of the evening intelligence arrived that Albuquerque was just come up with eight thousand men; that the combined troops, amounting to twenty-eight thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the table land of Don Benito, and that Cuesta, aware of the scattered state of the French army, was preparing to attack the two divisions on their march the next day. Upon this, Victor, notwithstanding the strength of the Spanish army, resolved to fight, and immediately sent orders to Lasalle, to Ruffin, and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their divisions down to Medellin; the latter was also directed to leave a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route of Merida, and a brigade at Zorita, to observe the Spaniards in the Sierra de Guadalupe.

Cuesta's numbers were greatly exaggerated; that General, blaming everybody but himself for his failure on the Tagus, had fallen back to Campanarios, rallied all his scattered detachments, and then returned to Villa Nueva de Serena, where he was joined on the 27th by Albuquerque, who brought up, not a great body of infantry and cavalry as supposed, but less than three thousand infantry and a few hundred horse. This reinforcement, added to some battalions drawn from Andalusia, increased Cuesta's army to about twenty-five thousand foot, four thousand horse, and eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery; and with this force, he, fearing for the safety of Badajos, retraced his steps and rushed headlong to destruction.

Medellin, possessing a fine stone bridge, is situated in a hollow on the left bank of the Guadiana, and just beyond the town is a vast plain, or table land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly down, forms the bed of the river. The Ortigosa, which cuts this plain, is a rapid torrent, rushing perpendicularly on to the Guadiana, and having steep and rugged banks, yet in parts passable for artillery. Two roads branch out from Medellin, the one leading to Mingabril on the right, the other to Don Benito on the left, those places being about five miles apart.

BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.

The French army, with the exception of the troops left to cover the communications and those at Zorita, was concentrated in the town at ten o'clock, and at one, about fourteen thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and forty-two pieces of artillery, went forth to fight. The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge of land, behind which Cuesta kept the

Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him display his lines of infantry the French General sent Lasalle's light cavalry, with a battery of six guns and two battalions of German infantry, towards Don Benito, while Latour Maubourg, with five squadrons of dragoons, eight guns, and two other battalions, keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced towards a point of the enemy's ridge called the Retamosa. The rest of the army were kept in reserve, the division of Villatte and the remainder of the Germans being, one half on the road of Don Benito, the other half on the road of Mingabril. Ruffin's division was a little way in rear, and a battalion was left to guard the baggage at the bridge of Medellin.

As the French squadron advanced, the artillery on both sides opened, and the Spanish cavalry guards in the plain retired slowly to the higher ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed forward, but just as the latter, who had the shortest distance to traverse, approached the enemy's position, the whole Spanish line of battle was suddenly descried in full march over the edge of the ridge, and stretching from the Ortigosa to within a mile of the Guadiana,—a menacing but glorious apparition. Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the Duke del Parque, with the mass of calvary, were on the left; Francisco Frias, with the main body of infantry, in the centre; Equia and Portazgo on the right, which was prolonged to the Guadiana by some scattered squadrons under Albuquerque, who flanked the march of the host as it descended with a rapid pace into the plain.

Cuesta's plan was now disclosed; his line overlapped the French left, and he was hastening to cut their army off from Medellin, but his order of battle was on a front of three miles, and he had no reserve. The Duke of Belluno, seeing this, instantly brought his centre a little forward, and then, reinforcing Latour Maubourg with ten guns and a battalion of grenadiers, and detaching a brigade of infantry as a support, ordered him to fall boldly on the advancing enemy; at the same time Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure of his antagonist, was directed to retire towards Medellin, always refusing his left.

The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the plain, and a special body of cavalry, with three thousand infantry, running out from their left, met Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars fell upon the French columns of grenadiers and guns in his rear. The hussars, being received with grape, a pelting fire of musketry, and a charge in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once; but the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the rest of their own cavalry, came boldly up to Latour Maubourg's horse-

men, and with a rough discharge, forced them back in disorder. The French, however, soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks with artillery, and fighting all together, broke in and overthrew their enemies, man and horse. Cuesta was wounded and fell, but, being quickly remounted, escaped.

While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle's cavalry, continually refusing its left, was brought fighting close up to the main body of the French infantry, which was now disposed on a new front, having a reserve behind the centre. Meanwhile Latour Maubourg's division was being re-formed on the ridge from whence the Spaniards had first descended, and the whole face of the battle was changed; for the Spanish left being put to flight, the French right wing overlapped the centre of their antagonist, and the long attenuated line of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing wide chasms, was still advancing without an object.

The Duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive moment of the battle had arrived, was on the point of commanding a general attack, when his attention was arrested by the appearance of a column coming down on the rear of his right wing from the side of Mingabril. A brigade from the reserve, with four guns, was immediately sent to keep this body in check, while Lasalle's cavalry, taking ground to its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre, and the latter advancing, poured a heavy fire into the Spanish ranks; Latour Maubourg, sweeping round their left flank, then fell on the rear, and, at the same moment, Lasalle also galloped in upon the dismayed and broken bands. A horrible carnage ensued, for the French soldiers, while their strength would permit, continued to follow and strike, until three-fifths of the Spanish army wallowed in blood. Six guns and several thousand prisoners were taken; General Frias, deeply wounded, fell into the hands of the victor's, and so utter was the discomfiture, that for several days after, Cuesta could not rally a single battalion of infantry, and his cavalry was only saved by the speed of the horses.

Following General Sémélé's Journal, of which, however, I only possess an unauthenticated copy, the French loss did not exceed three hundred men; a number so utterly disproportionate to that of the vanquished as to be scarcely credible, and if correct, discovering a savage rigor in the pursuit by no means commendable, for it does not appear that any previous cruelties were perpetrated by the Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right to slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor limited; but a brave soldier should always have regard to the character of his country, and be sparing of the sword towards beaten men.

The main body of the French army passed the night of the 28th

near the field of battle ; but Latour Maubourg marched with the dragoons by the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a detachment at Torre Mexia to watch the roads of Almendralego and Villa Franca, and to give notice if the remains of Cuesta's army should attempt to gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders to intercept them at Loboá. The 29th, Villatte's division advanced as far as Villa Nueva de Serena, and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campanarios ; yet, as all the reports agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the remnants of his army were dispersed and wandering through the fields and along the by-roads, without any power of reuniting, the Duke of Belluno relinquished the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters at Merida, and occupied that place and Medellin with his infantry, he formed with his cavalry a belt extending from Loboá on the right to Mingabril on the left ; but from all this tract of country the people had fled, and even the great towns were deserted. Merida, situated in a richly cultivated basin, possessed a fine bridge and many magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and Moorish ; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the river, close to the bridge, was so perfect that, in eight days, it was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault ; six guns were mounted on the walls, a hospital for a thousand men was established there, and a garrison of three hundred men, with two months' stores and provisions for eight hundred, was put into it.

The King now repeated his orders, that the Duke of Belluno should enter Portugal, and that General Lapisse should march upon Abrantes. The former again remonstrated, on the ground that he could not make such a movement and defend his communications with Almaraz, unless the division of Lapisse was permitted to join him by the route of Alcantara. Nevertheless, as Badajos, although more capable of defence than it had been in December, when the fourth corps was at Merida, was still far from being secure ; and as many of the richer inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the violence of the mob government, were more inclined to betray the gates to the French than to risk a siege ; Victor, whose battering train (composed of only twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided) was still at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with the malcontents. The parties met at the village of Albuera, and everything was arranged for the surrender, when the peasants giving notice to the Junta that some treason was in progress, the latter arrested all the persons supposed to be implicated, and the project was baffled. The Duke of Belluno then resigned all further thoughts of Badajos, and contented himself with sending de-

tachments to Alcantara to get intelligence of General Lapisse, of whose proceedings it is now time to give some account.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE.

This General, after taking Zamora in January, occupied Ledesma and Salamanca, where he was joined by General Maupetit's brigade of cavalry. Sir Robert Wilson's legion and the feeble garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his front, and universal terror prevailed; yet he, although at the head of ten thousand men, with a powerful artillery, remained inactive from January to the end of March, and suffered Sir Robert, with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, to intercept his provisions, to restrain his patrols, and even to disturb his infantry in their quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt, and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared.

Don Carlos d'España, with a small Spanish force, being after a time placed under Sir Robert's command, the latter detached two battalions to occupy the pass of Baños, and Lapisse was thus deprived of any direct communication with Victor. In this situation the French General remained without making any vigorous effort, either to clear his front, or to get intelligence of the Duke of Dalmatia's march upon Oporto, until the beginning of April, when he advanced towards Bejar; but, finding the passes occupied, turned suddenly to his right, dissipated Wilson's posts on the Ecla, and forced the legion, then commanded by Colonel Grant, to take refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. He summoned that town to surrender on the 6th, and, after a slight skirmish close to the walls, took a position between the Agueda and Ledesma. This event was followed by a general insurrection, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames to Bejar; for Lapisse, who had been again ordered by the King to fulfil the Emperor's instructions, and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, without regarding his connection with the second corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid march, through the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara, followed closely by Sir Robert Wilson. Don Carlos d'España, the two battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of peasants, both Portuguese and Spanish.

At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavored to defend the passage of the river, but the French broke through the intrenchments on the bridge, and with a full encounter carried the town, which they pillaged, and then joined the first corps at Merida, on the 19th of April. This false movement greatly injured the French cause. From that moment the conquering impulse given

by Napoleon was at an end, and his armies, ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary or retrograded, while the British, Spanish, and Portuguese once more assumed the lead. The Duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own resources, and in total ignorance of the situation of the corps by which his movements should have been supported, was forced to remain in Oporto; and at the moment when the French combinations were thus paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at Lisbon and the advance of Sir John Cradock towards Leiria, gave a sudden and violent impetus both to the Spaniards and Portuguese along the Beira frontier. The insurrection, no longer kept down by the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting Victor's and Soult's forces, was thus put into full activity, from Alcantara on the Tagus to Amarante on the Tamega.

During this time Cuesta was gathering another host in the Morena. The simultaneous defeat of the armies in Estremadura and La Mancha had at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia; yet the Spaniards, when they found such victories as Ciudad Real and Medellin only leading to a stagnant inactivity on the part of the French, concluded that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the Austrian war had, or would, oblige Napoleon to abandon his projects against the Peninsula. This idea was general, and upheld the people's spirit and the Central Junta's authority, which could not otherwise have been maintained after such a succession of follies and disasters.

The misfortunes of the two Spanish Generals had been equal; but Cartoajal, having no popular influence, was dismissed, while Cuesta was appointed to command what remained of both armies; and the Junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent danger in which they were placed, drew together all the scattered troops and levies in Andalusia, to reinforce him. To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles of Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred horse and two thousand three hundred infantry, drafted from the garrison of Seville; these were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from Cadiz, and by three thousand five hundred Granadian levies; and finally, eight thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horsemen, taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, until, in the latter end of April, they amounted to twenty-five thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry. General Venegas, also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha. Meanwhile Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition made of Lapisse's division, directed that Alcantara should be immediately re-occupied. This, however, could not be

done without an action, which belongs to another combination, and shall be noticed hereafter; it is now proper to return to the operations on the Douro, which were intimately connected with those on the Guadiana.

CHAPTER IV

The Bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the Regency—Humanity of Marshal Soult—The Anti-Braganza party revives in the north of Portugal—The leaders make proposals to Soult—He encourages them—Error arising out of this proceeding—Effects of Soult's policy—Assassination of Colonel Lameth—Execution at Arrifana—Distribution of the French troops—Franceschi opposed, on the Vouga, by Colonel Trant—Loison falls back behind the Souza—Heudelet marches to the relief of Tuy—The Spaniards, aided by some English frigates, oblige thirteen hundred French to capitulate at Vigo—Heudelet returns to Braga—The insurrection in the Entre Minho e Douro ceases—Silveira menaces Oporto—Laborde reinforces Loison, and drives Silveira over the Tamega—Gallant conduct and death of Colonel Patrick at Amarante—Combats at Amarante—French repulsed—Ingenious device of Captain Brochard—The bridge of Amarante carried by storm—Loison advances to the Douro—Is suddenly checked—Observations.

WHEN the Bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal, he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the Regency, became a member of that body, was soon after created Patriarch, and, as I shall have occasion to show, used his great influence in the most mischievous manner, discovering, on every occasion, the untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition.

The fall of Oporto enabled Marshal Soult to establish a solid base of operations, and to commence a regular system of warfare. The immediate fruit of his victory was the capture of immense magazines of powder; of a hundred and ninety-seven pieces of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action, and of thirty English vessels, wind-bound in the river, loaded with wine and provisions for a month, which fell into his hands. Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted the same conciliatory policy which had marked his conduct at Chaves and Braga, and endeavored to remedy, as far as it was possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers' fury; recovering and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants remaining in the town to be treated with respect, and invited, by proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no contribution, and restraining with a firm hand the violence of his men, contrived, from

the captured public property, to support the army and even to succor the poorest and most distressed of the population.

But his ability in the civil and political administration of the Entre Minho e Douro produced an effect which he was not prepared for. The Prince Regent's desertion of the country was not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal being a dependency as the Brazils, as it was to the usurpation of the French; and the comparison between Soult's government and the horrible anarchy which preceded it, was all in favor of the former. His victories, and the evident vigor of his character, contrasted with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency for the French power, and the party, formerly noticed as being inimical to the house of Braganza, revived. The leaders, thinking this a favorable opportunity to execute their intention, waited upon the Duke of Dalmatia, and expressed their desire for a French prince and an independent government. They even intimated their good wishes towards the Duke himself, and demanded his concurrence and protection, while, in the name of the people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end.

Although unauthorized by the Emperor to accede to this proposition, Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion, but the Marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged the design, appointed men to civil employments, and raised a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much dexterity, that in fifteen days the cities of Oporto and Braga, and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Pova de Barcim, Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses containing the expression of their sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons, as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of the people. These addresses were burnt when the French retreated from Oporto, but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been denied; the Regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter, and it was then asserted that very few persons were found to be implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders, may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance of the affair is also evident, and the inquisitors, if willing, could not have probed it to the bottom.

This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale, generally credited even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent crown. The circumstances were certainly such as might create suspicion; but that the conclusion was false, is shown by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the rumor and the

subject of it.* Slighting the former, he yet made known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, "*I remember nothing but Arrifina.*"† and at the same time largely increased the Duke of Delmar's command. On the other hand, the policy of Soult's conduct on this occasion, and the great influence, if not the numbers of the Portuguese malcontents, were abundantly proved by the unbroken relations between the army and the peasantry.‡ The fierceness of the latter subsided; and even the priests abated of their hostility in the Entre-Minho e Douro. The French soldiers were no longer assassinated in that province; whereas, previous to this war, that cruel species of warfare had been carried on with intense activity, and the most malignant passions called forth on both sides.

Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and of the truculent violence of the French soldiers, the death of Colonel Lameth, and the retaliation which followed, may be cited. That young officer, when returning from the Marshal's quarters to his own, was waylaid near the village of Arrifina, and murdered: his body was then stripped and mutilated in a shocking manner. This assassination, committed within the French lines, and at a time when Soult enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable neither by the laws of war nor by those of humanity. No general could neglect to punish such a proceeding. The protection due to the army, and even the welfare of the Portuguese within the French jurisdiction, demanded a severe example: for the violence of the troops had hitherto been with difficulty restrained by their commanders, and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent to their individual safety, his authority would have been set at naught, and the unmeasured indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate army executed.

Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death of a personal friend, Soult directed General Thomières to march, with a brigade of infantry, to Arrifina, and punish the criminals. Thomières was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian, and, after a judicial inquiry, shot five or six persons whose guilt was said to have been proved; but it is certain that the principal actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of his accomplices, escaped across the Vonga to Colonel Trant, who, disgusted at their conduct, sent them to Marshal Beresford. It would also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that Thomières, or those under him, exceeded Soult's orders: for in that statement, attested by oath, it is said that twenty-

* Bivaro's Memoirs.

† Soult himself died himself in that battle.

‡ S. Journal of Operations, MS.

four innocent persons were killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many atrocious excesses, burnt the village.

These details have been related partly because they throw a light upon the direful nature of this contest, but chiefly because the transaction has been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty in Soult; a charge not to be sustained by the facts of this case, and belied by the general tenor of his conduct, which even his enemies, while they attributed it to an insidious policy, acknowledged at the time to be mild and humane.* And now, having finished this digression, in which the chronological order of events has been anticipated, I shall resume the narrative of military operations at that part where the disorders attendant on the battle of Oporto having been repressed, a fresh series of combinations were commenced, not less important than those which brought the French army down to the Douro.

The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March was followed up with activity. The boat-bridge was restored during the night; the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz surrendered; Franceschi's cavalry crossed the Douro, and taking post ten miles in advance on the Coimbra road, pushed patrols as far as the Vouga river. To support this cavalry, General Mermet's division occupied a position somewhat beyond the suburb of Villa Nova; Oporto itself was held by three brigades; the dragoons of Lorge were sent to Villa de Conde, a walled town situated at the mouth of the Ave; and General Caulaincourt was directed up the Douro to Peñafiel, with a brigade of cavalry, having orders to clear the valley of the Tamega. Another brigade of cavalry was posted on the road leading to Barca de Trofa, to protect the rear of the army, and General Heudelet was directed to forward the hospitals from Braga to Oporto, but to hold his troop in readiness to open the communication with Tuy.

These dispositions being made, Soult had leisure to consider his general position. The flight of the Bishop had not much abated the hostility of the people, nor relieved the French from their difficulties; the communication with the Minho was still intercepted; the *Tras os Montes* was again in a state of insurrection; and Silveira, with a corps of eight thousand men, not only commanded the valley of the Tamega, but had advanced, after retaking Chaves, into the *Entre Minho e Douro*, posting himself between the *Sierra de Catalina* and the Douro. Lisbon, the ultimate object of the campaign, was two hundred miles distant, and covered by a British army, whose valor was to be dreaded, and whose numbers were daily increasing. A considerable body of natives were with Trant upon the Vouga, and Beresford's force between the Tagus and the Mondego, its disorderly and weak condition being unknown, appeared formidable at a distance. The day on which the second corps, fol-

* Appendix 8.

lowing the Emperor's instructions, should have reached Lisbon, was overpassed by six weeks, the line of correspondence with Victor was uncertain, and his co-operation could scarcely be calculated upon. Lapisse's division was yet unfelt as an aiding force, nor was it even known to Soult that he still remained at Salamanca: finally, the three thousand men expected from the Astorga country, under the conduct of the Marshal's brother, had not yet been heard of.

On the other hand, the Duke of Dalmatia had conquered a large and rich city; he had gained the military command of a very fertile country, from whence the principal supplies of the British army and of Lisbon were derived; he had obtained a secure base of operations and a prominent station in the kingdom; and if the people's fierceness was not yet quelled, they had learned to dread his talents, and to be sensible of their own inferiority in battle. In this state of affairs, judging that the most important objects were to relieve the garrison of Tuy and to obtain intelligence of Lapisse's division, Soult intrusted the first to Heudelet, and the second to Franceschi.

The last-named General had occupied Feira and Oliveira, and spread his posts along the Vouga; but the inhabitants fled to the other side of that river, and the rich valleys beyond were protected by Colonel Trant. This officer, well known to the Portuguese as having commanded their troops at Rorica and Vimiero, being at Coimbra when intelligence of the defeat at Braga arrived, had taken the command of all the armed men in that town, among which was a small body of volunteers, students at the university. The general dismay and confusion being greatly increased by the subsequent catastrophe at Oporto, the fugitives from that town and other places, accustomed to violence, and attributing every misfortune to treachery in the generals, flocked to Trant's standard; and he, as a foreigner, was enabled to assume an authority which no native of rank durst either have accepted or refused, without imminent danger. He soon advanced with eight hundred men to Sardao and Aveiro, where Eben and General Vittoria joined him, and the Conde de Barbacena brought him some cavalry. But as the people regarded these officers with suspicion, Trant retained the command, and his force was daily increased by the arrival of *ordenanza* and even regular troops, who abandoned Beresford's army to join him.

When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment by Castanheira to occupy the bridge of the Vouga; but the men, seized with a panic, dispersed, and this was followed by the desertion of many thousand *ordenanza*,—a happy circumstance, for the numbers that had at first collected behind the Vouga exceeded twelve thousand men, and their extreme violence and insubordination exciting

the utmost terror, impeded the measures necessary for defence. Trant, finally, retained about three thousand men, with which, imposing upon the French, he preserved a fruitful country from their incursions; he was, however, greatly distressed for money, because the Bishop of Oporto, in his flight, laid hands on all that was at Coimbra and carried it to Lisbon.

Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade of infantry, contented himself with chasing some insurgents that infested his left flank, while his scouts, sent forward on the side of Viseu, endeavored to obtain information of Lapisse's division; but that General, as we have seen, was still beyond the Agueda; and while Franceschi was thus employed in front of the French army, Caulaincourt's cavalry on the Tamega was pressed by Silveira. And although Loison marched with a brigade of infantry to his assistance on the 9th of April, Silveira was too strong for both, and on the 12th, advancing from Canavezas, obliged Loison, after a slight action, to take post behind the Souza.

Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy to recover the artillery and dépôts, from which the army had now been separated forty days. He was joined on the 6th of April, at Bacellos, by Lorge, who had taken Villa de Conde and cleared the coast line. The 7th they marched to Ponte de Lima, but the Portuguese resisted the passage vigorously, and it was not forced until the 8th. The 10th the French arrived in front of Valença, on the Minho. This fortress had been maltreated by the fire from Tuy, and the garrison, amounting to two hundred men, having only two days' provisions left, capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire to their homes, and before the French could take possession, deserted the town. The garrison in Tuy, never having received the slightest intelligence of the army since the separation at Ribadavia, marvelled that the fire from Valença was discontinued, and their surprise was extreme when they beheld the French colors flying in that fort, and observed French videttes on the left bank of the Minho.

La Martinière's garrison, by the arrival of stragglers and a battalion of detachments that followed the army from St. Jago, had been increased to three thousand four hundred men; twelve hundred were in hospital, and two-thirds of the artillery-horses had been eaten in default of other food; the Portuguese had passed the Minho, and in conjunction with the Spaniards, attacked the place on the 15th of March; yet the French General, by frequent sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant blockade. The 22d of March, the defeat at Braga being known, the Portuguese repassed the Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martinière immediately

sent three hundred men to bring off the garrison of Vigo; it was too late, that place was taken, and the detachment with difficulty regained Tuy.

The peasants on the Arosa estuary had, as I have before noticed, risen, the 27th of February, while Soult was still at Orense; they were headed, at first, by General Silva and by the Count de Mezeda, and finally, a Colonel Barrois, sent by the Central Junta, took the command. As their numbers were very considerable, Barrois with one part attacked Tuy, and Silva, assisted by the *Lively* and *Venus*, British frigates on that station, invested Vigo. The garrison of the latter place was at first small, but the paymaster-general of the second corps, instead of proceeding to Tuy, entered Vigo, with the military chest and an escort of eight hundred men, and was blockaded there; nevertheless, after some slight attacks had been repulsed, the French governor negotiated for a capitulation on the 23d of March; distrustful however of the peasantry, he was still undecided on the 26th, and meanwhile, some of Romana's stragglers coming from the Val des Orres, collected between Tuy and Vigo; and Pablo Murillo, a regular officer, assembling fifteen hundred retired soldiers, joined the blockading force. His troops acting in concert with Captain Mackinley, of the *Lively*, obliged the garrison to surrender on terms.* The 27th, thirteen hundred men and officers, including three hundred sick, marched out with the honors of war, and having laid down their arms on the glacis, were embarked for an English port, according to the articles agreed upon. Four hundred and forty-seven horses sixty-two covered wagons, some stores, and the military chest, containing five thousand pounds, fell into the victor's hands. The Spaniards then renewed their attack on Tuy; the Portuguese once more crossed the Minho, and the siege continued until the 10th of April, when the place was relieved by Heudelet.

The dépôts and the artillery were immediately transported across the river, and directed upon Oporto. The following day General Maucune, with a division of the sixth corps, arrived at Tuy, with the intention of carrying off the garrison, but seeing that the place was relieved, returned. Heudelet, after taking Viana, and the fort of Insoa, at the mouth of the Minho, placed a small garrison in the former, and blowing up the works of Valença, retired to Braga and Bacellos, sending Lorge again to Villa de Conde. The French sick were transported in boats along shore, from the mouth of the Minho to Viana, Villa de Conde, and thence to Oporto, and while these transactions were taking place on the Minho, La Houssaye, with a brigade of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured the coun-

* Captain Mackinley's Despatch.

try between the Lima and the Cavado, and so protected the rear of Heudelet.

All resistance in the Entre Minho e Douro had now ceased, because the influence of the *Anti-Braganza* party was exerted in favor of the French; but, on the *Tras os Montes* side, Silveira was advancing, and being joined by Botilho, from the Lima, boasted that he would be in Oporto the 15th. This unexpected boldness was explained by the news of Chaves having fallen, which now, for the first time, reached Soult. He then perceived that while Silveira was in arms, the tranquillity of the Entre Minho e Douro could only be momentary, and therefore directed Laborde with a brigade of infantry to join Loison and attack the Portuguese General by Amarante, while La Houssaye, crossing the Cavado, should push through Guimaraens for the same point.

The 15th, Laborde reached Peñafiel, and Silveira, hearing of La Houssaye's march, retired to Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back the Portuguese without difficulty, and their retreat soon became a flight. Silveira himself passed the Tamega at Amarante, and was making for the mountains, without a thought of defending that town, when Colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese service, encouraging his battalion, faced about, and rallying the fugitives, beat back the foremost of the enemy. This becoming act obliged Silveira to return, and while Patrick defended the approaches to the bridge on the right bank with obstinate valor, the former took a position, on the left bank, on the heights overhanging the suburb of Villa Real.

The 19th, La Houssaye arrived, the French renewed their attack on the town, and Patrick again baffled their efforts; but when that gallant man, being mortally wounded, was carried across the bridge, the defence slackened, and the Portuguese went over the Tamega: the passage of the river was, however, still to be effected. The bridges of Mondin and Cavez above, and that of Canavezas below Amarante, were destroyed; the Tamega was in full flood, with a deep rocky bed; the bridge in front of the French was mined, barred with three rows of palisades, and commanded by a battery of ten guns; the Portuguese were in position on the heights beyond, and could from thence discern all that passed on the bridge, and reinforce their advanced guard which was posted in the suburb.

PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE.

Laborde at first endeavored to work a way over by the flying ap. He reached the barricade the 20th of April, but the Portuguese fire was so deadly that he soon relinquished this method and

sought to construct a bridge of tressels half a mile below; which failed, and the efforts against the stone bridge were renewed. The 27th, the centre barricade was burned by Captain Brochard, an engineer, who then devised a method of forcing a passage so singularly bold, that all the generals, and especially Foy, were opposed to it. Nevertheless it was transmitted to Oporto, and Soult despatched General Hulot to examine its merits on the spot, who approved of it.

It appeared that the Portuguese mine was so constructed that while the muzzle of a loaded musket was in the chamber, a string tied to the trigger passed over the trenches and secured the greatest precision for the explosion. Brochard therefore proceeded in the following manner. In the night of the 2d of May, the French troops were conveniently disposed as near the head of the bridge as the necessity of keeping them hidden would permit; at eight o'clock, although the moon shone bright, twenty men were sent a little below the bridge to open an oblique fire against the intrenchments, and this being replied to and the attention of the Portuguese diverted to that side, a sapper, dressed in dark gray, crawled out, pushing with his head a barrel of powder, which was likewise enveloped in gray cloth to deaden the sound, along that side of the bridge which was darkened by the shadow of the parapet; when he had placed his barrel against the intrenchment covering the Portuguese mine, he retired in the same manner. Two others followed in succession, and retired without being discovered; but the fourth, after placing his barrel, rose to run back, and was immediately shot at and wounded. The fire of the Portuguese was then directed on the bridge itself, but as the barrels were not discovered, it soon ceased, and a fifth sapper, advancing like the others, attached a sausage seventy yards long to the barrels. At two o'clock in the morning the whole was completed, the French kept very quiet, and the Portuguese remained tranquil and unsuspecting.

Brochard had calculated that the effect of four barrels exploding together would destroy the Portuguese intrenchments, and burn the cord attached to their mine. The event proved that he was right, for a thick fog arising about three o'clock in the morning, the sausage was fired, and the explosion made a large breach. Brochard, with his sappers, instantly jumped on the bridge, threw water into the mine, cut away all obstacles, and, followed by a column of grenadiers, was at the other side before the smoke cleared away. The grenadiers being supported by other troops, not only the suburb, but the camp on the height behind were carried without a check, and the Portuguese dispersing, fled over the mountains. The execution of this bold, ingenious, and successful

project, cost only seven or eight men killed; while in the former futile attempts above a hundred and eighty men, besides many engineer and artillery officers, had fallen. It is, however, a singular fact, that there was a practicable ford near the bridge, unguarded, and apparently unknown to both sides.

A short time after the passage of the Tamega, Heudelet, marching from Braga by Guimaraens, entered Amarante; Laborde occupied the position abandoned by Silveira, and sent detachments up the left bank of the river to Mondin, while Loison pursued the fugitives. The Portuguese at the bridge of Canavezas, hearing of the action, destroyed the ammunition, and retired across the Douro. Over that river also went the inhabitants of Mezamfrio and Villa Real, when Loison, on the 6th of May, appeared in their vicinity.

This being made known to Soult, he reinforced Loison, and directed him to scour the right bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa; to complete the destruction of Silveira's army, and, with a view to the reduction of the *Tras os Montes*, to patrol towards Braganza, on which side Bessières had been asked to co-operate. That Marshal was, however, gone to France, and the reply of his successor Kellermann being intercepted, it appeared that he was unable or unwilling to afford any aid.

Laborde was now recalled to Oporto, with two regiments of infantry, another regiment and a brigade of dragoons were left to guard the communications with Amarante, and meanwhile Loison, meeting with resistance at Pezo de Ragoa, and observing a considerable movement on the opposite bank of the Douro, became alarmed, and fell back to Mezamfrio. The 8th he returned to Amarante, but his march was harassed by the peasantry, with a vigor and boldness that indicated the vicinity of some powerful support, and in truth a new actor had appeared; the whole country was in commotion, and the Duke of Dalmatia felt himself suddenly pushed backward by a strong and eager hand.

OBSERVATIONS.—SPANISH OPERATIONS.

1. The great pervading error of the Spaniards in this campaign was the notion that their armies were capable of taking the lead in offensive movements, and fighting the French in open countries; whereas, to avoid general actions should have been with them a vital principle.

2. The resolution to fight the French having been unfortunately adopted, the second great error was the attaching equal importance to the lines of operation in La Mancha and Estremadura; the one should have been considered only as an accessory. It is evident

that the first rank belonged to La Mancha, because it was in a more open country; because it more immediately threatened Madrid; and because a defeat there endangered Seville more than a defeat in Estremadura would have done. In La Mancha the beaten Spanish army must have fallen back upon Seville, in Estremadura it might have retired upon Badajos. But the latter place being defensible, and to the Spaniards of infinitely less importance than Madrid was to their opponents, the lead in the campaign must always have belonged to the army of La Mancha, which could, at any time, have obliged the French to fight a battle for the capital. The army of Estremadura might, therefore, have been safely reduced to fifteen thousand men, provided the army of La Mancha had been increased to forty or fifty thousand; and it would appear that, with a very little energy, the Junta could have provided a larger force. It is true that they would have been beaten just the same, but that is only an argument against fighting great battles, which was, certainly, the worst possible plan for the Spaniards to pursue.

3. The third great error was the inertness of Valencia and Murcia, or rather their hostility, for they were upon the verge of civil war with the Supreme Junta. Those provinces, so rich and populous, had been unmolested for eight months; they had suffered nothing from Monecy's irruption, they had received large succors from the English government, and Valencia had written her pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters of assassination; yet were it not for the force under Llamas, which, after the defeat of Tudela, helped to defend Zaragoza, Valencia and Murcia might have been swallowed up by the ocean without any sensible effect upon the general cause. Those countries were, however, admirably situated to serve as a support to Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and La Mancha, and they could, at this time, have paralyzed a large French force, by marching an army to San Clemente. It was the dread of their doing so that made the King restrain Sebastiani from pursuing his victory at Ciudad Real;* and assuredly, the Valencians should have moved; for it is not so much in their numbers as in the variety of their lines of operation that a whole people find their advantage in opposing regular armies. This, the observation of that profound and original writer, General Lloyd, was confirmed by the practice of Napoleon in Spain.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

1. To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was certainly as great an object with Napoleon as to seize Lisbon, but the truth of

* Parl. Papers, 1810.

the maxim quoted above regulated the Emperor's proceedings. If Victor had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the Portuguese and Valencians could have carried their lines of operations upon his flanks and rear; if Badajos and Lisbon had been the objects of his march, the Andalusians could have fallen on his left flank and cut his communications. Now all such dangers were avoided by the march of Soult and Lapisse; their direction was not only concentric, but a regular prolongation of the great line of communication with France. Ney protected the rear of one, Bessières, the rear of the other, and those two marshals, also, separated and cut off the Asturias from the rest of Spain; thus, all that was formidable was confined to the south of the Tagus. For the same reason the course of conquest was to have proceeded from Portugal to Andalusia, which would then have been assailed both in front and flank, while the fourth corps held the Valencians in check. By this plan the French would never have lost their central position, nor exposed their grand line of communication to a serious attack.

2. That this plan, so wisely conceived in its general bearing, should fail, without any of the different corps employed having suffered a defeat, nay, when they were victorious in all quarters, is surprising, but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon's orders were given at a time when he did not expect that a battle would have been fought at Coruña, or that the second corps would have suffered so much from the severity of the weather and the length of the marches; neither did he anticipate the resistance made by the Portuguese, between the Minho and the Douro. The last error was a consequence of the first, for his plans were calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity of Soult's movements would forestall all defence; yet the delay cannot be charged as a fault to that Marshal, whose energy was conspicuous.

3. Napoleon's attention, divided between Austria and Spain, must have been somewhat distracted by the multiplicity of his affairs. He does not seem to have made allowance for the very rugged country through which Soult had to march, at a season when all the rivers and streams were overflowing; and as the combinations of war were continually changing, the delay thus occasioned rendered Lapisse's instructions faulty; for, although it be true, that if the latter had marched by Guardia upon Abrantes while Soult advanced to Lisbon by Coimbra and Victor entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have been conquered without difficulty; yet the combination was so wide, and the communications so uncertain, that unity of action could not be insured. Soult, weakened by the obstacles he encountered, required reinforcements after the taking of Oporto,

and if Lapisse, attaching himself to Soult's instead of Victor's incursion, had then marched upon Viseu, the Duke of Dalmatia would have been enabled to win his way without regard to the co-operation in the Alemtejo.

4. The first error of the French, if the facts are correctly shown, must therefore be attributed to Napoleon, because he overlooked the probable chances of delay, combined the operations on too wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, instead of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction of Lapisse's march. I say, if the facts are correctly shown, for it is scarcely discreet to censure Napoleon's military dispositions, however erroneous they may *appear* to have been, and it is certain that, in this case, his errors, if errors they were, although sufficient to embarrass his lieutenants, will not account for their entire failure. Above sixty thousand men were put in motion by him, upon good military principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; we must therefore search in the particular conduct of the generals for the reason why a *project of Napoleon's, to be executed by sixty thousand French veterans, should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had been concocted by the Spanish Junta.*

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, ROMANA, SILVEIRA, AND CUESTA.

LAPISSE.

1. An intercepted letter of General Maupetit shows the small pains taken by Lapisse to communicate with Soult. He directs that *even so many* as three hundred men should patrol towards Tras os Montes, to obtain information of the second corps, at a time when the object was so important that his whole force should have moved in mass rather than have failed of intelligence.

2. The manner in which he suffered Sir Robert Wilson to gather strength and to insult his outposts was inexcusable. He might have marched straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed everything in his front; one of those fortresses would probably have fallen, if not both, and from thence a strong detachment pushed towards Lamego would not only have ascertained the situation of the second corps, but would have greatly aided its progress by threatening Oporto and Braga. It cannot be urged that Salamanca required the presence of a large force, because, in that open country, the people were at the mercy of Bessières' cavalry, and so sensible were the local junta of this, that both Salamanca and Ledesma refused assistance from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was offered, and preferred a quiet submission.

3. When, at last, the King's reiterated orders obliged Lapisse

to put his troops in motion, he made a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo, so feeble that it scarcely called the garrison to the ramparts, and then, as if all chance of success in Portugal was at an end, he broke through the pass of Perales, reached Alcantara, and rejoined the first corps, a movement equally at variance with Napoleon's orders, and with good military discretion; for the first directed him upon Abrantes, and the second would have carried him upon Viseu. The march to the latter place, while it insured a junction with Soult, would not have prevented an after movement upon Abrantes; the obstacles were by no means so great as those which awaited him on the march to Alcantara, and the great error of abandoning the whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro, to the insurgents, would have been avoided. Here then was one direct cause of failure; yet the error, although great, was not irreparable. If Soult was abandoned to his own resources, he had also obtained a firm and important position in the north, while Victor, reinforced by ten thousand men, was enabled to operate against Lisbon by the Alemtejo, more efficaciously than before; he, however, seems to have been less disposed than Lapisse to execute his instructions.

VICTOR.

1. The inactivity of this Marshal, after the rout of Ucles, has been already mentioned. It is certain that if the fourth and first corps had been well handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could have ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena; much less have bearded the French generals, and established a line of defence along the Tagus. Fifty thousand French troops should in two months have done something more than maintain fifty miles of country on one side of Madrid.

2. The passage of the Tagus was successful, but can hardly be called a skilful operation, unless the Duke of Belluno calculated upon the ignorance of his adversary. Before an able general and a movable army, possessing a pontoon train, it would have scarcely answered to separate the troops in three divisions in an extent of fifty miles, leaving the artillery and parc of ammunition, protected only by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, within two hours' march of the enemy for three days. If Cuesta had brought up all his detachments, the Meza d'Ibor might have been effectually manned, and ten thousand infantry and all the Spanish cavalry spared, to cross the Tagus at Almaraz on the 17th. In this case Victor's artillery would probably have been captured, and his project certainly baffled.

3. When the passage of the Tagus was effected, Victor not only permitted Cuesta to escape, but actually lost all traces of his army—

an evident fault, and not to be excused by pleading the impediments arising from the swelling of the river, the necessity of securing the communications, &c. If Cuesta's power was despised before the passage of the river, when his army was whole and his position strong, there could be no reason for such great circumspection after his defeat—a circumspection, too, not supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the French army the evening before the battle of Medellin proves.

4. That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on the morning of the 28th, with any prospect of success, must be attributed rather to fortune than to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards to retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tagus; nor can the first movement of the Duke of Belluno in the action be praised. He should have marched into the plain in a compact order of battle. The danger of sending Lasalle and Latour Maubourg to such a distance from the main body, I shall have occasion to show in my observations on Cuesta's operations. The after-movements of the French in this battle were well and rapidly combined and vigorously executed, and the success was proportionate to the ability displayed.

5. The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, which utterly destroyed the Spanish armies and laid Seville and Badajos open—those battles, in which blood was spilt like water, produced no result to the victors; for the French generals, as if they had touched a torpedo, never stretched forth their hands a second time. Sebastiani, indeed, wished to penetrate the Sierra Morena; but the King, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him. On the other hand, Joseph urged Victor to invade the Alemtejo; and the latter would not obey, even when reinforced by Lapisse's division. This last was the great and fatal error of the whole campaign; for nearly all the disposable British and Portuguese troops were thus enabled to move against the Duke of Dalmatia, while the Duke of Belluno contrived neither to fulfil the instructions of Napoleon nor the orders of the King, nor yet to perform any useful achievement himself.

He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he did not maintain Estremadura, he did not take Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta from twice renewing the offensive; yet he remained in an unhealthy situation until he lost more men by sickness than would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. Two months so unprofitably wasted by a general at the head of thirty thousand good troops, can scarcely be cited. The Duke of Belluno's reputation has been too hardly earned to attribute this inactivity to want of talent. That he was averse to aid the operations of Marshal Soult is evident, and most happy for Portugal it was so; but

whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, from indisposition to obey the King, or from a mistaken view of affairs, I have no means of judging.

CUESTA.

1. Cuesta's peculiar unfitness for the lead of an army has been remarked more than once. It remains to show that his proceedings, on this occasion, continued to justify those remarks.

To defend a river, on a long line, is generally hopeless, and especially when the defenders have not the means of passing freely, in several places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of others, have shown how the passage of rivers may be won. Eumenes, who prevented Antigonos from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the only example of a general baffling the efforts of a skilful and enterprising enemy in such an attempt.

2. The defence of rivers having always proved fruitless, it follows that no general should calculate upon success, and that he should exert the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance, to avoid a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring his magazines and dépôts close up to the army, in such a situation, is rashness itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim which forbids the establishment of magazines in the first line of defence, brought up the whole of his to Deleytosa and Truxillo. His combinations were ill-arranged; he abandoned Mirabete without an effort; his dépôts fell into the hands of the enemy; his retreat was confused and eccentric, inasmuch as part of his army retired into the Guadalupe, while others went to Merida and he himself to Medellin.

3. The line of retreat upon Medellin and Campanarios, instead of Badajos, being determined by the necessity of uniting with Albuquerque, cannot be blamed. The immediate return to Medellin was bold and worthy of praise, but its merit consisted in recovering the offensive immediately after a defeat; wherefore Cuesta should not have halted at Medellin, thus giving the lead again to the French General. He should have continued to advance, and falling upon the scattered divisions of the French army, endeavored to beat them in detail, and rally his own detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe. The error of stopping short at Medellin would have been apparent if Victor, placing a rear-guard to amuse the Spanish General, had taken the road to Seville by Almendralejos and Zafra.

4. Cuesta's general design for the battle of Medellin was well

imagined; that is, it was right to hide his army behind the ridge, and to defer the attack until the enemy had developed his force and order of battle in the plain; but the execution was on the lowest scale. If, instead of advancing in one long and weak line without a reserve, Cuesta had held the greatest part of his troops in solid columns, and thrust them between Lasalle and Latour Maubourg's divisions, which were pushed out like horns from the main body of the French, those generals would have been cut off, and the battle commenced by dividing the French army into three unconnected masses, while the Spaniards would have been compact, well in hand, and masters of the general movements. Nothing could then have saved Victor, except hard fighting, whereas Cuesta's dispositions rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to win the battle by courage, or to escape the pursuit by swiftness.

5. It is remarkable that the Spanish General seems never to have thought of putting Truxillo, Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or Medellin in a state of defence, although most if not all of those places had some castle or walls capable of resisting a sudden assault. There was time to do it, for Cuesta remained unmolested, on the Tagus, from January to the middle of March, and every additional point of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army would have diminished the advantages derived by the French from their superior facility of movement; the places themselves might have been garrisoned by the citizens and peasantry, and a week's, a day's, nay, even an hour's delay was of importance to a force like Cuesta's, which, from its inexperience, must have always been liable to confusion.

SOULT.

1. The march of this General in one column upon Tuy was made under the impression that resistance would not be offered; otherwise, it is probable that a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry would have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho; it seems to have been also an error in Ney, arising, probably, from the same cause, not to have kept Marchand's division of the sixth corps at Orense until the second corps had effected an entrance into Portugal.

2. Sout's resolution to place the artillery and stores in Tuy, and march into Portugal, trusting to victory for re-opening the communication, would increase the reputation of any general. Three times before he reached Oporto he was obliged to halt, in order to fabricate cartridges for the infantry, from the powder taken in battle, and his whole progress from Tuy to that city was energetic and able in the extreme.

3. The military proceedings, after the taking of Oporto, do not bear the same stamp. The administration of the civil affairs appears to have engrossed the Marshal's attention, and his absence from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected the operations. Franceschi showed too much respect for Trant's corps; Loison's movements were timid and slow; even Laborde's genius seems to have been asleep. The importance of crushing Silveira was obvious, and there is nothing more necessary in war than to strike with all the force you can at once; but here Caulaincourt was first sent; being too weak, Loison reinforced him, Laborde reinforced Loison, and all were scarcely sufficient at last to do that which half would have done at first. But the whole of these transactions are obscure. The great delay that took place before the bridge of Amarante, and the hesitation and frequent recurrence for orders to the Marshal, indicate want of zeal, or a desire to procrastinate, in opposition to Soult's wishes. Judging from Mr. Noble's history of the campaign, this must be traced to a conspiracy in the French army, which shall be touched upon hereafter.

4. The resistance made by the Portuguese peasantry was infinitely creditable to their courage, but there cannot be a stronger proof of the inefficacy of a like defence, when unsupported by good troops. No country is more favorable to such a warfare than the northern provinces of Portugal; the people were brave, they had the assistance of the organized forces under Romana, Silveira, Eben, and the Bishop; yet Soult, in the very worst season of the year, overcoming all resistance, penetrated to Oporto, without an actual loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of more than two thousand five hundred men, including the twelve hundred sick, captured at Chaves.

ROMANA.

1. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey, unmolested, from the 21st of January to the 6th of March; he had therefore time to reorganize his forces, and he had, in fact, ten thousand regular troops in tolerable order. He knew, on the 11th or 12th, that Soult was preparing to pass the Minho, between Tuy and Guardia. He knew, also, that the people of Ribidavia and Orense were in arms; that those on the Arosa were preparing to rise, and that, consequently, the French must, were it only from want of food, break out of the contracted position they occupied, either by Ribidavia and Orense, or by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to St. Jago. With these guides, the path of the Spanish General was as plain as the writing on the wall; he was at the head of ten thousand regular troops, and two marches would have brought him

to Ribidavia; in front of that town he might have occupied a position close on the left flank of the French, rallied all the insurgents about him, and organized a formidable warfare. The French durst not have attempted the passage of the Minho while he was in front of Ribidavia, and if they turned against him, the place was favorable for battle, the retreat open by Orense and Monterey; and the difficulty of bringing up artillery would have hampered the pursuit. On the other hand, if Soult had retreated, that alone would have been tantamount to a victory, and Romana would have been well placed to follow, connecting himself with the English vessels of war upon that coast as he advanced.

2. So far from contemplating operations of this nature, Romana did not even concentrate his force; but keeping it extended, in small parties, along fifteen miles of country, indulged himself in speculations about his enemy's weakness, and the prospect of their retreating altogether from the Peninsula. He was only roused from his reveries, by finding his divisions beaten in detail, and himself forced either to join the Portuguese with whom he was quarrelling, or to break his promises to Silveira and fly by cross roads over the mountain on his right; he adopted the latter, thus proving, that whatever might be his resources for raising an insurrection, he could not direct one, and that he was, although brave and active, totally destitute of military talent. At a later period of the war, the Duke of Wellington, after a long and fruitless military discussion, drily observed, that either Romana or himself had mistaken their profession!

SILVEIRA.

1. This Portuguese General's first operations were as ill conducted as Romana's; his posts were too extended, he made no attempt to repair the works of Chaves, none to aid the important insurrection of Ribidavia; but these errors cannot be fairly charged upon him, as his officers were so unruly, that they held a council of war per force, where thirty voted for fighting at Chaves, and twenty-nine against it; the casting voice being given by the voter calling on the troops to follow him. The after-movement, by which Chaves was recaptured, whether devised by Silveira himself, or directed by Marshal Beresford, was bold and skilful; but the advance to Peñafiel, while La Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by Guimaraens, and cut him off from Amarante, was as rash as his subsequent flight was disgraceful; yet, thanks to the heroic courage of Colonel Patrick, Silveira's reputation as a general was established among his countrymen, by the very action which should have ruined him in their estimation.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

Anarchy in Portugal—Sir J. Cradock quits the command—Sir A. Wellesley arrives at Lisbon—Happy effect of his presence—Nominated Captain-General—His military position described—Resolves to march against Soult—Reaches Coimbra—Conspiracy in the French army—D'Argenton's proceedings—Sir A. Wellesley's situation compared with that of Sir J. Cradock.

It will be remembered that the narrative of Sir John Cradock's proceedings was discontinued at the moment when that General nothing shaken by the importunities of the Regency, the representations of Marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, resolved to await at Lumiar the arrival of the promised reinforcements from England.* While in this position he made every exertion to obtain transport for the supplies, remounts for the cavalry, and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese government gave him no assistance, and an attempt to procure horses and mules in Morocco proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily furnished that, other reasons failing, this alone would have prevented any advance towards the frontier.

The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, but did not alter his resolution; yet, being continually importuned to advance, he, when assured that five thousand men of the promised reinforcements were actually off the rock of Lisbon, held a council of war on the subject.† All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto, except Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety depended on Victor's movements; meanwhile that Marshal approached Badajos, Lapisse came down upon the Agueda, and Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his advanced posts to the Vouga. A cry of treason was instantly heard throughout Portugal, and both the people and the soldiers evinced a spirit truly alarming. The latter, disregarding the authority of Beresford, and menacing their own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay a thousand traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in Abrantes even abandoned that post, and

* Sir John Cradock's Correspondence, MS. † See Appendix 1.

marched to join Trant upon the Vouga. But when these disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous movement of Victor and Lapisse would have produced fatal consequences, General Hill landed with about five thousand men and three hundred artillery horses. Cradock then resolved to advance, moved thereto chiefly by the representations of Beresford, who thought such a measure absolutely necessary to restore confidence, to insure the obedience of the native troops, and to enable him to take measures for the safety of Abrantes.* Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that Silveira was attacked at Peñafiel, by Laborde, the English army was put in motion, part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor; the campaign was, therefore, actually commenced by Cradock, when that General, although his measures had been all approved of by his government, was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender his command to Sir Arthur Wellesley, and proceed himself to Gibraltar.

It would appear that this arrangement was adopted after a struggle in the cabinet,† and, certainly, neither the particular choice nor the general principle of employing men of talent without regard to seniority can be censured; nevertheless Sir John Cradock was used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted a command on such terms, and it was neither just nor decent to expose him to an unmerited mortification.

Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock had assembled the army at Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and Peniché; but as the Admiral, fearing the difficult navigation at that season, would not send victuallers to the latter place, the magazines there were but scantily supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made way by Alcantara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became known, and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full spring. Trant's force also increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, who had succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack upon Soult; nevertheless Cradock, unprovided with a due proportion of cavalry, unable to procure provisions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon, refused, and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor had arrived, resigned his command and repaired to Gibraltar.

Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April. On the 24th he signified to the British ministers that, affairs being in the condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume the command of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, as indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a secondary ob-

* Sir John Cradock's Correspondence, MS.

† Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

ject, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt, and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the internal errors of the Cabinet.

The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious commander, created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The Regency immediately nominated him Marshal-General of their troops; the people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British, who had blamed Sir John Cradock's prudent caution, now, anticipating a change of system, spoke largely and confidently of the future operations: in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be achieved, pervaded the public mind.

Sir Arthur's plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, he felt the danger of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those at the enemy's disposal. Not that he wavered between offensive and defensive movements; a general of his discernment could not fail to perceive that, if the French were acting upon any concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops, or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult; and that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those Marshals.

Soult's offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted; he might establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two hundred miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, and nearly as numerous as his own; and, moreover, there were discontents and conspiracy in his camp, and of this Sir Arthur was aware.

Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital; but that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor, who was now at the head of thirty thousand men, and might march straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a movement, or even a semblance of it, must perforce draw the British and native armies to that side, and then Soult, coming down to

the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with Victor's by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon, as occasion offered.

Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources of the English General were:—

1. His central position.

2. The British and German troops, about twenty-six thousand in number; of which the present under arms, including sergeants, amounted to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred horses and mules. In the British army corporals and privates only are understood in the present under arms, but in the French army that term includes all military persons—officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and drummers, combatants and combatants; a distinction to be borne in mind when comparing the forces on each side.

3. The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be organized and armed about sixteen thousand.

Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego; and beyond the latter river, Trant and Silveira commanded separate corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega.

4. The militia and the *ordenanzas*, which may be denominated the insurgent force.

5. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, Peniché, and Badajos.

6. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of the coast and river navigation for his supplies.

7. The assistance of Cuesta, who had six thousand cavalry and thirty thousand infantry, of which twenty-five thousand were actually about the defiles of Monasterio in front of Victor's posts.

Sir Arthur Wellesly's moral resources were, the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity; the energy of an excited people; a favorable moment; the presentiment of victory, and a mind equal to the occasion.

In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because he was the most dangerous neighbor to Portugal; because his defeat would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be brought to bear against him. On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming a French party; the feelings of the Regency and the people were greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto, and their desire to regain it was strongly expressed.

To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with Cuesta; but that General was ill-disposed towards the British, and to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to attack the last-named Marshal without delay; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of defence in the northern provinces, and then, in conjunction with Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve Galicia more effectually than by following the French into that province.

The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted with thorns. To effect this, eight or ten thousand Portuguese troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, where two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just disembarked also marched, and were there joined by three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria.

A body of two thousand men, composed of a militia regiment, and the Lusitanian legion, which remained near Castello Branco after Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the command of Colonel Mayne, and directed to take post at the bridge of Alcantara, having orders to defend the passage of the river, and, if necessary, to blow up the structure. At the same time, the flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the garrison of the latter place was reinforced, and General Mackenzie was appointed to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus. These precautions appeared sufficient, especially as there was a general disposition to believe the French weaker than they really were. Victor could not, by a mere demonstration, shake this line of defence; and if he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and penetrated by the sterile and difficult route formerly followed by Junot, it would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance, and Mackenzie would have had time to line the rugged banks of the Zézere.

If, however, Victor, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, should pass through the Alemtejo, and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and Lisbon, he was to be feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow closely in the French General's rear, and it was reasonable to suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be unable to prevent the passage of the river, would not suffer himself to be cut off from the capital, where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid of the citi-

zens, and the chance of reinforcements from England, he might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro. Moreover, Victor was eighteen marches from Lisbon; it was only by accident that he and Soult could act in concert, and the allied army, having a sure and rapid mode of correspondence with Cuesta, was already within four marches of Oporto.

The main body of the allies was now directed upon Coimbra; four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated in the British brigades; Beresford retained, under his personal command, about six thousand native troops; Trant remained steadfast on the Vouga, Silveira on the Tamêga; and Sir Robert Wilson, quitting the command of the legion, was detached, with a small Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon Franceschi's left flank, he also communicated with Silveira's corps by the way of Lamego.

The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, which had pressed so sorely on Sir John Cradock, was now somewhat lessened. The land transport was indeed still scanty, and the Admiral, dreading the long-shore navigation for large vessels, was without the small craft necessary for victualling the troops by the coast; but the magazines at Caldas were partly filled, and twenty large country boats, loaded with provisions, the owners being induced by premiums to make the run, had got safely into Peniche and the Mondego. In short, the obstacles to a forward movement, although great, were not insurmountable.

Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of May. His army was concentrated there on the 5th, in number about twenty-five thousand sabres and bayonets; nine thousand were Portuguese, three thousand Germans, the remainder British. The Duke of Dalmatia was ignorant that the allies were thus assembled in force upon the Mondego; but many French officers knew it, and were silent, for they were engaged in a plot of a very extraordinary nature, which was probably a part of the conspiracy alluded to in the first volume of this work, as being conducted through the medium of the Princess of Tour and Taxis.

The French soldiers were impatient of their toils; their attachment to Napoleon himself was unshaken, but human nature shrinks from perpetual contact with death, and they were tired of war. This feeling induced some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to form a plan for changing the French government; generally speaking, these men were friendly to Napoleon personally, but they were republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of the Emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the troops in the Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English army, to elect a chief, and march into France with the resolution

to abate the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne. These conspirators at first turned their eyes upon Marshal Ney, but finally resolved to choose Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader; yet it was easier to resolve than to execute. Napoleon's ascendancy, supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men; and, although the hopes of these last were not entirely relinquished until after Massena's retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that period they discovered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were faithful to their great monarch, and would have slain any who openly stirred against him.

The foregoing facts are stated on the authority of a principal mover of the sedition; but many minor plots had cotemporary existence, for this was the spring-time of folly. In the second corps conspirators were numerous, and by their discourses and their slow sullen execution of orders, had continually thwarted the operations of Marshal Soult, yet without exciting his suspicions; as he penetrated into Portugal, their counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived at Oporto, their design was ripe for execution.

In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, had appeared at Marshal Beresford's head-quarters, with proposals from the French malcontents; who desired to have an English officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was to be commenced by seizing their General, and giving him over to the British outposts: a detestable project, for it is not in the field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the overthrow of their country's institutions. It would be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government, but there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his general in the field; a compact of honor, which it is singularly base to violate, and so it has in all ages been considered. When the Argyraspides, or silver-shields of the Macedonians, delivered their general, Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter, although he had tempted them to the deed, and scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, and with the approbation of all men destroyed them; yet Antigonus was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood.

An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting these French conspirators, and penetrated, by night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts, by the lake of Aveiro, or Ovar. He had previously arranged that one of the malcontents should meet him on the water; the boats unknowingly passed each other in the dark.

and the Englishman returned to Aveiro, where he found John Viana, in company with the French Adjutant-Major, D'Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana had declared at Thomar; he expressed great respect for Soult, yet dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be made to the soldiers; and he readily agreed to wait, in person, upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the French army to be afraid. Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon; thither D'Argenton followed, and having seen him and Sir Arthur Wellesley, remained five days in that capital, and then returned to Oporto. While at Lisbon, he, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy, stated that Soult wished to make himself King of Portugal; an error into which he and many others naturally fell, from circumstances that I have already noticed.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D'Argenton appeared again at the English head-quarters; this time, however, by the order of Sir Arthur, he was conducted through by-paths, and returned convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his absence, he had been denounced by General Lefebvre, who was falsely imagined to be favorable to the conspiracy; being arrested, passports, signed by Admiral Berkeley, which this unfortunate man, contrary to Sir A. Wellesley's urgent recommendation, had insisted upon having, completely proved his guilt, and Soult, until that moment without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned beneath his feet: his firmness, however, did not desert him. He offered D'Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose the names of the other conspirators, and relate truly what he had seen of the English and Portuguese armies; the prisoner, to save his life, readily told all that he knew of the British, but Sir A. Wellesley's foresight had rendered that tale useless, and with respect to his French accomplices D'Argenton was immovable. Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the Marshal's power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt the conspirators' sentiments; nor was his boldness fatal to him at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during the subsequent operations.

He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the British General. Colonel Donadieu and Colonel Lafitte were engaged in the conspiracy. The latter is said to have had an interview with Sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the first the malcontents were urgent that the movements

of the allied forces should be so regulated as to favor their proceedings. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, having little dependence upon intrigue, sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by their plots, and hastened his military measures.

Under the impression that Silveira was successfully defending the line of the Tamega, the British General at first resolved to reinforce him by sending Beresford's and Wilson's corps across the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from *Tras os Montes*; intending, when their junction was effected, to march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro near that town, by the aid of Beresford's corps, which would then be on the right bank. This measure, if executed, would, including Trant's, Wilson's, and Silveira's people, have placed a mass of thirty thousand troops, regulars and irregulars, between the *Tras os Montes* and Soult, and the latter must have fought a battle under very unfavorable circumstances, or have fallen back on the Minho, which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when intelligence arrived that the bridge of Amarante was forced, and that Silveira, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Douro. The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra the 4th of May, and, on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs. As this eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those who censured Sir J. Cradock's caution, it may here be well to show how far the circumstances were changed.

When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved in discipline.

Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since been added.

In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering the wrecks of his forces after Medellin; he was now at the head of thirty-five thousand men.

The intentions of the British government had been doubtful; they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock's influence had been restricted; the new General came out with enlarged powers, the full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind, always prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to dictate at once to the Regency, the diplomatists, the generals, and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues, and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was debarred.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command of armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a mind capacious of warlike affairs.

CHAPTER II.

Campaign on the Douro—Relative position of the French and English armies—Sir Arthur Wellesley marches to the Vouga—Sends Beresford to the Douro—A division under General Hill passes the lake of Ovar—Attempt to surprise Franceschi fails—Combat of Grijón—The French re-cross the Douro, and destroy the bridge of Oporto—Passage of the Douro—Soult retreats upon Amarante—Beresford reaches Amarante—Loison retreats from that town—Sir Arthur marches upon Braga—Desperate situation of Soult—His energy—He crosses the Sierra Catalina—Rejoins Loison—Reaches Carvalho d'Este—Falls back to Salamonde—Daring action of Major Dulong—The French pass the Ponte Nova and the Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre—Soult enters Orense—Observations.

CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.

AFTER the action of Amarante, Laborde's troops were recalled to Oporto, a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry being left to keep up the communication with Loison. General Botilho, however, soon reappeared upon the Lima, Lorge's dragoons were detached to watch him, and meanwhile Mermet's division was pushed towards the Vouga. The French army was thus extended in detachments from that river to the Tamega, occupying two sides of a triangle, its flanks presented to the enemy, the wings separated by the Douro and without communication, except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days to unite on the centre, and five days to concentrate on either extremity.

The situation of the allies was very different. Sir Arthur Wellesley, having assembled the bulk of his troops at Coimbra, had the choice of two lines of operation; the one, through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five marches, he could turn the French left and cut them off from *Tras os Montes*; the other leading upon Oporto, whereby, in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very superior numbers, upon the enemy's right, with a prospect of crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro. On the first of these two lines, which were separated by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could be covered by Wilson's corps, at Viseu, and by Silveira's near Lamego. Along the second, the movement could be screened by Trant's corps on the Vouga.

The Duke of Dalmatia's dispositions were made in ignorance of

Sir Arthur Wellesley's position, numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength, he meditated to cross the Tamega, and then, covered by that river and the Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so enter the Salamanca country.* It was in this view that Loison had been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, Mermet's advance towards the Vouga being only to support Franceschi's retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the Tamega.

The 9th of May, D'Argenton was arrested, the film fell from Soult's eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once upon his view. Treason in his camp which he could not probe; a powerful enemy close in his front; the insurgents again active in his rear; the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the Tamega, from the Douro to the Lima, and commanded by officers whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown. Appalling as this prospect was, the Duke of Dalmatia did not quail at the sight. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of the troops; he ordered Loison to keep Mezamfrio and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold Amarante fast, and the greatest part of the guns and stores at Oporto were directed upon the Tamega; the ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed, and Lorge was directed to withdraw the garrison of Viana and make for Amarante; D'Argenton was then closely, although vainly, pressed to discover his accomplices, and all the arrangements necessary for a movement upon the *Tras os Montes* were actively followed up. But the war was coming up with a full and swift tide; Loison, upon whose vigor the success of the operation depended, was giving way; Wellesley was already across the Vouga, and Franceschi was struggling in his grasp.

The English General had resolved to operate along both the routes before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succor, induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading to Oporto. He had one division of cavalry and three of infantry, exclusive of Beresford's corps. The first division, composed of two brigades of infantry and twelve guns, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Paget. The second, of three brigades of infantry and six guns, by Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke. The third, of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by Major-General

* S. Journal of Operations, MS. See Plan 1.

Hill. The cavalry by Lieutenant-General Payne. The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which six were only three-pounders.

The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of cavalry, marched upon Lamego, by the road of Viseu.

The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget's division advanced towards the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted on the 8th, to give Beresford time to reach the upper Douro, before the attack on the French right should commence. The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga; Hill's division took the Aveiro road, and the whole reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget's division was not brought up until after dark, and then with caution, to prevent the enemy's guard from seeing the columns, the intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning.

That General, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet's division, and six guns, occupied a village eight miles beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of Mermet's infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult that the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant's posts had closed upon the Vouga; he was, however, far from suspecting that the whole army was upon the last river, although, from the imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion of the field officer who had met D'Argenton. He had observed, during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar was unguarded by the French, although it extended twenty miles behind their outposts, and all the boats were at Aveiro, which was in possession of the allies. On this information, it was decided to turn the enemy's right by the lake. Accordingly, General Hill embarked on the evening of the 9th, with one brigade—the other being to follow him as quickly as possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise, but, soon comprehending the object, voluntarily rushed in crowds to the boats, and worked with such a will that the whole flotilla arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, when the troops immediately disembarked. That day, also, Beresford, having rallied Wilson's corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa; and he it was that had repulsed Loison and pursued him to Amarante.

Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same moment Sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Frances-

chi; for while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt to surprise that General at Albergaria Nova was in progress. Sherbrooke's division was not yet up; but General Cotton, with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga a little after midnight, endeavored to turn the enemy's left, and get behind him while the head of Paget's division, marching a little later, passed through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria. Trant's corps was to make way between Paget's division and the lake of Aveiro.

This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events, such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga, and late in the evening of the 9th, Colonel Trant, having ascertained that an impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Olivera de Azemiz, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles—thinking thus to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and Richard Stewart's brigade, which had been charged to conduct the British cannon. This task was difficult; several carriages broke down, and Trant's corps took the lead of Paget's column, the march of which was impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry under Cotton were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight, upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood garnished with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton dared not, under such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour's delay, produced by a few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry; for it is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi's horsemen were cut off, and General Hill at Ovar, Mermet's division could have escaped across the Douro.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget's infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with Trant's corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing against him; but being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged from the wood, he retreated along the road to Olivera de Azemis, briskly pursued by the allied infantry. Nevertheless, valiantly extricating himself from this perilous situation, he reached Olivera without any serious loss, and continuing his march during the night by Feria, joined Mermet next morning at Grijon.

Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the English army, including the troops with Hill, and it may create surprise that he should pass so near the latter General without being attacked; but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which forbade him to act on the enemy's rear; and those orders were wise and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies

on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious. While the number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced guard and the main body of the French. The object of Hill's being sent to Ovar was, 1. That the line of march might be eased and the enemy's attention distracted; 2. That a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell-mell with the flying enemy; and it was the soldier-like retreat of Franceschi that prevented the last object from being attained.

General Paget's division and the cavalry halted the night of the 10th at Olivera. Sherbrooke's division passed the Vouga later in the day, and remained in Albergaria. The next morning the pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with the enemy about eight o'clock in the morning.

COMBAT OF GRIJON.

The French were posted across the road on a range of steep hills, a wood occupied with infantry covered their right flank, and their front was protected by a village and broken ground, but their left was ill-placed. The British troops came up briskly in one column, the head of which was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and at the same time the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other flank of the French. The latter immediately abandoned the position, and, being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a few killed and about a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons, yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace, again drew near, they fell back; and thus fighting and retreating, a blow and a race, wore the day away. During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy's retreat; but, by some error in the transmission of orders, that General, taking the route of Feria, crossed Trant's line of march, and the time thus lost could not be regained.

The British halted at dark. The French passed the Douro in the night and destroyed the bridge, and all the heavy artillery and baggage still in Oporto were immediately sent off by this road to Amarante. Mermet, without halting, followed the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having orders to secure all the boats and vigilantly to patrol up the right bank of the river; and Loison, his retreat from Pezo de Ragoa being unknown, was again

warned to hold the Tamega, as he valued the safety of the army. Finally, Soult having directed all the craft in the Douro in his front to be secured, and having placed guards at convenient points, resolved to hold Oporto during the 12th, that Lorge's dragoons and the different detachments might have time to concentrate at Amarante.

The Duke of Dalmatia's attention was now principally directed to the river in its course *below* the city, for the reports of his cavalry led him to believe that Hill's division had been disembarked at Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the empty vessels would come round to effect a passage at the mouth of the Douro. Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mezamfrio and Pezo with six thousand men, and knowing that three brigades occupied intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in maintaining his position for another day. But the conspirators were busy. His orders were neglected or only half obeyed, and false reports of their execution made to him.

In this state of affairs the heads of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and before eight o'clock in the morning of the 12th, the whole army was concentrated there, yet hidden from Soult by the height upon which the convent of Sarea stood. The Douro rolled between the hostile forces, and the French, who had suffered nothing from the previous operations, could in two days take post behind the Tamega, from whence the retreat upon Bragança would be certain; and they might, in passing, defeat Beresford; for that General's force was feeble in numbers, in infancy as to organization, and the utmost Sir Arthur expected from it was that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route of Chaves and retire to Galicia instead of Leon. This however could not happen unless the main body of the allies followed the French closely from Oporto, and as Soult at Salamanca would have been more formidable than ever, the ultimate object of the campaign and the immediate safety of Beresford's corps alike demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. But how force the passage of a river, deep, swift, more than three hundred yards wide, and with ten thousand veterans guarding the opposite bank! Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame!

The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, prevented any view of the upper river from the town, and the Duke of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could

discern the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from the summit of Sarea, Sir A. Wellesley, with an eagle's glance, searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. He saw horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the dust of columns in retreat, but no large body of troops near the river; the enemy's guards were few and distant from each other; his patrols neither numerous nor vigilant, and an auspicious negligence seemed to pervade his camp. Suddenly a large unfinished building, called the Seminary, caught the English General's eye. This isolated structure, having a short easy access from the river, was surrounded by a high wall, which, extending to the water on either side, inclosed an area sufficient for two battalions in order of battle; the only egress was by an iron gate opening on the Vallonga road, and the building itself commanded everything in its vicinity, except one mound, which was within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct line of passage from the height of Sarea, across the river to the building, being to the right hand, was hidden from the troops in the town. Here, then, with a marvellous hardihood, Sir Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in the face of a veteran army and a renowned General.

PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.

A poor barber, evading the French patrols, had during the night come over the water in a small skiff. Colonel Waters, a staff officer, a quick daring man, discovered this, and aided by the barber and by the Prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his services, immediately passed the river, and in half an hour returned unperceived with three large barges. Meanwhile, eighteen pieces of artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea, and Major-General John Murray was directed, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and two guns, upon the Barca de Avintas, three miles above. He had orders to seek for boats and effect a passage there also, if possible; and when Waters returned, some of the English troops were pushed towards Murray in support, while others cautiously approached the brink of the river under Sarea.

It was now ten o'clock; the French were still tranquil and unsuspecting; the British wondering and expectant. Sir Arthur was informed that one boat was brought up to the point of passage. "*Well, let the men cross,*" was his reply; and at this simple order, an officer with twenty-five soldiers of the Bluffs embarked, and in a quarter of an hour silently placed themselves in the midst of the enemy's army.

The Seminary was thus gained; all was quiet in Oporto, and a

second boat followed the first; no hostile movement was seen, no sound heard, and a third boat passed higher up the river; but scarcely had the men from this last set foot on shore, when a tumultuous noise arose in the city. The drums beat to arms, shouts arose from all parts, the people were seen vehemently gesticulating and making signals from the houses; confused masses of French troops, hurrying forth from the streets by the higher grounds, threw out swarms of skirmishers that came furiously down against the Seminary. The British army instantly crowded to the bank of the river; Paget's and Hill's divisions collected at the point of passage, and Sherbrooke's division where the boat bridge had been cut away from Villa Nova. Paget himself had passed in the third boat, and having mounted the roof of the Seminary, was already struck down with a dangerous wound. Hill took his place. The musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing as the numbers on both sides accumulated; but the French attack was eager and constant, their fire augmented faster than that of the English, and their artillery also began to play upon the building. The British guns from Sarea commanded indeed the whole inclosure round the Seminary, and swept the left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault to the side of the iron gate; but Murray did not appear, and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical, that Sir Arthur himself was only prevented from crossing by the earnest representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had in General Hill.

At this period some citizens pushed over to Villa Nova with several great boats, Sherbrooke's people began to cross in large bodies, and at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city. Murray's troops were now seen descending the right bank from Avintas, three battalions were in the Seminary, and Hill, advancing to the inclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French columns, as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga road. Five pieces of French artillery came galloping out from the town on the left, but, appalled by the terrible line of musketry to be passed, the drivers suddenly pulled up, and while thus hesitating, a volley from behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the ground; the rest, dispersing among the inclosures, left their guns on the road. This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke's people, who, having forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear. In fine, the passage was won, and the allies were in considerable force on the French side of the river. To the left, General Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards and the 29th

regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, General Hill, holding the Seminary and the wall of the inclosure, with the Bluffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they passed him, and his line was prolonged on the right, although with a considerable interval, by General Murray's Germans, and two squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept passing the river at different points, and the artillery, from the height of Sarea, still searched the enemy's columns as they hurried along the line of retreat.

If General Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he suffered column after column to pass him, without even a cannon shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stewart and Major Hervey, impatient of this timidity, charged with the two squadrons of dragoons, and riding over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond, unhorsed Laborde and wounded Foy; but on the English side Hervey lost an arm, and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, had to fight their way back with loss. This finished the action; the French continued their retreat, and the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former had about five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) were afterwards found in the arsenal, and seven hundred men were captured in the hospitals.

Napoleon's veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare, that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again in order, with a regular rear-guard covering the retreat; a small garrison at the mouth of the Douro which had been cut off, being guided by some friendly Portuguese, also rejoined the army in the night, and Soult, believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped the danger.

Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the next day, in bringing over the rear-guard of the army, the baggage, the stores, and the artillery. Murray's Germans indeed pursued on the morning of the 13th, but not further than about two leagues on the road of Amarante, and this delay has been blamed as an error in Sir Arthur. It is argued that an enemy once surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult

should have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to pursue. The reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the army was still on the left bank of the Douro; secondly, that the troops had outmarched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and having passed over above eighty miles of difficult country in four days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate.

The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse of Loison's division, which immediately fell back, as I have already related, to Mezamfrio, but followed by the Portuguese patrols only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the 10th. Silveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the Marshal's force was thus, with the assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the route of Villa Real to Bragança. The 11th Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him so timid, followed and skirmished with his rear-guard; at the same time Silveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the French outposts in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens. These events were unknown to Sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery and ammunition, near Peñafiel, had passed over the mountains towards Braga, and judging this to arise from Beresford's operations on the Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to proceed by Peñafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at Chaves.

Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the other by the Ponte d'Ave and Barcellos; but, on the evening of the 14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off from the Barcellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult should take the line of Montalegre. The 15th, Sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders, was near Chaves, having sent Silveira towards Salamonde, with instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgasso. At this time, however, Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having, by

a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from; but to understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through which his retreat was effected.

I have already stated, that the Sierra de Cabreira and the Sierra de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, leaving a rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads from Oporto to Amarante: hence, the French in retreating to the latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de Catalina on their left, both supposed impassable; and although between Amarante and Braga, which is on the other side of the Catalina, a route practicable for artillery runs through Guimaraens, it was necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this road. Soult, therefore, as he advanced along the narrow pass between the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison's holding Amarante; several days, however, had elapsed since that General had communicated with the army, and an aide-de-camp was sent, on the morning of the 12th, to ascertain his exact position. Colonel Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but neither his remonstrances, nor the after-coming intelligence that Oporto was evacuated and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could induce that General to remain there; as we have seen, he marched towards Guimaraens on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of Amarante without a blow, and leaving his commander and two-thirds of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction.

The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o'clock on the morning of the 13th, just after he had passed the rugged banks of the Souza river; the weather was boisterous, the men were fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the whole army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the Duke of Dalmatia justified, by his energy, that fortune which had raised him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a Spanish pedlar, informed of a path that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage, loaded the animals with sick men and musket ammunition, and repassing the Souza, followed his Spanish guide with a hardy resolution. The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might be expected in those wild regions, yet the troops made good their passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and at Guimaraens happily fell in with Loison. During the night they

were joined by Lorge's dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army was concentrated.

If Soult's energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his sagacity and judgment were not less remarkably displayed in what followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route from Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Val-longa, that the bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison's and Lorge's corps in the face of an enemy—a circumstance that might operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like Cintra.* Wherefore, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and ammunition of Loison's and Lorge's divisions; then, leaving the high road to Braga on his left, once more took to the mountain paths, making for the heights of Carvalho d'Este, where he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day's march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his troops in the position he had occupied two months before, at the battle of Braga; and by this spectacle, where twenty thousand men were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed so as to produce the greatest effect, he aroused all the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy reach of generalship, an inspiration of real genius!

He now reorganized his army, taking the command of the rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to General Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says, "*the whole army was astonished*;" as if it were not a stroke of consummate policy, that the rear, which was pursued by the British, should be under the General-in-chief, and that the front, which was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions of the Portuguese. *Maneta dared not surrender!* and thus the Duke of Dalmatia dexterously forced those to act with most zeal who were least inclined to serve him; but in sooth, such was his perilous situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of his character were needed to save the army.

From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two lines of retreat: the one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which the army had marched when coming from Chaves

* Noble's *Campagne de Galice*.

two months before ; the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and defended by twelve hundred Portuguese, with artillery, and that another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte Nova on the Cavado river. The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves ; the second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving ; the ammunition was injured by the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of wind ; the British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the morning ; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely arrived. In this extremity, Soult sent for Major Dulong, an officer justly reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing himself to this brave man, he said, "I have chosen you from the whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. Select a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen, endeavor to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report ; your silence will suffice." Thus exhorted, and favored by the storm, Dulong reached the bridge unperceived of the Portuguese, killed the sentinel before any alarm was given, and then, followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow slip of masonry, which was the only part undestroyed. The Cavado river was flooded and roaring in its deep channel, one of the grenadiers fell into the gulf, but the noise of the waters was louder than his cry, and Dulong with the eleven reaching the other side surprised the nearest post ; the remainder of his men advanced at the same moment close to the bridge, and some crossing and others mounting the heights, shouting and firing, scared the poor peasantry, who imagined the whole army was upon them ; thus the passage was gallantly won.

At four o'clock, the bridge was repaired and the advanced guards of the French commenced crossing ; but the column of march was long, the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly, and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at last came upon a torrent called the Miserella, which, breaking down a deep ravine, or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge constructed with a single lofty arch, called *Saltador*, or the leaper

and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast. Fortunately for the French, the Saltador was not cut, but intrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants, who occupied the rocks on the farther side, and here the good soldier Dulong again saved the army;* for, when a first and second attempt had been repulsed, he carried the intrenchments by a third effort, and, at the same instant, fell deeply wounded. The head of the column then poured over, and it was full time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the Ponte Nova was choked with dead.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th, had come, about four o'clock, upon Soult's rear-guard, which remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left occupied a steep hill, and a stout battle might have been made; but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to retreat, will seldom stand firmly; on this occasion, when some light troops turned the left, and General Sherbrooke, with the guards, mounting the steep hill, attacked the front, the French made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed a rear-guard; yet being at last descried, some guns were brought to bear on them, and then man and horse, crushed together, went over into the gulph, and the bridge, and the rocks, and the defile beyond were strewed with mangled bodies. This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that fell into their power, and on the other hand, the soldiers, who held together in their turn, shot the peasants, while the track of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the burning houses.

The French reached Montalegre on the 17th, being followed only by Colonel Waters, with some cavalry, who picked up a few stragglers at Villella. Sir Arthur halted that day at Ruivaens, which seems to have been an error in principle, because there appears no adequate cause for the delay, but on the 18th he renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre, followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the Salas in force, and no action took place. Silveira, indeed, had entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was despatched to Mar-

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

shal Beresford with orders to move from Villa Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long, that all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end; for though Beresford, on the 19th, sent Colonel Talbot with the 14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force and obliged that officer to retire, and the pursuit terminated with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas.

Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th, and on the 19th entered Orense, without guns, stores, ammunition, or baggage; his men were exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest part without shoes, many without accoutrements, and, in some instances, even without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy six days before, with about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers; of which number above three thousand were taken in hospitals,* and about a thousand were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of sickness, previous to the retreat; the remainder were captured or had perished within the last eight days. He had carried fifty-eight pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier nowise diminished.

OBSERVATIONS.

The Duke of Dalmatia's arrangements being continually thwarted by the conspirators, his military skill cannot be fairly judged of; nevertheless the errors of the campaign may, without injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing them to their true sources.

1. The disposition of the army, on both sides of the Douro and upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It was, doubtless, right, that to clear the front and to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; but he remained too long in the same position, and he should have left Trant's force more positively. Had the latter officer (whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy of the country would have increased; and as Boresford's troops at Thomar wanted but an excuse to disperse, the Portuguese and British preparations must have been greatly retarded.

2. That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats

* Viz. 1800 left in Viana and Braga; 500 including the wounded taken in Oporto; 1800 taken at Chaves, by Silveira.

on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an hour, might have rendered Fabius careless! yet there were some peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army which indicate great negligence. The commanding officer of one regiment reported, as early as six o'clock, that the English were crossing the river;* the report was certainly premature, because no man passed before ten o'clock, but it reached Soult, and he sent General Quesnel, the Governor of Oporto, to verify the fact. Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error, and Soult took no further precaution; the patrols were not increased, no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three days since D'Argenton's conspiracy had been discovered, and the extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have induced the Duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards and posts of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the General, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent retreat.

3. When General Loison suffered Marshal Beresford to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military error, and when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy's forces; yet he, although at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, that night, and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from its perilous situation with honor! It was not General Loison's fault if England did not triumph a second time in the capture of a French Marshal.

MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL.

1. If Sir Arthur Wellesley's operations be looked at as a whole, it is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days he had restored public confidence, provided a defence against one ad-

*Noble's *Campagne de Galice*.

versary, and, having marched two hundred miles through a rugged country, and forced the passage of a great river, cursed his other opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage.

2. Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents of the General, that he was quick to see, and active to strike. And first, the secrecy and despatch with which the army was collected on the Vouga belong entirely to the man; for there were many obstacles to overcome, and D'Argenton, as the sequel proved, would, by his disclosures, have ruined Sir Arthur's combinations, if the latter had not providently given him a false view of affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in itself, no mean effort; for it must be recollected that this rapid advance against an eminent commander and a veteran army of above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force, of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, and, only three weeks before, in a state of open mutiny.

3. The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, seem a rash undertaking. When examined closely, it proves to be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French may indeed be called fortunate, because it permitted the English General to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could have maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir Arthur, when he so coolly said, "*Let them pass,*" was prepared to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that that General, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground inclosed by the wall round the building. Had only General Murray's troops passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered; but in the double passage all was secured—the men in the Seminary by the guns, by the strength of the building and by Murray's troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the enemy's attention away from them. Hence it was only necessary to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and the success was almost certain; because, while that building was maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by simple means is the highest effort of genius

4. If General Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and of military hardihood; and how would it have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante? If Soult, effecting his retreat in safety and reaching Zamora or Salamanca in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found full occupation for Sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he would have opened a free communication with the Duke of Belluno. The latter must then have marched either against Seville or Lisbon; and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English General, producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or, perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant, declamatory writer.

5. Sir Arthur Wellesley's reasons for halting at Oporto the 13th have been already noticed, but they require further remarks. Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter would have been overtaken on the Souza river and destroyed; but this chance, arising from Loison's wretched movements, was not to be foreseen. He knew nothing of Beresford's situation, but he naturally supposed that, following his instructions, he was about Villa Real, and that, consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either move by Villa Pouca to Chaves, or, taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make for the Minho; hence he remained where he could command the main roads to that river, in order to intercept Soult's retreat and force him to a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route—a process promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached General Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did; but there a political difficulty occurred. The English Cabinet, although improvident in its preparations, was very fearful of misfortune; and the General dared not risk the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. This circumstance often obliged him to curb his naturally enterprising disposition; and to this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been so often censured as a fault, not only by military writers, but by Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for not taking advantage thereof.*

* King Joseph's captured Correspondence, MS.

6. The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffetings of two vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, the other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure in the operations of Marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamonde until the evening of the 15th, and his rear-guard was still there on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre on the 18th, but from Chaves to that place is only one march. Again, Marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th, and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he must have known the importance of Salamonde, which was only thirty-two miles from Amarante, and that there was a road to it through Freixim and Refoyos de Basta, and another through Mondin and Cavez, both shorter than that by Guimaraens and Chaves. It is true that Silveira was directed to occupy Ruivaens and Melgasso; but he either disobeyed or executed his orders too slowly, and Miserella was totally neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the Marshal's staff, endeavored, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and Ruivaens, and it was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised at the former, had been collected; but he had only a single dragoon with him, and was without powder to execute this important task. The peasantry, also glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella, which was the key of all the communications, and all the great markets of the Entre Minho e Douro, and therefore sure to be built up again; in which case the people knew well that their labor and time would be called for without payment. It is however undoubted that Soult owed his safety, firstly, to the failure, whatever may have been the cause, in Beresford's general operations, and, secondly, to the particular failure in breaking down the bridges; and it is probable, from what he did do, that Major Warre would have effectually destroyed them, if he had been supplied with only the commonest means.

Silveira is accused of not moving either in the direction or with the celerity required of him by Beresford; but there seems to have been a misunderstanding between them, and some allowance must be made for the numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders by officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of moving troops not accustomed, and perhaps not perfectly willing, to act together.

CHAPTER III.

Romana surprises Villa Franca—Ney advances to Lugo—Romana retreats to the Asturias—Reforms the government there—Ney invades the Asturias by the west—Bonnet and Kellermann enter that province by the east and by the south—General Mahi flies to the valley of the Syl—Romana embarks at Gihon—Ballasteros takes Santander—Defeated by Bonnet—Kellermann returns to Valladolid—Ney marches for Coruña—Carrera defeats Maucune at St. Jago Compostella—Mahi blockades Lugo—It is relieved by Soult—Romana rejoins his army and marches to Orense—Lapisse storms the bridge of Alcantara—Cuesta advances to the Guadiana—Lapisse retires—Victor concentrates his army at Torremocha—Effect of the war in Germany upon that of Spain—Sir A. Wellesley encamps at Abrantes—The bridge of Alcantara destroyed—Victor crosses the Tagus at Almaraz—Beresford returns to the north of Portugal—Ney and Soult combine operations—Soult scours the valley of the Syl—Romana cut off from Castile and thrown back upon Orense—Ney advances towards Vigo—Combat of San Payo—Misunderstanding between him and Soult—Ney retreats to Coruña—Soult marches to Zamora—Franceschi falls into the hands of the Capuchino—His melancholy fate—Ney abandons Galicia—View of affairs in Aragon—Battles of Maria and Belchite.

THE Duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, and on the 21st put his troops in motion upon Lugo, to succor General Fournier, of the 6th corps, who, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards, under the command of General Mahi.* But to explain this it is necessary to resume the account of Romana's operations, after his defeat at Monterey on the 6th of March.

Having reassembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was soon after joined by three thousand men from Castile, and thus, unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the sixth corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, only occupied by two weak French battalions, and as their nearest support was at Lugo, Romana resolved to surprise them. Dividing his forces, he sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to take them in rear, and marched himself by the route of Calcabellos; in this manner he surrounded the French, who, after a short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men, surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias.

Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts of Galicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme Central Junta, the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The movable columns of the sixth corps daily lost a number of men, some in open battle,

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

and a still greater number by assassinations ; these last were however rigorously visited upon the districts where they took place, and thus, in Galicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed a more horrid character. Referring to this period, Colonel Barrios afterwards told Mr. Frere that to repress the excesses of Marshal Ney's troops, he himself had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho !* an avowal recorded by Mr. Frere without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it would, if true, have been detestable.

After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased rapidly. Barrios departed for Seville, Martin Carrera assumed the command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those near Vigo. General Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, apprised of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana immediately abandoned Galicia, and entering the Asturias by the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician frontier, until he reached Navia de Suarna, where he left Mahi, with the army, to observe Ney, but repaired himself to Oviedo, to redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians.

It is necessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian Junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable. Romana, after a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme authority, and appointed new men ; but this act of justice gave great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an approximation to Cuesta's manner in Leon, the year before ; and as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred any indication of vigor or probity in a general, Romana was soon afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile he was resolutely reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an unexpected event.

As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the Gallician side of the Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely to excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned a combined movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army, but also the Asturian troops, which then amounted to about fifteen thousand men, including the partida of Porlier, commonly called the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by General Ballasteros and General Vorster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph, arranged that Kellermann, who was at Astorga,

* Parl. Papers, 1810.

with six guns and eight thousand seven hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias from the south-east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always remained at the town of Santander, should break in, from the north-east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps should make an irruption by the Concejo de Ibas, a short but difficult route leading directly from Lugo.

When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney, appointing General Marchand to command in Galicia during his own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago, three others in garrison at Coruña under General D'Armagnac, one at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier at Lugo. He then marched himself, with twelve battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi, and the latter immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to Galicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. Ney, either thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi's troops, continued his route by the valley of the Nareca; and with such diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish General, thus surprised, made a feeble and fruitless endeavor to check the French at the bridge of Peñafior, after which, sending the single regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped.

The 18th, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by Kellermann, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon; Bonnet, likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later, and thus Vorster, being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the coast. Meanwhile Ballesteros, finding that Bonnet had passed between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon Santander and retook it, making the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred) prisoners; the *Amelia* and *Statira*, British frigates, arrived off the harbor at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were endeavoring to escape.

Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballesteros, and, the 11th of June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Galicia, had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and Kellermann, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had

also retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not calculated for defence, although with the aid of English ships, it might become extremely troublesome to the French.

While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago de Compostella at the moment that Colonel D'Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the Marshal to give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of dragoons in Maucune's camp. This escort was magnified by the Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men: but Carrera, who had been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, and, on the 23d, having attacked Maucune at a place called "*Campo de Estrella*," totally defeated him, with a loss of six hundred men and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, and the French retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check suffered by the 6th corps, for Mahi, having united a great body of peasants to his army, drove back Fournier's outposts, and closely invested him in Lugo on the 19th.

Such was the state of affairs in Galicia when Soult arrived at Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got intelligence of these events, rather exaggerated the success of their countrymen, the French Marshal immediately sent forward an advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the exhausted state of his troops would permit.* The 22d, he reached Gutin, and, the same day, his van being descried on the mountains above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp and fell back to Mondenedo.

The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the Emperor's first successes in Austria, and, with renewed energy, prepared for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, uninformed of Mahi's position at Mondenedo, had missed a favorable opportunity of revenging the loss of St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately marched along the line of the Asturian frontier, until he arrived at the sources of the Neyra: then crossing the royal road, a little above Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the Syl; and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This movement of Romana's was able, energetic, and worthy of every praise.

In pursuance of an order from the Emperor, Soult now sent eleven hundred men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of cavalry regiments, to France; and, having partially restored

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

the artillery and equipments of the second corps, from the arsenals of Coruña and Ferrol, he, in concert with the Duke of Elchingen, arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana; in the execution it failed, as shall be hereafter noticed, but at present it is necessary to return to the campaign south of the Tagus.

VICTOR'S OPERATIONS.

After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the Duke of Belluno, in obedience to the King's orders, proceeded to recover Alcantara.* His rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his column, under Lapisse, driving back some cavalry posts, entered the town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the bridge. The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand infantry, fifty cavalry, and six guns, and some works of defence were constructed on the right bank of the river; but on the 14th of May, Lapisse, lining the rocks on the left bank, skirmished so sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne then sprung a mine, yet the explosion did little injury to the bridge, and the French made good the passage; the Portuguese, who had suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse immediately sent patrols towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and Idanha Nova.

Intelligence of this attack having reached General Mackenzie, he directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; which movement, aided by a rumor that Soult had retreated from Oporto, afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and resuming his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true to the promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida, but, on the return of the French advanced guard, recrossed the Guadiana, and fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains.

Some time before this, King Joseph had received a despatch from the French Minister of War, giving notice that reinforcements had sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favor of Soult. It might be supposed that the original plan of the Emperor would then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of Portugal. It appears, when Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined that hostilities with Austria, although certain, would not

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

'break out so suddenly, but that he should have time to organize a sufficient army in Germany, without drawing his veteran troops from Spain; hence, he still left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the Prince of Neufchâtel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained at Paris, to superintend the preparations for reopening the campaign. The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain, and, aptly taking the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own declaration of war at the same moment. Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal to the French army, if the Emperor, journeying day and night, had not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the supernatural force of Napoleon's genius: in a few hours he changed the aspect of affairs, and in a few days, *maugre* their immense number, his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect; for never since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a display of military skill made by man. But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards were recalled from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube; the great reserve of infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry regiment were ordered to return to their *dépôts* in France; even the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to march for Germany. Thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Galicia, and while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand more were paralyzed with regard to offensive operations.

These things had rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon; Soult might be already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward movement; and the Duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torremocha, a central point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry posts watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his communications with Madrid, between the Tietar

and the Tagus, were protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the King.*

But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The neighborhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a division there the 22d, and, as from that period until the 10th of June he remained quiet, his campaign, which had opened so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce both Lisbon and Seville. Meanwhile the Spaniards were daily recovering strength and confidence, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his future operations with the Spanish armies in the south.

Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached the English General on the night of the 17th. That part of the army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. Colonel Trant was appointed military governor of Oporto, and it was thought sufficient to leave Silveira with some regular battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces, for Soult's army was considered a crippled force, which could not for a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made for the energy of that chief.

As the army proceeded southward, the narrow scope of Lapisse's movements was ascertained; Colonel Mayne was directed again to take post at Alcantara, and, as a reinforcement of five thousand men had landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank of the Tagus, but there was sickness and a great mortality in the ranks.

From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, Sir Arthur Wellesley had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the operation against Soult as the secondary object of the campaign;† and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

† Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence; Parl. Papers, 1810.

a discretionary power to enter the nearest province of Spain, if Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence with the Junta and with Cuesta, he had therefore strongly urged the necessity of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies, and this advice, approved of by the Junta, was attended to by Cuesta, inasmuch that he did not seek a battle; but he exposed his advanced posts, as if in derision of the counsel, and, disdainful of the English General's abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no desire to act heartily; "because," said he, "the system of the British appears to be never to expose their troops, owing to which, they never gain decisive actions by land."

Cuesta's knowledge of the enemy's strength and positions was always inaccurate, and his judgment false; hence he himself not only never gained any decisive action, but lost every army intrusted to his command. He was now discontented with the movement against Soult; asserting that the French hold of Galicia would only be strengthened thereby, unless that favorite folly of all Spanish generals were adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult was first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made upon Victor would *permanently deliver Galicia*; and this plan being followed, Galicia was abandoned by the French, and they never returned to that province!

When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was unfortunate that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be undertaken, yet, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. His views were, however, so opposed to all sound military principles, that Sir Arthur, although anxious to conciliate his humor, could scarcely concede the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have been employed in useful action, seeing that the return of the British army from the Douro had falsified Victor's position at Torremocha. That Marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division guarding the bridge of Almaraz, and it was difficult for him to ascertain the movements of Sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie's corps of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the English General, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, to place it between two fires. This did not escape the penetration of either

commander;* but Sir Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes and money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly that Cuesta's army was scattered over the open country, between the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and as he refused to concentrate or retire, Victor might have marched against and crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar.† Early in June, however, three brigades were directed upon Castello Branco, and the Duke of Belluno, immediately taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from Madrid, of Soult's retreat, resolved to recross the Tagus; but, previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.

Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again intrusted with that post, and unfortunately, his first orders to blow up the bridge, if the enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding unnecessary. Neither did Mayne keep his instructions secret, and Victor hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no other view than to induce its destruction. He succeeded. That noble monument of Trajan's genius was ruined! Yet such is the nature of war that, not long afterwards, both armies found its fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and of military advantage, sighed alike over the broken arches of Alcantara.

Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Placentia. Meanwhile Beresford returned to the defence of the northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing; for during the forced inactivity of the British at Abrantes, the cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place; and it is important that these changes should be well understood, because on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged.

When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms, agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering the valley of the Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which place it was expected that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Galicia be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the Tras

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

† Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

os Montes, by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging Sir Arthur Wellesley to remain in that province, while the second corps opened a direct communication with Madrid and with the first corps. This being arranged, Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of June, two divisions of infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the second corps, marched upon Monforte; they were followed the next day by two other divisions of infantry, and at the same time Franceschi, who was on the Fereira river, supported by La Houssaye's dragoons, was directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense.

From the 2d to the 9th, the main body halted at Monforte, to get up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks; for Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the valleys. Loison was then sent with a division to the Val des Orres, having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that direction. The 10th, he passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de Bibey, and the 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry, arrived at Monte Furada also on the Syl, and sent a detachment to Laronco, to connect his division with Loison's.* The remainder of the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa Franca to Lugo. Loison then forced the passage of the Puente de Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that river.

The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and pushed his patrols to Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey, with a view to ascertain the exact direction which Romana would take to avoid Loison's column, and to prevent the Spanish General from passing the left of the French army, and gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These precautions occupied the Duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged that he would attempt the same march towards Puebla de Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month of March; the French army was therefore directed up the valley of the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with the head of Romana's army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the 20th the whole of the

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

French troops were concentrated near Viana, intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the men dispersed.

Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having sent Heudelet's division to Villa Vieja to threaten the *Tras os Montes* frontier, and Mermet's division and Lorge's dragoons towards La Canda, to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers movements, through the rugged passes of Galicia, led to a variety of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to abandon such a post.

Romana's situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by a misunderstanding between the French Marshals. It appears that Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about ten thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra; the Comde de Noroña joined him there with some fresh troops, and assuming the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river, behind which he took post, placing his main body at the bridge of San Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On the 7th of June the French came up. The Spaniards had thirteen thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, and nine field pieces; of the troops only seven thousand were armed, but the whole of the artillery was in position to defend the passage at San Payo, and the bridge being cut, was overlooked by a battery of two eighteen-pounders. Three thousand men were in reserve at Redondela; and at Vigo, about sixty stragglers from Sir John Moore's army were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which was manned by English seamen, under Captain Winter, also proceeded up the river to the bridge of San Payo.

During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both sides, and on the 8th, the French were repulsed in two feeble attempts to force a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor, the loss on either side being about a hundred men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until the reports of the officers sent by Ney to ascertain the situation and projects of Soult's army, were received; but in the evening of the 8th, those officers returned with information received from the peasants, that the second corps was retreating upon Castile. I have been assured by persons then on Marshal Ney's staff, that he, amazed at these

tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed by personal feelings, wished to endanger the sixth corps; hence, filled with indignation, he immediately retired to Coruña, while Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their engagements, and an under-hand policy to oblige him to remain in Gallicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney from sending a column against Orense, while he himself kept in check Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that ten thousand of the best soldiers of France, led by an officer so quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without arms. But the history of the quarrel between these Marshals is involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those who shall write the memoirs of the men: for the purposes of this history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that therein the Gallicians found safety.

Soult, informed of Ney's retreat and of Sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother, General Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the King to send the artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the second corps; and here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most horrid scenes were daily enacted.

To put the King in possession of his views, Soult sent General Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an escort, fell into the hands of the *Capuchino*.* Being transferred to Seville, the Central Junta, with infamous cruelty, treated him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and confined him in a dungeon at Carthagená. The citizens there, ashamed of their government, endeavored to effect his escape; but he perished in confinement, at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his young wife, a daughter of Count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, she refused all nourishment, and, in a few days, by her death, added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman's affections.

The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria.

The 28th, he marched to Mombuey.

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the bridges of San Pelayo and Castro Gonzales.

The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a proposition of Ney's, that the two corps should jointly maintain Galicia, a rejection which induced the Duke of Elchingen to evacuate that province.

To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and, on the 22d of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful that Captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron off Coruña, seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and, in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The Marshal, however, marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived on the 30th, having brought off all his own sick and those of the second corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Galicia was finally delivered.

This important event has been erroneously attributed to the exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to protect their personal property; and when the French withdrew, this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the payment of tithes and rents—a compensation by no means relished by the proprietors of the church. But it is certain that their efforts were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were constantly on the coast. How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the sixth corps from Galicia, when Ney retained every important post in that province to the last—when single divisions of his army, at two different periods, traversed the country from Coruña to Tuy without let or hindrance—and when the Spaniards could not prevent him from overrunning the Asturias without losing his hold of Galicia? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army, that is, if a wrong system was pursued by the French; but he pointed out the right method of subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon's views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the movable columns could overrun the country; and this, he estimated, would only require fifty thousand pounds and six weeks' labor.* It is plain the real causes of deliverance were—the quarrels between the marshals, which saved

* Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Papers, 1810.

Romana and Noroña from destruction ; and the movements of Sir Arthur Wellesley on the Tagus ; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that Marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the first corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Galicia. Now, although Soult's views were undoubtedly just and his march provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of Galicia, because it would have been absurd to keep the sixth corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of communication, and estranged from the general operations.

The movement of the second corps, after quitting Monforte, being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly threatening the northern provinces, drew Marshal Beresford, as I have before stated, from the south, and all the regular Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately collected by him round Almeida. The Duke del Parque was at Ciudad Rodrigo ; and as that part of Romana's force which had been cut off by Soult's movement upon Gudina fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo, not less than twenty-five thousand men, Portuguese and Spaniards, were assembled or assembling round those two fortresses.

The change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the great western line of invasion was rendered more important by the events which were simultaneously taking place in other parts—especially in Aragon, where General Blake, whose army had been augmented to more than twenty thousand men, inflated with his success at Alcañiz, had advanced to Ixar and Samper. Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment, under General Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, marched in person through Carineña, and sent General Arisaga with a column to Bottorita, and the latter captured a convoy of provisions on the Huerba ; but Faber retired to Placentia, on the Xalon.

The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished to Bottorita ; and Blake, endeavoring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza.

The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by this march, was so great that Suchet doubted if he should not abandon Zaragoza and return towards Navarre ; for the peasantry had assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city itself. The importance of that place, however, made him resolve to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came on in the full confidence that the French General would retreat, furnished an opportunity which was not neglected.

BATTLE OF MARIA.

The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated at Bottorita.

The 15th, Blake slowly and unskillfully formed his troops in order of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o'clock in the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the French; but Suchet, who had just then been rejoined by Faber, and by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution, by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle. Blake drew men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, and was immediately engaged in a severe conflict. He repulsed the foremost of the enemy's columns, but so violent a storm arose at the moment, that neither army could see the other, although close together, and the action ceased for a time. Blake's position was so ill chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity of his right flank.* Suchet, who had observed this error, when the storm cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake, who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, twenty-five guns, and many stands of colors were taken, yet few prisoners, for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the ravines, and Blake rallied them the next day at Bottorita. The French lost nearly a thousand men, and General Harispé was wounded.

During the action, a French brigade held the position of Monte Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the Ebro to cut off Blake's retreat; General Laval, who commanded it, did not, however, execute his orders, and the Spanish army retired on the night of the 16th.

The 17th, the rear-guard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on the 18th, the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake, reinforced by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand strong; but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and

* Suchet's Memoirs.

his men were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand men, flushed with victory, into action.

BATTLE OF BELCHITE.

The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half inclosing the town;* their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the position and occupied by a reserve, served as a rallying point, because there was an easy line of communication between it and the left wing.† The centre, being on rough ground, containing the town of Belchite, which had a wall and gates, was also very strong, and the whole position was so compact that Blake, after completely filling his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather in the nature of an advanced post.

A French battalion commenced the action, by skirmishing with the Spanish centre, but, at the same time, two columns of attack marched, the one against the right, the other against the left. The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, although Blake's guns opened heavily from his centre and right. The rapid attack of the French, and the accidental explosion of an ammunition wagon, created a panic, which, commencing on the left, spread to all parts of the line. The Spanish General made a charge of cavalry to retrieve the day; it was, however, easily repulsed, and the confusion which followed is thus described by himself: "One regiment fled without firing a shot; it was followed by another, and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun, and, in a few moments, the whole position was abandoned."—"Thus we, the generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to make head against the enemy."

Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage: stung to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with a

* Suchet's Memoirs.

† Blake's Despatch.

strong and sincere feeling of honor, restored to the Junta the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at Alcañiz.

The battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about four thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under Mortier, who were now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations. Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellermann's and Bonnet's divisions, three complete *corps d'armée*, furnishing six thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, collected between Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, and the loss of Galicia followed, but Napoleon's admirable system of invasion was unbroken; his troops, deprived of his presiding genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further aggression; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements.

CHAPTER IV.

State of the British army—Embarrassments of Sir Arthur Wellesley—State and numbers of the French armies—State and numbers of the Spanish armies—Some account of the *partidas*, commonly called *guerillas*—Intrigues of Mr. Frere—Conduct of the Central Junta—Their inhuman treatment of the French prisoners—Corruption and incapacity—State of the Portuguese army—Impolicy of the British government—Expedition of Walcheren—Expedition against Italy.

THE British army remained in the camp of Abrantes until the latter end of June. During this period, Sir Arthur Wellesley, although burning to enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties. He had been reinforced with five thousand men immediately after his return from the Douro; and, in the preceding operations, the killed and hurt in battle had not exceeded three hundred men, but the deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand in hospital, and fifteen hundred employed in escort and dépôt duties, being deducted, the gross amount of the present under arms, as late even as the 25th of June, did not exceed twenty-two thousand men; and these were, at any moment, liable to be seriously diminished, because the ministers, still intent upon Cadiz, had authorized Mr. Frere, whenever the Junta should consent to the measure, to draw a garrison for that town from Sir Arthur's force. As an army, therefore, it was weak in everything but spirit; the

commissariat was without sufficient means of transport; the soldiers nearly barefooted, and totally without pay; the military chest empty, the hospitals full.*

The cost, at a low estimation, was about two hundred thousand pounds a month; with the most strenuous exertions, a hundred and sixty thousand pounds only had been procured in the two months of May and June, and of this, thirteen thousand had been obtained as a temporary loan in Oporto. The rate of exchange in Lisbon was high, and notwithstanding the increased value given to the government paper by the successes on the Douro, this rate was daily rising: the Spanish dollar was at five shillings, while Spanish gold sunk so much in value that the Commissary-General sent all that he received from England, or could collect in Lisbon, to Cadiz, and other parts, to truck for dollars;† but, in all places of commerce, the exchange was rising against England, a natural consequence of her enormous and increasing issues of paper. Those issues, the extravagant succors given to Spain, together with subsidies to Austria, made it impossible to supply the army in Portugal with specie, otherwise than by raising cash in every quarter of the globe on treasury-bills, and at a most enormous loss; an evil great in itself, opening a wide door to fraud and villany, and rendering the war between France and England not so much a glorious contest of arms as a struggle between public credit and military force, in which even victory was sure to be fatal to the former.

The want of money, sickness, Cuesta's impracticable temper, and a variety of minor difficulties, too tedious to mention, kept the army in a state of inactivity until the end of June; but, at that period, the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, and the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one obstacle to offensive operations, and Sir Arthur, having the certainty that eight thousand additional troops were off the rock of Lisbon, then commenced his march into Spain by the northern banks of the Tagus; meaning to unite with Cuesta on the Tietar, and to arrange, if possible, a plan of operations against Madrid.

But, before I embark on the full and broad stream into which the surges and eddies of the complicated warfare that succeeded Napoleon's departure from the Peninsula settled, I must give a general view of the state of affairs, that the reader, comprehending exactly what strength each party brought to the encounter, may judge more truly of the result.

* Appendix 12. † Parl. Papers, 1810.

FRENCH POWER.

	Men.	Horses.
The French, having received some reinforcements of conscripts, amounted, in the beginning of July, including the King's guards, to about.....	275,000	
In hospital.....	61,000	
Stragglers and prisoners borne on the states.....	7,000	
Total under arms.....	207,000	36,000
The military governments, lines of correspondence, garrisons, and detachments, absorbed.....	32,000	3,000
<i>Present under arms, with the corps d'armée</i>	175,000	33,000

The actual strength and situation of each *corps d'armée* was as follows:*

Under the King, covering Madrid.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
First corps, in the valley of the Tagus.....	20,881	4,200
Fourth corps, La Mancha.....	17,490	8,200
Division of Dessolles, Madrid.....	6,864	
King's French guards, Madrid, about	4,000	1,500
Total.....	49,235	8,900

In Old Castile, under Marshal Soult.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca.....	17,707	2,883
Fifth corps, Valladolid	16,042	874
Sixth corps, Astorga, and its vicinity.....	14,913	1,446
Total.....	48,662	5,203

In Aragon, under General Suchet.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcañitz, &c.....	15,226	2,604

In Catalonia, under Marshal Augereau.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona.....	30,593	2,500

In addition to these corps there were twelve hundred men belonging to the battering train; four thousand infantry under Bonnet, at Santander; and two thousand two hundred cavalry under Kellermann, in the Valladolid country.

The fortresses and armed places in possession of the French army were—St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, Santander, Burgos, Leon, Astorga, on the northern line;

Jacca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora, on the central line;

Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern line.

* Muster-rolls of the French Army, MS.

It needs but a glance at these dispositions and numbers to understand with what a power Napoleon had fastened upon the Peninsula, during his six weeks' campaign. Much had been lost since his departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards down, and, like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes, was immovable to their writhings. Nevertheless, the situation of Spain at this epoch was an ameliorated one compared to that which, four months before, the vehemence of Napoleon's personal warfare had reduced it to. The elements of resistance were again accumulated in masses, and the hope, or rather confidence, of success was again in full vigor; for it was in the character of this people, while grovelling on the earth, to suppose themselves standing firm; and when creeping in the gloom of defeat, to imagine they were soaring in the full blaze of victory.

The momentary cessation of offensive operations on the part of the French, instead of being traced to its true sources, the personal jealousies of the Marshals, and the King's want of vigor, was, as usual, attributed, first, to fear and weakness; secondly, to the pressure of the Austrian war. It was not considered that the want of unity, checking the course of conquest, would cease when the French army was driven to the defensive; neither was the might of France duly weighed, while the strength of Austria was unduly exalted. The disasters at Ucles, at Almaraz, at Zaragoza, Rosas, Cardadeu, Valls, at Ciudad Real, Medellin, Braga, and Oporto, and in the Asturias, were all forgotten; the French had been repulsed from Portugal, and they had not taken Seville! This, to the Spaniards, was sufficient evidence of their weakness; and, when the French were supposed to be weak, the others, by a curious reasoning process, always came to the conclusion that they were themselves strong. Hence, the fore-boasting at this period was little inferior to what it had been after the battle of Baylen, and the statement of the relative numbers was almost as absurd. The utmost amount of the French force was not calculated higher than a hundred and fifteen, or a hundred and twenty thousand men, of which about fifty thousand were supposed to be on the French side of the Ebro, and the whole only waiting for an excuse to abandon the Peninsula.

SPANISH POWER.

The Spanish armies, on paper, were, as usual, numerous; and the real amount of the regular force was certainly considerable, although very inadequate to the exigencies or the resources of the country. Before the battle of Belchite had broken Blake's strength, there were, organized and under arms, twelve thousand cavalry, and about one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, exclusive of

irregular bands and armed peasantry, who were available for particular defensive operations. After that defeat the number of regular forces, capable of taking the field in the south-eastern provinces, was not above twenty thousand men, of which about ten thousand, under Coupigny, were watching Barcelona, or, again, rallying under Blake; the remainder were in Valencia, where Caro, Romana's brother, had taken the command.

In the north-western provinces there were about twenty-five thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were in Galicia, some thousands in the Asturias under Vorster and Bellasteros, and the remainder under the Duke del Parque, who was directed to organize a new army in the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.

In Andalusia, or covering it, there were about seventy thousand men. Of these twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry, were assembled in the Morena, near St. Elena and Carolina, under the command of General Venegas; and thirty-eight thousand, including seven thousand cavalry, were in Estremadura, under the orders of Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of both armies.

The troops, thus separated into three grand divisions, were called the armies of *the right, the centre, the left*. The fortresses were Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, Mequinenza, Tarragona, Tortosa, Valencia, Carthagená, and Alicante, for the army of the right; Cadiz and Badajoz, for that of the centre; Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and Ferrol, for the army of the left.

The Spanish troops were, however, far from being serviceable in proportion to their numbers; most of them were new levies, and the rest were ill-trained. The generals had lost nothing of their presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their mutual jealousies were as strong as ever. Cuesta, still hating the Junta, was feared and hated by that body in return, and Venegas was placed at the head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. Romana, also, was obnoxious to the Junta, and in return, with more reason, the Junta was despised and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to the public welfare, satisfied if the war was kept from their own doors. In Catalonia there never was any unanimity.

Blake, who had abandoned Romana in Galicia, and who was still at enmity with Cuesta, had been, for these very reasons, invested with supreme power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; and moreover, there were factions and bickerings among the interior officers in the armies of Venegas and Cuesta. Albuquerque was ambitious of commanding in chief, and Mr. Frere warmly intrigued in his cause, for that gentleman still labored under the

delusion that he was appointed to direct the military instead of conducting the political service in the Peninsula. In April, he had proposed to the Junta that a force of five thousand cavalry and some infantry, taken from the armies of Cuesta and Venegas, should, under the command of the Duke of Albuquerque, commence offensive operations in La Mancha; this, he said, would, "*if the enemy refused to take notice of it,*" become "a very serious and perhaps a decisive movement;"* and he was so earnest that, without communicating upon the subject with Sir Arthur Wellesley, without waiting for the result of the operations against Soult, he pretended to the Junta that the co-operation of the English army with Cuesta (that co-operation which it was Sir Arthur's most anxious wish to bring about) could only be obtained as the price of the Spanish government's acceding to his own proposal.† The plenipotentiary's greatest efforts were, however, directed to procure the appointment of Albuquerque to the command of an army; but that nobleman was under the orders of Cuesta, who was not willing to part with him, and, moreover, Frere wished to displace Venegas, not that any fault was attributed to the latter, but merely to make way for Albuquerque; a scheme so indecorous that both the Junta and Cuesta peremptorily rejected it.

Mr. Frere did not hesitate to attribute this rejection to a mean jealousy of Albuquerque's high birth and talents;‡ yet the Junta had sufficient reason for their conduct, not only on this occasion, but afterwards, when they refused to give him any independent command. The Duke, although a brave and patriotic and even an able soldier, was the dupe of a woman who corresponded with the French; the Junta, in the fear of offending him, forbore to punish her, at first, yet, finally, they were obliged to shut her up, and they could not intrust him with a command while her dangerous influence lasted. Hence, Mr. Frere's intrigue failed to serve Albuquerque, and his military project for La Mancha fell to the ground when Sir Arthur Wellesley, unable to perceive its advantages, strongly advised the Junta, not to weaken but to reinforce Cuesta's army; not to meddle with the French either in La Mancha or Estremadura, but to preserve a strict defensive in all quarters.

The *Supreme Junta* was itself in fear of the old *Junta of Seville*, and the folly and arrogance of the first and its neglect of the public weal furnished ample grounds of attack, as a slight sketch of its administrative proceedings will suffice to prove. The King, after the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had, through the medium of Don Joachin Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his service, made an

* Parliam. Papers, 1810. † Appendix 8. ‡ Ibid.

attempt to negotiate for the submission of the Junta, which was spurned at by the latter, and in suitable terms, for dignified sentiments and lofty expressions were never wanting to the Spaniards; yet, taken with their deeds, they were but as a strong wind and shrivelled leaves.

The Junta did not fail to make the nation observe their patriotism upon this occasion, and, indeed, took every opportunity to praise their own proceedings; nevertheless, men were not wanting in Spain most anxious not only to check the actual abuses of power, but to lay bare all the ancient oppressions of the country, and recur to first principles, both for present reform and future permanent good governments; in short, to make public avowal of the misrule which had led to their misfortunes, and, if possible, to amend it. Knowing that although national independence may co-exist with tyranny, it is necessarily attached to civil and religious freedom, they desired to assemble the Cortes; to give the people an earnest that national independence was worth having, and to convince them that their sufferings and their exertions would lead to a sensible good, instead of a mere choice between an old and a new despotism; this party was powerful enough to have a manifesto, to their purpose, drawn up by the Junta, and it would have been published if the English ministers had not interposed; for, as I have before said, their object was not Spain, but Napoleon.

Mr. Frere vigorously opposed the promulgation of this manifesto, and not ambiguously hinted that the displeasure of England, and the wrath of the partisans of despotism in Spain, would be vented on the Junta, if any such approach to real liberty was made.* In his despatches to his Cabinet he wrote that, from his knowledge of the members of the Junta, he felt assured they would "*shrink from the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures which they held out*;" and this expression he meant in their praise! but still he thought it necessary to check the tendency to freedom in the outset, and it would be injustice not to give his sentiments in his own words; sentiments which were at this time perfectly agreeable to his immediate superior, Mr. Canning, but offering a curious contrast to the political liberality which that politician afterwards thought it his interest to affect.

Writing as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed Don Martin Garay:—

"If we have indeed passed three centuries under an arbitrary government, let us not forget that it is a price which we pay for having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of the globe; that the integrity of this immense power rests solely upon these two

* Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.

words, religion and the king. If the old constitution had been lost by the conquest of America, our first object should be to recover it, but in such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so much in the acquisition. From this consideration, it appears to me that we ought to avoid, as *political poison, any annunciation of general principles, the application of which it would be impossible to limit or qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should quote them in favor of themselves.* But let us allow that we have made a *bad exchange in bartering our ancient national liberty for the glory and extension of the Spanish name.* Let us allow that the nation has been deceived for three centuries, and that this error should, at all hazards, be immediately done away. Even though it were so, it does not appear *very becoming the character of a well educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of his forefathers,* or to complain of what he has lost by their negligence or prodigality; and still less so, if it is done in the face of all the world: and what shall we say of a nation who would do this publicly, and after mature deliberation?***

The manifesto was suppressed, a new one more consonant with Mr. Frere's notions was published, and a promise to convoke the Cortes given, but without naming any specific time for that event. The Junta, who, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not at all disposed to give any effect to free institutions, now proceeded to prop up their own tottering power by severity. They had, previous to the manifesto, issued a menacing proclamation, in which they endeavored to confound their political opponents with the spies and tools of the French; and having before established a tribunal of public security, they caused it to publish an edict, in which all men who endeavored to raise distrust of the Junta, or who tried to overturn the government by popular commotion or other means, that had by the Junta been reprobated, were declared guilty of high treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards, and sold to Napoleon: their punishment to be death, and confiscation of property. Any person propagating rumors tending to weaken or soften the hatred of the people against the French, was instantly to be arrested and punished without remission; lastly, rewards were offered for secret information upon these heads.

This decree was not a dead letter. Many persons were seized, imprisoned, and executed, without trial, or knowing their accusers. But the deepest stain upon the Spanish character, at this period, was the treatment experienced by prisoners of war. Thousands, and amongst them part of Dupont's troops, who were only prisoners by a breach of faith, were sent to the Balearic Isles, without any

* Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.

order being taken for their subsistence, and when remonstrated with, the Junta cast seven thousand ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera. At Majorca, numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants, in the most cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on Cabrera suffered miseries that can scarcely be described. The supply of food, always scanty, was often neglected altogether; there was but one spring on the rock, which dried up in summer; clothes were never given to them except by the English seamen, who, compassionating their sufferings, often assisted them in passing the island. Thus, afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like wild beasts while they could live, but perished in such numbers that less than two thousand remained to tell the tale of this inhumanity; and surely, it was no slight disgrace that the English government failed to interfere on such an occasion.

But what were the efforts made for the defence of the country by this barbarous Junta, which, having been originally assembled to discuss the form of establishing a central government, had unlawfully retained their delegated power, and used it so shamefully? There was a Spanish fleet, and a sufficient number of sailors to man it, in Carthagena, and there was another fleet, and an abundance of seamen, in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood and others pressed the Junta, constantly and earnestly, to fit these vessels out, and to make use of them, or at least to place them beyond the reach of the enemy, yet his remonstrances were unheeded; the sailors were rendered mutinous for want of pay, and even of subsistence, and the government would neither fit out ships themselves, nor suffer the English seamen to do it for them.* At the period when the Marquis of Romana and the insurgents in Galicia were praying for a few stands of arms and five thousand pounds from Sir John Cradock, the Junta possessed many millions of money, and their magazines in Cadiz were bursting with the continually increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving from England, but which were left to rot as they arrived, while, from every quarter of the country not yet subdued, the demand for these things was incessant.†

The fleet in Cadiz harbor might have been at sea in the beginning of February. In a week it might have been at Vigo, with money and succors of all kinds for the insurgents in Galicia; after which, by skilful operations along the coast from Vigo to St. Sebastian, it might have occupied an enormous French force on that line of country. Instead of a fleet, the Junta sent Colonel Barrios, an obscure person, to steal through by-ways, and to take the command of men who were not in want of leaders. In the same manner, the fleet in Carthagena might have been employed on the Catalanian

* Appendix 5. † Lord Collingwood's Correspondence. Gen. Miller's Mem.

and French coasts; but, far from using their means, which were really enormous, with energy and judgment, the Junta carried on the war by encouraging virulent publications against the French, and confined their real exertions to the assembling of the unfortunate peasants in masses, to starve for awhile, and then to be cut to pieces by their more experienced opponents.

The system of false reports, also, was persevered in without any relaxation: "*The French were beaten on all points; the marshals were slain or taken; their soldiers were deserting, or flying in terror at the sight of a Spaniard; Joseph had plundered and abandoned Madrid; Zaragoza had not fallen.*" Castro, the envoy to the Portuguese Regency, so late as April, anxiously endeavored to persuade that government and the English General that Zaragoza had never been subdued, and that the story of its fall was a French falsehood. In June, official letters were written to Marshal Beresford, from the neighborhood of Lugo, and dated the very day upon which Soult's army relieved that town, not to give intelligence of the event, but to announce the utter defeat of that Marshal, and the capture of Lugo itself; the amount of the killed and wounded, and the prisoners taken, being very exactly stated, and with such an appearance of truth as to deceive Beresford, notwithstanding his previous experience of the people he had to deal with.

But the proofs of corruption and incapacity in the Junta are innumerable, and not confined to the records of events kept by British officers. Romana, a few months later, upon the question of appointing a regency, thus describes their conduct: "He himself," he said, "had doubted if the Central Junta was a lawful government, and this doubt was general in the provinces through which he had passed; yet he had, to preserve the nation from anarchy, not only yielded obedience to it, but he had, likewise, forced the provinces of Galicia, Leon, and Asturias to do the same; because he thought that an illegal government might be useful if it deserved the confidence of the people, and that they respected its authority. The Central Junta, however, was not thus situated; the people, judging of measures by their effects, complained that the armies were weak, the government without energy; that there were no supplies; that the promised accounts of the public expenditure were withheld; and yet, all the sums drawn from America, all the succors granted by England, the rents of the crown, and the voluntary contributions were expended. The public employments were not given to men of merit and true lovers of their country. Some of the members of the Junta rendered their power subservient to their own advantage; others conferred lucrative appointments on their relations and dependents. Ecclesiastical offices had been filled up to enable indi-

viduals to seize those rents for themselves which ought to be appropriated for the public service. There was no unity to be found; many of the Junta cared only for the interest of their particular province, as if they were not members of the Spanish monarchy; confirming the appointments of the local juntas, without regard to fitness; and even assigning recompenses to men destitute of military knowledge, who had neither seen service nor performed the duties assigned to them.

"The Junta, divided into sections, undertook to manage affairs in which they were unversed, and which were altogether foreign to their professions. Horses, taken from their owners under pretence of supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger in the sea-marshes. And, finally, many important branches of administration were in the hands of men, suspected, both from their own conduct and from their having been creatures of that infamous favorite who was the author of the general misery."

It was at this period that the celebrated *partidas* first commenced the *guerilla*, or petty warfare, which has been so lauded, as if that had been the cause of Napoleon's discomfiture. Those bands were infinitely numerous, because every robber that feared a jail, or that could break from one; every smuggler,* whose trade had been interrupted; every friar, disliking the trammels of his convent; and every idler, that wished to avoid the ranks of the regular army, was to be found either as chief or associate in the *partidas*. The French, although harassed by the constant and cruel murders of isolated soldiers, or followers of the army, and sometimes by the loss of convoys, were never thwarted in any great object by these bands; but the necessity of providing subsistence, and attaching his followers to his fortunes, generally obliged the guerilla chief to rob his countrymen; and, indeed, one of the principal causes of the sudden growth of this system was the hope of intercepting the public and private plate, which, under a decree of Joseph, was bringing in from all parts to be coined in Madrid; for that monarch was obliged to have recourse to forced loans, and the property of the proscribed nobles and suppressed convents, to maintain even the appearance of a court.

This description will apply to the mass of the *partidas*; yet there were some actuated by nobler motives—by revenge, by a gallant enterprising spirit, or by an honest ambition, thinking to serve their country better than by joining the regular forces. Among the principal chiefs may be placed Renovales, and the two Minas, in Navarre and Aragon; Porlier, named the *Marquisetto*, and Longa, in the Asturias and Biscay; Juan Martin, or *El Empe*-

* The bands formed of smugglers were called *Quadrillas*.

cinado, who vexed the neighborhood of Madrid; Julian Sanchez, in the Gata and Salamanca country; Doctor Rovera, Perena, and some others, in Catalonia; Julian Palarea, or *El Medico*, between the Moreno and Toledo; the curate Merino, *El Principe*, and Saornil, in Castile; the friar Sapia, in Soria, and Juan Abril, near Segovia.

But these men were of very different merit. Renovales, a regular officer, raised the peasantry of the valleys between Pampluna and Zaragoza, after the fall of the latter city, and was soon subdued. Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, and the student Mina, discovered military talent, and Sanchez was certainly a very bold and honest man; but Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of the student, far outstripped his contemporaries in fame. He shed the blood of his prisoners freely, yet rather from false principles, and under peculiar circumstances, than from any real ferocity, his natural disposition being manly and generous; and although not possessed of any peculiar military genius, he had a sound judgment, surprising energy, and a constant spirit. By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders of his own country, and never would suffer any *hidalgo*, or gentleman, to join his band. From 1809 until the end of the war, he maintained himself in the provinces bordering on the Ebro; often defeated, and chased from place to place, he yet gradually increased his forces, until, in 1812, he was at the head of more than ten thousand men, whom he paid regularly, and supplied from resources chiefly created by himself; one of which was remarkable:—He established a treaty with the French generals, by which articles, not being warlike stores, coming from France, had safe conduct from his *partida*, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the subsistence of his followers.

That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops; and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than fifty thousand of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be assumed as a truth, that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the good will of the nation would have been the extirpating of the *partidas*. Nevertheless, a great and unquestionable advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the British, from the existence of these bands: the French could never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, except

by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts ; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph, an advantage equal to a reinforcement of thirty thousand men

PORTUGUESE POWER.

The Portuguese military system has been already explained. The ranks of the regular army, and of the militia, were filling ; the arms and equipments were supplied by England ; and means were taken to give effect to the authority of the *Capitães Mor*, or chiefs of districts, under whom the *ordenanzas* were to be gathered for the defence of the country. The people, having been a second time relieved from an invasion by the intervention of a British army, were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance of their deliverers ; but the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded the efforts made to draw forth the military resources of the kingdom ; and it is curious that, until the end of the war, such was the reluctance of the people to become soldiers, that, notwithstanding their undoubted hatred of the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority of the soldier's condition over that of the peasant or artisan, the recruiting was always difficult ; the odious spectacle was constantly exhibited, of men marched in chains, to reinforce armies, which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to have been a sacred cause.

The actual number of regular troops, armed and organized, was about fifteen thousand, but notwithstanding the courage displayed by those employed in the late operations, Marshal Beresford was still doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to act separately from the British troops. The most important fortresses in a condition for defence were Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in the first line ; Abrantes and Peniché, in the second ; the citadel, and forts of Lisbon, Palmela, and Setuval, in the third. But there were many other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of the country to assemble upon ; and hence Portugal offered, not only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in itself ; central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the English General to act without reference to the Spanish government or Spanish commanders ; an advantage more justly appreciated at the end of this campaign than at the commencement. Such were the relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula ; yet, to take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to look beyond the actual field of battle ; for the contest in Spain,

no longer isolated, was become an integral part of the great European struggle against France.

Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, entered Vienna, and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube; but a severe check, received at the battle of Esling on the 21st of May, so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he deemed it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his empire for one gigantic effort, which should restore the terror of his name. The appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while thus mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and as their hopes rose, their boasts became extravagant, more especially in England, where, to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow, was regarded as a heinous offence; and where the government, buoyed up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble and effectual warfare in Portugal than of nourishing and aiding the secondary and rather degrading hostility of conspirators, malcontents, and military adventurers in Germany.

While Sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two other armies were simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the French empire. The one, consisting of about twelve thousand men, drawn from Sicily, was destined to invade Italy, the southern parts of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on the Tagliamento.* The other was assembled on the coast of England, where above forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could boast of, and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies of the world combined, composed an armament intended to destroy the great marine establishment which the French Emperor had so suddenly and so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an expedition had never before left the British shores, neither any one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously conducted; for the marine and land forces, combined, numbered more than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of the bravest, yet the object in view was comparatively insignificant, and even that was not obtained. Delivered over to the leading of a man whose military incapacity has caused the glorious title of Chatham to be scorned, this ill-fated army, with spirit, and strength, and zeal to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth, perished, without a blow, in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren! And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of national honor, that men were found in Parliament base enough to reprobate the convention of Cintra, to sneer at Sir John Moore's operations, and yet to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even glorious.

* Adjutant-General's Returns.

The operation against Italy was less unfortunate rather than more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted, although during that period Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his Queen and the energy of Salicetti, the Minister of Police. We have seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but yielding to the representations of Sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make this display of military foolery: yet it is not with the bad or good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal, but with that direful ministerial incapacity which suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to waste and dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects, while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was left without an adequate force.

For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsular war, sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a British force; for the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny of France, the principal army of that country had met with an important check; the great conqueror's fortune seemed to waver, and the moment had arrived when the British government was called to display all its wisdom and energy. The Duke of York had performed his duty; he had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, all disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers; but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on the frontiers of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding them. He was forced to commence a campaign upon which the fate of the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, and the other to an inglorious and miserable fate. Shall the deliverance of the Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, under all the burden of their folly?

CHAPTER V.

Campaign of Talavera—Choice of operations—Sir Arthur Wellesley moves into Spain—Joseph marches against Venegas—Orders Victor to return to Talavera—Cuesta arrives at Almaraz—Sir Arthur reaches Placentia—Interview with Cuesta—Plan of operations arranged—Sir Arthur, embarrassed by the want of provisions, detaches Sir Robert Wilson up the Vera de Placentia, passes the Tietar, and unites with Cuesta at Oropesa—Skirmish at Talavera—Bad conduct of the Spanish troops—Victor takes post behind the Alberche—Cuesta's absurdity—Victor retires from the Alberche—Sir Arthur, in want of provisions, refuses to pass that river—Intrigues of Mr. Frere—The Junta secretly orders Venegas not to execute his part of the operation.

CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA.

IN the foregoing chapters the real state of affairs in the Peninsula has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different aspect to the English General, because false informations, egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to mislead Sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters, describing the enemy's misery and fears; nor was the camp free from these inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous of French weakness as publicly to announce to the Junta of Badajos that Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers. Nay, Sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the Junta, perhaps also a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come.

The Spanish government and the Spanish generals were importunate for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support; and the English General was as eager; for he was at the head of gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt that, if the Duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of Sir John Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive position, near Lisbon, until it became an object of suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people.

There were three lines of offensive operations open:—

1. *To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta's army, and, making Elvas and Badajos the base of movements, attack Victor in front.* This line was circuitous. It permitted the enemy to cover himself by the Tagus, and the operations of the allies would have been cramped

by the Sierra de Guadalupe on one side, and the mountains lying between Albuquerque and Alcantara on the other; strong detachments must also have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon, on the right bank of the Tagus. Finally, the communication between the Duke of Belluno and Soult being free, Beresford's corps would have been endangered.

2. *To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the base of movements, and to operate in conjunction with Beresford, the Duke de Parque, and Romana, by the line of Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas occupied the attention of the first and fourth corps on the Tagus.* The objections to this line were, that it separated the British troops from the most efficient and most numerous, and obliged them to act with the weakest and most irregular of the Spanish armies; that it abandoned Cuesta to the ruin which his headstrong humor would certainly provoke; and as the loss of Seville or of Lisbon would inevitably follow, the instructions of the English ministers (which enjoined the defence of the latter city as paramount to every object, save the military possession of Cadiz) would have been neglected.

3. *To march upon Placentia and Almaraz, form a junction with Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, while Venegas operated in the same view by the line of La Mancha.* The obstacles in the way of this plan were—1. That it exposed Cuesta to be defeated by Victor before the junction; and after the junction, the combinations would still be dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas's movements. 2. That Sir Arthur Wellesley's march, with reference to Soult's troops, would be a flank march; an unsafe operation at all times, but, on this occasion, when the troops must move through the long and narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly dangerous. Nevertheless, this line was adopted, nor were the reasons in favor of it devoid of force. The number of French immediately protecting Madrid was estimated at fifty thousand; but confidential officers, sent to the head-quarters of Cuesta and Venegas, had ascertained that their strength was not overstated at thirty-eight thousand for the first, and twenty-five thousand for the second; all well armed and equipped, and the last certainly the best and most efficient army that the Spaniards had yet brought into the field. Now the English force in Portugal amounted to thirty thousand men exclusive of the sick, twenty-two thousand being under arms on the frontier, and eight thousand at Lisbon; here, then, was a mass of ninety thousand regular troops that could be brought to bear on fifty thousand; besides which, there were Sir Robert Wilson's legion, about a thousand strong, and the Spanish *partidas* of the Guadalupe and the Sierra de Bejar.

The ridge of mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from Castile and Leon being, as has been already related, impracticable for artillery, except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it was supposed that the twenty thousand men under Beresford and the Duke del Parque would be sufficient to block those lines of march, and that Romana, moving by the *Tras os Montes*, might join the Duke del Parque; thus thirty thousand men, supported by two fortresses, would be ready to protect the flank of the British army in its march from Placentia towards Madrid. But this was a vain calculation, for Romana remained ostentatiously idle at Coruña, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of them; having had no experience of Spanish promises, he trusted them too far, and at the same time made a false judgment of the force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth corps at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid were unknown to him; the strength of the second corps, and, perhaps, the activity of its chief, were also underrated. Instead of fifteen or twenty thousand harassed French troops, without artillery, there were seventy thousand fighting men behind the mountains!

The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up from the camp of Abrantes, and being organized in the following manner, marched into Spain:—

		<i>Artillery.</i>	
Six brigades,	30 guns,	commanded by Maj.-Gen. Howorth.	
		<i>Cavalry.</i>	
Three brigades,	3,047 sabres,	commanded by Lt.-Gen. Payne.	
		<i>Infantry.</i>	
1st div. of 4 brigades,	6,023 bayonets,	commanded by Lt.-Gen. Sherbrooke.	
2d do. 2 do.	3,947 do.	do.	Maj.-Gen. Hill.
3d do. 2 do.	3,736 do.	do.	Maj.-Gen. Mackenzie.
4th do. 2 do.	2,957 do.	do.	Br.-Gen. Campbell.
5 divs. 13 brigades,	19,710 sabres and bayonets.		
—	1,287	Engineers, artillery, and wagon-train.	
Grand total.....20,997 men, and 30 pieces of artillery.			

Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon, and the troops on their march from that city, being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets, were organized in three brigades, commanded by Major-General Lightfoot and Brigadier-Generals Robert and Catlin Craufurd. But the leading brigade, under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on the 28th of June.

The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; one column proceeding through Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a boat-bridge was established. The 1st of July the head-quarters

were at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued their route in one column, by Moralejo and Coria; a flanking brigade, under General Donkin, being directed through Ceclavan and Torijoncillos, to explore the country between Zarza Mayor and the Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters were established at Placentia. The 10th, the army arrived at that place, and was, soon after, joined by a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry from Lisbon.

At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz; and Victor, of whose intermediate movements it is time to take notice, was at Talavera de la Reyna. When that Marshal had retired from Torremocha, the valley of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of the fourth and fifth corps;* but the valley of Placentia was extremely fertile and untouched, and the Duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened by the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, resolved to take post there, keeping a bridge at Bazagona, on the Tietar, by which he could, in two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured to pass the Tagus at Almaraz. At Placentia, also, he could open a communication with the second and fifth corps, and observe closely the movements of the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The bridge at Bazagona had been finished on the 21st of June, and the French light troops were scouring the country towards Placentia, when the King, who had already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large part of the cavalry of the first corps to reinforce the fourth, ordered the Duke of Belluno to retire instantly to Talavera, leaving rear-guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order, which arrived the 22d of June, was the result of that indecision which none but truly great men, or fools, are free from; the first, because they can see their way clearly through the thousand difficulties that encumber and bewilder the mind in war; the last, because they see nothing.

On the present occasion, General Sebastiani had reported that Venegas was reinforced and ready to penetrate by La Mancha; and the King, swayed by this false information, disturbed by the march of Cuesta, and still more by Blake's advance against Zaragoza (the result of which was then unknown), became so alarmed that he commanded St. Cyr to move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light cavalry and a division of infantry from Victor, obliged that Marshal to fall back on Talavera; and even commanded Mortier to bring up the fifth corps from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, following Napoleon's orders, it should have gone to Salamanca.

In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph had penetrated as far

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

as the Jabalon river, in La Mancha; and as the Spaniard, fearful of the tempest approaching him, immediately took shelter in the Morena, the King, leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored the light cavalry to the first corps, and, with his guards and reserve, returned to Madrid. But, while he had been pursuing a shadow, Victor was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six long marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten days, the Duke of Belluno, with only two divisions of infantry and two thousand cavalry—in all about fourteen thousand men—had remained at Talavera without any support, although sixty thousand men were marching against him from different points.

Victor did not suffer as he might have done, but his numerical weakness was certainly the safety of Cuesta; for that General, having followed the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, crossed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 23d of June, and pushed an advanced guard towards Oropesa. He had thirty-eight thousand men, yet he remained tranquil while (at a distance of only twelve miles) fourteen thousand French made a flank movement that lasted three days; and his careless method of acting, and his unskilful dispositions were so evident, that the French cavalry, far from fearing, were preparing to punish him, when he suddenly took the alarm, and, withdrawing to Almaraz, occupied himself in finishing his bridges over the Tagus.

The 28th of June, Victor, having removed his hospitals and dépôts from Arzobispo, had taken a position behind the Alberche, keeping, however, three battalions and the cavalry at Talavera, with advanced posts at Calera and Gamonal; a small detachment, also, watched the course of the Tagus from the mouth of the Alberche to that of the Guadarama, and a movable column was sent to Escalona, to observe the Vera de Placentia, and the passes leading upon Avila. In executing this retrograde movement, Victor, having no means of transport, burnt ten out of the fifteen pontoons supporting his bridge over the Tietar; and, for the same reason, he threw a considerable quantity of powder and shot into the river.* His troops had been for four days on quarter rations, and were suffering from sickness and hunger; and as the Tagus was fordable in several places, the danger of his position is evident. The British were, however, still at Abrantes, and Cuesta knew not how to profit by this opportunity before the King returned to La Mancha.

Such was the position of the different armies when the British General arrived at Placentia. He had seen Soult's letters, found upon General Franceschi, and thus ascertained that the second

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, First Corps, MS.

corps was at Zamora, and from Franceschi himself, who passed as a prisoner, at the same time, he learned the arrival of the fifth corps at Valladolid; but the march of Ney's corps was not suspected, and the tenor of Soult's letters led to the notion that Galicia was to be retained. A letter of Victor's to Joseph, dated the 23d of June, and written in the most desponding language, had been likewise intercepted; and, as Soult's correspondence also gave a strong picture of *his* difficulties, the general impression that the French armies were not only weak but utterly dismayed, was rather augmented than lessened by this information. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, could not but have some distrust, when he knew that *two corps* were beyond the mountains, on his left, and though far from suspecting the extent of his danger, he took additional precautions to protect that flank, and renewed his instructions to Beresford to watch the enemy's movements, and to look carefully to the defence of the *Puerto Perales*. But the pass of Baños was still to be guarded, and for this purpose Sir Arthur applied to Cuesta.*

The Spanish General was at first unwilling to detach any men to that quarter, yet finally agreed that two battalions from his army and two others from the town of Bejar, at the other side of the pass, should unite to defend Baños, and that the Duke del Parque should also send a detachment to the pass of Perales. Although these measures appeared sufficient to obviate danger from Soult's corps, weakened as it was supposed to be, they were evidently futile to check the real force under that Marshal; and they were rendered absolutely ridiculous by Cuesta, who sent two weak battalions of three hundred men each, and with only twenty rounds of ammunition per man: and this was only a part of a system which already weighed heavily on the English General.

The 10th, Sir Arthur Wellesley had proceeded to Cuesta's headquarters, near the Col de Mirabete, to confer with him on their future operations. Ever since the affair of Valdez, in 1808, the Junta had been sorely afraid of Cuesta, and, suspecting that he was meditating some signal vengeance, they endeavored to raise up rivals to his power. In this view, they had lavished honors and authority upon Blake, and when the defeat at Belchite crushed their hopes in that quarter, they turned their eyes upon Venegas, and increased his forces, taking care to give him the best troops. Still Cuesta's force was formidable, and to reduce it was the object both of Mr. Frere and the Junta; the motive of the first being to elevate the Duke of Albuquerque: the intention of the others being merely to reduce the power of Cuesta.

* Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, printed in 1810.

But whatever might have been the latter's ultimate intention with respect to the Junta, it is certain that his natural obstinacy and violence were greatly increased by a knowledge of these proceedings, and that he was ill-disposed towards the English General, as thinking him a party concerned in the intrigues. When, therefore, Sir Arthur, at the instigation of Mr. Frere, proposed that a draft of ten thousand Spanish troops should be detached towards Avila and Segovia, Cuesta replied that it must be done by the British, and absolutely refused to furnish more than two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to strengthen Sir Robert Wilson's partisan corps, which was destined to act on the enemy's right.* This determination again baffled Mr. Frere's project of placing the Duke of Albuquerque at the head of an independent force, and obliged the Supreme Junta to fall upon some other expedient for reducing Cuesta's power; however, it was fortunate that the old Spaniard resisted the proposal, because the ten thousand men would have gone straight into the midst of the fifth corps, which, in expectation of such a movement, was then at Villa Castin, and having been rejoined by the detachment of Colonel Briche, from Catalonia, was eighteen thousand strong, and supported by Kellermann's division of cavalry at Valladolid.

The discussion between the generals lasted two days; but with the approbation of the Supreme Junta, it was finally agreed that the British and Spanish armies, under Sir Arthur and Cuesta, should march on the 18th against Victor, and that Venegas, advancing at the same time through La Mancha, should leave Toledo and Aranjuez to his left, and push for Fuente Duenas and Villa Maorique on the upper Tagus. If this movement should draw Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, to that side, Venegas was to keep him in play while the allied forces defeated Victor. If Sebastiani disregarded it, Venegas was to cross the Tagus and march upon Madrid from the south-east, while Sir Robert Wilson, reinforced by some Spanish battalions, menaced that capital from the opposite quarter.

Previous to entering Spain, Sir Arthur had ascertained that the valleys of the Alagon and the Arago, and those between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo, were fertile, and capable of nourishing his army, and he had sent commissaries to all these points to purchase mules and to arrange with the alcaldes of the different districts for the supply of the troops. He had obtained the warmest assurances from the Supreme Junta, that every needful article should be forthcoming, and the latter had also sent the Intendant-General, Don Lonzano de Torres, to the British head-quarters, with full powers

* Sir A. Wollesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

to forward all arrangements for the supply of the English soldiers. Relying upon these preparations, Sir Arthur had crossed the frontier with few means of transport and without magazines, for Portugal could not furnish what was required, and, moreover, the Portuguese peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting their own country; a matter, however, apparently of little consequence, because Mr. Frere, writing officially at the time, described the people of Estremadura as viewing "*the war in the light of a crusade, and carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause!*"

From Castello Branco to Placentia is but seven days' march, yet that short time was sufficient to prove the bad faith of the Junta, and the illusion under which Mr. Frere labored. Neither mules for the transport of ammunition and provisions, nor the promised help of the authorities, nor aid of any kind could be procured; and Don Lonzano de Torres, although to Sir Arthur he freely acknowledged the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the inhabitants, and the shameful conduct of the Supreme Junta, afterwards, without shame, asserted that the British troops had always received and consumed double rations, and were in want of nothing; an assertion in which he was supported by Don Martin de Garay, the Spanish Secretary of State; the whole proceeding being a concerted plan to afford the Junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting a slur upon the English General's conduct, if any disasters should happen.*

Sir Arthur Wellesley, seriously alarmed for the subsistence of his army, wrote, upon the 16th, to Mr. Frere and to General O'Donoghue, the chief of Cuesta's staff, representing to both the distress of the troops, and intimating his resolution *not to proceed beyond the Alberche*, unless his wants were immediately supplied; faithful, however, to his agreement with Cuesta, he prepared to put his force in motion for that river. It was known at Placentia on the 15th, that Ney had retreated from Coruña; but it was believed that his corps had been recalled to France, and no change took place in the plan of campaign. It was not suspected that the sixth corps had then been sixteen days at Astorga!

The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was about to plunge, is intersected by several rivers, with rugged banks and deep channels; but their courses being very little out of the parallel of the Tagus, the Alberche is in a manner inclosed by the Tietar. Now, Sir Robert Wilson, having a detachment of four thousand Portuguese and Spanish troops, had ascended the right bank of the latter river, and gained possession of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, and of the pass of San Pedro Bernardino, which leads upon Madrid; in this position he covered the

* Appendix 18

Vera de Placentia, and threatened Victor's communication with the capital. The French Marshal was alarmed, and a movement of the whole army in the same direction would have obliged him to abandon the lower Alberche;* because two marches effected beyond Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Maqueda, would have placed Sir Arthur Wellesley between the first corps and Madrid. But, on the other hand, the line of country was too rugged for rapid movements with a large body; and it was necessary first to secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, having recovered his third division on the 7th of July, was again at the head of twenty-five thousand men. With such a force he could not be trusted near the Spaniards, and the British General therefore resolved to cross the Tietar, at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas upon Oropesa.

The 16th, two companies of the *staff corps*, with a working party of five hundred men, marched from Placentia to Bazagona, to throw a bridge over the Tietar. The Duke of Belluno had wasted many days in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to form his bridge at that place, and when he retired upon Talavera, he destroyed the greatest part of the equipage;† but the English officer employed on this occasion pulled down an old house in the neighborhood, felled some pine trees in a wood three miles distant, and, uniting intelligence with labor, contrived, without other aid than a few hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid bridge over the Tietar.

The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking the route of Miajadas, reached Talayuela.

The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello and Casa de Somas. The advanced posts were at Venta de St. Juliens.

The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as their marches had been long, and conducted through a difficult country, they halted the 21st; on which day Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by Naval Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and united his whole force at Velada, except a small detachment, which marched along the south bank of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge of Talavera.

The Duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, had supported his posts at Talavera with a division of infantry, which was disposed in successive detachments behind that town; but his situation appeared critical, because the allies, covered by the Alberche, might still gain a march and reach Escalona before him, and from thence either push for Madrid, by the pass of Brunete, or, taking post at

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

† Sémélé's Journal of the First Corps' Operations, MS.

Maqueda, cut him off from the capital. His sources of information were however sure, and he contented himself with sending a regiment of hussars to Cazar de Escalona, to watch the upper Alberche, and to support the movable column opposed to Sir Robert Wilson.

The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and Velada, Victor recalled all his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry behind the Alberche.

The 22d, the allies moved in two columns, to drive the French posts from Talavera, and Cuesta, marching by the high road, came first up with the enemy's rear-guard, near the village of Gamonal. Then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, and absurdity, that has seldom been equalled in war; the past defeats of the Spanish army were rendered quite explicable; the little fruit derived from them by Marshal Victor, quite inexplicable. General Latour Maubourg, with two thousand dragoons, came boldly on to the table-land of Gamonal, and sustaining a cannonade, not only checked the head of the Spanish leading column, but actually obliged General Zayas, who commanded it, to display his whole line, consisting of fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; nor did the French horsemen give back at all, until the appearance of the red uniforms on their right informed them that it was time to retire. Then, and not till then, Latour Maubourg, supported by some infantry, retreated behind the Alberche, and without loss, although many batteries, and at least six thousand Spanish horse, were close on his rear; the latter could never be induced to make even a partial charge, however favorable the opportunity, and by two o'clock the whole French army was safely concentrated on its position. Ruffin's division on the left touched the Tagus, and protected the bridge over the Alberche, which was more immediately defended by a regiment of infantry and fourteen pieces of artillery. Villatte's and Lapisse's divisions, drawn up in successive lines, on some high ground that overlooked the surrounding country, formed the right: the heavy cavalry were in second line near the bridge, and in this situation Victor rested the 22d and 23d.

It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information from the Spaniards by gentle means; hence, the French were usually better supplied with intelligence than the British, while the native generals never knew anything about the enemy, until they felt the weight of his blows. Up to this period, Sir Arthur's best sources of information had been the intercepted letters of the French; and now, although the latter had been in the same position, and without any change of numbers since the 7th, the inhabitants of Talavera

could not, or would not, give any information of their strength or situation; nor could any reasonable calculation be formed of either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus, and, from the mountains on the left bank of that river, saw the French position in reverse. The general outline of an attack was, however, agreed upon for the next morning, but the details were unsettled, and when the English commander came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone to bed! The British troops were under arms at three o'clock the next morning; Cuesta's staff were, however, not aroused from slumber until seven o'clock, and the old man finally objected to fight that day, alleging, among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. There was something more than absurdity in these proceedings. Victor, who was not ignorant of the weak points of his own position, remained tranquil the 23d, being well assured that no attack would take place, for it is certain that he had a correspondence with some of the Spanish staff, and the secret discussions between Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each party was present, became known to the enemy in twenty-four hours after; indeed, Cuesta was himself suspected of treachery by many, yet apparently without reason.

In the course of the 23d, the Spanish officer commanding the advanced posts reported that the French guns were withdrawn, and that it was evident they meant to retreat; Cuesta then became willing to attack, and proposed, in concert with Sir Arthur Wellesley, to examine Victor's position, when, to the surprise of the English commander, the Spaniard arrived in a coach, drawn by six horses, to perform this duty, and as the inequalities of the ground obliged him to descend from his vehicle, he cast himself at the foot of a tree, and in a few moments went to sleep; yet he was always ready to censure and to thwart every proposal of his able coadjutor. This time, however, he consented to fall upon the enemy, and the troops were in motion early in the morning of the 24th; but the Duke of Belluno was again duly informed of their intention, and having withdrawn his movable column from Escalona, and relinquished the road to Madrid, retreated during the night to Torrijos. Thus, the first combination of the allies failed entirely, and each hour the troops of the enemy were accumulating around them; for Venegas, who should have been at Fuente Duenas, high up on the Tagus, had not even passed Damyel; the King was collecting his whole strength in front, between Toledo and Talavera, and Soult was fast gathering his more formidable power behind the mountains of Bejar.

The English General was indeed still ignorant of the danger which threatened him from the Salamanca country, or he would,

doubtless, have withdrawn at once to Placentia, and secured his communications with Lisbon, and with Beresford's troops; and other powerful reasons were not wanting to prevent his further advance. Before he quitted Placentia he had completed contracts with the alcaldes, in the Vera de Placentia, for two hundred and fifty thousand rations of forage and provisions; this, together with what he had before collected, would have furnished supplies for ten or twelve days, a sufficient time to beat Victor, and carry the army into a fresh country; but distrustful, as he had reason to be, of the Spaniards, he again gave notice to Cuesta and the Junta, that BEYOND THE ALBERCHE he would not move, unless his wants were immediately supplied; for hitherto the rations contracted for had not been delivered, and his representations to the Junta and to Cuesta were, by both, equally disregarded; there were no means of transport provided; the troops were already on less than half allowance; absolute famine approached, and when the General demanded food for his soldiers, at the hands of those whose cause he came to defend, he was answered with false excuses, and insulted by false statements. Under any circumstances this would have forced him to halt, but the advance having been made in the exercise of his own discretion, and not at the command of his government, there could be no room for hesitation: wherefore, remonstrating warmly, but manfully, with the Supreme Junta, he announced his resolution to go no further, nay, even *to withdraw from Spain altogether*.*

It is evident that without these well-founded reasons for pausing, Cuesta's conduct, and the state of his army, offered no solid ground for expecting success by continuing the forward movement; yet the faithless and perverse conduct of the Supreme Junta, although hidden as yet from Sir Arthur Wellesley, far exceeded the measure even of Cuesta's obdurate folly. That body, after having agreed to the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded, in the fulness of their ignorance, that the combined troops in the valley of the Tagus would be sufficient to overthrow Joseph, and, therefore, secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part; arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, that it would be a master-stroke of policy to save him from any chance of defeat, and hoping thus to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own creatures, to maintain their own power. This was the cause why the army of La Mancha had failed to appear on the Tagus: and thus, the welfare of millions was made the sport of men, who yet were never tired of praising themselves, and have not failed to find admirers elsewhere.

As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying every thing and doing nothing, Sir Arthur's remonstrances drew forth

* Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

many official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions, after their manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thinking it necessary to make some apology for himself, asserted that the evil was deep-rooted, and that he had had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils that blighted the Spanish cause were deep-seated, and Mr. Frere, who could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that indispensable preliminary to military operations, and which was really within his province, thought himself competent to direct all the operations themselves which were in the province of the generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of the day; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders; to insult Sir John Moore; to pester Sir John Cradock with war-like advice; and to arrange the plan of campaign for Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, without that officer's concurrence.

CHAPTER VI.

Cuesta passes the Alberche—Sir Arthur Wellesley sends two English divisions to support him—Soult is appointed to command the second, fifth, and sixth corps—He proposes to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo and threaten Lisbon—He enters Salamanca, and sends General Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of operations—The King quits Madrid—Unites his whole army—Crosses the Guadarama river, and attacks Cuesta—Combat of Alcabon—Spaniards fall back in confusion to the Alberche—Cuesta refuses to pass that river—His dangerous position—The French advance—Cuesta re-crosses the Tietar—Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up the combined forces on the position of Talavera—The King crosses the Tietar—Skirmish at Casa de Salinas—Combat on the evening of the 27th—Panic in the Spanish army—Combat on the morning of the 28th—The King holds a council of war—Jourdan and Victor propose different plans—The King follows that of Victor—Battle of Talavera—The French re-cross the Alberche—General Craufurd arrives in the English camp—His extraordinary march—Observations.

THE English General's resolution to halt at Talavera made little impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him, and Madrid, nay, the Pyrenees themselves, instantly rose on the view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of military discipline and of the friendly warnings of Sir Arthur, who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the

24th, and being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued them by the road of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and by the road of Madrid, as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and marched himself to St. Ollalla, as if chasing a deer, but the 26th he discovered that he had been hunting a tiger. Meanwhile Sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the consequence of this imprudence, had sent General Sherbrooke, with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrally situated with respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with Sir Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23d. But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this complicated campaign.

The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, had received a despatch from the Emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English. "*Wellesley*," said Napoleon, "*will probably advance, by the Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him;*" for, at that distance, and without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this all-knowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and as certainly as those who projected them. The Duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these instructions to the King, and, at the same time, made known his own opinions and designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of Sir Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation of hostility in the north, that the English were in march with the design of joining Cuesta, and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed to concentrate the third corps at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, and menace Lisbon, which, he justly observed, would bring the English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if, as some supposed, the intention of Sir Arthur was to unite, at Bragança, with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to oppose them.

In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march with the sixth corps, by the left bank of the Escla. to Zamora; but

the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that the King, alarmed by Sebastiani's report, drew the fifth corps to Villa Castin, while Marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon, mortified also at being placed under the orders of another Marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry, under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Placentia: these troops relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellermann, who was still charged with the general government of the province.

The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Placentia became known, and it was manifest that Sir Arthur had no design to act north of the Douro; wherefore the Duke of Dalmatia resolved to advance, with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca; and, partly by authority, partly by address, he obliged Ney to put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier's dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile King Joseph, having returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first incredulous of the advance of Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but he agreed to Soult's project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that Marshal arrived, with his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under General Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes.

The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that Sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus, and therefore again addressed the King to move him to an immediate siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands were complied with, the most important being—1. The formation of a battering train; 2. The concentration of an immense number of detachments, which weakened the active corps; 3. A reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to join the *corps d'armée*. The first corps should, he said, continue to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, and be prepared either to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle,

if that should become necessary.* The siege might thus be pressed vigorously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida would be next invested, and the communications of the English army with Lisbon threatened.

The 17th, the King replied, through Marshal Jourdan, that he approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult's demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellermann and Bonnet with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the Asturias and thus strengthen the communications with France. This drew from the Duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance: "Under present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. Let us prepare, first, by concentrating on a few points capable of defence and covering the hospitals and dépôts which may be on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy's masses we shall recover all our ground." Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus: "I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed." It is remarkable that Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says: "I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large masses."

Meanwhile, Heudelet's division, having pushed back the advanced guards of the Duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and that Sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had already reached Placentia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at the same time, reinforced Heudelet's division with Merle's; the latter's place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the sixth corps, the remainder of which continued on the Escla, fronting the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men were at or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the passes of Baños, on the very day that Sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through the Duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him!

Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched General Foy to Madrid, with information of Sir Arthur's march, and to arrange the future combinations of the two armies. "It is probable," he said, "that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will oblige the English General to change his plan; but, if he shall already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him all together, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and our operations may go on with advantage." Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few hours afterwards, intelligence reached the King that the allies were at Talavera, in front of the first corps, and that Sir Robert Wilson (whose strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now cast. Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Placentia; then, leaving General Belliard, with only three thousand men, in the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23d, being at Naval Carneiro, he received notice that the first corps would retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind the Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with the Duke of Belluno on the 25th.

During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas near Danyel, deceived that General, and, returning to Toledo by forced marches, left three thousand men there, with the design of obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjuez. With the remainder of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the King, and thus nearly fifty thousand fighting men and ninety pieces of artillery were concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and within a few miles of Cuesta's advanced guard. But, on the side of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla, Sherbrooke, with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas, and the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were concentrated and in full march to attack, the allies were separated in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were inclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus! On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly.

In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the Duke of Belluno showed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot upon which every movement turned; it was the central point, by holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult's operations rendered every forward step a stride towards ruin; if, leaving Venegas to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The King knew that Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that Marshal had already assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days' march from Placentia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th; hence, to insure complete success, the royal army

needed only to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the plan that Soult had recommended, that the King promised to follow, and that Marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the separation of the allies, the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of famine, (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,) greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not preclude the King from punishing the folly of the Spanish General, whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so strongly invited an attack.

I have said that Cuesta was following a tiger: he had some faint perception of his danger on the 25th, and he gave orders to retreat on the 26th; but the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at two o'clock in the morning of that day, quickly drove the Spanish cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon; where General Zayas had drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand horsemen, and eight guns, on a plain, and now offered battle.

COMBAT OF ALCABON.

The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo Perez, and the left on the chapel of the same name. The French cavalry, under Latour Maubourg, advanced in a parallel line against the position, and a cannonade commenced; but at that moment, the head of the French infantry appeared in sight, the Spaniards broke, and fled in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed at full gallop by the horsemen, who pressed them so sorely that the panic would, doubtless, have spread through the whole army, but for the courage of Albuquerque, who, coming up with a division of three thousand fresh cavalry, held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated, in the greatest disorder, towards the Alberche.

After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened their efforts; the main body halted there, the advanced guards, save a few cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made to profit from the unconnected position of the allies—a gross and palpable error; for, either by the sword or dispersion, the Spaniards lost, on that day, not less than four thousand men, and such was their fear and haste that it required but a little more perseverance in the pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque, alone, showed any front; but his efforts were unavailing, and the disorder continued to increase until General Sherbrooke, marching out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; there was no concert between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was unfavorable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no position upon which the combined

forces could retire had been agreed upon ! What, then, would have been the consequence if the whole French army had borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered masses ?

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, had hastened to the front, seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a battle was at hand, and, being persuaded that in a strong defensive position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock, earnestly endeavored to persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke's people could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where there was ground suited for defence ; but Cuesta's uncouth nature again broke forth ; his people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued, bewildered, clustering on a narrow slip of low, flat land, between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas, and the first shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of defeat ; yet it was in vain that Sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those things, and entreated of him to avoid the fall of the rock that trembled over his head ; he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by any further retreat, and that he would fight where he stood : in this mood he passed the night.

The 27th, at daylight, the British General renewed his solicitations, at first fruitlessly, but when the enemy's cavalry came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly yielded, yet, turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed that "*He had first made the Englishman go down on his knees.*" Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of his genius, now assumed the direction of both armies. General Mackenzie's division and a brigade of light cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the retrograde movement, and the rest of the allied troops were soon in full march for the position, which was about six miles in the rear. Sir Robert Wilson, who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, and opened a communication with Madrid, and who would certainly have entered that capital but for the approaching battle, was also recalled. He returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the enemy's rear, but did not attempt to join the army.

Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera, the country was flat, and covered with olives and cork-trees ; but nearly parallel to the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or three miles, a chain of round steep hills bounded the woody plain. Beyond these hills, and separated from them by a deep and rugged valley, something less than half a mile wide, was the mountain-ridge which divides the bed of the Alberche from that of the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly from the Tagus would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles, and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, which was built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right of the Spaniards there, drawing their army up in two lines, with the left resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt was constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry was posted; all this front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud walls, breast-works, and felled trees. The cavalry was posted behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by a large house in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat on to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their disposition be even seen; and thus, one-half of the line necessary to be occupied by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and yet held by the worst troops.

The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry Campbell's division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish left, and Sherbrooke's division stood next to Campbell's, but arranged on one line only, because Mackenzie's division, destined to form the second line, was then near the Alberche. It was intended that Hill's division should close the left of the British, by taking post on the highest hill in the chain before mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, from some cause unknown, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied.

The whole line thus displayed was two miles in length, the left resting on the valley between the round hills and the mountain, and the front covered by a water-course, which, commencing about the centre of the line, opened deeply as it passed the left and became a wide chasm in the valley. Part of the British cavalry was with General Mackenzie, part in the plain beyond the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the junction of the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms that day were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous defeat, could only produce from thirty-three to thirty-four thousand men, but they had seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; the French came on with eighty guns, and, including the King's guards, nearly fifty thousand men, of which seven thousand were cavalry. But what a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did not exceed nineteen thousand.

The King passed the night of the 26th at St. Ollalla, but put his troops in motion before daylight, on the 27th. Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry preceded the column, and the first and fourth

corps, the royal guards, and reserve, followed in succession. The appearance of the leading squadrons, near Cazalegas, hastened, as we have seen, Cuesta's decision, and, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the first corps reached the heights of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as they took up their position, could be perceived; but neither their situation nor disposition could be made out, on account of the forest, which, clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the foot of the first range of hills, masked all their evolutions. The Duke of Belluno, however, being well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed their true position, and, in pursuance of his advice, the King directed the fourth corps against the left of the allies, the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself, with the first corps, against the right; the guards and the reserve supported the fourth corps.*

Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the Alberche to the position. The one, being the royal road to Talavera, was taken by the fourth corps and the reserve; the other, passing through a place called the *Casa de Salinas*, led directly upon Sir Arthur Wellesley's extreme left, and was taken by the first corps; but to reach this Casa, which was situated near the plain in front of the British left wing, it was necessary to ford the Alberche, and to march for a mile or two through the woods. A dust, which was observed to rise near the Casa itself, indicated the presence of troops at that place, and, in fact, General Mackenzie's division, and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted, the infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain: yet no patrols had been sent to the front, and this negligence gave rise to the

COMBAT OF SALINAS.

About three o'clock, Lapisse and Ruffin's division having crossed the Alberche, marched in two columns towards the *Casa de Salinas*, and their light infantry came so suddenly upon the British outposts that the latter were surprised, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was in the Casa, nearly fell into the enemy's hands. The French columns followed briskly, and charged so hotly that the English brigades were separated, and being composed principally of young battalions, got into confusion; one part fired upon another, and the whole were driven into the plain. But, in the midst of this disorder, the forty-fifth, a stubborn old regiment, and some companies of the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, were seen in perfect array, and when Sir Arthur rode up to the spot, the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily that the enemy was checked. The infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry, then crossed the plain, and

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

regained the left and centre of the position, having lost about four hundred men. General Mackenzie, with one brigade, immediately took post in second line behind the guards; the other was commanded by Colonel Donkin, who, finding the hill on the left unoccupied, drew up there without orders, and so accidentally completed the position. The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line.

Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, brought up Villatte's division, together with all the artillery and light cavalry, to the Casa de Salinas, and then, issuing from the forest, rapidly crossed the plain, advancing, with a fine military display, close up to the left of the position, where he seized an isolated hill, directly in front of Colonel Donkin's ground, and immediately opened a heavy cannonade upon that officer's brigade. Meanwhile, the fourth corps and the reserve, approaching the right more slowly, and being unable to discover the true situation of Cuesta's troops, sent their light cavalry forward to make that General show his lines. As the French horsemen rode boldly up to the front, and commenced skirmishing with their pistols, the Spaniards made a general discharge of small arms, and then, as if deprived of all sense, ten thousand infantry, and all the artillery, breaking their ranks, fled to the rear; the artillery-men carried off their horses, the infantry threw away their arms; the Adjutant-General O'Donoghue was amongst the foremost of the fugitives, and even Cuesta himself was in movement towards the rear. The panic spread, and the French would fain have charged home, but Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at hand, immediately flanked the main road with some English squadrons, and the ditches on the other side rendered the country impracticable; the fire of musketry was then renewed by those Spaniards who remained, the enemy lost some men, and finally retreated in disorder.

The greatest part of Cuesta's runaways fled as far as Oropesa, giving out that the allies were totally defeated and the French army in hot pursuit; thus, the rear became a scene of incredible disorder; the commissaries went off with their animals, the paymasters carried away their money chests, the baggage was scattered, and the alarm spread far and wide; nor is it to be concealed that some English officers disgraced their uniform on this occasion. Cuesta, however, having recovered from his first alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to head the fugitives and drive them back, and a part of the artillery, and some thousands of the infantry, were thus recovered during the night; but, in the next day's fight, the Spanish army was less by six thousand men than it should have

been, and the great redoubt in the centre was silent for want of guns.

COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.

The hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French, and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom, but towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent. Victor, however, observing that the extreme summit was unoccupied, and that Donkin's brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing it by a sudden assault.* The sun was sinking, and the twilight, and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right, appeared so favorable to his project, that, without communicating with the King, he immediately directed Ruffin's division to attack, Villatte to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, so as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously himself. Although the assault was quick and vigorous, Colonel Donkin beat back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend every part, and many of the French turning his left, mounted to the summit behind him. At this moment, General Hill was ordered to reinforce him, and it was not yet dark when that officer, while giving orders to the Colonel of the 48th regiment, was shot at by some troops from the highest point; thinking they were stragglers from his own ranks firing at the enemy, he rode up to them, followed by his Brigade-Major, Fordyce, and in a moment found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed, and Hill's horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the bridle; but the General, spurring the animal hard, broke the man's hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and, without an instant's delay, led them up with such a fierce charge, that the enemy could not sustain the shock.

The summit being thus recovered, the 48th regiment and the first battalion of detachments were immediately brought forward, and, in conjunction with the 29th, and Colonel Donkin's brigade, presented a formidable front of defence, and in good time; for the troops thus beaten back were only that part of the 9th French regiment which formed the advance of Ruffin's division; the two other regiments of that division had lost their way in the ravine, and hence the attack had not ceased, but only subsided for a time. Lapisse also was in motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German legion, and all the battalions of the 9th, being re-formed in one mass, again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigor. The fighting then became vehement, and, in the darkness,

* Sémélé's Journal of Operations, MS.

the opposing flashes of the musketry showed with what a resolute spirit the struggle was maintained; the combatants were scarcely twenty yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed doubtful; but soon the well known shout of the British soldier was heard, rising above the din of arms, and the enemy's broken troops were driven once more into the ravine below. Lapisse, who had made some impression on the German legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight hundred men, and the French about a thousand, on that day.

The bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and British soldiers were quiet; but, about twelve o'clock, the Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front, opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued for twenty minutes without any object; and during the remainder of the night, the whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from the allied troops, by which several men and officers were unfortunately slain. The Duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the prisoners, the exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French generals, now reported his own failure to the King, and proposed that a second attempt should be made in the morning, at daylight. Marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being a partial enterprise, which could not lead to any great result; yet Victor was so earnest for a trial, and, resting his representation on his intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home, that he won Joseph's assent, and immediately made dispositions for the attack.

The guns of the first corps, being formed in one mass, on the height corresponding to that on which the English left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as far as the great redoubt between the allied armies.

Ruffin's division was placed in advance, and Villatte's in rear of the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close in the ravine.

Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke's division.

Latour Maubourg's cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and General Beaumont's cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin.

On the English side, General Hill's division was concentrated; the cavalry was massed behind the left; the parc of artillery and hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry and Hill's division.

COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.

About daybreak, Ruffin's troops were drawn up, two regiments abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions, and in this order went forth against the left of the British; a part moving directly against the front, and a part by the valley on the right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid and steady, they were followed by Villatte's division, and their assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers instantly closed upon General Hill's division, and the height sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and reached the summit, but the reserves were always ready to vindicate their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast, yet the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover the retreat of their wounded, but, finally, unable to sustain the increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by the renewed play of their powerful artillery.

To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the English guns were few, and of small calibre, and when Sir Arthur Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy's retreat was by the great valley, and a favorable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred, but unfortunately the English cavalry, having retired during the night, for water and forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the mountain, beyond the left, taught the English General that he had committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley, and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he brought up the principal mass of his cavalry behind his left, with the leading squadrons looking into the valley, and having obtained, from Cuesta, General Bassecour's

division of infantry, posted it on the mountain itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile the Duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta's arrangements, came, with his division, to Sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six lines in depth.

Immediately after the failure of Ruffin's attack, King Joseph, having in person examined the whole position of the allies, from left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, Sir Arthur Wellesley's attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the Spaniards;* that, during the night, the whole army should have been silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, ready at daybreak to form a line of battle, to the left, on a new front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the allies to change their front also, and during this operation, they might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had secured their left flank, by occupying the valley, and the mountain and their front were alike inattackable. "*Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of Soult's operations on the English rear.*"

Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a combination failed, "*it was time to renounce making war.*"

The King was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan's; but he feared that Victor would cause the Emperor to believe a great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force could only reach Placentia between the 2d and 5th of August. Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared near Toledo, that General's advanced guard was approaching Aranjuez; and the King was much troubled by the danger thus threatening Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there; and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed almost the only pecuniary resource of his court; so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war. These considerations overpowered his judgment; adopt-

* Letter from Marshal Jourdan, MS.

ing the worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succor the capital, but, before separating the army, determined to try the chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war: Joseph should have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult; the advantages were obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary; but, if the King thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it before; that is, he should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared his plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta, the 26th; his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, and, before 12 o'clock on the 27th, the English army would have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. But, after neglecting the most favorable opportunity, when his army was full of ardor, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted, and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning.

While the French generals were engaged in council, the men on both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The Spanish camp was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no confidence, and Albuquerque, whether from conviction or instigated by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp charged with this message delivered it to Colonel Donkin, and that officer carried it to Sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter, seated on the summit of the hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat startling message without so much as turning his head, and then drily answering—"Very well, you may return to your brigade," continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of the man; and, indeed, Sir Arthur's conduct was throughout that day such as became a general upon whose vigilance and interdict the fate of fifty thousand men depended.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin's division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, and moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left.

Villatte's orders were to menace the contested height with one brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin's movement with the main attack.

Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg's dragoons, and by the King's reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the English centre, and to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke's division, while the other half, connecting its attack with Villatte's brigade, mounted the hill, and made a third effort to master that important point.

Milhaud's dragoons were left on the main road, opposite Talavera, to keep the Spaniards in check; but the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into the centre, behind General Sebastiani, who, with the fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte's brigade in the valley, and a part remained in reserve.

A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light cavalry; where, also, the Duke of Belluno stationed himself, to direct the movements of the first corps.

From nine o'clock in the morning until mid-day, the field of battle offered no appearance of hostility; the weather was intensely hot, and the troops on both sides descended and mingled, without fear or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which divided the positions; but, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour later, the King's guards, the reserve, and the fourth corps were descried, near the centre of the King's position, marching to join the first corps; and, at two o'clock, the table-land and the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered with the dark and lowering masses. At this moment some hundreds of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be Sir Robert Wilson's corps joining the army; nevertheless, the Duke of Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for battle, and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on with the swiftness and violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad, black columns, in all the majesty of war.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the fourth corps rushing forwards, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, clearing the intersected ground in their front, and falling upon

Campbell's division with infinite fury; but that General, assisted by Mackenzie's brigade, and by two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts. The English regiments, putting the French skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and, breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire, and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage. Ten guns were taken, but as Campbell prudently resolved not to break his line by a pursuit, the French instantly rallied on their supports, and made head for another attack; then the British artillery and musketry played vehemently upon their masses, a Spanish cavalry regiment charged their flank, and they retired in disorder: thus the victory was secured in that quarter.

But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte's division, preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left, and, beyond Villatte, Rufin was discovered marching towards the mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson's brigade of cavalry, composed of the twenty-third light dragoons and the first German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; these regiments, coming on at a canter, and increasing their speed as they advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but, in a few moments, came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened their fire; and Colonel Arentschild, commanding the hussars, an officer whom forty years' experience had made a master in his art, promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming in his broken phrase, "*I will not kill my young mens!*" But in front of the twenty-third, the chasm was more practicable, the English blood hot, and the regiment plunged down without a check; men and horses rolling over each other in dreadful confusion; the survivors, still untamed, mounted the opposite bank by twos and threes, and Colonel Seymour being severely wounded, Major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallied all who came up, and passing through the midst of Villatte's columns, which poured in a fire from each side, fell with inexpressible violence upon a brigade of French *chasseurs* in the rear. The combat was fierce but short. Victor had perceived the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers, and Westphalian light-horse, to the support of Villatte; and these fresh troops coming up when the twenty-third, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs, entirely broke them. Those who were not killed or taken, made for Bassecour's Spanish division, and so escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven men and officers, or about half the number that went into action.

During this time, the hill, the key of the position, was again attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the English centre; his own artillery, aided by the great battery on his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke's ranks, and the French columns came close up to the British lines in the resolution to win; but they were received with a general discharge of all arms, and so vigorously encountered that they gave back in disorder. Under the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English guards, quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate ardor, when the enemy's supporting columns and their dragoons advanced, the men who had been repulsed turned again, and the heavy French batteries pounded the flank and front of the guards.

Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same time, the German legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. At this moment, although Hill's and Campbell's divisions on the extremities of the line held fast, the centre of the British was absolutely broken, and the fortune of the day seemed to incline in favor of the French, when, suddenly, Colonel Donellan, with the forty-eighth regiment, was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses. At first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the retiring crowds, but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass through the intervals, and then resuming its proud and beautiful line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied them with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the French was checked. The guards and the Germans immediately rallied, a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot, the artillery battered the enemy's flanks without intermission, the French wavered, lost their advantage, and the battle was restored.

In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment, which will give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When the guards first made their rash charge, Sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth down from the hill, although a rough battle was going on there, and, at the same time, he directed Cotton's light cavalry to advance. These dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by degrees, the fire of the English grew hotter, and their loud and confident shouts—sure augury of success—were heard along the whole line.

In the hands of a great general, Joseph's guards and the reserve, which were yet entire, might have restored the combat, but all combination was at an end on the French side; the fourth corps, beaten back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion; the

troops in the great valley on the right, amazed at the furious charge of the twenty-third, and awed by the sight of four distinct lines of cavalry still in reserve, remained stationary; no impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse was mortally wounded, his division gave way, and the whole army finally retired to the position from whence it had descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery, and the British, exhausted by toil and want of food, and reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, could not pursue. The Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o'clock all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the morning. But the battle was scarcely over when, the dry grass and shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in its course, both the dead and the wounded.

On the British side, two generals, (Mackenzie and Langworth,) thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and seven hundred and sixty-seven sergeants and soldiers were killed on the spot; three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three thousand seven hundred and eighteen sergeants and privates wounded. Nine officers, six hundred and forty-three sergeants and soldiers were missing; thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred and sixty-eight, in the two days' fighting, of which five thousand four hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th.

The French suffered more severely; nine hundred and forty-four, including two generals, were killed!* six thousand two hundred and ninety-four wounded, one hundred and fifty-six prisoners, furnished a total of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, of which four thousand were of Victor's corps; ten guns were taken by General Campbell's division, and seven were left in the woods by the French.†

The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred men killed and wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at the time.

The 29th, at daybreak, the French army quitted its position, and before six o'clock was in order of battle on the heights of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, General Robert Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third, fifty-second, and ninety-fifth regiments, and immediately took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of twenty miles, were in *bivouac* near Malpartida de Placentia, when the alarm caused by the Spanish fugitives spread to that part. Craufurd, fearing that the army was

* Marshal Jourdan, MS.

† Sémélé's Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MS

pressed, allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced his march, with the resolution not to halt till he reached the field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the runaways were met with, and although not all Spaniards, all propagating the vilest falsehoods: "*the army was defeated;*" "*Sir Arthur Wellesley was killed;*" "*the French were only a few miles distant;*" nay, some, blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy's advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful scene, the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of their pace, and leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body; having in that time passed over sixty-two English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the "delicacy of modern soldiers!"

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The moral courage evinced by Sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition which finally rendered him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of the 28th.

A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general must bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of his army into play at the same time if he means to win, and all may be too little. Marshal Jourdan's project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy of his reputation; and it is possible that he might have placed his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and then by a sudden and general attack have carried the key of his position, thus commencing his battle well; but Sir Arthur Wellesley's resources would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such an occurrence, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been reinforced by Wilson's corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a complete victory, while the allies would,

even though defeated, have insured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would thus have fallen to them, and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, might have been obtained. But these matters are only speculative.

2. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin's, and the half of Villatte's division, were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all before Soult reached Placentia.

3. It has been said, that to complete the victory Sir Arthur Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; this would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta nor his troops were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of the first and the fourth corps were still above twenty thousand strong, and, although a repulsed, by no means a discomfited force; the cavalry, the King's guards, and Dessolle's division, had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat the Spaniards; a second panic, such as that of the 27th, would have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those who know with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse, will readily acknowledge.

The battle of Talavera was one of hard honest fighting, and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honored the nations to which they belonged. The English owed much to the General's dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve of their infantry were withheld from the great attack on the 28th, and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves to be truly formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of them still bore the number of their former regiments on their accoutrements.

CHAPTER VII.

The King goes to Illescas with the fourth corps and reserve—Sir R. Wilson advances to Escalona—Victor retires to Maqueda—Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera—Cuesta's cruelty—The allied generals hear of Soult's movement upon Baños—Bassecour's division marches towards that point—The passes of Baños forced—Sir A. Wellesley marches against Soult—Proceedings of that Marshal—He crosses the Bejar, and arrives at Placentia with three *corps d'armée*—Cuesta abandons the British hospitals at Talavera to the enemy, and retreats upon Oropesa—Dangerous position of the allies—Sir Arthur crosses the Tagus at Arzobispo—The French arrive near that bridge—Cuesta passes the Tagus—Combat of Arzobispo—Soult's plans overruled by the King—Ney defeats Sir R. Wilson at Baños, and returns to France.

THE French rested the 29th at Salinas; but, in the night, the King marched with the 4th corps and the reserve to St. Ollalla, from whence he sent a division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted. The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central position, from whence he could interpose between Venegas and the capital. The Duke of Belluno, with the first corps, remained on the Alberche, having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the allies, when the latter should be forced to retire, in consequence of Soult's operations. Meantime, Sir Robert Wilson, who during the action was near Cazalegas, returned to Escalona, and Victor, displaying an unaccountable dread of this small body, which he supposed to be the precursor of the allied army, immediately retired, first to Maqueda, and then to Santa Cruz del Retamar; he was even proceeding to Mostoles, when a retrograde movement of the allies recalled him to the Alberche.

The British army was so weak, and had suffered so much, that the 29th and 30th were passed, by Sir Arthur, in establishing his hospitals at Talavera, and in fruitless endeavors to procure provisions, and the necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men from perishing. Both Cuesta and the inhabitants of Talavera possessed the means, but would not render the slightest aid, nor would they even assist to bury the dead; the corn secreted in Talavera was sufficient to support the army for a month, yet the starving troops were kept in ignorance of it, although the inhabitants, who had fled across the Tagus with their portable effects at the beginning of the battle, had now returned. It is not surprising that, in such circumstances, men should endeavor to save their property, especially provisions; but the apathy with which they beheld the wounded men dying for want of aid, and those who were sound sinking from hunger, did in no wise answer Mr. Frere's description

of them, as men who "*looked upon the war in the light of a crusade, and carried it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause.*"

This conduct left an indelible impression on the minds of the English soldiers. From that period to the end of the war their contempt and dislike of the Spaniards were never effaced, and long afterwards, Badajos and St. Sebastian suffered for the churlish behavior of the people of Talavera. The principal motive of action with the Spaniards was always personal rancor: hence, those troops who had behaved so ill in action, and the inhabitants, who withheld alike their sympathy and their aid from the English soldiers to whose bravery they owed the existence of their town, were busily engaged after the battle in beating out the brains of the wounded French as they lay upon the field; and they were only checked by the English soldiers, who, in some instances, fired upon the perpetrators of this horrible iniquity. Cuesta also gave proofs of his ferocious character: he, who had shown himself alike devoid of talent and real patriotism, he whose indolence and ignorance of his profession had banished all order and discipline from his army, and whose stupid pride had all but caused its destruction, now assumed the Roman general, and proceeded to decimate the regiments that had fled in the panic on the 27th. Above fifty men he slew in this manner; and if his cruelty, so contrary to reason and the morals of the age, had not been mitigated by the earnest intercession of Sir Arthur Wellesley, more men would have been destroyed in cold blood, by this savage old man, than had fallen in the battle.

Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of the Duke of Dalmatia's movements, and their eyes were still fixed on Madrid; but, the 30th, information was received at Talavera, that twelve thousand rations had been ordered, for the 28th, at Fuente Dueña by that Marshal, and twenty-four thousand at Los Santos, a town situated between Alba de Tormes and the pass of Baños.* Cuesta, conscious of the defenceless state of the latter post, suggested that Sir Robert Wilson should be sent there; but Sir Arthur Wellesley wished Wilson to remain at Escalona, to renew his intercourse with Madrid, and proposed that a Spanish corps should go: indeed, he still slighted the idea of danger from that quarter, and hoped that the result of the battle would suffice to check Soult's march. Cuesta rejected this proposal at the moment, and again on the 31st, when Sir Arthur renewed his application; but, on the 1st of August, it was known that Soult had entered Bejar; and, on the 2d, General Bassecour was detached by Cuesta to defend the Puerto de Baños, from which he was absent four long marches, while the enemy had been, on the 31st, within one march.

* Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

The day that Bassecour marched, intelligence arrived that Soult had entered Placentia. Baños had been abandoned to the enemy without a shot; for the battalions from Bejar had dispersed, and those sent by Cuesta had been withdrawn to Almaraz by their General the Marquis de la Reyna, who also proclaimed that he would destroy the boat-bridge at that place. This news roused Cuesta; he proposed that half the allied army should march to the rear, and attack Soult. Sir Arthur Wellesley however refused to divide the English army, yet offered to go or stay with the whole; and, when the other desired him to choose, he answered that he would go, and Cuesta appeared satisfied.

On the night of the 2d August, letters were received from Wilson, announcing the appearance of the French near Nombella, whither he, unconscious of the effect produced by his presence at Escalona, had retreated with his infantry, sending his artillery to St. Roman, near Talavera. As Sir Arthur Wellesley could not suppose that Sir Robert Wilson's corps alone would cause the first corps to retire, he naturally concluded that Victor's design was to cross the Alberche at Escalona, crush Wilson, and operate a communication with Soult by the valley of the Tietar. As such a movement, if persisted in, would necessarily dislodge Cuesta from Talavera, Sir Arthur, before he commenced his march, obtained the Spanish General's promise that he would collect cars, for the purpose of transporting as many of the English wounded as were in a condition to be moved, from Talavera to some more suitable place. This promise, like all the others, was shamefully violated, but the British General had not yet learned the full extent of Cuesta's bad faith, and thinking that a few days would suffice to drive back Soult, marched, on the 3d of August, with seventeen thousand men, to Oropesa, intending to unite with Bassecour's division, and to fight Soult, whose force he estimated at fifteen thousand.

Meanwhile, Soult being, by the return of General Foy, on the 24th of July, assured of the King's concurrence in the combined movements to be executed, ordered Laborde, Merle, and La Houssaye to march from Zamora and Toro upon Salamanca and Ledesma, and to scour the banks of the Tormes.* The sixth corps was also directed upon the same place, and, the 25th, Soult repaired to Salamanca in person, intending to unite the three corps there. Hearing, however, of Victor's retrograde movement from the Alberche to the Guadarama, he desired Marshal Mortier to march, on the 28th, to Placentia, by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and he placed La Houssaye's and Lorge's dragoons under his command;

* S. Journal of Operations, 2d Corps, MS.

the remainder of the second corps and the light cavalry were to follow when the sixth corps should be in motion. This done, Scult wrote to the King, saying, "*My urgent desire is that your Majesty may not fight a general battle before you are certain of the concentration of all my forces near Placentia. The most important results will be obtained if your Majesty will abstain from attacking until the moment when a knowledge of my march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which he must do, or he is lost.*"

The 29th, the fifth corps was at Fuente Roble; but information being received that Beresford, with an army, had reached Almeida on the 27th, the march was covered by strong detachments on the side of Ciudad Rodrigo. The long-expected convoy of artillery and ammunition for the second corps had, however, arrived in Salamanca the 29th; and Ney wrote, from Toro, that he also would be there the 31st.

The 30th, the fifth corps drove the Marquis de la Reyna from the pass of Baños, and took post at Aldea Nueva del Camina and Herbas; and the second corps, quitting Salamanca, arrived, the same day, at Siete Carrera.

The 31st, the fifth corps entered Placentia; the second corps reached Fuente la Casa, Fuente Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos.

Placentia was full of convalescents, detachments, and non-combatants, and when the French arrived, about two thousand men, including five hundred of the Lusitanian legion, evacuated the town, taking the road to Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; yet four hundred sick men, following the enemy's accounts, were captured, together with a few stores. During these rapid marches, the French were daily harassed by the Spanish peasantry, the villages were deserted, the cavalry wandered far and near to procure subsistence, and several slight skirmishes and some pillage took place.

The 1st of August, the second corps passed the Col de Baños, and the head of the column entered Placentia, which was, like other places, deserted by the greatest part of the inhabitants. Vague reports that a battle had been fought between the 26th and 29th was the only intelligence that could be procured of the situation of the allies, and on the second, the advanced guard of the army marched to the Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were, at the same time, directed towards Coria, to acquire news of Marshal Beresford, who was now said to be moving along the Portuguese frontier.

The 3d of August, the fifth corps and the dragoons, passing the Tietar, reached Toril, the outposts were pushed to Cazatejada and Sierra de Requemedá, but the second corps remained at Placentia,

awaiting the arrival of the sixth corps, the head of which was now at Baños. Hence, on the 3d of August, the King and Sebastiani being at Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta at Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and Soult on the Tietar, the narrow valley of the Tagus was crowded in its whole length by the contending troops.

The allies held the centre, being only one day's march asunder, but their force, when concentrated, was not more than forty-seven thousand men. The French could not unite under three days, but their combined forces exceeded ninety thousand men, of which fifty-three thousand were under Soult.* This singular situation was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor and the King, frightened by Wilson's partisan corps of four thousand men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley was supposed, by Joseph, to be at the head of twenty-five thousand British; and the former, calculating on Soult's weakness, was marching, with twenty-three thousand Spanish and English, to engage fifty-three thousand French; while Soult, unable to ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment the fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear the weight for twenty-four hours, yet fortune so ordained that no irreparable disaster ensued.

At five o'clock in the evening of the 3d, it was known at the English head-quarters that the French were near Naval Moral, and, consequently, between the allies and the bridge of Almaraz.

At six o'clock, letters from Cuesta advised Sir Arthur that the King was again advancing, and that, from intercepted despatches addressed to Soult, it appeared that the latter must be stronger than was supposed; wherefore Cuesta said, that wishing to aid the English, he would quit Talavera that evening: in other words, abandon the British hospitals!

To this unexpected communication Sir Arthur replied that the King was still some marches off, and that Venegas should be directed to occupy him on the upper Tagus; that Soult's strength was exceedingly overrated, and Victor's movements not decided enough to oblige the Spanish army to quit Talavera; wherefore he required that Cuesta should at least wait until the next morning, to cover the evacuation of the English hospitals. But, before this communication reached Cuesta, he was in full march, and, at daybreak on the 4th, the Spanish army was descried moving, in several columns, down the valley towards Oropesa; Bassecour's division soon

* Appendix 30, § 4, Vol. I.

after joined it from Centinello, and, at the same time, the cavalry patrols found the French near Naval Moral.

Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen the intercepted letters himself, became convinced that Soult's force was not over-rated at thirty thousand; and the Duke of Dalmatia, who had also intercepted some English letters, learned that, on the first of August, the allies were still at Talavera, and ill-informed of his march. Thus, the one general perceived his danger and the other his advantage at the same moment.

Mortier was immediately ordered, by the Duke of Dalmatia, to take a position with the fifth corps at Cazatejada, to seize the boat-bridge at Almaraz, if it was not destroyed, and to patrol towards Arzobispo; the second corps was, likewise, directed upon the same place, and the head of the 6th entered Placentia. The further progress of the allies was thus barred in front; the Tagus was on their left; impassable mountains on their right; and it was certain that Cuesta's retreat would immediately bring the King and Victor down upon their rear. The peril of this situation was apparent to every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a general inquietude. No man felt the slightest confidence in the Spaniards, and the recollection of the stern conflict at Talavera, aided by a sense of exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed the spirits of men and officers. The army was, indeed, ready to fight, but all persons felt that it must be for safety, not for glory.

In this trying moment, Sir Arthur Wellesley abated nothing of his usual calmness and fortitude. He knew not indeed the full extent of the danger; but, assuming the enemy in his front to be thirty thousand men, and Victor to have twenty-five thousand others in his rear, he judged that to continue the offensive would be rash, because he must fight and beat those two marshals separately within three days, which, with starving and tired troops, inferior in number, was scarcely to be accomplished. To remain where he was, on the defensive, was equally unpromising; because the road from Talavera to Arzobispo led through Calera, in the rear of Oropesa, and thus Victor could intercept the only line of retreat; a battle must then be fought, in an unfavorable position, against the united forces of the enemy, estimated, as we have seen, to be above fifty thousand men. One resource remained: to pass the bridge of Arzobispo immediately, and take up a line of defence behind that river, before the French could seize the Col de Mirabete, and so cut off the road to Truxillo and Merida—a hard alternative; but the long-cherished error relative to Soult's weakness had dried up the springs of success, and left the campaign, like a withered stem, without fruit or foliage.

Cuesta doggedly opposed this project, asserting that Oropesa was a position suitable for a battle, and that he would fight there. Further concession to his humors would have been folly, and Sir Arthur sternly declared that he would move forthwith, leaving the Spanish General to do that which should seem meet to him; and, assuredly, this decided conduct saved the Peninsula, for not fifty, but ninety thousand enemies were at hand.

It was now six o'clock in the morning; the baggage and ammunition were already in motion for the bridge of Arzobispo, but the army, which had been reinforced by a troop of horse-artillery, and some convalescents that escaped from Placentia, remained in position for several hours, to cover the passage of stores and wounded men from Talavera, who had just arrived at Calera in the most pitiable condition. About noon, the road being clear, the columns marched to the bridge, and, at two o'clock, the whole army was in position at the other side; the immediate danger was averted, and the combinations of the enemy were baffled. During the passage, several herds of swine, which, following the custom of the country, had been feeding in the woods, under charge of the swineherds, were fallen in with, and the soldiers, instigated by hunger, broke their ranks, and ran in upon the animals as in a charge, shooting, stabbing, and, like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the beasts were yet alive; nor can this conduct be much censured under the circumstances of the moment, although it was a severe misfortune to the poor peasants, whose property was thus destroyed.

From Arzobispo, the army moved towards Deleytosa, and General Craufurd's brigade, having six pieces of artillery attached, was directed to gain the bridge of Almaraz by a forced march, lest the enemy, discovering the ford below that place, should cross the river, and seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The roads were exceedingly rugged, and the guns could only be dragged up the Meza d'Ibor by the force of men; nevertheless, Craufurd reached his destination on the evening of the 5th, and the head-quarters were established at Deleytosa on the 7th, the artillery being at Campillo, the rear-guard occupying the Meza d'Ibor. The sick and wounded were then forwarded to Merida, but the paucity of transport was such, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was obliged to unload both ammunition and treasure carts for the conveyance of these unfortunate men. Meanwhile Soult, little thinking that his object was already frustrated, continued his march on the 5th, and Mortier took post at Naval Moral; the advanced guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and the patrols, scouring the roads to Oropesa and the bridge of Arzobispo, fell in with and were chased by the Spanish cavalry from Arzobispo; for Cuesta would not retire on the 4th, and was

in the act of passing the bridge when the French came in view. The movements were now hurried on both sides. Before dark, the Spanish army was across the Tagus, with the exception of a rear-guard, which remained on the right bank that evening, but it was driven across the river, on the morning of the 6th, by the fifth corps, which afterwards took post at Valdeveja and Puebla de Naciada. Ney also reached Naval Moral, and the second corps entered Gordo.

The 7th Mortier examined the Spanish position, and reported that Cuesta, having thrown up intrenchments, and placed twenty guns in battery, to rake the bridge, which was also barricadoed, had left two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to hold the post, and withdrawn the rest of his army towards Meza d'Ibor. Hereupon Soult detached his light cavalry towards Talavera, to communicate with the King, and brought up the second corps to Arzobispo. Meanwhile the Duke of Belluno, having on the 5th ascertained the retreat of the allies from Talavera, retraced his steps, and entered that town on the 6th; thus the English wounded, left there, fell into his hands, and their treatment was such as might be expected from a gallant and courteous nation; between the British soldiers and the French there was no rancor, and the generous usages of a civilized and honorable warfare were cherished.

The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge of Talavera, and pushed his advanced guard to Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya, on the left bank, within a few leagues of the Spanish position, which Soult was preparing to attack in front; for he had observed that, at a certain point, the Spanish horses when brought to drink came far into the stream; and the place being sounded in the night of the 7th, a deep but practicable ford was discovered about half a mile above the bridge.

The fifth and second corps and a division of the sixth were concentrated, to force this passage, early on the morning of the 8th; but Soult being just then informed of Victor's movement, and perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, leaving only a rear-guard in the works, judged that the allies were retreating; wherefore, without relinquishing the attack at Arzobispo, he immediately sent the division of the sixth corps back to Naval Moral, and at the same time transmitting a plan of the ford below Almaraz, directed Ney to cross the Tagus there, seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the allies, as they came out from the defiles between Deleytosa and Truxillo. Meanwhile the heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek shelter for his horsemen in a wood near Azutan, a village about five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad

guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought, when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack, taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage of the river.

COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.

The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, were secretly assembled near the ford, and, about two o'clock in the day, General Caulaincourt's brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, running to their arms, manned the batteries and opened upon the leading squadrons, but Mortier, with a powerful concentric fire of artillery, immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and Caulaincourt, having reached the other side of the river, turned to his right, and taking the batteries in reverse cut down the artillery-men, and dispersed the infantry who attempted to form. The Duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, now came down with all his horsemen in one mass, but without order, upon Caulaincourt, and the latter was in imminent danger, when the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford, another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and by this time the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque's effort was thus frustrated, a general rout ensued, and five guns and about four hundred prisoners were taken.

Soult's intention being to follow up this success, he directed that the first corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe and Deleytosa, intending to support it with the second and fifth, while the sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the Spanish army, and forced Sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous retreat; for so complete was the surprise and so sudden the overthrow that some of the English foragers also fell into the hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta's army was in no condition to have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with vigor, is clear, from the following facts:

1. When he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to Peralada de Garbin, on the 7th, he left fifteen pieces of artillery by the road-side, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag of truce, either treacherously or foolishly mentioned it in the French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch them off.

2. The British military agent, placed at the Spanish head-quar-

ters, was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was only by the arrival of the Duke of Albuquerque at Deleytosa, on the evening of the 9th, that Sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy in check; but when he repaired in person to that General's quarter, on the 10th, he found the country covered with fugitives and stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All his ammunition and guns (forty pieces) were at the right bank of the Ibor, and of course at the foot of the Meza, and within sight and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right bank of the Tagus; they would have been taken by the first French patrols that approached, but that Sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish staff-officers to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the 10th, without Cuesta's knowledge.

In this state of affairs the impending fate of the Peninsula was again averted by the King, who recalled the first corps to the support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz, and, by the 11th, the allies had re-established their line of defence. The head-quarters of the British were at Jaraicejo, and those of the Spaniards at Deleytosa: the former, guarding the ford of Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d'Ibor and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta resigned. General Eguia succeeded to the command, and at first gave hopes of a better co-operation, but the evil was in the character of the people. The position of the allies was, however, compact and central; the reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication to the rear was open, and, if defended with courage, the Meza d'Ibor was impregnable; and to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a difficult operation, would, while the Mirabete and Meza d'Ibor were occupied, have been dangerous for the French, as they would be inclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river.

The Duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that Sir Arthur Wellesley would endeavor to repass the Tagus by Alcantara, and so rejoin Beresford and the five thousand British troops under Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the frontier of Portugal. To prevent this, he resolved to march at once upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, threaten both Beresford's and Sir Arthur's communication with Lisbon, and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but Marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation. He observed that Sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in a hasty manner;

and that the army could not be fed between Coria, Placentia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca being again in possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to cover Castile. This reasoning was approved by Joseph, who dreaded the further fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the operations during the excessive heats, and in a wasted country; and he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a despatch from the Emperor, dated Schönbrunn, the 29th of July, in which any further offensive operations were forbad, until the reinforcements which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should arrive in Spain. The second corps was, consequently, directed to take post at Placentia; the fifth corps relieved the first at Talavera; and the English wounded being, by Victor, given over to Marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honor, would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were first supplied; the sixth corps was directed upon Valladolid, for Joseph was alarmed lest a fresh insurrection, excited and supported by the Duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of Leon and Castile.

Ney marched on the 11th; but, to his surprise, found that Sir Robert Wilson, with about four thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed, that when the British army marched from Talavera on the 3d, Wilson, being at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his artillery to the army on the 3d, and on the 4th, finding that the Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back with his infantry to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then twenty-four miles from Arzobispo, and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the 5th, a junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected; but it was impossible to know this at the time, and Wilson, very prudently, crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting to his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte's division pursued him, on the 5th, to Nombella; a detachment from the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas and Monbeltran; and General Foy waited for him in the Vera de Placentia. Nevertheless, baffling his opponents, he broke through their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the Sierra de Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes, reached Bejar: from thence, thinking to recover his communications with the army, he marched towards Placentia, by the pass of Baños, and thus, on the morning of the 12th, met with Ney, returning to the Salamanca country.

The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a

retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why Sir Robert Wilson should have given battle to the sixth corps. His position, although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could hope to stop a whole army; and, accordingly, when the French, overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight was at an end; the first charge broke both the legion and the Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney continued his march, and having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned the command of the sixth corps to General Marchand, and returned to France. But, while these things happened in Estremadura, La Mancha was the theatre of more important operations.

CHAPTER VIII.

Venegas advances to Aranjuez—Skirmishes there—Sebastiani crosses the Tagus at Toledo—Venegas concentrates his army—Battle of Almonacid—Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented by the ill-conduct of the Junta—His troops distressed for provisions—He resolves to retire into Portugal—False charge made by Cuesta against the British army refuted—Beresford's proceedings—Mr. Frere superseded by Lord Wellesley—The English army abandons its position at Jaraceijo and marches towards Portugal—Consternation of the Junta—Sir A. Wellesley defends his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain—Takes a position within the Portuguese frontier—Sickness in the army.

WHEN the Duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the King, fearing that the allies were moving up the right bank of the Alberche, carried his reserve, in the night of the 3d, to Mos-toles; but the fourth corps remained at Illescas, and sent strong patrols to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, as we have seen, from Nombella, on the 4th; and the King, no longer expecting the allies in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was joined by the fourth corps from Illescas.

The 5th, the Duke of Belluno returned to St. Ollalla; and the King marched against General Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret orders of the Junta, before mentioned, had loitered about Danyel and Tembleque until the 27th of July. It was the 29th before Venegas reached Ocaña, his advanced posts being at Aranjuez, his rear-guard at Yepes, and one division, under Lacy, in front of Toledo; the same day, one of the *partidas*, attending the army, surprised a small French post on the other side of the Tagus, and Lacy's division skirmished with the garrison of Toledo

The 30th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera, and at the same time Lacy reported that the head of the enemy's columns were to be seen on the road beyond Toledo. Hereupon, the Spanish commander reinforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as a point of retreat; but, on the 2d of August, being falsely informed by Cuesta that the allied troops would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas recalled his divisions from Toledo, pretending to concentrate his army at Aranjuez, in order to march also upon the capital; yet he had no intention of doing so, for the Junta did not desire to see Cuesta, at the head of sixty thousand men, in that city, and, previous to the battle of Talavera, had not only forbidden him to enter Madrid, but appointed another man governor. This prohibition would, no doubt, have been disregarded by Cuesta, but Venegas was obedient to their secret instructions, and under pretence of danger to his flanks, if he marched on the capital, remained at Aranjuez, where, his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming from Toledo, he yet performed no service to the general cause.

The 3d, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente Largo, and leaving six hundred infantry and some cavalry near Toledo, concentrated his army between Aranjuez and Ocaña. In this position he remained until the 5th, when his advanced guard was driven from the Puente Largo, and across the Tagus; his line of posts on that river was then attacked by the French skirmishers, and, under cover of a heavy cannonade, his position was examined by the enemy's generals: but when the latter found that all the bridges above and below Aranjuez were broken down, they resolved to pass the Tagus at Toledo. With this intent the French army recrossed the Xarama river, and marched in the direction of that city; but Venegas still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, foolishly dispersed his other divisions at Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He himself was desirous of defending La Mancha; the Central Junta, with more prudence, wished him to retreat into the Sierra Morena; but Mr. Frere proposed that his army should be divided, one part to enter the Morena, and the other to march by Cuença upon Aragon, and so to menace the communications with France! The admirable absurdity of this proposal would probably have caused it to be adopted, if Sebastiani's movements had not put an end to the discussion. That General, crossing the Tagus at Toledo, and at a ford higher up, drove the Spanish left back upon the Guazalate, on the 9th of August; on the 10th, Venegas concentrated his whole army at Almonacid, and, holding a council of war, resolved to attack the French on the 12th. The time was miscalculated; Sebastiani advanced on the 11th, and commenced

THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID.

The army of Venegas, including two thousand five hundred cavalry, was somewhat more than twenty-five thousand strong, with forty pieces of artillery. It was the most efficient Spanish force that had yet taken the field: it was composed of the best regiments in Spain, well armed and clothed, and the generals of divisions were neither incapacitated by age, nor destitute of experience, most of them having been employed in the previous campaign. The village of Almonacid was in the centre of the Spanish position, and, together with some table-land in front of it, was occupied by two divisions of infantry under General Castejon. The left wing, under General Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road to Consuegra. The right wing, commanded by General Vigodet, was drawn up on some rising ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, under General Giron, and the greatest part of the artillery, were posted behind the centre, on a rugged hill, crowned by an old castle. The cavalry were placed at the extremity of each wing.

General Dessolles, with the French reserve, was still some hours' march behind, but Sebastiani, after observing the dispositions made by Venegas, resolved to attack him with the fourth corps only. The Polish division immediately marched against the front, Laval's Germans turned the flank of the hill, on which the Spanish left was posted, and two French brigades were directed upon the centre. After a sharp fight, the Spanish left was put to flight: Venegas, however, outflanked the victorious troops with his cavalry, and charging, threw them into disorder; but at this moment, the head of Dessolles' column arrived, and enabled Sebastiani's reserves to restore the combat. The Spanish cavalry, shattered by musketry, and by the fire of four pieces of artillery, was in turn charged by a French regiment of horse, and broken. Venegas rallied his troops again on the castle-hill, behind the village; but the King came up with the remainder of the reserve, and the attack was renewed. The Poles and Germans continued their march against the left flank of the Spaniards, nine fresh battalions fell upon their centre, and a column of six battalions forced the right; the height and the castle were thus carried at the first effort. Venegas attempted to cover his retreat, by making a stand in the plain behind; but two divisions of dragoons charged his troops before they could re-form, and the disorder became irremediable; the Spaniards, throwing away their arms, dispersed in every direction, and were pursued and slaughtered by the horsemen for several hours.

Following the French account, three thousand of the vanquished were slain, and four thousand taken prisoners; and all the guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages fell into the hands of the victors, whose loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. The remnants of the defeated army took shelter in the Sierra Morena. The headquarters of the fourth corps were then established at Aranjuez; those of the first at Toledo, and the King returned in triumph to the capital.

The Anglo-Spanish army, however, still held its positions at Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was not, at the first, without hopes to maintain himself there, or even to resume offensive operations; for he knew that Ney had returned to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that Mortier commanded only a part of the first corps, and that the remainder were at Toledo.* On the other hand, his own strength was about seventeen thousand men; Beresford had reached Moraleja with from twelve to fourteen thousand Portuguese; and between the frontier of Portugal and Lisbon there were at least five thousand British troops, composing the brigades of Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn. If Soult invaded Portugal, the intention of the English General was to have followed him. If the French remained in their present position, he meant to recross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford's troops, to fall upon their right at Placentia. For his own front he had no fear; and he was taking measures to restore the broken arch of the Cardinal's bridge over the Tagus, with a view to his operation against Placentia, when the misconduct of the Spanish government and its generals again obliged him to look solely to the preservation of his own army.

From the 23d of July, when the bad faith of the Junta, the apathy of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta had checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the latter, which had commenced at Placentia, daily increased. It was in vain that Sir Arthur, remonstrating with Cuesta and the Junta, had warned them of the consequences; it was in vain that he refused to pass the Alberche until the necessary supplies were secured; his reasonings, his representations, and even the fact of his having halted at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, judging from their own habits, concluded that his actions would also be at variance with his professions.† If he demanded food for his troops, he was answered by false statements of what had been, and false promises of what would be done; the glorious services rendered at Talavera, far from exciting the gratitude or calling forth the activity of the Spanish authorities, seemed only to render them

* Parliamentary Papers, 1810. † Appendix 3.

the more perverse. The soldiers in the ranks were weakened by hunger, the sick were dying for the want of necessary succors, the commissaries were without the means of transport; and when Sir Arthur Wellesley applied for only ninety artillery horses to supply the place of those killed in the action, Cuesta, on the very field of battle, and with the steam of the English blood still reeking in his nostrils, refused this request; two days after, he abandoned the wounded men to an enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing as the most ferocious and dishonorable of mankind.

The retreat of the allies across the Tagus increased the sufferings of the troops, and the warmth of their General's remonstrances rose in proportion to the ill treatment they experienced; but the replies, nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became insulting both to the General and his army: "*The British were not only well, but over supplied;*"—"they robbed the peasantry, pillaged the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired;"—"the retreat of the army across the Tagus was unnecessary; Soult ought to have been destroyed; and the English General must have secret motives for his conduct, which he dare not avouch;"—and other calumnies of the like nature.

Now, from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, although the Spaniards were generally well fed, the English soldiers had not received ten full rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and, twice a week, a few ounces of flour, with a quarter of a pound of goat's flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers; and this scanty supply was procured with much labor, for the goats were to be caught and killed by the troops. It was, perhaps, upon this additional hardship that the accusation of selling provisions was founded, for, in such cases, it is in all armies the custom that the offal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals; but the famine in the camp was plainly proved by this very fact; for a goat's offal sold, at this time, for even three or four dollars, or about double the usual price of the whole animal, and men and officers strove to outbid each other for the wretched food.

It has been said that the British soldiers are less intelligent in providing for themselves, and less able to sustain privations of food, than the soldiers of any other nation. This is one of many vulgar errors which have been promulgated respecting them. That they should be constantly victorious, and yet inferior to all other nations in military qualification, does not, at first sight, appear a very logical conclusion; but the truth is, that, with the exception of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are, undoubtedly, more sober, the English soldiers possess all the most valuable military qualities in

as high, and many in a much higher degree than any other nation. They are as rapid and as intelligent as the French, as obedient as the Germans, as enduring as the Russians, and more robust than any; and, with respect to food, this is sure, that no man, of any nation, with less than two pounds of solid food, of some kind, daily, can do his work well for any length of time. A general charge of pillaging is easily made and hard to be disproved, yet it is certain that the Spanish troops themselves did not only pillage, but wantonly devastate the country, and that without any excuse, for, with the exception of the three days succeeding the defeat of Arzobispo, their rations were regular and sufficient. With respect to the interruption of their convoys by the British soldiers, the reverse was the fact. *The Spanish cavalry intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies.**

Before the middle of August there were, in the six regiments of English cavalry, a thousand men dismounted, and the horses of seven hundred others were unserviceable;† the baggage animals died in greater numbers; the artillery cattle were scarcely able to drag the guns, and one third of the reserve ammunition was given over to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were required for the conveyance of sick men, of which the number daily increased. Marshal Beresford experienced the same difficulties in the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.‡ The numerous desertions that took place in the Portuguese army, when it became known that the troops were to enter Spain, prevented him from taking the field as soon as he had expected; but, in the last days of July, being prepared to act, he crossed the Portuguese frontier, and, from that moment, the usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced. Romana still continued at Coruña; the Duke del Parque was full of mighty projects, and indignant that Beresford would not blindly adopt his recommendations. Both generals were ignorant of the real strength of the French; but the Spaniard was confident, and insisted upon offensive movements, while Beresford, a general by no means of an enterprising disposition when in the sole command of an army, contented himself with taking up a defensive line behind the Agueda. In this he was justified—first, by his instructions, which obliged him to look to the pass of Perales and the defence of the frontier line; secondly, by the state of his army, which was not half organized, and without horsemen or artillery; thirdly, by the conduct of the Spanish authorities.

The Portuguese troops were not only refused provisions, but those which had been collected by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and put

* Appendix 14.

† Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

‡ Appendix 18.

into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view to operate in that quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for a debt pretended to be due for the supply of Sir John Moore's army. The claim itself was of doubtful character, for Cradock had before offered to pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher for its being due, a preliminary which had not been complied with. There was also an English commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to liquidate that, and any other just claim upon the British military chest; but the cabildo, like all Spaniards, mistaking violence for energy, preferred this display of petty power to the interests of the common cause. Meanwhile, Soult having passed the Sierra de Gredos, by the Baños, Beresford, moving in a parallel direction, crossed the Sierra de Gata, at Perales; reached Moraleja about the 12th of August, and having rallied the troops and convalescents cut off from Talavera, marched to Salvatierra, where he arrived the 17th, and took post behind the Elga, covering the road to Abrantes.

Such was the state of affairs when the Supreme Junta offered Sir Arthur Wellesley the rank of Captain-General, and sent him a present of horses; and when he, accepting the rank, refused the pay as he had before refused that of the Portuguese government, they pressed him to renew offensive operations; but, acting as if they thought the honors conferred upon the General would amply compensate for the sufferings of the troops, the Junta made no change in their system. Sir Arthur Wellesley was, however, now convinced that Spain was no longer the place for a British army. He relinquished the notion of further operations in that country, sent his cavalry to the neighborhood of Cáceres, broke down another arch of the Cardinal's bridge, to prevent the enemy from troubling him, and, through the British ambassador, informed the Junta that he would immediately retire into Portugal.

This information created the wildest consternation; for, in their swollen self-sufficiency, the members of the government had hitherto disregarded all warnings upon this subject, and now acting as, in the like case, they had acted the year before with Sir John Moore, they endeavored to avert the consequences of their own evil doings by vehement remonstrances and the most absurd statements:—"The French were weak, and the moment most propitious for driving them beyond the Pyrenees;" "the uncalled-for retreat of the English would ruin the cause;" and so forth. But they had to deal with a general as firm as Sir John Moore; and, in the British ambassador, they no longer found an instrument suited to their purposes. Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses to be called great, but of an expanded capacity, and a genius at

once subtle and imperious, had come out on a special mission, and Mr. Frere, whose last communication with the Junta had been to recommend another military project, was happily displaced; yet, even in his private capacity, he made an effort to have some of the generals superseded; and the Junta, with a refined irony truly Spanish, created him *Marquis of UNION*.

At Cadiz, the honors paid to Lord Wellesley were extravagant and unbecoming, and his journey from thence to Seville was a scene of triumph; but these outward demonstrations of feeling did not impose upon him beyond the moment; his brother's correspondence and his own penetration soon enabled him to make a just estimate of the Junta's protestations. Disdaining their intrigues, and fully appreciating a general's right to direct the operations of his own army, he seconded Sir Arthur's remonstrances with firmness, and wisely taking the latter's statements as a guide and basis for his own views, urged them upon the Spanish government with becoming dignity.

The Junta, on their part, always protesting that the welfare of the British army was the principal object of their care, did not fail to prove very clearly, upon paper, that the troops, ever since their entry into Spain, had been amply supplied; and that no measures might be wanting to satisfy the English General, they invested Don Lorenzo Calvo, a member of their body, with full powers to draw forth and apply all the resources of the country to the nourishment of both armies. This gentleman's promises and assurances relative to the supply, were more full and formal than M. de Garay's, and equally false. He declared that provisions and forage, in vast quantities, were actually being delivered into the magazines at Truxillo, when, in fact, there was not even an effort making to collect any. He promised that the British should be served, although the Spanish troops should thereby suffer, and, at the very time of making this promise, he obliged the alcaldes of a distant town to send into the Spanish camp provisions which had been already purchased by an English commissary. In fine, Lord Wellesley had arrived too late; all the mischief that petulance, folly, bad faith, violence, and ignorance united, could inflict, was already accomplished, and, while he was vainly urging a vile, if not a treacherous government, to provide sustenance for the soldiers, Sir Arthur withdrew the latter from a post where the vultures, in their prescience of death, were already congregating.

The 20th, the main body of the British army quitted Jaraicejo, and marched by Truxillo upon Merida. The light brigade, under Craufurd, being relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the road of Caceres to Valencia de Alcantara; but the pass of Mira-

bete bore ample testimony to the previous sufferings of the troops. Craufurd's brigade, which, only three weeks before, had traversed sixty miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, and after many halts, able to reach the summit of the Mirabete, although only four miles from their camp; and the side of that mountain was covered with baggage, and the carcasses of many hundred animals that died in the ascent.

When the retreat commenced, the Junta, with the malevolence of anger engendered by fear, calumniated the man to whom, only ten days before, they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, and to whose courage and skill they owed their own existence. "*It was not the want of provisions,*" they said, "*but some other motive that caused the English General to retreat.*" This was openly and insultingly stated by Garay, by Eguia, and by Calvo, in their correspondence with Lord Wellesley and Sir Arthur; and at the same time the Junta industriously spread a report that the true reason was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous demands of the English ministers, who had required the cession of Cadiz and the island of Cuba, as the price of further assistance. But the only firmness they had shown, was in resistance to the just demands of their ally. At Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been forced to give over to the Spaniards the artillery taken from the enemy; at Meza d'Ibor, he had sacrificed a part of his ammunition to obtain conveyance for the wounded men; and to effect the present movement from Jaraicejo without leaving his sick behind, he was obliged to abandon all his parc of ammunition and stores; then, however, the Spanish generals, who had refused the slightest aid to convey the sick and wounded men, immediately found ample means to carry off all these stores to their own magazines. In this manner, almost bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers, who had withstood the fiercest efforts of the enemy, were driven, as it were, ignominiously from the country they had protected to their own loss.

The 24th, the head-quarters being at Merida, a despatch from Lord Wellesley was received. He painted in strong colors the terror of the Junta, the distraction of the people, the universal confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate their distress, he proposed that the British army should, notwithstanding the past, endeavor to cover Andalusia, by taking, in conjunction with the Spanish army, a defensive post behind the Guadiana, in such manner that the left should rest on the frontier of Portugal; to facilitate this he had, he said, presented a plan to the Junta for the future supply of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier and of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty on that point. But

he rested his project entirely upon political grounds, and it is worthy of observation, that he, who for many years had, with despotic power, controlled the movements of immense armies in India, carefully avoided any appearance of meddling with the General's province.

"I am," said he, "fully sensible not only of the *indelicacy*, but of the inutility of attempting to offer to you any opinion of mine in a situation where your own judgment must be your best guide. Viewing, however, so nearly, the painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I have deemed it to be my duty to submit to your consideration the possibility of adopting an intermediate plan." Let this proceeding be compared with Mr. Frere's conduct to Sir John Moore on a similar occasion.

On the receipt of this despatch, Sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Merida for some days; he was able in that country to obtain provisions, and he wished, if possible, to allay the excitement occasioned by his retreat; but he refused to co-operate again with the Spaniards. "Want," he said, "had driven him to separate from them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have justified him for doing so. To take up a defensive position behind the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable, and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at the moment by Eguia, was so strong that if the Spaniards could defend anything, they might defend that. His advice, then, was that they should send the pontoon-bridge to Badajos, and remain on the defensive at Deleytosa and Almaraz. But, it might be asked," he said, "was there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The French were as numerous, if not more so, than the allies; and, with respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing game as before. Baños and Perales must be guarded, or the bands in Castile would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army; but who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to detach, and the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could, Avila and the Guadarama passes remained, by which the enemy could reinforce the army in front; for there were no Spanish troops in the north of Spain capable of making a diversion.

"But there was a more serious consideration, namely, the constant and shameful misbehavior of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We, in England," said Sir Arthur, "never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers telling of nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, I believe, have never been pub-

lished. In the battle of Talavera," he continued, "in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms and ran off, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these dastardly soldiers run away, they plunder everything they meet. In their flight from Talavera, they plundered the baggage of the British army, which was, at that moment, bravely engaged in their cause."

For these reasons he would not, he said, again co-operate with the Spaniards; yet by taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would hang upon the enemy's flank, and thus, unless the latter came with very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana. This reasoning was conclusive; but ere it reached Lord Wellesley, the latter found that so far from his plans relative to the supply having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the Junta; that miserable body, at one moment shrinking with fear, at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy's being about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to the interior of France! and assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well as of their own, importunately pressed for an immediate, combined, offensive operation, by the troops of the three nations, to harass the enemy in his retreat! but, at the same time, they ordered Eguia to withdraw from Deleytosa, behind the Guadiana.

The 31st, Eguia reached La Serena, and Venegas having rallied his fugitives in the Morena, and being reinforced from the dépôts in Andalusia, the two armies amounted to about fifty thousand men, of which eight or ten thousand were horse, for, as I have before observed, the Spanish cavalry seldom suffered much. But the tide of popular discontent was now setting full against the central government. The members of the ancient Junta of Seville worked incessantly for their overthrow. Romana, Castaños, Cuesta, Albuquerque, all, and they were many, who had suffered dishonor at their hands, were against them; and the local Junta of Estremadura insisted that Albuquerque should command in that province. Thus pressed, the Supreme Junta, considering Venegas as a man devoted to their wishes, resolved to increase his forces. For this purpose they gave Albuquerque the command in Estremadura, yet furnished him with only twelve thousand men, and sent the remainder of Eguia's army to Venegas; at the same time, they made a last effort to engage the British General in their proceedings, offering to place Albuquerque under his orders, provided he would undertake an offensive movement. By these means they maintained their tottering power, but their plans, being founded upon vile political intrigues, could in no wise alter Sir Arthur Wellesley's determination, which was the result of enlarged military views.

He refused their offers; and, the 4th of September, his headquarters were established at Badajos. Meanwhile, Romana, delivering over his army to the Duke del Parque, repaired to Seville; and Venegas again advanced into La Mancha, but at the approach of a very inferior force of the enemy, retired, with all the haste and confusion of a rout, to the Morena. The English troops were then distributed in Badajos, Elvas, Campo Mayor, and other places, on both banks of the Guadiana; the brigades already in Portugal were brought up to the army, and the lost ammunition and equipments were replaced from the magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem; Beresford, leaving some light troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar, and this eventful campaign of two months terminated.

The loss of the army was considerable; above three thousand five hundred men had been killed, or had died of sickness, or fallen into the enemy's hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from want of food, exclusive of those lost in battle; the spirits of the soldiers were depressed, and a heart-burning hatred of the Spaniards was engendered by the treatment all had endured. To fill the cup, the pestilent fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which fatigue and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made frightful ravages; dysentery, that scourge of armies, raged, and, in a short time, above five thousand men died in the hospitals.

CHAPTER IX.

General observations on the campaign—Comparison between the operations of Sir John Moore and Sir A. Wellesley.

OBSERVATIONS.

DURING this short, but important campaign, the armies on both sides acted in violation of the maxim which condemns "*double external lines of operation*," but the results vindicated the soundness of the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, or the reputation of the commanders, was achieved; yet, neither Sir Arthur Wellesley, nor the Duke of Dalmatia, nor Marshal Jourdan can be justly censured, seeing that the two last were controlled by the King, and the first by circumstances of a peculiar nature. The French Marshals were thwarted by superior authority; and the English General, commanding an auxiliary

force, was obliged to regulate his movements, not by his own military views, but by the actual state of the Spaniards' operations, and with reference to the politics and temper of that people.

La Mancha was the true line by which to act against Madrid; but the British army was on the frontier of Portugal, the Junta refused Cadiz as a place of arms, and without Cadiz, or some other fortified sea-port, neither prudence nor his instructions would permit Sir Arthur to hazard a great operation on that side; hence he adopted, not what was most fitting in a military sense, but what was least objectionable among the few plans that could be concerted at all with the Spanish generals and government. Now, the latter being resolved to act with strong armies, both in Estremadura and La Mancha, the English General had but to remain on a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or to unite with Cuesta in the valley of the Tagus. His territorial line of operations was therefore a matter of necessity, and any fair criticism must be founded on the management of his masses after it was chosen. That he did not greatly err in his conception of the campaign is to be inferred from the fact, that Napoleon, Soult, Victor, and Jourdan simultaneously expected him upon the very line he followed. He was thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas failed to aid him, and the fatal error relative to Soult's forces under which he labored throughout, vitiated all his operations; yet he shook the intrusive monarch roughly, in the midst of fifty thousand men.

Let the project be judged, not by what did happen, but by what would have happened, if Cuesta had been active, and if Venegas had performed his part loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish forces was made at Naval Moral, on the 22d of July. The Duke of Belluno, with twenty-one thousand men, was then in position behind the Alberche, the fourth corps near Madrilejos in La Mancha, and Joseph at Madrid, where General Foy had just arrived, to concert Soult's movement upon Placentia. It is evident that the King and Sebastiani could not reach the scene of action before the 25th or 26th of July, nor could Soult influence the operations before the 1st or 2d of August. If, then, the allied army, being sixty thousand strong, with a hundred pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning of the 23d, it is to be presumed that the latter would have been beaten, and obliged to retreat, either upon Madrid or Toledo; but the country immediately in his rear was open, and ten thousand horsemen could have been launched in the pursuit. Sir Robert Wilson, also, would have been on Victor's flank, if, neglecting a junction with the fourth corps, that Marshal had taken the road to Madrid; and if that of Toledo,

the first and fourth corps would have been separated from the King, who did not reach Vargas until the evening of the 25th, but who would not, in this case, have been able to advance at all beyond Naval Carneiro.

Now, admitting that, by superior discipline and experience, the French troops had effected their retreat on either line without any serious calamity, what would have followed?

1. If Victor joined the King, the latter could only have retired, by Guadalaxara, upon the third corps, or have gone by the Guadarama towards Soult.

2. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps must have retreated to Guadalaxara, and the King would have joined them there, or, as before said, have pushed for the Guadarama to join Soult.

No doubt that Marshal, having so powerful an army, would, in either case, have restored Joseph to his capital, and have cut off Sir Arthur's communication with Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Nevertheless, a great moral impression would have been produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, which was, moreover, the general dépôt of all the French armies; and, meanwhile, Venegas, Cuesta, and Sir Arthur Wellesley would have been united, and on one line of operations, (that of La Mancha,) which, under such circumstances, would have forced the Junta to consent to the occupation of Cadiz. In this view it must be admitted that the plan was conceived with genius.

Victor's position on the Alberche was, however, strong; he commanded twenty-five thousand veterans; and, as the Spaniards were very incapable in the field, it may be argued that a general movement of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence to Maqueda, would have been preferable to a direct attack at Salinas; because the allies, if thus suddenly placed in the midst of the French corps, might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly have cut the King off from the Guadarama, and forced him back upon the Guadalaxara. But, with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a general undertake an operation requiring celerity and the nicest calculation?

The false dealing of the Junta no prudence could guard against, but experience proves that, without extraordinary good fortune, some accident will always happen to mar the combinations of armies acting upon "*double external lines*." And so it was with respect to Venegas; for that General, with a force of twenty-six thousand men, suffered himself to be held in check for five days by three thousand French, and at the battle of Almonacid showed that he knew neither when to advance nor when to retreat.

The patience with which Sir Arthur Wellesley bore the foolish

insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted firmness with which he sought to protect the Spanish army, require no illustration. When the latter fell back from St. Ollalla on the 26th, it was impossible for the British to retreat with honor: and there is nothing more memorable in the history of this war, nothing more creditable to the personal character of the English chief, than the battle of Talavera, considered as an isolated event. Nevertheless, that contest proved that the allies were unable to attain their object: for, notwithstanding Victor's ill-judged partial attacks on the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, and notwithstanding the final repulse of the French, all the advantages of the movements, as a whole, were with the latter. They were, on the 31st of July, including the garrison of Toledo, still above forty thousand men, and they maintained their central position, although it was not until the 1st of August that Soult's approach caused any change in the views of the allied generals: and this brings us to the fundamental error of Sir Arthur Wellesley's operations.

That so able a commander should engage himself in the narrow valley of the Tagus with twenty thousand British and forty thousand Spanish troops, when fifty thousand French were waiting for him at the further end, and above fifty thousand more were hanging on his flank and rear, shows that the greatest masters of the art may err: but he who wars, walks in a mist through which the keenest eyes cannot always discern the right path. "*Speak to me of a general who has made no mistakes in war,*" said Turenne, "*and you speak of one who has seldom made war.*"

Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error: "When I entered Spain I had reason to believe that I should be joined by a Spanish army in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as that it had kept in check, during nearly three months after a defeat, a French army, at one time superior, and at no time much inferior.

"I had likewise reason to believe that the French corps in the north of Spain were fully employed: and although I had heard of the arrival of Marshal Soult at Zamora, on the 29th of June, with a view to equip the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible that three French corps, consisting of thirty-four thousand men, under three marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca without the knowledge of the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the Junta of Castile: that these corps could have been moved from their stations in Galicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting free, for general operations, any Spanish troops which had been opposed to them, or without any other inconvenience to the enemy than that of protracting to a later period the settlement

of his government in those provinces ; and that they could have penetrated into Estremadura, without a shot being fired at them by the troops deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals."

Thus it was that, like the figures in a phantasmagoria, the military preparations of Spain, however menacing in appearance, were invariably found to be vain and illusory. That Sir Arthur Wellesley's error was not fatal is to be attributed to three causes :

1. The reluctance of Marshal Ney to quit Astorga ; 2. The march of the fifth corps upon Villa Castin instead of Salamanca ; 3. The vehemence with which Victor urged the battle of Talavera : in short, jealousy among the marshals, and the undecided temper of the King.

If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have concentrated the three corps near Salamanca before the 20th, and he would have reached Placentia before the 28th of July. The allies must then have forced their way into La Mancha, or been crushed ; but could they have done the former without another battle ? without the loss of all the wounded men ? could they have done it at all ? The British, including Robert Craufurd's brigade, were seventeen thousand fighting men on the 29th, yet wasted with fatigue and hunger. The Spaniards were above thirty thousand ; but in them no trust could be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and courage of the highest order. The intrusive King was at the head of forty thousand good troops. Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered by the intrigues of the Junta, was as nought in the operations, while Soult's step, stealthy when the situation of affairs was obscure, would have been impetuous when a light broke on the field of battle ; it is scarcely possible to conceive that the allies could have forced their way in front before that Marshal would have fallen on their rear.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

Joseph was finally successful ; yet it may be safely affirmed that, with the exception of uniting his three corps behind the Guadarama, on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings were an almost uninterrupted series of errors. He would not suffer Soult to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo with seventy thousand men, in the end of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas overbalanced, in his mind, the advantages of this bold and grand project, which would inevitably have drawn Sir Arthur Wellesley from the Tagus, and which, interrupting all military communication between the northern and southern provinces, and insuring possession of Castile and Leon, would, by its success, have opened a broad way to Lisbon.

Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have marched against Madrid!—Cuesta and Venegas, acting on external lines, and whose united force did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! The King, holding a central position, with fifty thousand French veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and, rejecting Soult's plan, drew Mortier, with the fifth corps, to Villa Castin. Truly, this was to avoid the fruit-tree from fear of a nettle at its stem!

Sir Arthur Wellesley's advance to Talavera was the result of this great error; but he having thus incautiously afforded Soult an opportunity of striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was concerted. The King, with equal judgment and activity, then united all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta, pushed back the latter upon the English army, and obliged both to stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their front, when the real point of danger was in the rear. This indeed was skilful; but the battle of Talavera which followed was a palpable, an enormous fault. The allies could neither move forward nor backward, without being infinitely worse situated for success than in that strong position, which seemed marked out by fortune herself for their security. Until the 31st, the operations of Venegas were not even felt; hence, till the 31st, the French position on the Alberche might have been maintained without danger; and, on the first of August, the head of Soult's column was at Placentia.

Let us suppose that the French had merely made demonstrations on the 28th, and had retired behind the Alberche the 29th, would the allies have dared to attack them in that position? The conduct of the Spaniards, on the evening of the 27th, answers the question; and moreover, Joseph, with an army compact, active, and experienced, could with ease have baffled any efforts of the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered himself by the Guadarama river and by the Tagus in succession; and the farther he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult's operation; but here we have another proof that double external lines are essentially vicious.

The combined movement of the French was desirable, from the greatness of the object to be gained, and safe, from the powerful force on each point; and the occasion was so favorable that, notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of Ney, and the unsteady temper of the King, the fate of the allies was, up to the evening of the 3d, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, as the central position held by the allies cut the line of correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the King's despatches were intercepted, and the whole operation, even at the last hour, was thus baffled

The first element of success in war is, that everything should emanate from a single head ; and it would have been preferable that the King, drawing the second and fifth corps to him by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the eighty thousand men thus united, have fallen upon the allies in front. Such a combination, although of less brilliant promise than the one adopted, would have been more sure ; and the less a general trusts to fortune, the better. She is capricious !

When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another completely beaten at Almonacid, and when Wilson's Portuguese corps was dispersed at Baños, the Junta had just completed the measure of their folly by quarrelling with the British, which was the only force left that could protect them. The French were in truth, therefore, the masters of the Peninsula, but they terminated their operations at the very moment when they should have pursued them with redoubled activity, because the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances of the campaign were alike favorable. For Napoleon was victorious in Germany ; and of the British expeditions against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into life—the latter was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph might have been assured that he would receive reinforcements, but that none, of any consequence, could reach his adversaries ; and, in the Peninsula, there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, Aragon, and the Castiles were subdued ; Gerona closely beleaguered, and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, totally unable to succor that noble city. Valencia was inert ; the Asturias still trembling ; in Galicia there was nothing but confusion. Romana, commanding fifteen thousand infantry, but neither cavalry nor artillery, was then at Coruña, and dared not quit the mountains. The Duke del Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but was in no condition to make head against more than a French division. The battle of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops. Estremadura and Andalusia were, as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese armies, the one being at Jaraicejo, the other at Moraleja.

The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to have extended from the Sierra Morena to Coruña—weak from its length ; weaker, that the allied corps, being separated by mountains, by rivers, and by vast tracts of country, and having different bases of operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad Rodrigo, could not act in concert, except offensively ; and with how little effect in that way the campaign of Talavera had proved ! But the French were concentrated in a narrow space, and, having only Madrid to cover, were

advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements. The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly organized, and would not, all together, have amounted to ninety thousand fighting men. The French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous from their discipline and experience—more dangerous that they held a central position, and that their numbers were unknown to their opponents; and, moreover, having in four days gained one general and two minor battles, their courage was high and eager.

At this period, by the acknowledgment of Spaniards themselves, the fate of the country depended entirely upon the British troops, and doubtless the latter were soldiers of no ordinary stamp; yet there is a limit to human power, in war as well as in other matters.* Sir Arthur Wellesley was at the head of some seventeen thousand men, of all arms, and about five thousand were between Lisbon and Alcantara; but the whole French army could, in two days, have been concentrated in the valley of the Tagus. Soult alone, of all the associated generals, appears to have viewed this crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he been permitted to follow up the attack at Arzobispo, on the 8th of August, what could the seventeen thousand starving British troops, encumbered with the terror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against the seventy thousand French that would have stormed their positions on three sides at once? The hardy, enduring English infantry might, indeed, have held their ground in one battle, but could they have fought a second? Would not a movement of the first corps by Guadalupe, would not famine alone, have forced the ten or twelve thousand men remaining (if, indeed, so many were left) to abandon the banks of the Tagus—to abandon, also, their stores of ammunition and their wounded men, and to retreat towards Portugal?—and to retreat also with little hope, harassed, as they would have been, by six thousand horsemen?—for Soult had eighteen regiments of cavalry.

Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of the Meza d'Ibor and the Mirabete had baffled all the enemy's efforts, and that, seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the sixth corps, in pursuance of Soult's second proposal, had crossed the frontier of Portugal: Sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating such an event, affirmed that he meant to follow them in any movement they might make against Lisbon.† There were, however, two ways of following, the one by the south and the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now, if he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal's bridge, and so, connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the

* See Calvo, Garay, and Lord Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810

† Parl. Papers, 1810.

enemy's rear, it could only have been while he was ignorant of Verrugas's defeat, and when he imagined the French to have but thirty thousand men in the valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy thousand; and, without endangering Madrid, they could have invaded Portugal with, at least, fifty thousand men under arms. If, on the other hand, he designed to move by the south side of the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the 12th, would have been cut off, and thrown back upon Almeida. It is true that Marshal Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding the troops in the country about Placentia and Coria, and the prudence of Soult's project might, in that respect, have been somewhat questionable. But the Duke of Elchingen was averse to *any* invasion of Portugal, and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties enlarge beyond their due proportion; moreover, his talents were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a campaign, and Soult's opinion must, on this occasion, be allowed greater weight; because the Vera de Placentia and the valleys of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were exceedingly fertile, and had been little injured, and the object was, not to fix a base of operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence until a richer country could be opened.

• Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon was not feasible at that moment, there could have been no well-founded objection to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The Emperor's instructions were indeed pleaded, but those were general, and founded on the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of the future; they were not applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the moment, and would have been disregarded by a general with a tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive King was not a great commander; when he might have entered the temple of victory with banners flying, he stretched himself at the threshold and slept.

The departure of the English army was a remarkable epoch in the Peninsular war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French, had been fairly acted upon, and had failed; and the long cherished delusion relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency, was at last dissipated. The transactions of the campaign of 1809 form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All the objections which had been made to Sir John Moore's conduct, being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while the soundness of that General's views was confirmed in every particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking resemblance to each other.

Both Sir Arthur Wellesley and Sir John Moore advanced from Portugal to *aid the Spanish armies*. The first General commanded about twenty thousand, the last about twenty-three thousand men ; but there was this difference : that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganized as to require a British force to keep down anarchy ; whereas, in 1809, Portugal formed a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army was acting in co-operation with the British.

Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men under Romana, and there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him.

Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards under Cuesta, and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand under Venegas ; while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others were acting in Galicia and Leon.

Sir John Moore was urgent to throw himself into the heart of Spain, to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless, feeling that some practical demonstration of the difficulties to be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a great political as well as military purpose. To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English government and the English public that they had taken a false view of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river ; but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French Emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established a second line of retreat upon Galicia, and he kept a watchful eye upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult's corps, and being upon the point of attacking him, the expected storm burst, but by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente was however untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon, and the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a battle, embarked.

It was objected, 1. That Moore should have gone to Madrid. 2. That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo, instead of at Coruña. 3. That he overrated the strength of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the Spaniards, and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the

opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro; for, that a battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy's power, and called forth all the energies of Spain.

Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great; that it evaporated in boasting and promises which could not be relied upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as a principal force, and that the native armies being all dispersed before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too strong to contend with single-handed; wherefore, it was prudent to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to give up the contest altogether; for that little or no hope of final success could be entertained unless the counsels and dispositions of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; and the English ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent an auxiliary army to Spain, although the system still existed which he had denounced as incompatible with success.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice—and assuredly a better could not have been made—was placed at the head of this army; and, after giving to Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also advanced to deliver Spain. Like Sir John Moore, he was cramped for the want of money, and, like Sir John Moore, he was pestered with false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short-sighted views, and displaying great ignorance of the art of war; but, finally, he adopted, and, as far as the inveterate nature of the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project which, like Sir John Moore's, had for its object to overpower the French in his front, and, by forcing them to concentrate, relieve the distant provinces, and give full play to the enthusiasm of the Spaniards.

When Sir John Moore advanced, there were no Spanish armies to assist him; the French were above three hundred and twenty thousand strong, and of these two hundred and fifty thousand were disposable to move against any point; moreover, they were commanded in person by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the Duke of Wellington, that his presence alone was equal to forty thousand good troops.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the Peninsula did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand men, of which only one hundred thousand could be brought to bear on his operations; and he was assisted by sixty thousand Spaniards, well armed, and tolerably disciplined. His plans were certainly laid with great ability upon the data furnished to him, but he trusted to

Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he did not fail to repent his credulity. He delivered and gained that battle which Sir John Moore had been reproached for not essaying; but it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even much dispirited, by one defeat; and while this battle was fighting, Soult, with fifty thousand men, came down upon the flank and rear of the English, a movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from Madrid upon the flank and rear of Sir John Moore. This last General saved himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the French patrols; and in like manner, Sir Arthur evaded destruction by crossing the Tagus, within view of the enemy's scouts; so closely timed was the escape of both.

When Sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching him, asserted that the French were on the point of ruin, and Romana, even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley retired from Jaraicejo, the Junta in the same manner asserted that the French were upon the point of retiring from Spain, and General Eguia proposed offensive operations.

In explaining his motives, and discussing the treatment he had met with, Sir John Moore wrote thus to his own government: "*The British were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not equal to encounter the French, who have at least eighty thousand men, and we have nothing to expect from the Spaniards, who are not to be trusted; they are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise, backward to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of flying before the enemy; they refuse all assistance, and I am obliged to leave ammunition, stores and money behind. The Spanish armies have shown no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring spirit, and that which has not been shown hitherto, I know not why it should be expected to be displayed hereafter.*" Such were his expressions.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the Spaniards, he, also, writing to his government, says:—"We are here worse off than in a hostile country; never was an army so ill used;—the Spaniards have made all sorts of promises;—we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army; on the contrary, we were obliged to lay down our ammunition, to unload the treasure, and to employ the cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The common dictates of humanity have been disregarded by them; and I have been obliged to leave ammunition, stores, and money behind. *Whatever is to be done must be done by the British army, but that is*

certainly not capable, singly, to resist a French army of at least seventy thousand men."

The last advice given to the government, by Sir John Moore, was against sending an auxiliary force to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the same spirit, withdrew his troops; and, from that moment to the end of the struggle, he warred indeed for Spain, and in Spain, but never with Spain. "I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again," was his expression, when speaking of this campaign; and he kept his word. That country became, indeed, a field on which the French and English armies contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats or victories, the promises or the performances of the Spaniards scarcely influenced the movements. Spain, being left to her own devices, was beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project, yet made no change in her policy; and while Portugal endeavored to raise her energy on a level with that of her ally, Spain sought to drag down England to the depth of folly and weakness in which she herself was plunged. The one would not sacrifice an atom of false pride to obtain the greatest benefits; the other submitted, not with abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility, to every mortification, rather than be conquered: and the effects of their different modes were such as might be expected. Portugal, although assaulted by an infinitely greater number of enemies, in proportion to her strength, overthrew the oppressors the moment they set foot upon her soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, army after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, and every defeat sensibly diminished the heat of resistance.

Napoleon once declared that a nation resolved to be free could not be conquered, and the Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestos, as if to say it was all that was necessary. But Napoleon contemplated a nation, like the Portuguese, making use of every means of defence, whether derived from themselves or their alliances; not a people puffed with conceit, and lavish of sounding phrases, such as "perishing under the ruins of the last wall," yet beaten with a facility that rendered them the derision of the world; a people unable to guide themselves, yet arrogantly refusing all advice. Such a nation is ripe for destruction, and such a nation was Spain.

The campaign of 1809 finished the third epoch of the war, and it was prolific of instruction. The jealousy of the French marshals, the evils of disunion, the folly of the Spanish government, and the absurdity of the Spanish character, with respect to public affairs, were placed in the strongest light; while the vast combinations, the sanguinary battles, the singular changes of fortune, the

result so little suitable to the greatness of the efforts, amply demonstrated the difficulty and the uncertainty of military affairs. It was a campaign replete with interest; a great lesson from which a great commander profited. Sir Arthur Wellesley had now experienced the weakness of his friends and the strength of his enemies, and he felt all the emptiness of public boasting. Foreseeing that if the contest was to be carried on, it must be in Portugal, and that unless he himself could support the cause of the Peninsula, it must fall, his manner of making war changed; his caution increased tenfold, yet abating nothing of his boldness, he met and baffled the best of the French legions in the fulness of their strength. He was alike unmoved by the intrigues of the Portuguese Regency, and by the undisguised hatred of the Spanish government; and when some of his own generals, and two of them on his personal staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the ruin of the army, caused the puny energy of the English ministers to quail as the crisis approached, he, with gigantic vigor, pushed aside these impediments, and, steadily holding on his own course, proved himself a sufficient man, whether to uphold or to conquer kingdoms.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

Dispositions of the Asturians and Gallicians—Guerilla system in Navarre and Aragon—The partidas surround the third corps—Blake abandons Aragon—Suchet's operations against the partidas—Combat of Tremendal—The advantages of Suchet's position—Troubles at Pampeluna—Suchet ordered by Napoleon to repair there—Observations on the guerilla system.

WHEN Galicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy's principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly used. Kellermann's division at Valladolid, and Bonnet's at Santander, sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were collaterally, as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts, the war was steadily progressive in favor of the French, yet their career was one of pains and difficulties.

Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that the artillery employed against Zaragoza was conveyed by the country people, without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the guerilla system commenced in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired reputation at the moment when Blake was losing credit by defeats, the dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards, hoping thus to cover past disgrace, and to live with a greater license; because the regular armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying the benefits of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves. Thus, Zaragoza being surrounded by rugged mountains, every range became the mother of a guerilla brood; nor were the regular partisan corps less numerous than the partidas.

On the left of the Ebro, the Catalonian colonels, Baget, Parena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, brought their Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the Cinca and operating on

both sides of that river, they harassed the communication between Zaragoza and the French outposts, and maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon.

On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the district of Molino were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, entering the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain of Zaragoza, and occupied Nuestra Senora del Aguilar; this convent, situated on the top of a high rock near Carineña, he made his dépôt for provisions and ammunition, and surrounded the building with an intrenched camp.

On Gayan's left, General Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy, established himself at Calatayud, with the regular regiments of Soria and La Princesa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed a large force, with which he cut the direct line between Zaragoza and Madrid.

Beyond Villa Campa's positions the circle of war was continued by other bands, which, descending from the Moncayo mountains, infested the districts of Tarazona and Borja, and intercepted the communications between Tudela and Zaragoza. The younger Mina, called the student, vexed the country between Tudela and Pampeluna; and the inhabitants of the high Pyrenean valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo were also in arms, under Renovalles. This officer, taken at Zaragoza, was, by the French, said to have broken his parole, but he pleaded a previous breach of the capitulation, and having escaped to Lerida passed from thence, with some regular officers, into the valleys, where he surprised several French detachments. His principal post was at the convent of San Juan de la Pena, which is built on a rock, remarkable in Spanish history as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish conquerors; the bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the church, and the whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese, and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, the investment of the third corps.

All these bands, amounting to at least twenty thousand armed men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts of the French army. Meanwhile Blake, having rallied his fugitives at Tortosa, abandoned Aragon, and proceeding to Tarragona, endeavored to keep the war alive in Catalonia.

Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, had sent de-

tachments as far as Morella, on the borders of Valencia, and pushed his scouting parties close up to Tortosa. Finding the dispersion of Blake's troops complete, he posted Meunier's division on the line of the Guadalupe, with orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so as to form a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro; then crossing that river at Caspe with the rest of the army, he made demonstrations against Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging the governor to draw in his detachments, and close the gates. After this he continued his march by Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and leaving Habert's division to guard that line, returned himself in the latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of Monzon.

Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces and given full effect to his victory, the French General sought to fix himself firmly in the positions he had gained. Sensible that arms may win battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, he projected a system of civil administration which might enable him to support his troops, and yet offer some security of property to those inhabitants who remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for the people to trust to any system, or to avoid danger, while the mountains swarmed with the partidas, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter without relaxation, and to put down all resistance in Aragon before he attempted to enlarge the circle of his conquests; and he knew that while he thus laid a solid base for further operations, he should also form an army capable of executing any enterprise.

Commencing on the side of Jaca, he dislodged the Spaniards from their positions near that castle, in June, and supplied it with ten months provisions. After this operation, Almunia and Carineña, on the right of the Ebro, were occupied by his detachments, and having suddenly drawn together four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers at the latter point, he surrounded Nuestra Senora del Aguilar during the night of the 19th, destroyed the intrenched camp, and sent a detachment in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, Pedroza was repulsed on the other side of the Ebro, near Barbastro, and General Habert also defeated Perena. The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his corps at Uzed, Daroca was occupied by the French, and the vicinity of Calatayud and the mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments from Zaragoza, one of which took possession of the district of Cinco Villas. Meanwhile Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards of St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending from thence by the valley of the Gallego, on the 23d of August, surprised and slew a detachment of seventy men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, however, five French battalions stormed the sacred rock, and penetrated

up the valleys of Anso and Echo in pursuit of Renovalles; nevertheless, that chief, retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for the valley without surrendering himself.

These operations having, in a certain degree, cleared Aragon of the bands on the side of Navarre and Castile, the French General turned against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, Perena, and Pedroza were chased from the Sierra de Guarra, but rallied between the Cinca and the Noguerra, and were there joined by Renovalles, who assumed the chief command; on the 23d of September, however, the whole were routed by General Habert, the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in Lerida and Mequinenza. Suchet then occupied Fraga, Candasnos, and Monzon, established a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, raised some field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to invade the districts of Venasque and Benevarres, the subjection of which would have secured his left flank, and opened a new line of communication with France. The inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated partisans, menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. Colonel La Peyrolerie, the commandant, marched the 17th of October, by Roda, to meet them, but having reached a certain distance up the valley, was surrounded, yet he broke through in the night, and regained his post. During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to kill his sick men; the townsmen of Graus opposed this barbarity, and Marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was not rare in Aragonese towns.

While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candasnos to be attacked, and some sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, but the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina still intercepted the communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud, rallied Gayan's troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished a citadel for an intrenched camp. Against this place Colonel Henriod marched from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to two thousand men and three pieces of artillery, and driving back some advanced posts from Ojos Negros and Origuella, came in front of the main position at eleven o'clock in the morning of the 25th of November.

COMBAT OF TREMENDAL

The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the centre of which a

tongue of land shooting out, overhung Origuella, and on the upper part of this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open attack, skirmished as if he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin. Villa Campa was thus induced to mass his forces on that side, and in the night, the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see that the main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, while Henriod, with six chosen companies and two pieces of artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove the Spanish outposts into the fortified convent, and opened a fire with his guns, as if to cover the retreat. This cannonade, however, soon ceased, and Villa Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, was thrown completely off his guard; Henriod's six companies then secretly scaled the rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, killed and wounded five hundred, and put the whole army to flight. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, that district was disarmed.

Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon, but the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way. In December, Suchet, assisted by General Milhaud, with a movable column from Madrid, took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the insurgent Junta fled to Valencia, and thus the subjection of Aragon was, in a manner, effected; for the interior was disarmed and quieted, and the partidas which still hung upon the frontiers were obliged to recruit and be supplied from other provinces, and acted chiefly on the defensive. The Aragonese were indeed so vexed by the smaller bands, now dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro asked leave to raise a Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them.

The reinforcements now pouring into Spain enabled the French General to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand men, of which a part were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortosa, and the rest about Lerida and Mequinenza; those fortresses were, in fact, the only obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps, and in them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, when closely pressed by the invaders.

The policy of the Supreme Junta was always to form fresh corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Novarro, mak-

ing Tortosa his base of operations, lined the banks of the Algas, and menaced Alcañitz; and Perena, trusting to the neighborhood of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the Segre. However, the activity of the French gave little time to effect any considerable organization.

Suchet's positions formed a circle round Zaragoza. Tudela, Jaca, and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned, but his principal forces were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcañitz, Caspe, Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque; of these, the first, third, and fourth were places of strength, and whether his situation be regarded in a political or a military light, it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate the feelings of the Aragonese—at that time, confessedly the most energetic portion of the nation—and to place the third corps, with reference to the general operations of the war, in a most formidable position.

1. The fortified castle of Alcañitz formed a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro, and being situated at the entrance of the passes leading into Valencia, furnished a base, from which Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which, also, he could place the Catalanian army between two fires, whenever the seventh corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat.

2. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps, while Fraga, with its wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons.

3. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida; and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all the country between Lerida and Venasque; moreover, a co-operation of the garrison of Monzon, the troops at Barbastro, and those at Benevarres, could always curb Perena.

4. The possession of Venasque permitted Suchet to communicate with the movable columns, (appointed to guard the French frontier,) while the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a manner independent of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca and the Guadalupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected the operations of the third with the seventh corps, and henceforward we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they formed but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against the south.

Suchet's projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy

and sudden enterprises, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The Duke of Mahon, one of Joseph's Spanish adherents, appointed Viceroy of Navarre, was at variance with the military authorities, and all the disorders attendant on a divided administration and a rapacious system ensued. General D'Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of being in Mina's pay, and his suicide during an investigation seems to confirm the suspicion, but it is certain that the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak.

To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, the Emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third corps, and that General soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually captured Mina himself; yet he was unable to suppress the system of the *partidas*. "*Espoz y Mina*" took his nephew's place; and from that time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this celebrated man—undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the *partida* chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils.

It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the greatest injury to the French cause, and it was precisely in those provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succors may be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the *partidas* of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and often commanded by men of undoubted enterprise and courage, never occupied half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely defeated a single division—never prevented any considerable enterprise—never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a single "corps d'armée."

It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere in such a system, it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no people will thus persevere; the aged, the sick, the timid, the helpless, are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, also, be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on every occasion that so rich and powerful a people as the English will be found in

alliance with insurrection; and when the invaders follow up their victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet and some others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of ease natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions of honor; and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures resorted to by the *partida* chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their bands.

To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct the energy thus aroused is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected, the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides, and to represent it otherwise, is to make history give false lessons to posterity. Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of Lord Wellington, but that great man, instead of following the example of the Supreme Junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced a military organization upon totally different principles. The people were, indeed, called upon and obliged to resist the enemy, but it was under a regular system, by which all classes were kept in just bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation rendered subservient to the plan of the General-in-chief. To act differently is to confess weakness: it is to say that the government, being unequal to the direction of affairs, permits anarchy.

The *partida* system in Spain was the offspring of disorder, and disorder in war is weakness accompanied by ills the least of which is sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare, that habits of unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and disrespect for the rights of property are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for the duties of citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency been cited as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by politicians who hold regular armies in abhorrence, although a high sense of honor, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance, regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the latter's discipline.

Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one great man is sufficient to save a nation; but when every person is permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself, for one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, there will be two to act from personal interest; in short, there will be more robbers than generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y

Mina was to slay the commander of a neighboring band, because, under the mask of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen :* nay, this, the most fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any other partida than his own to be in his district ; he also, as I have before related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla system confined to the one side. The following observations of St. Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was greater than the benefit :

“ Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans, I admired them ; but, as they often exceeded the bounds of reason, their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without advantage.

“ When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which defends it, it is beyond question that the population should come to the assistance of the troops, and lend them every support ; but, without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on to the field of battle.” “ It is inhuman to place their inexperience in opposition to hardened veterans.

“ Instead of *exasperating* the people of Catalonia, the leaders should have endeavored to *calm* them, and have directed their ardor so as to second the army on great occasions. But they excited them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to embark if they were on the coast, if inland to take to the mountains and perish of misery within sight of their own homes, thus abandoned to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people's ardor was exhausted daily in partial operations ; and hence, on great occasions, when they could have been eminently useful, they were not to be had.

“ Their good will had been so often abused by the folly of their leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain. The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and ill-used them when broken by defeat.

“ They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often as dangerous to their own party as to the enemy. The atrocities committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic,

* Extract from the Life of Mina.

abated their zeal, caused the middle classes to desire peace as the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at first, began to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, but for the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in Spain would never have remounted the throne.

"The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the slaves of their duty and of the state; certain of death a little sooner or a little later, they, like the Spaniards, were victims of the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted warfare; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out this disposition prematurely; and that unhappy people were themselves the victims of a cruelty, which, either of their own will or excited by others, they had exercised upon those troops that fell into their power; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a contrary system would, in a little time, have broken up the seventh corps—seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners, naturally inclined to desert. But the murders of all wounded, and sick, and helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion, which at first menaced total destruction, ceased entirely."

Such were St. Cyr's opinions; and, assuredly, the struggle in Catalonia, of which it is now time to resume the relation, was not the least successful in Spain.

CHAPTER II

Continuation of the operations in Catalonia—St. Cyr sends Lecchi to the Ampurdan; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian war, of Verdier's arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Augereau's appointment to the command of the seventh corps—Augereau's inflated proclamation—It is torn down by the Catalonians—He remains sick at Perpignan—St. Cyr continues to command—Refuses to obey Joseph's orders to remove into Aragon—Presses Verdier to commence the siege of Gerona—Reinforces Verdier—Remains himself at Vich—Constancy of the Spaniards—St. Cyr marches from Vich, defeats three Spanish battalions, and captures a convoy—Storms St. Felien de Quixols—Takes a position to cover Verdier's operations—Siege of Gerona—State of the contending parties—Assault of Monjouic fails—General Fontanes storms Palamos—Wimpfen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw succors into Gerona—Monjouic abandoned.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

THE narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the moment when St. Cyr, having established his quarters at Vich, received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had

been relieved by the squadron of Admiral Comaso.* His whole attention was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening General Reille's preparation for the siege of that place, a second detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to Ampurdan. During this time, Coupigny continued at Tarragona, and Blake made his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans and Wimpfen, had composed Reding's left wing, were continually skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the partisans, especially Claros and the Doctor Rovira, molested the communications in a more systematic manner than before.

Lecchi returned, about the 18th of May, with the intelligence that Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that General Verdier had replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and that Marshal Augereau had reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the command of the seventh corps. The latter part of this information gave St. Cyr infinite discontent. In his "Journal of Operations," he asserts that his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and his own observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous of his rival.

Augereau, who, having served in Catalonia during the war of the revolution, imagined that he had then acquired an influence which might be revived on the present occasion, framed a proclamation that vied with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes; but the latter, although turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people, whereas Augereau's address, being at utter variance with those feelings, was a pure folly. This proclamation he sent into Catalonia, escorted by a battalion; but even on the frontier, the Miguelette colonel, Porta, defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies that had been posted. Augereau, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan; and St. Cyr continued to command, but reluctantly, because (as he affirms) the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon's ill-will. The most serious of these affronts was permitting Verdier to correspond directly with the Minister of War in France, and the publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr's. For these reasons, the latter says he contented himself with a simple discharge of his duty. But, after the conspiracy in the second corps, Napoleon cannot be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer who, however free himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was certainly designed for their leader. It is rather to be admired that the Emperor discovered so little jealousy. When a man has once raised himself to the highest power, he must inevitably give offence to his former comrades; for,

* See vol. I. p. 421.

as all honors and rewards flowing from him are taken as personal favors, so all checks and slights, or even the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where the sanction of time is wanting to identify the sovereign with the country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is patriotism.

While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake's movement against Suchet.* This order he refused to obey, and with reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake's false movement to occupy two "*corps d'armée*," and so retard the siege of Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the Spaniards' possession. St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all his operations, was urgent, for many reasons, to commence the siege without delay; but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, was cautious in attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme; and when pressed to begin, complained that he could not, after placing garrisons in Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand men before Gerona, which, seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient.

St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and that expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, considering that a *dépôt* of provisions, established for the service of the siege at Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as the supplies which he had himself collected at Vich, he sent all his own cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, and having thus increased the number of troops there to eighteen thousand men, again urged Verdier to be expeditious.

These reinforcements marched the 23d of May, and the covering army, diminished to about twelve thousand men under arms, continued to hold the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the Migueletes often skirmished with the advanced posts, but without skill or profit; and the inhabitants of the town always remained in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, yet still firm of resolution not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments, which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude; men and women alike, they endure ca-

* See page 135.

lamity with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and, continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigor to execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more than becomes either wise or brave men.

Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly all his corn, resolved to approach Gerona, and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in that district; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent his sick and wounded men, under a strong escort, to Barcelona, and disposed his reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without loss. The army, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. In two days it passed by Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de Farnes; the head-quarters were fixed at Caldas de Malavella on the 20th, the fort of St. Felieu de Quixols was stormed on the 21st, and the Spanish privateers driven to seek another harbor. The French then occupied a half circle, extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola, thus cutting off the communication between Gerona and the districts occupied by Coupigny, Wimpfen, the Milans, and Claros.

During the march from Vich, the French defeated three Spanish battalions, and captured a convoy, coming from the side of Martorel, and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of Blake's army—a curious error, for Blake was, on that very day, being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. Strictly speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalonian army; the few troops that kept the field were acting independently. Coupigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Tarragona, where he and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and political intrigues than with military affairs, were thwarting each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations were alike weakened by internal divisions.

Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive to the facilities afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within the works. He, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the 6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June that, reinforced with Lecchi's division, he completed the investment of the place on both sides of the Ter. On the 8th, however, ground was broken; and thus, at the very moment when Blake, with the main body of the army, was advancing against Zaragoza, in other words, seeking

to wrest Aragon from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands.

THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA.

When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of the contending parties were as follows:—Eighteen thousand French held the Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number about four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier found the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, *destitute of a garrison*, when he arrived there from France; a fact consistent with Lord Collingwood's description of the Catalan warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigor attributed to them by others.

St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, covered the siege with twelve thousand men, and Duhesme, having about ten thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona.* Forty thousand French were, therefore, disposed between that city and Figueras; while, on the Spanish side, there was no preparation. Blake was still in Aragon; Coupigny, with six thousand of the worst troops, was at Tarragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimpfen, with a few thousand, held the country about the upper Llobregat; Juan Claros and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olat and Ripol; and, in the higher Catalonia, small bands of Migueletes were dispersed under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own system of warfare, not only disregarded the generals as in the time of Reding, but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever a favorable opportunity occurred. The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Felieu, now resorted to Palamos bay, and the English fleet, under Lord Collingwood, watched incessantly to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, from carrying provisions by the coast.

From Gerona, the Governor did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the *Supreme Central Junta*, for succors, but his cry was disregarded, and when the siege commenced, his garrison did not exceed three thousand regular troops, his magazines and hospitals were but scantily provided, and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was, however, of a lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no manner daunted.

The works of Gerona, already described, were little changed since the first siege; there, however, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical force of the city had been called forth. There, like

* Imperial Muster Roll, MS.

wise, a sickness, common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the ranks of the besiegers ; and there also women were enrolled, under the title of the company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded, and to wait upon the hospitals, and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers ! To evince his own resolution, the Governor forbade the mention of a capitulation under pain of death ; but severe punishments were only denounced, not inflicted. Alvarez, master of his actions, and capable of commanding without phrensy, had recourse to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority ; obstinate his defence was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain of cruelty, and rich in honor.

On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and on the 12th one mortar-battery, erected at Casen Rocca on the left of the Ter, and two breaching-batteries, established against Fort Monjouic, being ready to play, the town was summoned in form. The answer was an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would be fired upon, which was the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the conduct of Alvarez.

The 13th, the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the French, and early on the morning of the 14th, the batteries opened against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from Casen Rocca. The 17th, the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men.

The 19th, the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the outworks of Monjouic, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The French immediately erected breaching-batteries, four hundred yards from the northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their works, but they made a practicable opening by the 4th of July, and with a strange temerity resolved to give the assault, although the flank fire of the works was not silenced, nor the glacis crowned, nor the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a half-moon, in a perfect state, covered the approaches to the breach. The latter was proved by the engineers in a false attack on the night of the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted, yet the storming force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th ; and during these four days, as the batteries ceased to play, the Spaniards retrenched and barricadoed the opening.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column, jumping out of the trenches, rapidly cleared the space between them and the fort, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault

with great resolution ; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that no impression could be made, and the assailants, taken in flank and rear by the fire from the half-moon, the covered way, and the eastern bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt, but their assault failed, with a loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic and the city.

About the period of this assault, which was given without St. Cyr's knowledge, the latter, finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of Souham's division from Santa Coloma de Farnes, and posted it on the left of the Ter, at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich were thus reduced to about eight thousand men under arms, although an effort to raise the siege was to be expected ; for letters from Alvarez, urgently demanding succors of Blake, had been intercepted, and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as I have said, collecting men at Tarragona.

Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take Palamos. To effect this, General Fontanes marched from St. Felieu on the 5th of July with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the attack ; but in passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti, they were cannonaded by six gun-boats so sharply, that they could not keep the road until the artillery had obliged the boats to sheer off.

STORMING OF PALAMOS.

This town having a good roadstead, and being only one march from Gerona, was necessarily a place of importance ; and the works, although partly ruined, were so far repaired by the Catalans as to be capable of some defence. Twenty guns were mounted, and the town, built on a narrow rocky peninsula, had but one front, the approach to which was over an open plain completely commanded from the left by some very rugged hills, on which a considerable number of Somatenes were assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town. Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, and a third time summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the Italians immediately stormed the works. The Spaniards, flying towards the shore, endeavored to get on board their vessels, but the latter put off to sea, and some

of Fontanes' troops having turned the town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the sword.

Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimpfen and the Milans, arriving near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham's outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr's attention to that side, while a reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left of the line into the city. The French General was not deceived, but fifteen hundred chosen men, under the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, endeavored to penetrate secretly through the enemy's posts at Llagostera; they were accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishman also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing General Pino's posts unobserved. Unfortunately a straggler was taken, and St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line of investment would be made in the night, and by the road of Casa de Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, and sent another in pursuit of the succoring column.

As the French General had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the other troops, and lost a thousand men; the rest dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill used and robbed of their arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal having offered to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his men; but the Spanish General Coupigny affirmed that the men abandoned Marshal, and refused to fight; that Rich ran away before he had seen the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. It is also certain that Marshal's flight was to Gerona, where he afterwards fell fighting gallantly.

This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was thus debarred the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies as the enemy neared the walls; his resolution was unshaken, but he did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Coupigny, and even denounced his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That General excused himself on the ground of Blake's absence, the want of provisions, and the danger of carrying the contagious sickness of Tarragona into Gerona, and finally adduced Colonel Marshal's unfortunate attempt, as a proof that due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches, a bombardment and an assault without any succor, and that during that time he himself

remained at Tarragona, instead of being at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect.

From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Coupigny nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have forgotten, that with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand men to man the works and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at any moment.

After the failure of the assault at Monjoui, Verdier recommenced his approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan; his operations were, however, retarded by Claros and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French frontier; and to prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade from Souham's division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja.

The 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort and Monjoui, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted the communication between the latter place and the city. The 4th of August, the glacis of Monjoui being crowned, the counterscarp blown in and the flank defences ruined, the ditch was passed, and the half-moon in front of the curtain carried by storm, but no lodgment was effected. During this day, Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan, and at the same time, two hundred Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners.

On the 5th, the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line of attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A second practicable breach was soon opened, and preparations made for storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches and one assault.

CHAPTER III.

Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the French frontier—Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter Gerona with succors—Alvarez remonstrates with the Junta of Catalonia—Bad conduct of the latter—Blake advances to the aid of the city—Pestilence there—Affects the French army—St. Cyr's firmness—Blake's timid operations—O'Donnell fights Souham, but without success—St. Cyr takes a position of battle—Garcia Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into Gerona—Blake retires—Siege resumed—Garcia Conde comes out of the city—Ridiculous error of the French—Conde forces the French lines and escapes—Assault on Gerona fails—Blake advances a second time—Sends another convoy under the command of O'Donnell to the city—O'Donnell with the head of the convoy succeeds, the remainder is cut off—Blake's incapacity—He retires—St. Cyr goes to Perpignan—Augereau takes the command of the siege—O'Donnell breaks through the French lines—Blake advances a third time—Is beaten by Souham—Pino takes Hostalrich—Admiral Martin intercepts a French squadron—Captain Hallowell destroys a convoy in Rosas bay—Distress in Gerona—Alvarez is seized with delirium, and the city surrenders—Observations.

VERDIER, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the town, in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding facts. The Spaniards, indignant at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, at the head of two thousand five hundred Migueletes, attacked Bascara, a post between Figueras and Gerona, at the moment when a convoy, escorted by a battalion, had arrived there from Belgarde. The commandant of Figueras, uniting some "*gens d'armes*" and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succored the post on the 6th, but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. That General refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion to censure the system of movable columns, as more likely to create than to suppress insurrections; as being harassing to the troops, weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the peasantry must always be more movable than the columns, and better informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral

discipline that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times requiring a nice judgment, great talents, and excellent arrangement, was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the seventh corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting the flanks and rear of an invading army, than that of movable columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr's objections. The Emperor's views, opinions, and actions will, in defiance of all attempts to lessen them, go down with a wonderful authority to posterity.

A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, made a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening of the 10th upon the Ter, in front of Angeles, and being baffled in an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near St. Pons, entered Gerona at daybreak. This hardy exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison; yet the enemy's approaches hourly advanced, pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the town still remained inactive. In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to themselves; while defending the half-ruined walls of Gerona with inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succored them. The Supreme Junta of Catalonia forwarded their complaints to the Central Junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of expression.

"The generals of our army," they said, "have formed no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty. Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to her own feeble resources? If so, her destruction is inevitable; and should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when this most interesting place can obtain no help from them? Do you not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is sufficient to freeze the ardor, to desolate the hearts of the most zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this

bulwark of our frontier be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no longer any real existence."

In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to lend Catalonia every succor, and Blake received orders to make an immediate effort to raise the siege. But how little did the language of the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent upon thwarting and insulting the English General after the battle of Talavera; and this was the moment that the Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic with the pen, were selling to foreign merchants the arms supplied by England for the defence of their country!

Towards the end of August, when the French fire had made three breaches in Girona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Tarragona with a force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the mountains to St. Hilario, where he was joined by Wimpfen and the Milans. As he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand men against the circle of investment, and his arrival created considerable alarm among the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged was also among the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained many thousand patients; the battalions in the field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were obliged to rise from sick-beds to take the command of the brigades; and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, was extended along more than thirty miles of mountainous wooded country, intersected by rivers, and every way favorable for Blake's operations.

Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. Cyr's best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, decided and prompt in council; and, although apparently wanting in those original and daring views which mark the man of superior genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, "that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed courage, and Blake's inaction was rather the thing to

be dreaded; for, notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days' provisions could be procured, to supply the troops when together, and it would be necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner, that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would probably act immediately; hence it was necessary to concentrate as many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and deliver battle; and there were still ten thousand good troops under arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing corps."

On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed, but by no means spirited, was, from frequent defeat, become cautious without being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. He had collected and loaded with flour about two thousand beasts of burthen, placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; and Garcia Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man, undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused Colonel Henry O'Donnell to fall upon Souham's posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of August, supporting this attack with another detachment under General Logoyri. At the same time he directed Colonel Landen to collect the Migueletes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession of "*N. S. de los Angeles*," a convent, situated on a high mountain behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to pass.

O'Donnell, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of the position occupied by one of Souham's battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, with an impetuous charge, recovered the ground. The Spanish General, being then joined by Logoyri, renewed the skirmish, but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. Cyr, having transferred his headquarters to Fornels, was earnestly advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly, that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in detail during their march. He

however argued that his opponent must be exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his forces, and broken the covering line at once; wherefore, seeing that such an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own troops on the Oñá, by a flank march close under the beard of his unskilful adversary.

Souham's division, falling back in the night, took post the first of September on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and at eight o'clock the head of Pino's division entered this line, prolonging it by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At twelve o'clock, these two divisions were established in position, and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Verdier, with a strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casen Rocca was disarmed, and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria and look to the security of the parc and the trenches.

A thick fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when, the weather clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the heads of Blake's columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnes, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas. Scarcely had the French General quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and descended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy. He was now on the flat ground, having two thousand men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said, at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira at Claros, and consequently with their rear to the advancing convoy.

Verdier's reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post, advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge, put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first took the direction of the town, but being fired upon, turned towards the heights of Palau, made for Fornels, and would have gone straight into Blake's camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from viewing that General's position. Rallying and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino's division, St. Cyr instantly

directed them back again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow Garcia Conde with the reserve. It was too late; the latter had already entered the town, and Alvarez, sallying forth, destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio; and thinking the siege raised, had immediately sent five hundred sick men out of the town, into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the French two days before. Verdier, after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two partisans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. Thus the place was succored for a moment; but, as Blake made no further movement, Alvarez was little benefited by the success. The provisions received did not amount to more than seven or eight days' consumption, and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour this food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies.

While Millosewitz's troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, the report of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake's army was victorious and the French in flight; hence he refrained from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde's men, might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic, before Verdier could have come to their support.

St. Cyr, having now but one day's provisions left, resolved to seek Blake and deliver battle; but the Spanish General retired up the mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so contemptible with reference to the means at Blake's disposal, that Alvarez believed himself betrayed, and, trusting thenceforth only to his own heroism, permitted Conde's troops to go back or to remain, as they pleased—exactng, however, from those who stopped, an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half and afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance—a measure which caused some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen, freely sharing their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in everything.

Garcia Conde's success must be attributed partly to the negli-

gence of St. Cyr's subordinates; but the extended cantonments occupied in the evening of the 31st gave Blake, as the French General himself acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much danger or difficulty. Nor were St. Cyr's dispositions for the next day perfectly combined; it is evident that giving Blake credit for sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle, that he forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between the left of the Ona and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave two thousand men in that place, with their front to the garrison and their rear to the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to have been at too great a distance from the town. The firing that took place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier's reserve, and the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves.

St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted authority. St. Cyr, however, acknowledges that his soldiers answered honestly to every call he made, and he was bound, while he retained the command, to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honor.* In other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as beseemed his reputation. It was not so with Blake: the whole of his operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of any great enterprise. He should have come up with a resolution to raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight skirmishes and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions, and then, notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned away with a cold look and a donation that mocked its wants.

When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile, came out at daybreak on the 3d, with fifteen hundred men and the beasts of burthen. He halted for a little time, just beyond the gate, to examine the country in front with his glass, and as everything appeared favorable, his troops were beginning to move for-

* St. Cyr's Journal of Operations.

ward, when the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French, forgetting the ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at daylight, and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily retreated again into the town.

Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed Mazzuchelli's brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde's rear when the latter should again come forth. He likewise put a battalion on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it back either upon Mazzuchelli's brigade, or upon La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino's division.

The 4th, one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed in single files along a bypath, leading to Castellar de Selva. Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without hurt, although the French in Monjouic, observing all that passed, plied their guns against the rear of his column. Being informed by the peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, Conde made for Casa de Selva, and General Pino having notice of his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge which crossed the Spanish line of march; these battalions took a wrong direction, the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their rear was attacked by Pino's personal escort, and that fifty men and some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honor.

There were now four open breaches in Gerona. Mazzuchelli's brigade and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French store of powder failed; ten days elapsed before a fresh supply could be obtained, and Alvarez profited of this cessation, to retrench and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st

of August, to seize the convent of *Madonna de los Angeles*, had fortified that building, and introduced small supplies of provisions. This revived, in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, by which, in conjunction with the post at *Madonna de los Angeles*, and with the assistance of Blake's army, he hoped to maintain an open communication with the country. But this bold and skilful conception he was unable to effect; because in a sally from the Capuchins on the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he was beaten by a single French regiment, and the same day Mazzuchelli's Italians stormed *Madonna de los Angeles*, and put the garrison to the sword.

During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira, who were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer, but was repulsed with loss, and the French General Joba was killed. Meanwhile, the batteries having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general sally, by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes between the generals of the covering and the investing forces were rife; the engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins, was in possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted.

Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau, above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in a body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm provided Calvary were first taken.

Souham's division was appointed to watch Blake; Pino was directed to make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier's troops, in three columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault; but the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and the besiegers were completely

repulsed from all the breaches with a loss of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to the assault;* but that General asserted that the men had behaved perfectly well, and calling a council of war, proposed to continue the operations with as much vigor as the nature of the case would permit. His spirit was not, however, partaken by the council, and the siege was turned into a blockade.

Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, made as if he would raise the blockade; yet his object was merely to introduce another convoy, and St. Cyr, divining his intention and judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could reach the town. In this view, Souham's division was placed behind Palau, and Pino's division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi's division of the investing troops was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, while the two former came down upon their rear.

Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of St. Sadurni, detached ten thousand men, under Wimpfen, to protect the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O'Donnell led the advanced guard. At daybreak on the 26th, O'Donnell fell upon the rear of the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part of Souham's division, came upon the left flank of the convoy, and, pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde. Pino's division, then running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the rear-guard under Wimpfen, the rout was complete, and Blake made no effort to save the distressed troops. O'Donnell with a thousand men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town; the remainder of the convoy was taken, the Italians gave no quarter, and three thousand of the Spaniards were slain.

After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace Blake's communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. Felieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings, which were become almost insupportable—without money, without medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches open. "If," said Alvarez, "the Captain-General be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise

* St Cyr's Journal of Operations.

to our aid, or Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcasses and ruins, the memory of which will afflict posterity!"

St. Cyr having repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future supply, found Augereau in a good state of health, and obliged him to assume the command. Then, he says, everything needful was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found in the state of Napoleon's affairs. Peace had been concluded with Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming disposable, not only the seventh, but every "corps d'armée" in Spain was reinforced.

Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, reached the camp before Gerona the 12th of October. In the course of the following night, O'Donnell, issuing from the town on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham's quarters, obliged that General to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction with Milans, at Santa Coloma; thus successfully executing as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused.

Blake, on the 29th, took possession once more of the heights of Bruñola, but Souham with an inferior force put him to flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of Hostalrich. This place, fortified with an old wall and towers, was defended by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle; it was, however, carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there captured, although Blake, with his army, was only a few miles off. Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th, was intercepted by Admiral Martin on the 23d, who burnt several of his smaller vessels and drove the rest on shore at different places, when two of the line-of-battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and some of the armed vessels took refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity fort, presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. But on the 31st, Captain Hallowell

appeared in the bay with a squadron, and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the British seventy men killed and wounded.

The distress of Gerona increased, desertions became frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the Governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During November, famine and sickness tormented the city, and the French were inactive for want of powder, but on the 6th of December, ammunition having arrived, the suburbs of Marina, that of Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the walls, were carried by the besiegers, and Alvarez, thus confined to the circuit of the walls, was cut off from the Capuchin and Constable forts. He had been ill for some days, but rousing himself for a last effort, made a general sally on the 7th, retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts, and opening a way to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison; the next day, overcome by suffering, he became delirious. A council of war then assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honors of war, the troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza.

French and Spanish writers alike affirm that Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigor and contumely that excited every person's indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last accusation admits, however, of dispute: the monks had, during the siege, formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform, and being to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute them prisoners, was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh interpretation of the terms.

Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance; yet constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular progress of the engineer; the combinations of science are not to

be defied with impunity; but the French combinations were not scientific, and this, saving the right of Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the defence.

2. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Monjouic was ill-judged and worse executed, says, "The principal approaches should have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there was easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clefts, and the defences open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the Casen Rocca; but on the side of Monjouic, the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the flying sap, with great loss and difficulty." If, however, the Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been covered by the Oña, and Monjouic, and the forts of the Constable and Capuchin, (regular places complete in themselves,) would have remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor, who defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell, would have surrendered all, because a lodgment was made in an isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful, and certainly it must always be a great matter with a general to raise the moral confidence of his own army, and to sink that of his adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive success.

3. The faulty execution of the attack on Monjouic is less doubtful than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the progress of the siege, that during that month disease invaded the army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted operations, became careless and disinclined to the labors of the trenches.

4. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted than that against Monjouic; and considering these facts, together with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the maladministration of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken at all.

5. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely, they endured unheard-of sufferings with constancy, and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau is as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are

good and evil principles in man, how dependent upon accidental circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona Monjouic, on the insolent summons of Duhesme! At that period, the influence of a base court degraded public feeling, and what was weak in his character came to the surface; but in times more congenial to virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man's nature broke forth.

6. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less than those who came against the former city; the regular garrison of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand, that of Gerona about three thousand. The armed multitude, in the one, amounted to at least twenty-five thousand, in the other; they were less than six thousand. Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza; the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance; above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush for; the fighting was more successful, the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy greater, the suffering within the walls neither wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled that of Zaragoza, and every proceeding tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of generous men.

7. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as Lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant or so careless of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by Sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post, and that place being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor more disposed than others to

act cord ally with their allies; but the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of their convoys, would have rendered the invaders' task most difficult.

8. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy of the Valencians had been characterized by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should be conquered; hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthage, the governors of this rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of defence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few days' march from Valencia itself, two solid bases for further invasion! But it is now time to revert to the operations of the "*Central Supreme Junta*," that it may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, and the fortunes of the Spanish people were sported with by those who had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula.

CHAPTER IV.

Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by Lord Wellesley—Junta propose a new form of government—Opposed by Romana—Junta announce the convocation of the National Cortes, but endeavor to deceive the people—A Spanish army assembled in the Morena under Eguia—Bassecour sends cavalry to reinforce Del Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad Rodrigo—He is joined by the Gallician divisions—Santocildes occupies Astorga—French endeavor to surprise him, but are repulsed—Ballesteros quits the Asturias, and marching by Astorga attempts to storm Zamora—Enters Portugal—Del Parque demands the aid of the Portuguese army—Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his reasons in detail—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Tamames—Del Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were assembling at Valladolid, retires to Bejar.

WHEN Sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place;

but the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition, no good could be expected from the change; otherwise, such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state.

"Spain," said Lord Wellesley, "has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is untrue to herself." "Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain." "No alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and national infirmity."

This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hope of assistance; but he being accredited to the existing government, apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation and some peculiarly heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived.

But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, every member of the existing Junta, in rotation, to have a place; the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that assembly. Thus, under the pretence of resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the proposal in favor of the colonies was, following the opinion of Lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and government.

This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission, dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was objected to some amongst the Junta, that having as merchants contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult of access, and insolent of demeanor.

Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, not members of the Junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, and to be styled "*The Permanent Deputation of the Realm.*" One of this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in favor of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong in favor of civil liberty, was not well considered. The "Permanent Deputation," being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, having the sole distribution of honors and emoluments, could not fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled.

Some time before this, when the terror caused by Sir Arthur Wellesley's retreat from Spain was fresh, Don Martin de Garay had applied to Lord Wellesley for advice as to the best form of government, and that nobleman also recommended a "Council of Regency," and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with a list of grievances, "a Bill of Rights," founded on an enlarged conciliatory policy, and having equal regard for the interests of the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that Lord Wellesley condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic form as for its inefficiency; the English Cabinet never forgot that they were the champions of privilege,

nor that the war was essentially less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of the aristocratic system of Europe.

To evade Romana's proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October, announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded Romana's plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, trample on the King's rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; moreover, that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then, enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which deceived nobody; for, to use the words of Lord Wellesley, "no plan had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses or relief from exactions, and the administration of justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security of persons and property, and every other great branch of government, were as defective as the military establishments."

However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power. They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and in September and October fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and Andalusia, had been incorporated with the remains of Cuesta's old army; the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for, owing to the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English stores and money at Cadiz and Seville was sufficient for every exigency.

In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province, made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid.

During these movements, Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, detached eight hundred horsemen to reinforce the Duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and about six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service of the *dépôts* behind the Morena.

In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese frontier to the Tagus, the Duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions of Mendizabel and Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men, completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in July,) made a movement into the rugged country about the Sierra de Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same time General Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men, took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, which, after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the Tormes and the Esla.* In this situation, a French detachment attempted to surprise one of the gates of Astorga on the 9th of October, and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards Ballesteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from thence proceeded to join the Duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies of Galicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Galicia a general disposition to resist the authority of the Central Junta.

Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, had demanded in September, through Perez Castro, the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join him; this being referred to Sir Arthur Wellesley, he gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of the military state of affairs at this period.

"The enemy," he said, "were superior to the allies, including those which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammu-

* See p. 175.

nition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after the great victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since.

"But besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate the Duke Del Parque's intended operations. He could march a part or the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operations of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon the Duke Del Parque and Beresford with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, which was at Placentia, and with the force under Kellermann, which was near Valladolid; in which case, even if he, Sir Arthur, had the inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them from destruction.

"In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate, or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the commencement of the argument, forbade a general co-operation with any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could follow would be that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to resume those defensive positions which they ought never to have quitted.

"Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the enemy's hands, was resolved not to give the Duke Del Parque any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the Portuguese government not to risk Beresford's army in a situation which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the Duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose those troops to a defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the

way of preventing the success of an attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the other corps, which must be put in motion if Ciudad was to be saved; and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact position which the Duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain that in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal, at least, if not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period which the enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize, and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be accomplished unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were much more important to all parties than any desultory successful operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort.”*

This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the Spanish Junta or their General. Castro replied to it by demanding a positive and definitive answer as to when the Portuguese army would be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. “*When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any person can engage to carry into execution a military operation; when means shall be pointed out and fixed for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the case when lately in that country. When decided answers shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors of Portugal that their Excellencies have an army in a state to be sent into Spain.*”† This was Sir Arthur's reply, which ended the negotiation, and the Duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself.

To favor the junction of Ballesteros, his first movement was towards Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together,

* Letter from sir A. Wellesley, September 23, 1809, MS.

† Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence with Don M. Forgas, October 19, 1809, MS.

at Salamanca, eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him. Thereupon, the Duke, without having effected his junction, fell back to Tamames, taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable strength; where he awaited the enemy, with a thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be accounted experienced soldiers.

BATTLE OF TAMAMES.

General Losada commanded the Spanish right, Count Belvedere the reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballesteros could arrive, moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th, and immediately fell upon Del Parque's left. The Spanish cavalry fled rather hastily, the French horsemen followed closely, the infantry, surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and the Duke rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered the guns, and discomfited the French with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers, but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to be inclosed by Ballesteros in that disordered state, retreated to Salamanca.

Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st, when, being joined by Ballesteros, he pushed with nearly thirty thousand men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off Marchand's retreat, but that General had timely information, and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames reached Madrid; Dessolle's division was detached through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps, and Kellermann was directed to advance from Valladolid, and take the command of the whole.

When the Duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while these events were taking place in Castile, the Central Junta, having finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha.

CHAPTER V.

Areizaga takes the command of Eguia's army, and is ordered to advance against Madrid—Folly of the Supreme Junta—Operations in La Mancha—Combat of Dos Barrios—Cavalry combat of Ocaña—Battle of Ocaña—Destruction of the Spanish army.

IN the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success, which continues until the hour of battle, and then, when it might be of use, generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta, having to deceive the people affirmed that Sir Arthur Wellesley had retreated to the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, that forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a provisionary system for the future administration of the capital, with a care that they denied to the army which was to put them in possession.

Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their eyes upon General Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation was that, at the petty battle of Alcañitz, Blake had noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter end of October; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from Madrid.

This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the Duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna. The Duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men were to be put in motion against Madrid, precisely on that plan which Sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favor of the French, that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on the defensive, Areizaga's irruption may be regarded as an extreme example of military rashness; and

the project of uniting Del Parque's forces with Albuquerque's at Talavera, was also certain to fail, because the enemy's masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque's rear.

Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favorite scheme, the Junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate, and permitted Areizaga to march under the impression that it was so. Nothing could be more untrue.* Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even *officially inform him of Areizaga's march until the 18th of November*, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, *on the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance*, and with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque's forces. Sir Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act; and he assured the Junta that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever.

OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.

Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the Baron Crossand, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters, which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and Danyel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full of life and confidence, and being without impediments of any kind, made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects.

Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumors of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had re-

* Appendix 16, § 1.

turned to France, Soult was Major-General of the French armies, and under his advice, the King, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards Talavera, for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in deceiving the French as to the approach of the English;* and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta.

The second corps, commanded by General Héudelet, being withdrawn from Placentia, was, on the 5th, posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar.

The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera.

Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolle's troops; the other half, under General Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud's cavalry at Ocaña.

The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, and commanded by Marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yébenes, a day's march in advance of Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos, on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole army, including the French and Spanish guards, was above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle's division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains.

In the night of the 6th, information reached the King, that six thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second column, likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos.† All the prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was above fifty thousand strong, and the Duke of Belluno immediately concentrated the first corps at Yébenes, but kept his cavalry at Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and Madrilejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front of the first corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña were chased back by cavalry; hence Soult judged, what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga, continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division of the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank of the Tagus to

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

† Ibid.

Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry at that point on the 9th; the same day Victor retired with the first corps to Ajofrin.

On the 10th, Gazan's division of the fifth corps was ordered to march from Talavera to Toledo, and the first corps, which had reached the latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who, holding fast at Ocaña, sent six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them towards Ocaña.

COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.

Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only Sebastiani's cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French, thus pressed, drew back behind the infantry, which was close at hand, and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons, which were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the whole mass of the enemy's cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of two hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga's main body was, however, coming up, Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña, and the next morning took up a position on some heights lining the left bank of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez; the Spaniards entered Dos Barrios, but there their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from the Morena like a stream of lava, and burst into La Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumor to precede them. This swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or position, without any plan of action, Arcizaga had rushed like a maniac into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still trembling and bewildered.

From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his government of Sebastiani's stubborn resistance, and of the doubts which now for the first time assailed his own mind.* It was then the Junta, changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the British army, and commanded the Dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately, and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the public, that Sir Arthur was also coming on. Wherefore Areizaga, thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first incertitude, made on the 14th a

* Appendix 16, § 1.

flank march by his right to Santa Cruz de la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been concentrated from every quarter, and although to the south of Ocaña the ground is open and undulating, on the north, the ramifications of the Cuença mountains, leading down the left bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which, stretching strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for Sebastiani to cover that place.

Soult was awake to his adversary's projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement unless certain of support from the British army, and therefore kept the different corps quiet on the 11th, waiting for Heudelet's report from Oropesa.* In the night it arrived, stating that rumors of a combined Spanish and English army being on the march were rife, but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was actually within several marches. Soult, now judging that, although the rumors should be true, his central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada and Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, to be in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, information being received of the Duke Del Parque's retreat from Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth corps, Dessolle's division was recalled to Madrid.

During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in march, General Liger Belair's brigade continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions on the height in front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th, the general movement was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the King's guards at Madrid formed a reserve for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, and Dessolle's division was in the Guadarama, on its return to the capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, when Areizaga's flank march to Santa Cruz de la Zarza occasioned new combinations.

In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry over the Tagus. The Duke of Belluno was imme-

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

diately ordered to carry the first and fourth corps (with the exception of a brigade left in Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating so as to fix Areizaga, and force him to deliver battle; and, with a view of tempting the Spaniard by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and Aranjuez were broken down.

While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish General commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The partidas also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French garrison to retire from Guadalaxara upon Arganda, and occupied the former town on the 12th; but, in the night of the 13th, eight French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march, surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took eighty horses and a piece of artillery.

The 16th, the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and during this time the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to the Duke of Belluno.

The 17th, Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on the approach of the Duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed the work, and withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus, and on the 18th (the cavalry of the first corps having reached Villarejo de Salvanes) he destroyed his bridges, called in his parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la Sarza.

Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the unsettled plans of the Spanish General, rendered it difficult for the French to fix a field of battle, but now Areizaga's march to St. Cruz had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close together, the Duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with the first corps, and the King, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Areizaga's rear, by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger could arise from this double line of operations, because a single march would bring both the King and Victor upon Areizaga, and if the latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez, and the fourth corps

received a like order. The King himself, quitting Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the royal French guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of Dessolle's division which had just arrived; in all about ten thousand men. The same day the Duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps at Villarejo de Salvanes, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges near Aranjuez in two hours; and about one o'clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. General Milhaud with the leading squadrons immediately pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen, and was thus led to the table-land between Antiguela and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. Having only twelve hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire, but at that moment General Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the whole making a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were advancing to the charge.

CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCANA.

The Spaniards came on at a trot, and Sebastiani directed Paris, with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which being executed with great vigor, especially by the Poles, caused considerable confusion, which the Spanish General endeavored to remedy by closing to the assailed flank. But to effect this he formed his left centre in one vast column, whereupon Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserve, and the enormous mass yielding to the shock got into confusion, and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of the French bore no proportion in men, but General Paris was killed, and several superior officers were wounded.

This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult to believe that the Spanish General, aware of his error, was endeavoring to recover his line of operations. The examination of the prisoners confirmed this opinion, and in the night, information from the Duke of Belluno and the reports of officers sent towards Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to

be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon the King's forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the morning of the 19th at Ocaña, but judging from the cavalry action that the French could attack first, he drew up his whole army on the same plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder.

Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which, commencing gently half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows, whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this ravine the Spanish left was posted, crossing the main road from Aranjuez to Dos Barrios; one flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña. The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge *in front* of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods, which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga's dispositions.

Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing his forces. The whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one regiment left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary, to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded by General Senarmont. The royal guards remained with the King, and Marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements.

Before daybreak, on the 10th, the monarch marched with the intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At Antiguela his troops, quitting the high road, turned to their left, gained the table-land of Ocaña, somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga's army in order of battle. The French cavalry, instantly forming to the front, covered the advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish out-posts fell back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile front and opened a sharp fire.

About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand

cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and fifty guns, including the battery of the royal guard. But Areizaga's position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was paralyzed by the ravine; it could neither attack nor be attacked; the centre was scarcely better situated, and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horsemen, who were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the attack.

BATTLE OF OCANA.

At ten o'clock, Sebastiani's cavalry, gaining ground to his left, turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed in front, followed the cavalry, and drove General Zayas from the olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same manner, followed Leval in second line, and General Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The King remained in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two columns; the principal one flanked by the cavalry, directed against and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre in check, and each being supported by reserves.

These dispositions were completed at eleven o'clock, at which hour Senarmont, massing thirty pieces of artillery, opened a shattering fire on Areizaga's centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played at the same time across the ravine against the left, and six others swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their skirmishing fire brisk, and, from the centre of their line, sixteen guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval's and Girard's columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the Spaniards gave back, their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine by a flanking fire of grape, and Senarmont immediately drawing the artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga's right wing in its whole length.

During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward,

obliged the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing *behind* the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senar-mont's artillery tore their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive, and their fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was wounded slightly, Leval severely; the line advanced, and the leading French divisions wavered and gave back.

The moment was critical, and the Duke of Treviso lost no time in exhortations to Leval's troops, but, like a great commander, instantly brought up Girard's division through the intervals of the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one regiment in square on the left flank; for he expected that Areizaga's powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge for the victory. Girard's fire soon threw the Spanish first line into disorder, and meanwhile Dessolles, who had gained ground by an oblique movement, seeing the enemy's right thus shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side. The light cavalry of the King's guard, followed by the infantry, then poured through the town, and on the extreme left Sebastiani, with a rapid charge, cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off entirely, and the second line of infantry gave ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion; Areizaga, confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself.

For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained endeavored to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolles' divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself across the plain; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an

oblique direction, continually contracted the space, and the pursuing cavalry arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men, and forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all quarters, and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous execution was inflicted, and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, were desired, in raillery, "to return to their homes, and abandon war as a trade they were unfit for." This fatal battle commenced at eleven o'clock; before two, thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty carriages, twenty-five stand of colors, three generals, six hundred inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards contrived to make away towards the mountain of Tarancon, others followed the various routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena, and many saved themselves in Valencia and Murcia.

Meanwhile the first corps, having passed the Tagus by a ford, re-established the bridge at Villa Maurique before ten o'clock in the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed Areizaga's traces; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on, took a thousand of the fugitives who were making for Tarancon. The Duke of Belluno, being thus apprised of the result of the battle, halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward to La Guardia, where they joined Sebastiani's horsemen, and the whole continuing the pursuit to Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred horses. This finished the operations of the day; only eighteen hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred men, killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand, and before night-fall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand captives, were in the hands of the conquerors!*

Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, he met General Benaz with a thousand dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle commenced; this body he directed on Madrilejos to cover the retreat of the fugitives, but so strongly did the panic spread that when Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz's men fled, without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came

* S. Journal of Operations, MS. Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809, MS.

from the fight. Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares; and still fewer at La Carolina.*

CHAPTER VI.

King Joseph's return to Madrid—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Alba de Tormes—Dispersion of the Spanish troops—Their great sufferings and patience—The Supreme Junta treat Sir A. Wellesley's counsels with contempt—He breaks up from the Guadiana and moves to the Mondego—Vindication of his conduct for having remained so long on the Guadiana—French remain torpid about Madrid—Observations.

JOSEPH halted at Dos Barrios the night of the battle, and the next day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, upon Madrilejos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena; the fifth corps, by Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, from Aranjuez to Consuegra. The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolles' first brigade, returned on the 20th to Madrid.

Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La Mancha, but the Duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolles' division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the uncertainty with respect to the British movements obliged the King to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del Parque gained upon the sixth corps, he might raise an insurrection in Leon, Gazan's division of the sixth corps was sent from Toledo through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand's assistance, and Kellermann was again directed to take the command of the whole.

During these events, the British army remained tranquil about Badajos; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being joined by the Duke Del Parque. That General, however, who had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolles' division was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and therefore advanced from Bejar towards Alba de

* Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809, MS.

Tormes on the 17th, two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the Tormes, and having reached Alba the 21st, sent a division to take possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d, he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellermann, collecting all the troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon Medina del Campo, and the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once, but the infantry stood firm and repulsed the assailants.

The 24th, the Duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement.* Kellermann, without waiting for the arrival of Gazan's division, instantly pursued, and his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes; being repulsed, the French retired upon their supports, and the Duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one division, back to the right bank.

BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.

Scarcely was the line formed when Kellermann came up with two divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating, sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and with the other charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred; those on the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The Duke rallied his cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the fight; but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the dusk. During the night the Duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, but at daybreak, when a French patrol came up with his rear, his whole army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellermann, having meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete.

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, MS.

After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about twenty thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of the sufferings of those famished soldiers. Many actually died of want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed nor murmured! Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and feeble in battle, are patient to the last degree in suffering.

This result of the Duke Del Parque's operation had amply justified Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice to the Portuguese Regency. In like manner the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the Duke of Albuquerque's advance to Arzobispo, had justified that which he gave to the Central Junta. It might therefore be imagined that the latter would have received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before the rout of Alba de Tormes, Sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten thousand men, to be taken from the Duke Del Parque, should *reinforce Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of Meza d'Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter.** Meanwhile Del Parque's force, thus reduced one-third, could, he said, be more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, and, as he informed them, only delayed *to protect Estremadura until the Duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement.* The only reply of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque *immediately to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the Guadiana*; thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha.

This foolish and contemptuous proceeding being followed by Del Parque's defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, Sir Arthur at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were again collected in La Carolina; and that the troops (eight thousand) who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença, under General Echevaria; and as the numbers reassembled in the Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809, MS.

in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. Albuquerque's retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta to oblige Sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura, but it only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to engage in serious operations on that side, yet to have retired when that province was actually attacked would have been disreputable; wherefore, seizing this unhappily favorable moment to quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of the Mondego, leaving General Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand men, at Abrantes.

The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed him for stopping so long, but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved Andalusia from subjection, and this is easy of demonstration. Joseph, having rejected Soult's project against Portugal, dared not invade Andalusia, by Estremadura, with the English army on his right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La Mancha, without drawing Sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive King desired to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried Sir Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English army behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty thousand men, and Albuquerque ten thousand, it was no exaggeration to assume that a hundred thousand could have been organized for defence, and the whole of the troops in the south of Portugal would have been available to aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand English, there would have been a mass of at least one hundred thousand soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the Morena.

From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at the former, the allied army could have protected Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and large cities behind them, and a free

communication with the sea, and abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.

It was a perception of these advantages that caused Sir John Moore to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the northern line for his operations.* Lord Wellesley, also, impressed with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he would undertake the defence of Andalusia, conditions they would not accede to, but without which he could not be secured against the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle against reason.* This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English, but political as well as physical resources and moral considerations weighed in that argument.

For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during a dangerous crisis of affairs, Sir Arthur persisted, at such an enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana, yet it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother's wishes than his own judgment, that he remained after Areizaga's army was assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear-sighted, as to their perverseness, than Lord Wellesley, who, being in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of future exertion, clung longer to the notions that Spain could be put in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever released the British General from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government.

Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. Kellermann remained at Salamanca, watching the movements of the Duke Del Parque, and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of the fourth corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echevaria, but on his arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated by Toboado to Hellin in Murcia, combined his operations with General Suchet, and as I have before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, but, as the Spanish regiments

* Sir J. Moore's Correspondence.

† Lord Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

of the guard had fought freely against their countrymen, and many of the prisoners taken at Ocaña had offered to join the invaders' colors, the King conceived hopes of raising a national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing to serve the French Emperor, but not the intrusive King of Spain. Spanish authors assume that none entered the enemy's ranks save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have reassembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with the loss sustained in the action. However, the battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of offensive operations, which the Austrian war and the reappearance of a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful, the enemy again took the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted that it would join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of Areizaga's acting without such assistance, gave currency to the fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but when deceiving their own General, they permitted Areizaga to act under the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an error, but an enormous crime. Nor was the General much less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, no understanding with the allied commander, as to their mutual resources and intentions, had taken place.

2. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga's movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle, unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government! no general is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but victory; and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory, rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

3. At Dos Barrios the Spanish General, having first met with

opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of the real force in his front; yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could improve accidental advantages.

4. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuña and Henares, only great rapidity could give a chance of success; yet Areizaga was slow, so late as the 15th he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French, moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps, out of the three opposed to him, approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The King by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, and then Areizaga, who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani when the latter had only eight thousand men, sought a battle on the same ground with the King, who was at the head of thirty thousand, the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yébenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this Spanish General, who pretended to treat his adversaries as if they were blind men.

5. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to intrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to await the effect of Albuquerque's and Del Parque's operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga's, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere's former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line

of communication with Valencia, which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet without examining whether either the Spanish General or army were capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th, and on the 16th the first corps, the fourth, the greatest part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, there were no mountains to hold: between Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain, and on the 18th there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The former was chosen, Areizaga's army was destroyed, and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when the men, undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

6. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced to do aught but commend movements so eminently successful; yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga's rush from the mountains was so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate, and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in front at Zarza, on the 19th, whereas, reinforced with the division of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear and flank from Mora a week before; and this, during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours' march.

7. The 11th, the King knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus; Areizaga did not quit Dos Barrios until the 13th, and he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days, therefore, the Spanish General was permitted to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched fifty thousand men about like a patrol of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary's positions or his own line of operations.

8. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralyzed the left of the Spaniards; the disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops! why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the King, unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military genius of his advising general? or was he distracted by disputes amongst the different commanders? or did the British army at Badajos alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

9. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Areizaga's army exceeded fifty thousand men, Albuquerque's ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del Parque, who, at Tamames, had just overthrown the best troops in the French army. Villa Campa also, and the partida bands on the side of Cuenca, were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why, then, was Sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? "*Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war.*" He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, and he foresaw, to use his own expressions, "*that after one or two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by others, all would have to retreat again;*"* yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy's superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those who, asserting Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame Sir John Moore's conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on Sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this pe-

* Letter to Lord Liverpool, MS.

ried the chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise and brave man's toil has been the sport of fools.

Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection; after his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them everywhere acting on the defensive, and everywhere weak.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I

Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia—Distracted state of affairs in that province—Military position and resources described—Invasion of Andalusia—Passes of the Morena forced by the French—Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta—Tumult in Seville—Supreme Junta dissolved—Junta of Seville reassembles, but dispersed immediately after—The French take Jaen—Sebastiani enters Granada—King Joseph enters Cordoba, and afterwards marches against Seville—Albuquerque's march to Cadiz—Seville surrenders—Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani—Victor invests Cadiz—Faction in that city—Mortier marches against Badajos—The Visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte—Inhospitable conduct of the Bishop of Algarve.

NAPOLEON, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past inactivity of the King, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigor. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque's defeat on one side and Echevaria's on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, but immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the first corps, which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives.

Joseph's vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in Navarre, under Renvalles and Mina; partly because Lord Wellington, previous to quitting the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, as a matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district, and his confidential letter being published in the town gazette, and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, made Joseph suspect it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the Spaniards, and emboldened the French partisans, who were

very numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. When the troubles in Navarre were quieted by Suchet, and the distribution of the British army in the valley of the Mondego known, Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, that "war should support war," paid only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the military chest.

Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National Cortes had been short-lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the Council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious, and the general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. The Marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the Archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,—that Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of France,—that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall upon the enemy's rear,—and that a second Baylen might be expected. But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their sittings to that town on the 1st of February. Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of a hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state.

To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of the army in the Morena, and imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The Marquis of Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was confined in Peniscola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a dungeon, where it is believed his infamous existence terminated. The celebrated Padre Gill was sent on a mission to Sicily. While on his passage he told an English gentleman, "*They have sent me on this embassy to get rid of my never ceasing remonstrances; and I have submitted to this banishment for fear I might be got rid of in another way!*" Romana refused to serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was

appointed to command the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; most of the other generals kept aloof, and in Galicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning his command, issued a manifesto against the Junta. The public hatred increased, and the partisans of Palafox and Montijo, certain that the people would be against the government under any circumstances, only waited for a favorable moment to commence violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot of the Morena with a great and well organized army.

The military preparation of the Junta was in harmony with their political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men, issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand poniards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces at the disposal of the Junta were still numerous enough if well directed to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five thousand men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was close by at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to disregard all instructions. Thus amidst a whirlpool of passions, intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink.

This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, Granada and Seville in the south, was protected on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbade all military communication until near the Morena, where, abating somewhat of their surly grandeur, they leave a space through which troops could move from one province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of Andalusia.

Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal road to Seville was practicable for artillery. This road entering the hills, a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful strength, called the Despenas Perros, led by La Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another

route passed through the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little beyond the Despenas Perros, and there were other passes also, but all falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha.

To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From thence, roads practicable for cavalry and infantry penetrated the hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.

In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or rather paths, penetrated into the kingdoms of Cordoba. One, entering the mountains by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond these roads that the ridges separating La Mancha from Estremadura begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo.

If entering Estremadura by these passes an army should then invade Andalusia, the Morena must still be passed, and the only military communications between those provinces were by three great roads, namely, one from Medellin and Llerena to Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo; a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through Belalcázar, to Guadalcanal; but all these routes, except that of Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the mountains led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are finally lost in the Atlantic.

To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which was intrenched, but with so little skill and labor as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative to the strength of mountain defiles, common enough even amongst men who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their profession.

From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. Now, without stopping to prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious. Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest advantages from the strength of mountain passes. The practice of some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy's columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills.

Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong detachment, before Areizaga could have been safely attacked.

Nor was Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an obstinate defence. Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean, while the intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand divisions of country: 1. The upper or rugged, between the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2. The lower, or open country, about Seville. 3. The coast tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the Mediterranean. This

last is studded, in its whole length, with seaport towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places.

No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But, to reach the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges inclosing the valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Granada, and Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Granada, nor the lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey's sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were matured.

But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. Those once forced, Seville was open, and, from that great city, the French could penetrate into all parts, and their communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital of the province, and, from its political position, the most important town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon foundries, and all establishments necessary to a great military power.

INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.

The number of fighting men destined for this enterprise was about sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements, but the King was disposed to take a more prominent part in the military arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the second corps was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments pushed into the valley of the Tagus; two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two battalions occupied minor posts, such as

Arganda and Guadalaxara. Gazan's division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud's from Aragon; the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the King's guards, and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed upon Andalusia.

During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches, gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud's division, coming by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of menacing demonstrations, being then made along the front of the Spanish line of defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena; on the 18th, the King arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses.

In the centre, the artillery, the King's guards, the reserve, and the fifth corps, under Marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto del Rey.

On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen.

On the right, the Duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo, to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues with the first corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, Areizaga's line of defence in the Morena, and Albuquerque's line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened.

On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the Guadalquivir, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquivir.

In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan's division, crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the foolish pride engendered by that victory, was one of the principal causes of their subsequent losses.

Meanwhile the Duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and Sebastiani's flanking parties communicated also

with the fifth corps at Andujar, and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an extent of fifty miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains.

In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo's partisans were secretly preparing to strike, and the ancient Junta openly discovered a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those who had portable property, endeavored to remove to Cadiz, but the populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. The Central Junta, fearing alike the enemy and their own people, prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise; because the Duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque, and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena and gain a great victory.

It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was published, and it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched orders for the Duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger of the crisis, had left General Contreras at Medellin with four thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos, and marched himself on the 22d, with about nine thousand, towards Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; he had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and Almaden were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat upon Seville. In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, and his own artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of which he disregarded, and others he could not obey: wherefore, conforming to circumstances, when the Morena was forced, he descended into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadal-

quiver a few leagues from that city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy's progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central Junta, burst at Seville.

Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the Junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and Montijo were released, and the Junta of Seville being re-established by acclamation, the Central Junta committed to their hands the fence of Andalusia, and endeavored themselves to reach Cadiz, each as he could; yet with the full intention of reuniting and resuming their authority. On the road, however, some of them were cast into prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, by judicious measures calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his old army, which was now under the Duke Del Parque, made some other popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take into consideration the necessity of constituting a regency, which was readily acceded to. The events of war crowding on, overlaid their schemes. Three days after the flight of the Central Junta, treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville Junta, they also disbanded; some remained in the town, others, amongst them Saavedra, repaired to Cadiz. The tumults were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume the command and defend the city, but he evaded this dangerous honor, and proceeded to Badajos.

Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville elected a military Junta, and discovered the same disposition as the people of other towns in the Peninsula had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza had then assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious; and finally, a feeling of helplessness producing fear in all, Seville was ready to submit to the invaders.

When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French corps again received their artillery, the centre and right wing remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps, which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied his troops at Jaen, but Sabastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six guns mounted on the walls. The Spanish General then made one more stand, and being again beaten, all his artillery was captured, and his army

dispersed. Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry, throwing away their arms, escaped to Gibraltar, while Areizaga himself, with a remnant of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superseded by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani having marched upon Granada, entered it the 28th of January, and was received with apparent joy, so entirely had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former enthusiasm of the people.

The capture of Jaen having secured the left flank of the French, the King with the centre and right moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there also, as at Jaen and Granada, the invaders were received without any mark of aversion,* and thus the upper country was conquered. But the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before that city; hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and seize the Granadan coast, an operation that would enable him with greater facility to act against Valencia. To insure the success of the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cor

* Dupont's Proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*." Upon the authority of General Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, calls it "*a gratuitous atrocity*," and "*an inhuman butchery*," and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that *capacity and cruelty are rarely united*; that *Dupont was a fool*, and that *Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon*, but that he must have "*drugged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and hatred*."

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became Minister of War at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of "*the Annals*," as *the era of good government in France*.

I rejected Foy's authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye-witness, and his relation, at variance with the "*official Journal of Dupont's operations*," was also contradicted by the testimony of a *British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event*.

"Some time after the victory, order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police."—*Journal of Operations*.

Cordoba was not pillaged, being one of the few places where the *French were well received*.—Letters from a British General to Colonel Napier.

On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the "*Annals*," after contrasting my account with Foy's, thus proceeds, "It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier *without any quotation of authority*."

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, *six months previous to the publication of the Annals*, Colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, *because there was no quotation of authority*, transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had authority for every statement, and that he would willingly furnish the author with any or all of them: no notice was taken of this offer.

doba to Suchet, urging him to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia.*

Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen, and the first and fifth corps, followed by the King's guards, proceeded without delay towards Ecija, where, it will be remembered, Albuquerque's cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French approached, the Duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to Seville or Cadiz, the way to the latter being through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. Albuquerque, despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz, and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres, by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear at Utrera, but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties; for the King had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered the first corps, which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the advanced guard came on that city.

Some intrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence; the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight, and besides the populace, there were about seven thousand troops, composed partly of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the town. Nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on the 31st, with all its stores, foundries, and arsenals complete, and on the 1st of February the King entered in triumph. The lower country was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to subdue.

The first corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, the fifth against Estremadura; and Sebastiani, having placed fifteen hundred men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops a Swiss battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people having imprisoned the members of the local Junta, were headed by a Capuchin friar, who resolved to fight the French, and collected a vast multitude armed in all manners above

* Suchet's Memoirs.

Antequera and Allama, where the road from Granada enters the hills.

As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but through the plains of Granada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at once, lest the Granadans, having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia on the other, and in their own country many sea-ports and fortified towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. Wherefore, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, driving the insurgents upon Malaga, near which place they rallied, and an engagement with the advanced guard of the French, under General Milhaud, taking place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished took refuge on board some English ships of war, the rest submitted, and more than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British merchandise, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and thus the insurrection was quelled, for in every other part, both troops and peasantry were terrified and submissive to the last degree.*

Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such diligence as to reach Chiclana on the 4th, and it is generally supposed that he might have rendered himself master of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz and the Isla were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir George Smith's negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque's troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in every way inefficient; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests. In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the canal.

Venegas was governor of Cadiz, but when it was known that the Central Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, they appointed a Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. Although the Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, at first, the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartho-

* General Campbell's Correspondence from Gibraltar, MS.

lomeu Frere induced them to acquiesce; and on the 29th of January, the Bishop of Orense, General Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed Regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain.

The Council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with usurpation—the public voice added peculation and other crimes; and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into prison, and banished others to the provinces; thus completely extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly some of unsullied honor and fine talents, ready and eloquent of speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not in Spain only, that men possessing all the “grace and ornament” of words, have proved to be mean and contemptible statesmen.

Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta, and commander of the forces, endeavored to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its real strength, after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, that, under the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town towards the Morena; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet were like to be destroyed, because the Bishop of Algarve, from national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese frontier.* Mortier, however, disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned it the 12th of February; but Contreras' detachment had arrived there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to Merida.

This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in possession of Andalusia and southern Estremadura, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Bardajoz, Olivenza, and Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained, and the capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.

From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, yet the French took ten days to traverse that space; a tardiness for which there

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

appears no adequate cause. The King, apparently elated at the acclamations and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages, greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her gates at once; and thinking that the possession of that town would produce the greatest moral effect in Andalusia and all over Spain, changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville was however transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz, and Joseph was deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had entered Corboda. When he discovered his error there was still time to repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but fearing to leave a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon his flank, he resolved to reduce Seville, and met indeed with no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition as left him only the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The first his humanity forbade; the latter cost him time, which was worth his crown, for Albuquerque's proceedings were only secondary: the ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz.

The march by which the Spanish Duke secured the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed of the enemy's movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his after-march upon Guadalcanal was the forced result of his position; he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos.

From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of taking such a decided part was dependent upon the state of public sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque, indeed, imagined that the French were already in possession of the place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; yet they could easily have entered it on the 24th, and as he believed that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in the people's disposition; in this view, his determination to cross the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered Seville a lost city; and when the French approached, we find him marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again late in deciding, for the enemy's cavalry, moving by the shorter road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard; and the infantry would assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him, if the King

had not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city therefore saved Albuquerque, and he, in return, saved Cadiz.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia—Pursuit of the student Mina—Suchet's preparations—His incursion against Valencia—Returns to Aragon—Difficulty of the war in Catalonia—Operations of the seventh corps—French detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua—Augereau enters Barcelona—Sends Duhesme to France—Returns to Gerona—O'Donnell rallies the Spanish army near Centellas—Conduct of Vich—Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of Hostalrich—Augereau again advances to Barcelona—Sends two divisions to Reus—Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca—French troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera—Swartz abandons Manreza—Is defeated at Savadel—Colonel Villatte communicates with the third corps by Falcet—Severoli retreats from Reus to Villa Franca—Is harassed on the march—Augereau's unskilful conduct—Hostalrich falls—Gallant exploit of the Governor, Julian Estrada—Cruelty of Augereau.

LORD WELLINGTON'S plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia. But before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, it is necessary once more to revert to the operations in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy the unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject.

OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.

Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to Pampeluna, having previously directed an active pursuit of the student Mina,* who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe, with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavored to surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body, moving into the valleys of Ainsa and Mediano, cut him off from the Cinca river.

Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line of communication;† the garrison, however, made a strong re-

* Plan 7, p. 201.

† Suchet's Memoirs.

sistance, and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division under Loison was at Logroño; wherefore Harispe having, in concert with that General and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puente de Reyna, and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of movable columns, that continually pursued Mina until, chased into the higher parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.

But that General, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials for a methodical war of invasion beyond the frontiers of Aragon; and when General Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed Governor of Navarre, Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, although some petty actions had taken place, his general arrangements were not disturbed, and the Emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Teruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, and other events in Catalonia, having, however, baffled Napoleon's calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed. Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortosa or Lerida; the eighth corps, then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear; the seventh corps to advance to the lower Ebro and support the siege. But neither was this arrangement definite; fresh orders sent the eighth corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph's letter from Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.

A decree of the Emperor, dated the eighth of January, and constituting Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the King's orders, civil or military. This decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had, however, been intercepted, and the French General, doubtful of Napoleon's real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia; but wishing first to intimidate the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, who was defeated on the side of Cuença, and his troops dispersed.

Suchet then fortified a post at Teruel, to serve as a temporary

base of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry, and some field artillery, and at the same time caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at Alcañiz, under General Habert. The remainder of the third corps was distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcañiz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four thousand men newly arrived from France were pushed to Daroca, to link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida, reached Teruel; yet as Habert's column, having marched on the 27th by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of Valencia, the operation went on.

INCURSION TO VALENCIA.

The first day brought Suchet's column in presence of the Valencian army, for Ventura Caro, Captain-General of the province, was in march to attack the French at Teruel, and his advanced guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a deep ravine so suddenly sunk as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventosa, situated somewhat in advance of the Spanish centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was rather more practicable.

Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, while Habert's column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight on the 2d, to turn the left of the position and cut off the retreat; nevertheless, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet then entered Segorbe, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. At the same time Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea-coast. The country between their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after passing Saguntum, the columns united in the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain.

Suchet arrived before the city on the 5th of March, and seized

the suburb Seranos, and the harbor called the Grao. His spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a Baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the Archbishop and many others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days the French General remained before the city vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe and Teruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la Plana, and General Villa Campa, who had re-assembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between Teruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left at Alventoza, and, having invested the post at Teruel on the 7th by a bold and ready-witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The 12th, however, the head of Suchet's column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French General reached Zaragoza. During his absence, Pereña had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida entered the latter town and destroyed the bridge and French intrenchments. Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable that they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment but for an accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner.

Suchet's failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. The principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded; and although Suchet labors, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon's avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at certain conjunctures any progress could be made, and one of the most favorable of those conjunctures was lost for want of the co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered.

That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic

shores; for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, and the hills, thus broken by the river, push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Tarragona from Tortosa, and inclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manresa, Tarragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described.* The western portion of Catalonia, lying beyond the principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and rugged valleys, each the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortosa, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia.

Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable leading upon walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and Tarragona stands Mombanch, and between Tarragona and Tortosa, the Fort St. Felipe blocks the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes of the higher valleys took refuge from the movable columns, and from whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass the flanks and rear of both the French corps.

In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich and Tarragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted.

Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains, or by sea from Tarragona, harassed the

* Book I. Chap. VI.

French flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, or Cervera, and finally to Tarragona. From this last, the generals communicated with Tortosa, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, and drew succors of all kinds from those places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief period of lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Tarragona, because the Miguelletes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Tarragona, again passing by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the communication, and thus obliged the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.

But when Barcelona could not be succored by sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected; this being often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus during the siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. When the place fell, he retired again to Tarragona, and Augereau took the occasion to attack the Miguelletes and Somatenes in the high valleys; but in the midst of this operation Admiral Baudin's squadron was intercepted by Admiral Martin, and the insatiable craving of Barcelona obliged Augereau to re-assemble his army and conduct a convoy there by land; yet he was obliged to return immediately, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated, and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would, following the Emperor's design, be before Lerida or Tortosa. But at this time, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O'Donnell, who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida. Thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other's movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above.

OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

Gerona having fallen, General Souham with a division scoured the high valleys, beat the Migueletes of Claros and Rovira, at Besalu, Olot, Ribas and Campredon, and at Ripoll destroyed a manufactory of arms.* Being afterwards reinforced with Pino's division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu, and although the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, the French forced the passage, and took possession of Vich. Meanwhile Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of Catalonia rejecting the Duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give the command to Henry O'Donnell, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains of Blake's army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham's advanced guard pursued, and at Tona captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights of Sespina, charged with a shock that sent them headlong down again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the next day offered battle, but O'Donnell continued his retreat, and the French General returned to Vich.

During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardadeu; having previously ordered Duhesme to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction of the roads of Cardadeu and Manresa, to watch O'Donnell. Colonel Guery, commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, taking no military precautions, wherefore O'Donnell, who had been joined by Campo Verde, sent him to fall upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sebadel, surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; those at Granollers threw themselves into a large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach of Augereau they were relieved. The Marshal, finding the streets of Mollet strewn with French carcasses, ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona; and when there, affecting to be convinced how oppressive Duhesme's conduct had been, sent him to France in disgrace. After this act of justice or of personal malice, for it has been called both names, Augereau, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham returned to Vich.

* Plan 8, p. 218.

All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde's enterprise, produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken were marched from town to town, the action everywhere exaggerated, the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced with vigor, and the execution intrusted to the Baron d'Erolles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced, the confidence of the people increased hourly, and a local Junta was established at Arenas de Mar, to organize the Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succors from the sea. The partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.

O'Donnell himself, moving to Manresa, called the Migueletes from the Lerida side to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more than twelve thousand fighting men, with which he took post at Moya, in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies, and having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to them, demanded reinforcements, but Augereau paid little attention to him, and O'Donnell, descending the mountain of Centellas, on the 20th, entered the plains in three columns. The French General had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigor hitherto unusual with the Spaniards.

COMBAT OF VICH.

Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy's posts, on the side of Roda, back upon the town; O'Donnell, then, coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, intending to outflank Souham's left. The latter General, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the first charge, were driven back in confusion. The Spanish foot then fell in on the French centre, but failed to make any serious impression, wherefore O'Donnell, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavored to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and him-

self severely wounded in the head. O'Donnell, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left. At this critical period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was afterwards driven away from the rear, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded twelve hundred of the enemy.

O'Donnell's advance had been the signal for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were, however, with the exception of a slight succor thrown into Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the movable columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the Junta fled from Arenas de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O'Donnell, quitting the upper Llobregat, retired by Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Tarragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Ordal.

It was at this moment, when upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish General, that the Emperor directed the seventh corps upon the lower Ebro, to support Suchet's operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and General Mazzucchelli (the one commanding Souham's, and the other Pino's division) to march upon Manresa, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent movements.

General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manresa the 16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli: the inhabitants had abandoned the place, and General Swartz was sent with a brigade, from Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement by Montserrat upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Tarragona. The French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Tarragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca.

O'Donnell, whose energy and military talents were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, General Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores, but, being wounded himself, resigned the command to General Gasca, after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manresa, then detached columns, both by Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz, and the first reached its destinations, but the other, twelve hundred strong, was intercepted by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. Campo Verde immediately came down from the side of Cervera, took the chief command, and proceeded against Manresa by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch and Rovira hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz thus menaced evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sebadel, was followed closely by Rovira and Milans, and so pressed, on the 5th of April, that with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage he reached Barcelona.

These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched by sea, with orders to recall them to Barcelona. Meanwhile Count Severoli, who had taken the command of them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Tarragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached Colonel Villatte, at the head of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the lower Ebro. Villatte having accomplished his object, returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles in his rear, and regaining Reus just as Severoli, having received the order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona.

In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion, that from Tarragona O'Donnell perceived the disorder, and sending a detachment, under Colonel Orry, to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army.* Nevertheless, Severoli's rear-guard covered the retreat successfully, until a position was attained near Villa Franca, where Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their

* Vacani, *Istoria Militare degl' Italiani in Ispagna.*

main body. When these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements; the situation in which he had voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose.

Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa were beyond those defiles, and several days' march from each other. Rovira and Milans, being about San Cugat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; O'Donnell at Tarragona was nearer to the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus; and his own communication with Campo Verde was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Queralt; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San Sadurni and Igualada. Augereau indeed placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous country, against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion at Villa Franca was put to the sword, Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight, and the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat. O'Donnell, who, one month before, had retired from the battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona, with disgrace; a surprising change, yet one in which fortune had no share.

Augereau's talents for handling small corps in a battle have been recorded by a master hand.* There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign. But the truth is, that Catalonia had, like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, afflicted with the gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, indefatigable and eager; he merited the success he obtained, and, with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet, if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O'Donnell, distracted by a double attack, would have remained at Tarragona, and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at Mollet, Villa Franca and Esparaguera, would have taken place.

* Napoleon's Memoirs.

Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, sent Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command.

FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.

This citadel had been invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable, and the French at first endeavored to reduce it by a simple blockade, but towards the middle of February, they commenced the erection of mortar batteries. Severoli also pressed the place more vigorously than before, and although O'Donnell, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mat-taro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the Migueletes, every attempt to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity, and honorable terms were offered, but the Governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy's line; an exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne's days, and, as Napoleon has shown by numerous examples, generally successful.*

O'Donnell, who could always communicate with the garrison, being aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenas de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to favor the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada leaving his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first made as if for St. Celoni, afterwards turning to his right he broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Bux-alieu and pushed for Vich; but the French, closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, that Estrada himself was wounded and taken, together with about three hundred men, many were killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety; this courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, after two years of field operations, many battles, and four sieges.

Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized. This event, which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from port to port with provisions or despatches, finished Augereau's career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr's. The latter,

* Napoleon's Memoirs.

victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau, endeavoring to frighten those people into submission whom he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, which cruelty produced precisely the effect that might be expected.* The Catalans, more animated by their successes than daunted by this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus, all human feeling lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes.

CHAPTER III.

Suchet marches against Lerida—Description of that fortress—Suchet marches to Tarega—O'Donnell advances from Tarragona—Suchet returns to Balaguer—Combat of Margalef—Siege of Lerida—The city stormed—Suchet drives the inhabitants into the citadel, and thus forces it to surrender.

WHILE Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from France had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand, and of these he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, and to hold in check the partisans, principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa, however, with from three to four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the mountains of Albaracin.

Two lines of operation were open to Suchet: the one, short and direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to Lerida; the other, circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and Ebro, was close on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions.

Monzon was already a considerable military establishment; the battering train, consisting of forty pieces, with seven hundred rounds of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed

* *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.*

under the guard of Habert's division, which occupied the line of the Cinca. Leval, leaving General Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcañitz, and was there joined by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point, from Teruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by detachments.

The right bank of that river being guarded by Leval's division, and the country on the left bank secured by a number of fortified posts, there remained two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with O'Donnell at Manresa, Garcia Novarro was at Tarragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to cover Tortosa; Pereña with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the upper Segre.

Such were the relative situations of both parties, when General Musnier, quitting Alcañitz towards the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove Novarro's detachments within the walls of Tortosa, and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated, as I have before related, with Colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. While this was passing on the Ebro, General Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed the Segre at Camarasa. Pereña, fearing to be attacked on both sides of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence with the Segre.

Suchet himself, having repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, placed a detachment at Candanos to cover his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, and the 13th advanced with a brigade of infantry, and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of Noguerra, and obliged Pereña to retire within the place. The same day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed, the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected. Suchet's line of operations from Aragon was short, direct, and easy to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than the consumption. Augereau's line was long and unsafe, and the produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption.

Lerida contained about eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated

upon the high road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about sixty-five miles from each, it possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short distance from the Ebro and the Cinca rivers; its strategic importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner commanded the plain of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. The regular governor was named Gonzalez, but Garcia Conde had been appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O'Donnell's elevation; and the troops he brought with him had increased the garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants.

The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, and the head of the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch inclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north side was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on the east was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, which was an assemblage of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height, and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with ramparts from forty to fifty feet high.

The descent from the citadel into the town was gentle, and the works were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was squeezed out about two or three hundred yards, and the salient part was secured by an intrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen and the Magdalen.

To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight hundred yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petreius encamped to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work with ditches above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando secured the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good condition, and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery, the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local Junta also had been formed to excite public feeling, and two officers of artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the gates of the town.

The siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps, but the information derived from Colonel Villatte, and the appearance of Spanish partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to

suspect that the seventh corps had already retired, and that the burthen would rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at Monzon, intending to wait until O'Donnell's plans should be clearly indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared materials for the construction of batteries. Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and Balaguer; the remainder were thus distributed: On the left bank of the Segre, at Alcoteletge, four thousand men, including the cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; Harispe, with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by patrols.

Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French General detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for there were rumors that O'Donnell was collecting troops at Momblanch, that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet, anxious to ascertain the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation to Balaguer. The Governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make a sally, but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French General, to strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa, above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega, forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he was still uncertain of Augereau's movements, and like every other general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, he ascertained that O'Donnell, with two divisions, was at Momblanch, ready to descend the mountains and succor Lerida; wherefore, returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier to resume his former position at Alcoteletge.

This rapidity was well-timed, for O'Donnell had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with eight thousand chosen infantry and six hun

dred cavalry, and was encamped at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida, on the 22d, when a note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn off, the investing force was weak, reached him. Being willing to seize the favorable moment, he immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o'clock in the morning of the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow more leisurely.

COMBAT OF MARGALEF.

Four miles from Juneda stood the ruined village of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O'Donnell could perceive no covering force; hence, trusting implicitly to Conde's information, (already falsified by Suchet's activity,) the Spanish General descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns, one following the high road and the other two marching on the right and left. The centre, outstripping the flankers, soon beat back the advanced posts of Harispe; but that General charged with his three hundred hussars upon the centre Spanish column, so suddenly, that it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which place the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but as the French infantry stood firm, the besieged, seeing the rout of O'Donnell's people, returned to the town.

Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, hoping to cut off the Spaniards' retreat. O'Donnell, who had rallied his troops, was already in line of battle, having the artillery on the right and the cavalry on the left, but his second division was still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and the Spanish cavalry rode forward, when the French cuirassiers, commanded by General Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, and Boussard, observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of the infantry. The Walloon guards made a vain effort to form square, but the confusion was extreme, and finally nearly all the Spanish infantry threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the advanced guard of the second Spanish division; yet the main body of the latter checked their fury, and O'Donnell retreated in good order and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. This action, although not discreditable to

O'Donnell, was very unfortunate. The plain was strewed with carcasses; three Spanish guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of the defeat.

Suchet, wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the besieged, attempted the night after the battle to storm the redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, and as the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with hand grenades, could not drive them away, a parley ensued, when it was agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the Pilar was also saved, for, being commanded by San Fernando, it was necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners; but Garcia Conde replied, "*that Lerida had never looked for external succor in her defences.*"

SIEGE OF LERIDA.

The absolute retreat of Augereau was now fully ascertained, yet the victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to France by the way of Jaca, the battering train was brought up from Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed, the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th and 27th. The following night, under the direction of General Haxo, ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls, and opened a few guns, without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the besiegers were well covered in the trenches.

In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed. Breaching and counter batteries were commenced, six sixteen-pounders were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long twelve-pounders to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy and the labor heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the Spanish musketeers incommoded the trenches from

the left bank of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of investment on that side.

In the evening of the 4th, six hundred Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in check, and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town; but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken down to the river; and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at this extremity.

All the French batteries opened at daybreak on the 7th, the mortars played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three hundred men, stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by the French reserves, but they suffered from the Spanish guns in the pursuit, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the besiegers labored at their works, and opened a second parallel one hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention of forming fresh batteries, that, being closer under the citadel-rock, would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted; three new batteries were constructed, and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers.

On the 12th the fire recommenced from eight batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their answers, the French artillery took the ascendant, the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen, appeared practicable, and after dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought intelligence that the streets of the town behind the breaches were retrenched and defended by batteries.

Suchet's hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high.

He had from the first supposed that the vehemence of the citizens, and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs, easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected to carry the breaches briskly, and with one sweep, to force all the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable fortress; but he resolved first to carry the forts of San Fernando and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius that night; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden, but meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a hundred men.

During this operation the great batteries played into the citadel only, but, at daybreak, renewed their fire on the breaches; steps were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the troops to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to effect a solid lodgment on the walls, were conveyed into the trenches. These arrangements being completed at seven o'clock in the evening of the 13th, the signal was made, and four storming parties jumped out of the trenches; two made for the Carmen, one against the Magdalen, and one moved close by the river, and the Spaniards being at this moment preparing a sally to retake the horn-work of Fort Garden, did so little expect this assault, that they suffered the French to mount the breaches without opposition; but then rallying, poured such a fire of musketry and artillery upon the heads of the principal columns, that the latter staggered and would have yielded if Habert had not revived their courage, and led them into the town, at the very moment that the troops on the right and left, having also forced their way, turned all the retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, General Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, followed close upon the steps of the storming parties; the Spaniards were thus

overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat into the citadel.

It was now that the French General put his design into execution.* Harispe's brigade, passing the bridge, made for the gate of St. Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and thus cut off all egress from the town; this done, the French columns advanced from every side, in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and stabs, and musketry, drove men, women and children before them, while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded on the summit of the rock; but all that night, the French shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and, at daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. At twelve o'clock, the horrible scene terminated. The capitulation that followed was honorable in terms to the besieged, but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, for the whole loss of the garrison had been only twelve hundred men.

Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, by a proceeding, politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. For, though a town taken by assault be considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless people into a situation where they must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless the governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground that he thus spared a great effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers' blood at the expense of women's and children's, and, had Garcia Conde's nature been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers.

* Suchet's Memoirs.

CHAPTER IV.

Reflections on that act—Lazan enters Alcañitz, but is driven out by the French—Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa, and assassinated after the action—Siege of Mequinenza—Fall of that place—Morella taken—Suchet prepares to enter Catalonia—Strength and resources of that province.

WHEN Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet was sufficient for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls on the side of the attack could not be expected to, and scarcely did, offer an impediment to the French General; hence the citadel should have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers' force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled Suchet's utmost efforts. Engineers require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged should not be less than four to one; yet here, the French invested a force equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the midst of succoring armies: for Lerida had communications, 1. With the armed population of the high valleys; 2. With O'Donnell's corps of fourteen thousand; 3. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was posted with four thousand men; 4. With Tortosa, where the Marquis of Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six thousand; 5. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable army of fifteen thousand regular and more than thirty thousand irregular soldiers.

It is evident that if all these forces had been directed with skill and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised, but the very safety of the third corps endangered; and it was to obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take such a position on the lower Ebro as would keep both O'Donnell and the Valencians in check. Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do this; and St. Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains and enter the valley of the Ebro. On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon's instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat similar circumstances, blockaded Tarragona for a month; Augereau, who had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet spared six thousand men to pass the mountains; Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O'Donnell, would have had a covering army to protect

the siege, and the succors, fed from the resources of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.

Augereau has been justified on the ground that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this could not have escaped the Emperor, yet his military judgment, unerring in principle, was often false in application, because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon's standard only suited the heroic proportions. One thing is however certain, that Catalonia presented the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the Migueletes and Somatenes,—the well-arranged system of fortresses,—the ruggedness and sterility of the country,—the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work, and, finally, the aid of an English fleet, combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. Nevertheless, the French made progress; each step planted, slowly indeed, and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making another.

Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; and, by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the midst of the Catalonian strongholds; and he had taken or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles. The Migueletes supplied O'Donnell with abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Tarragona, San Felipe, Balaguer, and Tortosa, the link of connection between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during every great operation, the partisans being unmolested, recovered strength. Thus during the siege of Lerida, the Marquis of Lazan entered the town of Alcañitz with five thousand men, and would have carried the castle, but that General Laval despatched two thousand men from Zaragoza to its succor, when the Spaniards, after a skirmish in the streets, retired; and, while this was passing at Alcañitz, Villa Campa intercepted four hundred men conducting a convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasnó, was forced to abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to one hundred and eighty wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and at the village of Arandiza finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band were taken or killed, and Petit

himself, wounded, a prisoner, and sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, but at the same time suffered the troops to burn alive an old man, the Alcalde of Frasno, who was taken among the French.

This action happened the day Lerida fell, and the next day Chlopiski, following Villa Campa's march from Daroca, reached Frasno, but the Spaniards were no longer there; Chlopiski, then dividing his forces, pursued them by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed the Spanish General that his troops disbanded, and several hundred retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack made from the side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed.

These petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet's power in Aragon. His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the nature of this unjust war would permit; and however questionable the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided measures, for the retreat of the seventh corps set free not only O'Donnell's army, but Campo Verde's and all the irregular bands. The Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force on the upper Segre the very day of the assault; eight hundred Migueletes attacked Venasque three days after, and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera by Aramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled.

Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the Migueletes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at Tremp; and General Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. If the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O'Donnell, less hasty, had combined his march at a later period with these Somatenes and with Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza. This place, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The French General could not advance in force against Tortosa, nor avail himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall; and such was his activity

that one detachment, sent the day after the assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before the place; and Musnier's division, descending the right bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the investment on the 20th of May.

Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high and overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water. This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered on a third by the town, could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined the rock to the parent hills: and the rampart on that side was bastioned, lined with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way with palisades. No guns could be brought against the castle, until the country people, employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June; and meanwhile the brigade, which had defeated Lazan at Alcañiz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of May, General Rogniat, coming from France, with a reinforcement of engineer-officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, when, taking the direction of the works, he contracted the circle of investment, and commenced active operations.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.

The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st;* and, the 2d of June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces, of which six were twenty-four pounders, being brought over the hills, the advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle. During the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place, under a destructive fire of grape, and while this was passing on the height, approaches were made against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also intrenched, close to the water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation, but of eleven boats freighted with inhabitants and their property, nine effected their escape.

In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were per-

* Plan 7, p. 201.

fects, the breaching-batteries were commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised, from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the castle with musketry; the works against the town were also advanced, but in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too narrow for batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry with such effect on the wall, that the garrison could not stop, and both the wall and tower were then escaladed without difficulty, the Spaniards all retiring to the castle. The French placed a battalion in the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from above, they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy.

The 6th, the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were completed; and, in the night, forty grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th, Suchet, who had been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp, and on the 8th, sixteen pieces of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards answered with such vigor, that three French guns were dismounted, yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and at nine o'clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavored to keep up the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment, that, at ten o'clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men became prisoners of war; forty-five guns, and large stores of powder and of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were found in the magazines.

Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, General Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, had left that important fort, commanding one of the principal entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. When it was lost, General O'Donaju, with a division of the Valencian army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place of arms.

By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1. A fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance

to those provinces; 3. The command of several fertile tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4. The co-operation of the seventh corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage beyond the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation of Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land with Valencia, and to destroy O'Donnell's base. The first could only be effected by taking Tortosa, the second by capturing Tarragona. Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the Emperor.

Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions in the eastern region of Catalonia was increased by O'Donnell's measures, and that General, still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His harsh manners and stern sway rendered him hateful to the people; but he was watchful to confirm the courage and excite the enthusiasm of his troops, by conferring rewards and honors on the field of battle, and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations had more effect. Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good officers, and the full strength and importance of every position and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these helps O'Donnell long prevented the siege of Tortosa, and found full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had before impeded their progress.

The foundations of military power were, however, deeply cast in Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action, could at any period of 1809 and 1810 have paralyzed the operations of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortosa, Tarragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy; but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern coast of Spain. Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English ministers were still ignorant of every military principle, and yet too arro-

gant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory of Salamanca showed the giant in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgment, although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

CHAPTER V.

Operations in Andalusia—Blockade of Cadiz—Desertions in that city—Regency formed—Albuquerque sent to England—Dies there—Regency consent to admit British troops—General Colin Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy the Spanish lines at San Roque—General William Stewart arrives at Cadiz—Seizes Matagorda—Tempest destroys many vessels—Mr. Henry Wellesley and General Graham arrive at Cadiz—Apathy of the Spaniards—Gallant defence of Matagorda—Heroic conduct of a sergeant's wife—General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy Tarifa—French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks, and drift during a tempest—General Lacy's expedition to the Ronda—His bad conduct—Returns to Cadiz—Reflections on the state of affairs.

SUCHET's preparations equally menaced Valencia and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Granada, and made excursions against the fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads me back to Catalonia; those of the Murcian army belong to the

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the fourth in Granada, Dessolles' division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, and the fifth corps (with the exception of six battalions and some horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The King, accompanied by Marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry to different points, and received from all the great towns assurances of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money and provisions, movable columns were employed to collect them, especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to discipline as soon to verify the observation of St. Cyr, that they

were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. The people, exasperated by disorders and violence, and at the same time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, suddenly rose in arms, and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain, became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare.*

The Granadans of the Alpuxaras were the first to resist, and this insurrection, spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda, and on the other towards Murcia, received succors from Gibraltar, and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command of Blake. The communication between the first and fourth corps, across the Sierra de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From the latter place, the insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the other extremity Blake, marching from Almeira, took Arda and Motril, and at the same time the mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba interrupted Dessolles' communications with La Mancha.

These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the King and Soult being then in the city of Granada, sent one column across the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, while a second, moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeira, cut off his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same time, Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to restore the communications with the first corps. Being joined by the detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of March; but during their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favorers of the enemy, and would have done more, but that another column from Granada came down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. It had, however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison and a part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha, the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader's service.† The King, who feared the Valencian and Murcian armies would invade La Mancha, repaired thither, and after a time returned to Madrid. The Duke of Dalmatia then remained chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system of administration

* King Joseph's Correspondence, captured at Vittoria, MS.

† Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold: but this will be better shown hereafter; at present, it is more convenient to notice

THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

Marshal Victor, having declined an assault on the Isla, spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The towns, the islands, castles, harbors, and rivers he thus inclosed are too numerous, and in their relative bearings too intricate, for minute description; yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I shall endeavor to point out the leading features.

The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or intrenched positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, having its left on the sea-coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from thence carried across the Almanza and the Chiclana rivers, to the Zuraque, on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad. This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers, and by a number of navigable water-courses or creeks, was also cut in its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the upper harbor of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles long, from two to three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the marsh, and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the bridge of Zuaro, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbor mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable, save by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and served as an advanced post. On the left hand, the castle of Santi Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel.

Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangle, the base of which rested on the channel, the right side on the harbor, the left on the open sea, and the apex pointing towards Cadiz. All this island was a salt marsh, except one high and strong ridge in the centre, about four miles long, upon which the large town of La Isla stands, and which, being within cannon shot of the Santi Petri, offered the second line of defence.

From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus about five miles long connected the island with the rocks upon

which Cadiz stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of defence. The fourth and final line was the land front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified.

On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces were only separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the Santi Petri, the French, having their chief dépôts in the town of Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might force the passage of the channel; because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza creeks were navigable above the lines of contravallation. The thick woods behind afforded the means of constructing an armed flotilla; and such was the nature of the ground bordering the Santi Petri itself on both sides, that off the high road it could only be approached by water, or by narrow foot-paths, leading between the salt-pans of the marsh.

The central French or Puerto Real division, extending from the Zuraque on the left to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete on the right, measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to form, with the position of Chiclana, a half circle. Puerto Real itself was intrenched, but a tongue of land four miles long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or canal of Trocadero, separated the inner from the outer harbor, and at its extreme points stood the village of Trocadero and the fort of Matagorda, opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city was above four thousand yards, but across the channel to Puntales was only twelve hundred; it was therefore the nearest point to Cadiz and to the isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From thence the French could search the upper harbor with their fire, and throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their flotilla, safely moored in the Trocadero creek, could make a descent upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned Matagorda.

The third, or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro on the left to the castle of Santa Catalina, the extreme point of the outer harbor on the right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the mouth of the Guadalete, in the centre of this line, was in-

trenched, and the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged.

Besides these lines of blockade, which were connected by a covered way concealed by thick woods, and when finished armed with three hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead; the second commanded the mouth of the Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade, Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina Sidonia, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the position of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress of events within the blockaded city.

The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the Regency, and the proclamation for convoking the National Cortes have been already touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, commander-in-chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have unlimited power, but in reality possessed no authority, except over his own soldiers, and did not meddle with administration. The Regency, appointed provisionally, and composed of men without personal energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the Junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body, without honor, talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile privately trafficked with the public stores.*

Albuquerque's troops were in a deplorable state; the whole had been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes.† When he demanded supplies, the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the Duke affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing openly to attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in reasoning; for although they had elected the Duke president of their own body, they accused him, amongst other things, with retreating from Carmona too quickly; and they finished with a menacing intimation that, supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, it was thought he meant to go to South America, but he died in London some months after, of a phrensy,

* Albuquerque's Manifesto.

† Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz, 1810, MS.

brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at the unworthy treatment he received. He was judged to be a brave and generous man, but weak and hasty, and easy to be duped.*

The misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the Junta, the apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many favorers, and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish storehouses, and if the Regency had not consented to receive British troops into the city. Their entrance saved it, and at the same time General Colin Campbell (who had succeeded Sir John Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his country, for by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of San Roque and the forts round the harbor of Algesiras should be demolished.† Both measures were very essential to the present and permanent interests of England, and the last especially so, because it cleared the neighborhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure harbor. Gibraltar at this time contained a mixed and disaffected population of more than twelve thousand persons, and merchandise to the value of two millions sterling, which could have been easily destroyed by bombardment. Ceuta, which was chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, and its works miserably neglected, had only six days' provisions, was at the mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the straits; and the possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries were exceedingly active.

General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz on the 11th of February, with two thousand men, a thousand more joined him from Gibraltar, and the whole were received with an enthusiasm that proved Sir George Smith's perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere's unskilful management of the Central Junta had alone prevented a similar measure the year before. The 17th, a Portuguese regiment, thirteen hundred strong, was also admitted into the city; Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies; two ships of war, the *Euthalion* and *Undaunted*, arrived from Mexico with six millions of dollars; and another British battalion, a detachment of artillery, and more native troops having joined the garrison, the whole force assembled behind the *Santi Petri* was not less than

* Appendix 17, § 2. † Gen. Campbell's Correspondence, MS.

four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen thousand Spaniards * Yet there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter; and in all this time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or had volunteered, either to labor or to fight. The ships recovered at Ferrol had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay twenty-three men of war, of which four of the line and three frigates were British; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a thousand absurdities were the invariable attendants of Spanish armies and governments.

General Stewart's first measure was to recover Matagorda, the error of abandoning which was to be attributed as much to Admiral Purvis as to the Spaniards. In the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of Captain M'Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a solid lodgment; and although the French cannonaded the work with field artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire of Puntales, was immovable.

The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a continued tempest, beating upon the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary's. One ship of the line was taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the fourth English regiment, fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an immense booty.

Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary, arrived, and on the 24th of that month, General Graham coming from England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence was quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts of the enemy, twenty thousand soldiers, and a system of redoubts and batteries, requiring the labor of four thousand men for three months, were absolutely necessary.† Now, the Spaniards had only worked beyond the Santi Petri; and that without judgment; their batteries in the marsh were ill-placed, their intrenchments on the tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel were of contempt-

* Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz, 1810, MS.

† Appendix 17, § 1.

ible strength, and the Caraccas, which they had armed with one hundred and fifty guns, being full of dry timber, could be easily burned by carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda and the Troccadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries to the junction of the Chiclana road with the royal causeway, in the marsh, that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water and land.

It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination paralyzed their allies, and would have lost the place, had the French been prepared to press it vigorously. They were indifferent to the progress of the enemy, and, to use General Graham's expression, they wished the English would drive away the French, *that they might go and eat strawberries at Chiclana*. Nor were the British works (when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and rapidly completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores nor implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always expected to "make bricks without straw," and thus the laurels of the British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due more to his perseverance and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring operations afterwards.

Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz on the 31st, and both sides continued to labor, but the allies slowly and without harmony, and the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased; many persons were forced to quit Cadiz, two thousand men were sent to Ayamonte to collect provisions on the Guadiana; and notwithstanding this, so strange a people were the Junta, that they deceived Mr. Wellesley by assurances that the magazines were full, and thus induced him to suffer them to send wheat and flour away from the city, which was actually done, at the very time they were thus pressed by want!*

But now Matagorda, which, though frequently cannonaded, had been held fifty-five days, impeded the completion of the enemy's

* General Graham's Correspondence, MS.

works at the Trocadero point. This small fort, of a square form, with one angle projecting towards the land, without a ditch, and without bomb-proofs sufficient for the garrison, was little calculated for resistance; and, as it could only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The French had however raised great batteries behind some houses on the Trocadero, and, as daylight broke on the 21st of April, a hissing shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken six times in an hour, and the colors were at last fastened to the angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors, besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours this tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty were down, when General Graham, finding a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion was then blown up, under the direction of Major Lefebvre, an engineer of great promise, but he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant's wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and although a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered it, and fulfilled her mission.*

After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz, but Sebastiani's cavalry infested the neighborhood of Gibraltar, and he himself entered the capital of Murcia on the 23d, when Blake retired upon Alicant and Carthagenæ. Meanwhile the French covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for provisions, and General Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa, drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with

* An interesting account of this noble-minded woman is to be found in a small volume, entitled "*Sketches of a Soldier's Life in Ireland*," by the author of "*The Eventful Life of a Soldier*." This last work was erroneously designated, in the former part of this work, as "*The Life of a Sergeant*."

cattle.* The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, yet by their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to five hundred men, with some guns, and placed the whole under the command of Major Brown of the 28th.

In May, the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent against them being beat off by throwing cold shot from the decks, above fifteen hundred men saved themselves in despite of the fire from the boats of the allied fleet, and from the batteries, which was continued after the vessels had grounded; although the miserable creatures, thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty, and, being all of Dupont's or Vedel's corps, were prisoners only by a dishonorable breach of faith!† Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder was daily increasing. The Regency having recalled Cuesta to their military councils, he published an attack on the deposed Central Junta, and was answered so as to convince the world that the course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English General was hampered by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the Municipal Junta consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla.

English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand Spaniards from Murcia joined the garrison, or rather army, now within the lines; yet such was the state of the troops, and the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy's works. It was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, General Lacy was embarked, with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to aid the armed peasants, or Seranos, of the Ronda.‡ These people had been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed by Captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, sent from Gibraltar. General Campbell also offered to reinforce Lacy, from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where

* General Campbell's Correspondence, MS. † Appendix 17, § 1.

‡ General Graham's Despatches, MS.

there were twenty thousand males fit to carry arms, and the French were only two thousand, and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but twelve guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise, and demanded that eight hundred men from Gibraltar should make a diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algesiras, moved on Ronda; this being assented to, the English armament sailed under the command of General Bowes.

Lacy made good his movement upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified it, were too strong at that point, or rather Lacy, a man of no enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and General Rey, marching from Seville against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July. Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers at Cadiz were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than fifty thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favorably placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz; for, even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to paralyze this mighty power.

It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favorable localities, are all required, in the combined operations of a fleet and army, and troops disembarking also require time to equip for service. But Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the coast of Catalonia and Valencia is so pacific and safe, that seldom or never does a gale blow on shore; the operations would always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, and Lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal, experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege, undertaken by the seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, if the gar-

rison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas, the slight expeditions of this period were generally disconcerted by the presence of a few French companies.

In July the British force in Cadiz was increased to eight thousand five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de Barameda, made no attacks, and his works have been much censured, as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is however a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations was at the Trocadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria were necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which in ordinary times was fetched from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla constructing at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid the labor, and it is to be considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops, but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or ostentatious.

Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the Duke of Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper's government, while the National Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a narrow corner of the province. Moreover, the preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured, that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham's division, consisting of excellent soldiers, would have been set free, instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number of the French troops at the blockade; for the latter aided indirectly, and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as there was an army in the Isla.

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the operations in Andalusia—Description of the Spanish and Portuguese lines of frontier south of the Tagus—Situation of the armies in Estremadura—Complex operations in that province—Soult's policy.

WHILE the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville was guarded by a few thousand men of the fifth corps, left by Mortier when he advanced against Badajos; and even from this small body six hundred infantry, under General Remond, and two hundred cavalry, were sent to attack the Viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding a refuge in Portugal. The latter had four thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left through Gibrleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado de Niebla, and the French immediately occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had hitherto drawn supplies. Meanwhile the Viscount, returning to Ayamonte, sailed with his troops to Cadiz, and was replaced by General Copons, who came with two thousand men to gather provisions on the lower Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.

On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered Granada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia; a great part of that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was ravaged and laid waste.

In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles reduced the struggle to a trifling guerilla warfare; but it was different in La Mancha, where the partidas became so numerous and the war so onerous, that one of Joseph's ministers, writing to a friend, described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands. It remains to speak of Estremadura, which was become the scene of various complicated movements and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal.

The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier south of the Tagus may be divided into three parts:

1. From the Tagus to Badajos on the Guadiana.
2. From Badajos to the Morena.
3. From the Morena to the sea.

Each of these divisions is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick

woods, a double chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish; Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, the principal Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in the mountains, the others in the open country, which spread from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to all the above-named fortresses.

From Badajos to the Morena forms the second division of the country; it is rugged, and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche.

From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte; the Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin; and, although the greater number of these places were dismantled, the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza.

When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided, that a fortnight's blockade would have reduced it;* but the French General, who had only brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard slain. Romana then returned to Badajos the 20th; and the 27th, Mortier, leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the Guadiana.

It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by General Mermet, occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps through the pass of Baños formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and Kellermann. The latter was at Bejar and Miranda de Castanar, watching the Duke Del Parque, in the early part of January, but withdrew to Salamanca when the British army arrived in the valley of the Mondego. The Duke Del Parque then left Martin Carrera with a weak division in the Sierra de Gata, marched, with thirteen thousand men, through the pass of

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left on the Guadiana.

When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus, by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult's brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed the bridge of Arzobispo, advanced by Caceres, surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del Rey, and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by degrees; General Reynier took the command, and, as I have said, was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions and fascines as if to besiege Badajos.

These demonstrations attracted the notice of General Hill, who advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre; and then Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the Duke Del Parque's army, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act against the communications of the French. His first division, commanded by Charles O'Donnell, brother to the Catalan General, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five thousand Asturians, was sent under Ballesteros to Olivenza, and the fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier's communications with Seville.

Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballesteros with the fourth at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras' movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida. The 10th, Romana advanced again towards Albuquerque, and having pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by General Foy. The 14th, O'Donnell endeavored to surprise Foy in return, but the latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres.

At this period the insurrections in Granada, the movements of the Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence of Suchet's retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence of Andalusia; wherefore the latter, after holding a council of war with Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida on the 19th, and retired to Seville, leaving Gazan's division at Monasterio.

Reynier having sent his stores to Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at Torremocha, and O'Donnell returned to Caceres.

There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1. The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2. A shorter, but more difficult road, which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel routes have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, there is one from Araceña to Ronquillo. Now when Mortier retired, Ballesteros marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united corps, amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal Causeway by Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th, coming up with Gazan, fought an undecided action; the next day it was renewed, and the Spaniards having the worst, Ballesteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballesteros marched to Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Girard drove him back again to Araceña, yet again entering the Condado de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the Tinto river.

Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the communication of the fifth corps with Reynier; but that General marched with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops, the 2d of April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that O'Donnell immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so completely defeated, that he regained Zafra in the night of the 14th, with only two thousand men; Ballesteros also, assailed by a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña.

The 20th, Reynier marched to Montijo, and O'Donnell retired from Caceres, but his rear-guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would have been lost, if Mendizabel, and Hill also, had not come to his aid, whereupon Reynier, declining a general action, retired to Merida. The insurrection in the Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians remained inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult assumed the government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura. On the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier's rear; Ballesteros remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre, and Romana encamped, with fourteen thousand men,

near Badajos, where a Spanish plot was formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was to have executed the atrocious deed escaped.*

Notwithstanding Romana's presence, Reynier and the younger Soult passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only four hundred cavalry, and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the whole Spanish army; at the same time Mortier's advanced guards arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men joined the second corps from Toledo; however the want of provisions would not permit the French to remain concentrated, and Mortier returned to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May a French detachment again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and would have cut off Ballesteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to Elvas arrested its movement. Meanwhile, Ballesteros again menaced Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of three hundred men.

To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the frontier of Portugal, by the lower Guadiana, sometimes appearing at Gibráleon and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession of which would have lamed Ballesteros' movements; yet the advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the first corps; and O'Donnell having made an attempt, during Reynier's absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque with great difficulty. It would be perplexing to trace farther and in detail all the movements on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two circumstances there were, of historical importance. In the beginning of July, Lacy being in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballesteros near Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph's service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one of inhospitality, the other of robbery and violence, would, but for the mediation of the British authorities, have commenced a regular war, and their mutual jealousy and hatred was extended to the governments on both sides.

Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter's demands for aid were continual, and most of his projects were ill-judged, and contrary to Lord Wellington's advice. On the 26th of June, however, Reynier, passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known also that his corps belonged to the army assembling in Cas-

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

tile for the invasion of Portugal, that he had collected mules and other means of transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted that he was going to cross the Tagus. Hill therefore gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of Beira. The march of the second corps was, however, postponed, and the after operations, belonging to greater combinations, will be treated of in another place.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Although apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana, as far as Badajos, is separated from the valley of the Tagus by a range of heights, connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque; and the country between those hills and the Tagus contained fertile valleys, and considerable towns, such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor presented a barrier, from behind which the Spaniards, supported by the fort of Albuquerque, could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act accordingly; hence O'Donnell's frequent advances and retreats.

2. Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in unison with the fifth corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana, and Merida, on account of its stone bridge, was the key of his movements. But Mortier's base of operations being in Andalusia, his front was spread from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat, and to draw provisions from about Lereña; now the road of Xeres de los Caballeros was always open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances of Ballesteros and Contreras were to harass Mortier's line of communication. Wherefore the clue of affairs was this: Romana, holding Badajos, and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of his lines of operation; but, as his projects were generally vague and injudicious, Lord Wellington forbade Hill to assist, except for definite and approved objects.

3. To stop Romana's movements, Mortier had only to unite the 2d and 5th corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he ardently desired.* Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections and descents from Cadiz; and to say that either Marshal

* Appendix 19, § 1.

was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier and Reynier united could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana, having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and Lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north; the King and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate consequences are not to be assumed.

On the other hand, Soult, judging that ere future conquests were attempted, the great province of Andalusia should be rendered a strong hold, and independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement provided for the current consumption of his troops, and vast reserve magazines were filled without overwhelming the people. The native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries flowing from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general laboring to preserve regularity. All this could not be the work of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult's orders, being employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire control of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations, because thus only could they be distinguished. But the Duke of Dalmatia, while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain, by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, was also well assured that, in fixing a solid foundation for future military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able administrator and pacificator of a conquered country.

4. Soult's views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, than with the wishes of the King, whose poverty forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army in person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. He who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the King's demands, and thus excited the monarch's hatred to an incredible degree; nevertheless, the Duke of Dalmatia never lost the Emperor's confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually tranquillized, the military resources of the country drawn forth, and considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully employed, to repress the efforts of the partisan

chiefs. The arsenal of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of lead at Lenares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the foundries, and every provision for the use of a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out; a commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Granada; and finally, a secret, but considerable traffic, carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult.* Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain.

5. Both Marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men in Estremadura during the months of June and July, would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him directing Suchet in July to co-operate with fifteen thousand men in Massena's invasion whenever Tortosa should fall. The application of this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative advances; and whether Napoleon's recent marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away from business; or that, absorbed by the other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish affairs; or whether, deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason why the King, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before the end of June, made no movement to favor the attack on Portugal. It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause than the inevitable errors that mar all great military combinations not directed by a single hand

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

CHAPTER VII.

Situation of the armies north of the Tagus—Operations in old Castile and the Asturias—Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo—Loison repulsed from Astorga—Kellermann chases Carrera from the Gata mountains—Obscurity of the French projects—Siege of Astorga—Mahi driven into Galicia—Spaniards defeated at Mombuey—Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca—The ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain—Massena assume the command of the army of Portugal and of the northern provinces—Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town—Massena arrives and alters the plan of attack—Daring action of three French soldiers—Place surrenders—Andreas Herrasti—His fine conduct—Reflections upon the Spanish character.

THE operations south of the Tagus having been described, those which occurred north of that river shall now be traced; for previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French stretched in one great line across the Peninsula from Cadiz to Gihon, and eagerly discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies.

It will be remembered that the Duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains to interrupt the communication between the Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and beyond the Douro the Gallician army, under Garcia, (in number about ten thousand,) occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca, and Astorga, menacing the right flank and rear of the sixth corps. Mahi was organizing a second army at Lugo, and in the Asturias the Captain-General D'Arco commanded seven thousand men, three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under General Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, six hundred miles long, was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese troops were lying.

On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by movable columns, and thus menaced all the important points without scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where Ney had resumed the command, being supported by Kellermann with the force of his government, and by an eighth corps under the Duke of Abrantes.

The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement of all the French in Spain; and while Victor and Mortier

menaced Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonnet, entering the Asturias, threatened Galicia by the Concija d'Ibas. At the same time, Loison, with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Galicia by Puebla de Senabria, and on the 15th of February his cavalry cut to pieces five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched against Astorga, and at the same time Bonnet destroyed Ponte's force at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonnet and by Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca to support Mahi.

Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and Loison, although supported by the men from Leon who advanced to Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the eighth corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form; but he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise in the capital during the King's absence. Mahi and Garcia being apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, thinking to relieve the Asturians by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon; but as Loison still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, and after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga, retired to Villa Franca.

Bonnet did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when General Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, leaving Mahi to command in Galicia, marched himself with the remnant of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile Kellermann advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and Ney's force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. It is unnecessary to trace all these movements, because the French, while preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false reports, and making demonstrations in various directions, to mislead the allies and to cover their own projects.

Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion of Portugal by the northern line was not finally arranged until a later period; yet it seems probable, that while Bonnet drew the attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the Duke of Abrantes designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria; not as Loison announced, for the invasion of Galicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest

Ciudad Rodrigo. Whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were frustrated, partly by the insurrection in Granada and the failure of Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally; and everywhere it was plainly seen that the French corps d'armée, however formidable in themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in the general system.

When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old Castile; Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes; Kellermann retired to Valladolid; detachments placed on the Douro maintained the communications between Ney and Junot; and the latter, having drawn a reinforcement from Bonnet, invested Astorga with ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four pounders, and two mortars. His covering divisions were placed, one at Benevente, to watch the road to Mombuey, one near Puebla de Senabria, and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the Gallician army at Villa Franca and Foncebadon, and detached fifteen hundred men, under Echevaria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing army; yet his force was weak; the Gallician authorities had frequently assured Lord Wellington that it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized troops; it now appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill provided, and prone to desertion.*

SIEGE OF ASTORGA.

Santocildes, the governor, was an officer of courage; his garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry, besides cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition, scarcely twenty days' rations, and nothing outside the walls capable of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain, and had three suburbs: Puerto de Hierro to the north, St. Andreas to the east, and Retebia to the west. On the two last Junot made false attacks, and conducted his real approaches against the front between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia.

The place was invested the 22d, and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies were repulsed, and the trenches opened, before the end of the month. A breach was then commenced, but the battering guns soon became unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless, the town suffered from shells, the wall was broken on the 20th of April, an assault was

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

ordered, and although a previous attack on Retebia had failed, Santocildes was so distressed for ammunition, that he offered to capitulate.

Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five o'clock in the evening of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach, which was well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy, while the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The storming party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks and in front with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia, it would have been totally destroyed, but for the scarcity of ammunition, which paralyzed the Spanish defence. Three hundred French are said to have fallen on the breach itself, but the remainder finally effected a lodgment in the ruins. During the night, a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication was opened from the parallels to the lodgment, and strong working parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into the town, when the governor surrendered.

Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would have succored the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, where his rear was overtaken and defeated by General Clausel on the 24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from Mombuey; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter, and, on the 25th, totally defeated Echevaria at Castro Contrijo. Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored Bonnet his division. That General, who had retired to Santander during the siege, then reoccupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and once more menaced Galicia by the road of Concijsa, and by that of Sales; several slight actions ensued; the French penetrated no farther, and the Junta of Galicia reinforced the Asturians with three thousand men.

During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at Salamanca; a strong detachment of Kellermann's troops seized the pass of Baños; and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were commencing, and the line of communication with France was encumbered with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering train, collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca; General Martineau, with ten thousand men for the eighth corps, reached Valladolid; General Drouet passed the Pyrenees with a ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in Spain; and these were followed by seventeen

thousand of the imperial guards, whose presence gave force to the rumor that the Emperor himself was coming to take the chief command.

Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all parties, and credited both by Joseph's ministers and the French ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless; a leader for the projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed that Marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps, under the impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal; that the intrigues of Marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated his hopes; that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the Peninsula; that his marriage, and some important political affairs, diverted him from that object, and that Massena, Prince of Esling, was finally chosen, partly for his great name in arms, partly that he was of higher rank than the other Marshals, and a stranger to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was known in May amongst the allies, and Lord Wellington had no longer to dread the formidable presence of the French Emperor.

That Massena's base of operations might not be exposed to the interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military governments of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and Santander were placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the King, and it would seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed in the French councils; because in the imperial muster-rolls, the head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that army, yet during the month of April only; a circumstance strongly indicating Napoleon's intention to assume the command himself. The northern line was, however, definitively adopted, and while the Prince of Esling was still in the capital the eighth corps passed the Tormes, and Ney commenced the

FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

The conduct of the governor of this fortress had in the beginning of the year appeared so suspicious, that Lord Wellington demanded his removal.* Don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor, was a veteran of fifty years' service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance, and courteous manners excited respect; and whose courage, talents, and honors were worthy of his venerable

* Lord Wellington's Correspondence, MS.

appearance. His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men, besides the citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, and without other flanks than a few projections containing some light guns: a second wall, about twelve feet high, called a "*fausse braie*," with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first, yet was placed so low on the hill as scarcely to offer any cover to the upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he secured as he might.

Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by an earthen intrenchment, and strengthened by two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place. The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the bottom of the ditch.

The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was easy for troops; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the castle-gate. The Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia, and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks.

During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city; and, in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose; and these portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress.

This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps, and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps invested the place, the eighth occupied San Felices Grande and other points, the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river, but the battering train with a great escort was still two days' march in the rear, for the rains inundating the flat country between the Agueda and the Tormes rendered the roads impassable. The

bridges were established on the 2d and 7th of June, the one above, the other below the town, and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater Teson. The 22d, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, which had hitherto been but slightly watched. That night Julian Sanchez, with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out of the castle-gate, and crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This event induced Ney to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against General Crawford the 25th, on which day, also, the French batteries opened.

Ney's plan was to breach the body of the place, without attending to the Spanish fire, and salvos from forty-six guns, constantly directed on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; nevertheless the besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches, and killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the 27th the Prince of Esling arriving in the camp, summoned the governor to surrender, and Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so good a soldier. The fire was then resumed until the first of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow in the counterscarp, and pass the ditch in form.* Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the new works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right flank, was carried after a fierce resistance; and, on the left, the suburb was attacked, taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of everything beyond the walls.

During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and strengthened his flank defences. On the 9th of July, the besiegers' batteries, being established on the Lesser Teson, re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown in by a mine on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch was filled by the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. Three French soldiers, of heroic courage, then rushed out of the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of affairs, discharged their

* Intercepted French Correspondence, MS.

muskets, and, with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their comrades.

The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the signal, and a few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of the city, when the white flag suddenly waved on the rampart, and the venerable governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, by his gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully, while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonor to his silver hairs, that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre and devastation.

Six months had now elapsed since the French, resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the Spanish forces, broken and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most obscure parts: solid resistance there was none, and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British General. How he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related in the foregoing chapters were contemporaneous, and that he has been led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been called the Spanish military policy; and without accurate notions on that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the man, who, like Milton's phantom, paved a broad way through their chaotic warfare.

I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and most unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it is the province of history to record foolish as well as glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all, and neither will I mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country's arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people. In their constancy, in the unexampled patience with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a ruthless enemy and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their prisoners with humanity; that their Junta were honest or wise; their generals skilful; their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth, when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own

cause ! Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact ; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon, is an illusion. Spain baffle him ! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the opportunity ; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans ; the English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched ; with a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to arrest the conqueror's progress ; the snows of Russia destroyed three hundred thousand of his best soldiers ; and finally, when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered to the great European aristocracy ; she was delivered, because England enabled that aristocracy to triumph, for a moment, over the principles of the French revolution.

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington's policy—Change of administration in England—Duel between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning—Lord Wellesley joins the new ministry—Debates in Parliament—Factional violence on both sides—Lord Wellington's sagacity and firmness vindicated—His views for the defence of Portugal—Ministers accede to his demands—Grandeur of Napoleon's designs against the Peninsula—Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the English Ministers—Discusses the state of the war—Similarity of his views with those of Sir John Moore—His reasons for not advancing into Spain explained and vindicated.

THE defence of Portugal was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was Lord Wellington moved thereto by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and deliberately formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings up to the moment when, confident in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, labored to thwart his measures and to ruin his designs.

After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the Central Junta upon matters touching the war, but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley's departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration was about to take place; a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected, because the ineptitude of the government was, in private, acknowledged by many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition was only the signal for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James's the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any

in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly denounced Lord Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him.* Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his abilities, to plan and conduct the fitting out of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England.† When it became evident that loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue, thus becoming known to Lord Castlereagh, was by him characterized as “*a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private.*” This was followed by a duel! and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool being then empowered to form another Cabinet, after a fruitless negotiation with Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered the department of foreign affairs to Lord Wellesley.

Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which were afterwards so gloriously realized; but which could never have been undertaken with confidence by that General, unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, imbued with the same sentiments, bound by common interest, and resolute, to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise and commendable in Lord Wellesley to sacrifice something of his own personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects promising so much glory to the country and his own family; and the first proceedings in Parliament justified his policy.

Previous to the change in the Cabinet, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been created Baron Douro, and Viscount Wellington; but those honors, although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the opposition members, who, with few exceptions, assailed the General personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment.‡ Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Galicia and Estremadura, and obliged one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid!

Lord Grey, opposing his own crude military notions to the practised skill of Sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter's dispositions at Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that

* Lord Castlereagh's statement.

† Mr. Canning's statement.

‡ See Parliamentary Debates.

action : and some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army ! That battle, so sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators ; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgment, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth !

This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side : there was a ministerial person at this time, who in his dread of the opposition, wrote to Lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation : *anything provided blood were spilt !* A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the General's abhorrence of this detestable policy. When such passions were abroad, it is evident that Lord Wellesley's accession to the government was essential to the success of Lord Wellington's projects.

Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of Europe, and every step made towards their accomplishment merits attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune in war, or that the Duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favorites ; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid ground ; that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him ; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced.

Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the ministers were yet unchanged, Lord Castlereagh, brought by continual reverses to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded Lord Wellington's opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached the General on the 14th of September, 1809 ; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country ; and at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal was necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that Lord Wellington replied to Lord Liverpool, who,

during the interval, had succeeded Lord Castlereagh in the war department.

Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster, the former *could not then make an attack upon Portugal*; yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it.* “But the peace in Germany,” he said, “might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, *until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive*, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, *provided England employed her armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organized to the full extent of which it was capable*. But the number of British forces employed should not be less than thirty thousand effective men, although the Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry, and the militia amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanzas.”

The next point of consideration was the probable expense. “The actual yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence the most important consideration was the expense of renovating and supporting the Portuguese military and civil services. The British government had already subsidized the Portuguese Regency, at the rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place at the service of the English Commander-in-Chief.

“But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. Hence, for that year the most pressing only of the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars,

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Badajoz, 14th Nov. 1809, MS.

which, after a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food.

"It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished the country, that it was impossible to raise the revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and therefore justice as well as policy required that England should afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency.

"Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The officers of that army had for many years done no duty, partly that their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and lived with their families; and to these advantages, added others arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary discipline introduced by Marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom or against whom they were to fight.

"If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of three hundred thousand pounds, to supply the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English Cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance the difficulties of the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he, Lord Wellington, felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense hitherto incurred would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide.

"There remained two other points to consider—the re-embarkation of the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry and artillery; those could not be carried off, if the embarkation took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, the expense of horse transports would be more than the worth of the animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although I," he said, "*consider the Portuguese government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that their success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British officers and troops; I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the state of the war, not only in Portugal, but Spain.* If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually, the British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than continue by their means the contest in this country."

Peniche and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, but neither was likely to come within the scope of the operations, and Lord Wellington's opinion as to the facility of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon Admiral Berkeley's assurances that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d'Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian's for an embarkation. But the Admiral's views, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the Tagus, for the purpose of an embarkation, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, from the recent loss sustained in the Walcheren expedition, they truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of England, the ministers assented to Lord Wellington's proposals;

they undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; and being now pledged to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of complete efficiency.

Thus supported, Lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. His troops, removed from the Guadiana, took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal. He expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England, smaller detachments had already reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand, for nine thousand were in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the effects of past illness.

The 20th of January, the head-quarters and the artillery park were established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry was quartered, by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, and Santarem. General Hill was left with five thousand British, and a like number of Portuguese, at Abrantes; and the remainder of the infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was distributed along the valley of the Mondego.

The plans of the English General were, at first, grounded upon the supposition that the French would follow the right or northern line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations against the Peninsula, that is, *attack Portugal from the side of Old Castile*, rather than *Andalusia from the side of La Mancha*. In this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon; his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, Lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question, whether *Portugal should be defended at all*; but at the same time transmitting one of those clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the ministers' information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; statements in which, showing the bearings of past

and present events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has attributed to fortune, and the favor of the Cabinet, successes which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.

"The enemy," he said, "aimed at conquering the south; he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources; and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however, be lost and the authorities dispersed, but the war of partisans would continue. Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist within its walls, but it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs left Portugal untouched; yet it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers' attention.

"They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within the last nine months, for the enrolment, organization, and equipment of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by military experience.

"When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass, *that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather than an advantage to the French government.* Thence arose this question, Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to the allies?

"It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars everything that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and

army; they were loyal to their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually determined to do everything for the cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs.”*

Under these circumstances, and *adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain*, he demanded to know whether “*the enemy, bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found.*” But under any circumstances, (he said,) the British army could always be embarked in despite of the enemy.”

Such being the view taken of this important subject by Lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in disparagement of Sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, whereas Lord Wellington did defend that country.† The former General, premising that he was not prepared to answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a superior force;‡ yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, and Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c., which could only be made at Lisbon. That the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend the Trás os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal, “*because the latter was without a military force,*” and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Rorica and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops. This opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the *state of affairs existing at that moment*, being expressly founded on the *miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military, Spain also being supposed conquered.*

Now Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy which prevailed during Sir John Cradock's time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force reorganized, and her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature consideration, and when Spain was still fighting; when Andalusia, Cat-

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810, MS.

† Mr. James Moore's Narrative.

‡ Appendix 16.

alonia, Murcia, Valencia, Galicia, and the Asturias were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared for defence; Lord Wellington, I say, came to the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the army then in the Peninsula, provided *an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation.** And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government that, *although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardor of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted.*† Lisbon, also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as temporary posts.

But, in all things concerning this war, there was between those generals a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action.

"*The French,*" said Sir John Moore, "*will find the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little more than a march to subdue the country.*"‡

"*The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be,*" said Lord Wellington, "*the probable consequence of any action in which either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the war of partisans will probably continue.*"§

And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of Andalusia, Lord Wellington, on the first indication of Joseph's march, designed to make a movement similar in principle to that executed by Sir John Moore on a like occasion;¶ that is, by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy's rear, in such sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred from this project by the knowledge that fresh troops were entering Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it, and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers then, and since,

* Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14, 1809, MS.

† Ibid, Jan. 31, 1810, MS.

‡ Mr. James Moore's Narrative.

§ Letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810, MS.

¶ Appendix 16, § 3.

have accused him of looking on with indifference, if not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the Central Junta's operations, as if it only depended upon him to render them successful.

Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already explained. He abandoned his own—

1. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill's division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the field. Hill's division, however, could not be moved without leaving the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,—a danger which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, would only increase.

2. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before mentioned.* To bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization, destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the troops of Kellermann's government, Lord Wellington knew to be at least thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning was sound shall now be shown.

Mortier's march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajoz, if the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia was only part of a general system throughout Spain; and when the King placed himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellermann marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the sixth corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley of the Tagus; at the same time, the second corps, coming down that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Baños, and with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold of Andalusia, three *corps d'armée*, namely, the sixth, second, and fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could, on an emergency, be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of Lord Wellington's. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted, but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross, the Western Pyrenees.†

* Lord Wellington's correspondence, MS.

† Rolls of the French army.

Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the field, but the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth corps, and the former, under the command of the Duke of Abrantes, advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellermann, have overwhelmed the British army, but for that sagacity which the French, with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards, with ingratitude, have termed "*the selfish caution of the English system.*"

Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a machine as a British army, with all its national reputation to support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, and incapable of attaining, and consequently incapable of losing, any military reputation.

CHAPTER II.

Greatness of Lord Wellington's plans—Situation of the belligerents described—State of the French—Character of Joseph—Of his ministers—Disputes with the Marshals—Napoleon's policy—Military governments—Almenara sent to Paris—Curious deception executed by the Marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart and the historian Cabanes—Prodigious force of the French army—State of Spain—Inertness of Galicia—Secret plan of the Regency for encouraging the Guerrillas—Operations of those bands—Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to South America—England—State of parties—Factional injustice on both sides—Difficulty of raising money—Bullion Committee—Wm. Cobbett—Lord King—Mr. Vansittart—Extravagance of the Ministers—State of Portugal—Parties in that country—Intrigues of the Patriarch and the Souzas—Mr. Staart is appointed Plenipotentiary—His firmness—Princess Carlotta claims the Regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne of Spain.

THE greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the idea of offensive operations, Lord Wellington turned his whole attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavorable change of circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its defence; yet the majority yielded to the influence of his brother rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and threw the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the General. The deep designs, the vast combinations, the mighty efforts by which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to comprehend the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprin-

cipléd politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. Failure was everywhere anticipated, and there were but few who even thought him serious in his undertaking.

But having now brought the story of the war down to that period when England, setting Portugal and Spain as it were aside, undertook the contest with France, it will be well to take a survey of the respective conditions and plans of the belligerents; and to show how great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock.

State of the French.—France, victorious, and in a state of the highest prosperity, could with ease furnish the number of men required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. The utmost strength of the Spaniards had been proved, and it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies, disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years, yet no effectual resistance made; and as in the war of succession, the people would gradually have accommodated themselves to the change of dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully demonstrated by an effort to effect his release. For when Baron Kolli, the agent employed on this occasion, was detected and his place supplied by one of the French police to ascertain the intentions of the captive King, the latter, *influenced by personal fears alone*, not only refused to make the attempt, but dishonorably denounced Kolli to the French government. The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be equal to the task. Yet in war there are always circumstances which, though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much as the wind influences the sailing of a ship; and amongst the most important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive King.

Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards never accused him of anything worse than being too convivial; but it is evident that he was unequal to his task, and mistook his true situation, when, resisting Napoleon's policy, he claimed the treatment of an independent King. He should have known that he was a tool, and in Spain could only be a tool of the Emperor's. To have refused a crown like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept and then to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in Napoleon's path. Joseph's object was to create a

Spanish party for himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen submission, much less attachment, from a nation so abused; neither was it possible to recast public feeling until the people had passed through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his throne.

Now Joseph's Spanish ministers were men who joined him upon principle, and who, far from showing a renegade zeal in favor of the French, were as ardently attached to their own country as any of those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies, they as well as the King invariably supported the former; and so strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended to fall on the Emperor's troops.* Thus civil contention weakened the military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command in person, or to adopt a policy which, however defective, will perhaps be found to have been the best adapted to the actual state of affairs.

He suffered, or as some, eager to lower a great man's genius to their own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals and the King; but the true question is, could he prevent those disputes? A wise policy does not consist in pushing any one point to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole. To arrive at a sound judgment of Napoleon's measures, therefore, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, and there are not sufficient materials yet before the world to do this correctly; yet we may be certain that his situation, with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required extraordinary management. It must always be remembered that he was not merely a conqueror; he was also the founder of a political structure too much exposed to storms without, to bear any tampering with its internal supports. If money be the sinew of war, it is also the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon's policy than the care with which he handled financial matters, avoiding as he would the plague that fictitious system of public credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not, without hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the only resource left was to make "*the war maintain the war.*" Now Joseph's desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, were opposed to this system; nor were

* Appendix 18, § 1.

the proceeds of the contributions always applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy; yet openly to declare the King of no consideration would have been impolitic in the highest degree. The Emperor adopted an intermediate course, and formed what were called "*particular military governments*," such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia and Andalusia, in which the marshal or general named governor possessed both the civil and military power; in short, he created viceroys as he threatened to do when at Madrid, and, though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon's measures.

The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended the King, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the Emperor.* On the other hand, experience proved that Joseph was not a general equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits that, at this period, the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies, and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were feebly pushed.† Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to make the success of each "*corps d'armée*," and the reputation of its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it was fighting. And, although some of the governors had neither the sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation, others, such as Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly not have been attained under the supreme government of the King, because he knew little of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain.

I am aware that the first named generals, especially Soult, were included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people, extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result of personal enmity, and facts, derived from less interested quarters, as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer reach in their policy than the King could understand.

There is yet another view in which the matter may be consid-

* Appendix 18, § 2, 3. † Mémoires de St. Hélène.

ered. Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the military governments of Spain. The marshal's sway, however wisely adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and violence, was of necessity onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful government of the King, who would then have been regarded as a deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the constitution of Bayonne.

Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this system were injurious to the French cause.* Fresh contributions were exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of succors from France; and, to avoid these, men, who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The *partidas* also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as Major-General for the King, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the Regency answered by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had strong grounds for what they did: the Junta, because the defence of the country now rested chiefly on the *partidas*; Joseph, because the latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and were, by the Junta, encouraged in assassination. Mina, and indeed all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he might destroy the mother and the infant together!† And such things were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of the treatment of prisoners was generally decided by granting no quarter on either side.

Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the Marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother,

* King Joseph's Correspondence, MS.

† Suchet's Memoirs.

and to complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, especially Ney and Kellermann;* and he denounced one act of the latter, which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas, by which infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military. Another object of Almenara's mission was to ascertain if there was really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro; and this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he, in concert with Romana, and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulating the style and manner of Napoleon's state papers, composed a counterfeit "*senatus consultum*" and decree for annexing the provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph, whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile, his distress for money was so extreme, that his ministers were at times actually destitute of food.

These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning the King's French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less than *three hundred and seventy thousand men, and eighty thousand horses*. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four thousand prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms, ready either for battle or siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve eighteen thousand strong was in march to enter Spain.† In May, this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus distributed:—

Governments or Armies in the 2d Line.

			Total Strength,
1. Catalonia	Seventh corps.....	Duke of Tarento...	55,647
2. Aragon...	Third corps.....	Gen. Suchet.....	33,007
3. Navarre.....	{ Detachments and a division of the Imperial Guards.....	{ Gen. Reille.....	21,887
4. Biscay.....			
5. Old Castile, comprising Burgos, Aranda, and Soria...	{ Divisions of the Imperial Guards and cavalry.....	{ Gen. Caffarelli.....	6,570
6. Valladolid, &c.....	Detachments.....	Gen. Dorsenne.....	10,803
7. Asturias.....	One division.....	Gen. Kellermann..	6,474
		Gen. Bonnet.....	9,893
Total for the governments.....			143,786

Armies in the 1st Line.

<i>Army of the South</i> , composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult.....	72,769
<i>Army of the Centre</i> , composed of the Royal Guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the King.....	24,187
<i>Army of Portugal</i> , composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena.....	86,396
The ninth corps, commanded by General Drouet, distributed by divisions along the great line of communication from Vittoria to Valladolid.....	23,815
A division under General Serras, employed as a movable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal.....	10,605

* Appendix 18, § 1. † Appendix 15, § 1.

218,272

Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines, namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the interior circle was still held by the French, and their lines of communication were crowded with troops.

State of Spain.—On the right, the armies of Valencia and Catalonia were opposed to the third and seventh corps; and their utmost efforts could only retard, not prevent the sieges of Tarragona and Tortosa. In the centre, the Murcian troops, and those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance of the British force under General Graham. On the left, Romana, supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partisan warfare from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Galicia and Asturia did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonnet advanced beyond the frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was used to send through the country movable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige the villages to furnish their quota of men.* Yet, with all this severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, Galicia never was of any signal service to the British operations.

But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the *partidas* suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French columns; and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system to its utmost extent, established secret guerilla juntas in each province, enjoining them diligently to collect stores and provisions in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline and payment of the *partidas*, and particular tracts were charged with the supplies, each according to its means.† Lastly, every province was divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act in mass.

The first burst of these bands occasioned the French considerable loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians,

* *Memoirs of Contreras*, published by himself.

† *Mr. Stuart's Papers*, MS.

in concert with the peasants of Granada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of Andalusia. Franquisetto and Palarea beset the neighborhood of Ciudad Real and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, Temprano, and Juan Abril, keeping the circuit of the Carpentino mountains, from the Somosierra to Avila, and descending sometimes on the side of New, sometimes on the side of Old Castile, sometimes in Estremadura, carried off small French posts even close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the very gates of that town. On the other side of Madrid, Duran with two thousand men, and the Empecinado with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, as far as Cuença, and ventured sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of more than two thousand men, harassed Biscay and the neighborhood of Vittoria, and the chain of communication between these great bands and the Empecinado was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia; the two first acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually hanging upon the flanks and rear of Bonnet, between Santander and Oviedo, acted in concert with Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders of Galicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, and slew numbers of the guerillas, many of whom were robbers that, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely harassed their own countrymen; few were really formidable, though all were vexatious. Enough has been said upon this point.

But, while reduced to this irregular warfare for preventing the entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and provoking civil war, as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence of Spain was with them of subordinate interest to the continuance of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops were withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency of expecting Napoleon's innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their own doors by guerilla operations, and yet attempting with a few divisions to crush whole nations acting in the same manner at three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and

Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula.

England.—The contentions of party were vehement, and the ministers' policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1. The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2. The furnishing money for the expenses; 3. The recruiting of the armies. The last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition in Parliament was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers were indeed justly attacked, but when particulars touching the contest in Portugal were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy of Beresford's report of the numbers and efficiency of the native forces was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful resistance assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused one of the smallest difficulties encountered by the English General.

On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in Parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or wherefore; and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was expected, his numbers were contemptible, if a victory was gained, his host was countless. Members of Parliament related stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing that consummate art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit and to stifle reason, was neglected.

But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The country, inundated with bank notes, was destitute of gold. Napoleon's continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are the inevitable result of a factitious currency, were too perceptible to be longer disregarded in Parliament. A committee appointed to investigate the matter, made early in the session of

1810 a report in which the evils of the existing system and the causes of the depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced; but the authors did not perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice and the ruin attending a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views.* The government at first endeavored to stave off the bullion question; but finding that they must either abandon the prosecution of the war in the Peninsula or deny the facts adduced by the committee, adopted the latter. On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, the house voted in substance that a pound note and a shilling were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, although light guineas were then openly sold at twenty-eight shillings each. Lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank notes, exposed all the fraud and the hollowness of the ministers' system; and the vote of the Commons, although well calculated to convince the ministers' opponents that no proposition could be too base or absurd to meet with support in the existing Parliament, did not remove the difficulties of raising money; hence no resource remained but that of the desperate spendthrift, who, never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war had, however, given England a monopoly of the world's commerce by sea, and the ministers, affirming that the country was in a state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of their General, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might have extinguished forever.

State of Portugal.—In this country three parties were apparent:—that of the *people*, ready to peril body and goods for independence,—that of the *fidalgos*, who thought to profit from the nation's energy without any diminution of ancient abuses,—that of the *disaffected*, who desired the success of the French, some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This party looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed. Those noblemen, in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot's time, under the authority of the Prince Regent's edict to that effect; Freire, more honorable than his companions, refused

* Paper against Gold.

to bear arms against his country; the two others had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in the military archives at Paris.

The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British General and army; but the *fidalgos* or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and supported by the Regency, were a powerful body, and their political proceedings after the departure of Sir John Cradock demand notice. The Patriarch, formerly Bishop of Oporto, the Marquis de Olhao, Conteiro Mor, and the Marquis of Das Minas, composed the Regency; and they, and every other member of the government, were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses. As the military organization carried on by Beresford was only a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was necessarily hateful to the Regency, and to the *fidalgos*, who profited by its degeneracy. The opposition of these people, joined to unavoidable difficulties in finance and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia and *ordenanza* nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, the energy of Lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few nor inactive, gathered. As the times obliged the government to permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon, it naturally followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, and those opinions being repeated in the British Parliament, were printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colors of misrepresentation at the moment when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people.

After Das Minas' resignation, Mr. Stuart and three Portuguese, namely, Antonio, called Principal Souza, the Conde de Redondo, and Doctor Nogueira, were added to the Regency by an intrigue which shall be hereafter noticed. The last was a man of honesty, talent and discretion, but Souza, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder. Seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the British generals, he was strenuously assisted by the Patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable. An exceedingly powerful cabal

was thus formed, whose object was to obtain the supreme direction of the civil and military affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde Linhares, head of the Souza family, was Prime Minister in the Brazils; the Principal was in the Regency at Lisbon; the Chevalier Souza was envoy at the British Court, and a fourth of the family, Don Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish Regency; playing into each others hands, and guided by the subtle Principal, they concocted very dangerous intrigues, and their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley's energetic interference reduced the latter indeed to a reasonable disposition, yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they durst not attempt by force they sought to attain by artifice.

In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers had, fortunately for the cause, been replaced as envoy by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman, well experienced in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine understanding and resolute temper to forward the views of Lord Wellington. It is undoubted that the dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the plans of the commander, had been employed.

To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in Portugal, but with the *fidalgos* it was a question of interest more than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great body of which, perceiving at once that they must stand or fall with the English army, heartily aided the cause, the *fidalgos* clung rather to the Regency. Now the *caballeros* in that body, who were the same people that had opposed Sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces (of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating against this design. Moreover the natural indolence of the people, being fostered by the negligence and fears of the Regency, rendered it most difficult to obtain the execution of any work or the fulfilment of any agreement in which the Portuguese government or the civil authorities were concerned.

Another spring of political action was the hatred and jealousy of Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For when the Spaniards showed a distrust of their allies,

the Portuguese were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they had no feeling in common with their neighbors. Yet notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the Princess Carlotta, wife to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed not only succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother's death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent; and to persuade the Spanish tribunals to acknowledge her claims, was the object of Pedro Souza's mission to Cadiz.

Although the Council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish Regency, readily recognized Carlotta's pretensions in virtue of the decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique law of Philip the Fifth, the regents would pay no attention to them; yet Souza, renewing his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, by corruption obtained from the majority of the members a secret acknowledgment of the Princess's claim. His further progress was however promptly arrested by Lord Wellington, who foresaw that his success would affect, not only the military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one family. Moreover, although at first he thought it might prove beneficial in the event of the Peninsula being conquered, he soon judged it a scheme concocted at Rio Janeiro to embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the Princess should reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of the plan, she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain that arrogance, deceit, negligence in business, and personal intrigues were common to the Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shown in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III.

Lord Wellington's scheme for the defence of Portugal—Vastness of his designs—Number of his troops—Description of the country—Plan of defence analyzed—Difficulty of supplying the army—Resources of the belligerents compared—Character of the British soldier.

WHEN Lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed and managed with such an inexperienced staff and civil administration as that of the English army, rather than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was that he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet knowing from his experience in Spain how passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free promises of their governors, and insisted that his own authority as *Marshal-General of Portugal* should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or "ordenanzas;" for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means.*

Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency to revive and enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men were to be enrolled and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on whatever line the invaders should penetrate; and that this might be deliberately and effectually performed, he designed, at the head of all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy in such sort, that without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, converted into soldiers and closing on the rear and flanks, should cut off all resources, save those carried in the midst of the troops.

But it was evident that if the French could find or carry supplies sufficient to maintain themselves until the British commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark, or giving battle be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary to find a

* Appendix 19, § 9.

position covering Lisbon where the allied forces could neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, furnished this keystone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the positions had been made under the directions of Sir Charles Stuart in 1799, and, together with the French Colonel Vincent's minutes, showing how they covered Lisbon, were in Lord Wellington's possession. From these documents the original notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but the above named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be made by an army in movement before an equal or a greater force. It was Lord Wellington who first conceived the design of turning those vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula.

Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations and redoubts secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the English General's undertaking. He was a foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure, and he was vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility of that country; yet, in this apparently weak position, he undertook at one and the same time to overcome the abuses engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole people sunk in sloth to arise in arms, to devastate their own lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power of modern times.

Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the Regency, and of the *fidalgos*, the ancient military laws were revived, and so effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand militia, and the remainder "ordenanzas;" but this multitude was necessarily subject to many deductions. The "*capitans mor*," or chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, the *fidalgos* evaded service by the connivance of the government, and the total number of "ordenanzas" really assembled fell far short of the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the militia, only thirty-two thousand of which had muskets and bayonets; and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived at absence under false pretences, to such an extent,

that scarcely twenty-six thousand men ever remained with their colors. Of the regular troops the whole were in good condition; thirty thousand being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed, disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus the disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand men, one half of which were militia.

At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, of which six thousand were in hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. The latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty thousand men, while the army on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British, such was the policy of the English Cabinet; for this was the ministers' and not the general's arrangement. The ordenanzas being set aside, the actual force at the disposition of Lord Wellington cannot be estimated higher than eighty thousand men, and the frontier to defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence, shall now be described.

The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to invasion:

1. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, extending from the mouth of the Minho to Miranda on the Douro.
2. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes, following the course of the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo.
3. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the Tagus.
4. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, stretching in one line from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana.

But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military aspect of the country; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of the whole; but each had a separate system for itself, based on the one general principle, that the country should be

wasted, and the best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the invaders.

The northern and southern provinces have been already described. Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is, from the Douro to the Tagus, the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of the enemy.

An invading army, then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications could be maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and the pass of Baños; and the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between the Douro and the Tagus would offer them an opening of ninety miles against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply, amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following directions:

From Ciudad Rodrigo.—1. By the valley of the Douro; 2. By the valley of the Mondego; 3. By the valley of the Zezere.

From Coria.—1. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus; and, 2. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa.

To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement could be prosecuted against Lisbon.

To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes—the first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land offers a position where a large army (for a small one it is danger-

ous) could seal the passage on either side of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.

On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the positions, if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable for artillery of any calibre.

Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles, while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier consists in this: *the Tagus along its whole course is, from June till December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the lines.* A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at any place below Abrantes would therefore render all the frontier positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the Mondego or that of the Zézere. For these reasons *the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers.*

Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of the French corps, led Lord Wellington to expect that the principal attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes; and, under this impression, he made the following dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniche, Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.

General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British Colonels Trant, Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the garrison of Valença, on the Minho.

The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In the Alentejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. There remained in reserve twelve regiments of the fifty composing the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida, Elvas and Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes.

The British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as follows:

		Men.
1st Division	General Spencer, about	6,000 Viseu.
2d Division, including the 18th Dragoons	{ General Hill,	" 5,000 Abrantes and Portalegre.
3d Division		
4th Division	General Picton,	" 3,000 Celerico.
Light Division	General Cole,	" 4,000 Guarda.
	Robert Crawford,	" 2,400 Pinhel.
The Cavalry	General Cotton,	" 8,000 Valley of Mondego.
Total		23,400 under arms.

Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and ordenanza, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could, in two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as short a period, unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on that line. If the enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura, across the Tagus, Beresford could succor the militia by moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach that place much quicker than General Reynier, in consequence of an arrangement which merits particular attention.

It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains, and to have repaired the roads between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But Lord Wellington, after throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line of communication by the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to the pass of Villa Velha, where, by a flying bridge

the river was re-crossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now the pass of Villa Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet much accelerated, for the road near Villa Velha, being reconstructed by the engineers, was excellent.

Thus all the obstacles to an enemy's march by the north bank were preserved. The line by Villa Velha enabled Hill to pass from Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank movement in less time than Reynier; and also provided a lateral communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find of vital importance in the combinations of the English General, supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales, which otherwise would have been adopted. The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños, and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

Notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo, before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a battle lost there would, in the dry season, decide the fate of Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the very basis of Lord Wellington's defence, and all his dispositions were made to oblige *the French to move in masses*, and to *gain time himself*; time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenanza: above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his combinations will show that they were well adapted to effect these objects.

1. The enemy dared not advance, except with *concentrated masses*, because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter above twenty thousand men.

2. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana's troops and even forced back Hill's, the latter, passing the Tagus at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no

regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms.

3. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul; Beresford and Hill could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this line, save by a light corps in connection with other attacks, was not to be expected; for, although the enemy should force the Sobreira, and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back.

4. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida, to the valley of the Mondego; the road from Belmonte towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and obstructed, and that from Thomar by Espinal to the Ponte de Murcella was repaired and widened; thus the inner and shorter line was rendered easy for the allies, while the outward and longer line was rendered difficult for the enemy, and to secure quick reports telegraphs were established from Lisbon to Elvas, to Abrantes, and to Almeida.

The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel run, in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen into profound and gloomy chasms; and there are few bridges. But the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open. If the French adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, where they would have to choose between the right and the left bank. In the latter case, they must march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, until they reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, behind which they would find the allied army in a position of surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter noticed; but, in either case, the allied

forces, having *interior lines of communication*, could, as long as the Belmonte road was sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra. Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to be apprehended, and it behoved General Hill to watch vigilantly and act decisively in opposition to General Reynier. For the latter, having necessarily the lead in the movements, might, by skilful evolutions and rapid marches, either join the sixth and eighth corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the allied divisions on the Mondego; or drawing him across the Tagus, furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the southern bank of that river.

In these dispositions the English General had regard only to the enemy's actual situation, and expecting the invasion to be in summer, but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and the roads deteriorated, the defence would have been different; fewer troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus and the Zezere, the Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the allied troops could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn resistance made on the northern line.

Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, Lord Wellington trusted that his own military quickness, and the valor of the British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes during the retreat, and once within the lines, (the Portuguese people and the government doing their part,) he looked confidently to the final result. He judged that in a wasted country, and with thirty regiments of militia in the mountains on the flank and rear of the enemy, the latter could not long remain before the lines, and his retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were, however, many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a third line of intrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army.*

In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies; there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country,

* Lord Wellington's Correspondence, MS.

but it was unevenly distributed, difficult to get at, and the people are of a nature to render it impossible to depend upon contracts even where they are friendly ; some places were exhausted, others overflowing ; the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in this the allies enjoyed a great advantage ; their convoys could pass unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards, first to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the people ; after a time scarcely any food for man or beast (some cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted) was to be obtained in that country : nay, the whole nation was at last in a manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable war, and yet it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle against famine, even near the sea ; but at a distance from that nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use ; hence the only resource for the conveyance of stores was water-carriage, to a certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.

Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus ; Figueras and Raiva de Pena Cova, on the Mondego, and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on the Douro, were the principal dépôts formed by Lord Wellington, and his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celerico, Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four hundred miserable bullock cars and about twelve thousand hired mules, organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores and provisions to the armies ; when additional succors could be obtained, it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount of transport, and all his magazines in advance of Lisbon were so limited and arranged that he could easily carry them off or destroy them before the enemy.

With such means and with such preparations was the defence of Portugal undertaken, and it must be evident to the most superficial observer, that amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number of intricate combinations, Lord Wellington's situation was not one in which a General could sleep ; and that, due allowance being made for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his talents and steel-hardened resolution.

In the foregoing exposition of the political and military force of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched, and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The unfavorable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence

of the Emperor,—the erroneous views of the King,—the rivalry of the marshals,—the impediments to correspondence,—the necessity of frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,—the iniquity of the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who for the most part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could not patiently endure a service replete with personal dangers over and above the ordinary mishaps of war, and promising little ultimate reward.

For the English, the quicksands were—the memory of former failures on the continent,—the financial drain,—a powerful and eloquent opposition, pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the General dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a panic amongst the ministers which all Lord Wellesley's vigor would be unable to stem,—the intrigues of the Souza party, and the necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for the sake of defending a *European cause*,—finally, the babbling of the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew the most certain information of the strength and situation of the army. On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified towns of the Peninsula, and, while her enormous army threatened to crush every opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to the recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the educated classes did not shrink less from the British government's known hostility to all free institutions. What, then, remained for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the armies, the chances of another continental war,—the complete dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,—the recruiting through the militia, which was, in fact, a conscription with two links in the chain instead of one; lastly, the ardor of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of Europe, and to raise a rival to the French Emperor. And here, as General Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of the British soldiers, I will set down what many years' experience gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams.

That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat, with incredible vigor. When completely disciplined,—and three years are required to accomplish this,—his port is lofty and his movements

free ; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them ; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril.

It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered ! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy ; no honors awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen ; his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore ? Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, overthrow, with incredible energy, every opponent, and at all times prove that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honor was also full and fresh within him ?

The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations have given the first place amongst the European infantry to the British ; but in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world.

CHAPTER IV.

Character of Miguel Alava—Portuguese government demand more English troops—Lord Wellington refuses, and reproaches the Regency—The factions conduct of the latter—Character of the light division—General Crawford passes the Coa—His activity and skilful arrangements—Is joined by Carrera—Skirmish at Barba del Puerco—Carrera invites Ney to desert—Roinana arrives at head-quarters—Lord Wellington refuses to succor Ciudad Rodrigo—His decision vindicated—Crawford's ability and obstinacy—He maintains his position—Skirmish at Alameda—Captain Krautkenberg's gallantry—Skirmish at Villa de Puerco—Colonel Talbot killed—Gallantry of the French Captain Guache—Combat of the Coa—Comparison between General Picton and General Crawford.

In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave, generous and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connection was kept up. Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent of the Junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity of zealously seconding the English General. But in the manner of doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own country, and as he was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always honorable to himself and advantageous to both nations.

It will be remembered that in February, Ney threatened Ciudad Rodrigo at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos, and that Hill advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre. Lord Wellington immediately reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light division across the Coa, to observe the enemy's proceedings. The Portuguese Regency were alarmed, and demanded more British troops;* but Lord Wellington replied that the numbers already fixed would be as great as he could feed, and he took that occasion to point out, that the measures agreed upon with respect to the native forces were neither executed with vigor nor impartiality; and that the carriages and other assistance, required for the support of the British soldiers then in the country, were not supplied. These matters he urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops; and, at the same time, as the Regency, in the hope of rendering him unpopular with the natives, intimated a wish that he should take the punishment of the offenders into his own hands, he informed them that, although he advised the adoption of severe measures, he would not be made the despotic punisher

* Appendix 19, § 1.

of the people, while the actual laws were sufficient for the purpose.

When Ney first appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo, and the second corps under Mermet was at Placentia, Lord Wellington was considerably embarrassed; the French might have passed from Placentia across the Tagus and pushed between Hill and the army in Beira, or even between the latter and Lisbon, seeing that the Portuguese government had with their usual apathy neglected the works projected for opening the road from Thomar to Espinal; and thus, instead of being within three or four marches of the Tagus, Lord Wellington was nine marches distant. He was, therefore, forced to keep a keen watch upon the motions of the second corps, and to have his own troops in hand to withdraw from the frontier, lest the French should suddenly cross the Tagus; for the want of good information was now and for a long time after severely felt. This was in February; but when Del Parque's movement from Gata to Badajos occupied the attention of Mermet,* and that Junot commenced the siege of Astorga, the repairs of the road to Espinal being also in a forward state, his situation was different; the Portuguese army was brought up to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern provinces were ordered to concentrate at Braga to guard the *Tras os Montes*.

Ciudad Rodrigo being soon after seriously menaced, Lord Wellington sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, and transferred his own quarters to Celerico; for he contemplated a sudden incursion into Castile with his whole army, intending to strike at the French magazines in Salamanca. But when he considered the force they had in his front, which could be also reinforced by Kellermann's and Junot's corps, and would therefore be strong enough to defend the Tormes, he relinquished this project, and confined his views to the succor of Ciudad Rodrigo, if occasion should offer without detriment to the general plan of defending Portugal in the lines. The conduct of both the British and the Portuguese governments cramped his exertions. The resources of the country were not brought forward, and the English General could scarcely maintain his actual position, much less advance; and yet the Regency treated his remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera.

Indignant at their conduct, he told them that "their proceedings were evasive and frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public or private interests; that the resources were in the country, could be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England

* See page 317.

was desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and, to be effectual, must begin with the higher classes."* Then, issuing a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omissions of both magistrates and people, and by this vigorous interference procured some immediate relief for his troops.

Meanwhile, General Crawford had commenced a series of remarkable operations with the light division. His three regiments of infantry were singularly fitted for any difficult service; they had been for several years under Sir John Moore, and, being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms, that, in six years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected in their system.

As the enemy's posts on the Agueda rendered it impossible for the light division to remain without cavalry beyond the Coa unless some support was at hand nearer than Guarda or Celerico, Crawford proposed that, while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the fourth division, should take up the line of the Coa. But that General would not quit his own position at Guarda; and Lord Wellington approving, and yet desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view to succor Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the third division to Pinhel; and then reinforcing Crawford with the first German hussars, (four hundred excellent and experienced soldiers,) and with a superb troop of horse-artillery, commanded by Captain Ross, gave him the command of all the outposts, and ordered Picton and Cole to support him, if called upon.

In the middle of March Crawford lined the bank of the Agueda with his hussars, from Escalhon on the left to Navas Frias on the right, a distance of twenty-five miles, following the course of the river. The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between Almeida and the lower Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Concepcion, and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores which soon afterwards arrived, were placed in reserve, making a total of four thousand men and six guns.

The French at this period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and Salamanca, but as they did not occupy the pass of Perales, Carrera's Spanish division being at Coria, was in communication with Crawford, whose line, although extended, was very advantageous. For from Navas Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain, and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at Navas Frias; one at Villar, about a league below the first; one at Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge of Barba del Puerco. While, therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two first bridges which were distant, the troops could always concentrate

* Appendix 19. § 1.

under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a few companies of the ninety-fifth were considered capable of opposing any numbers. This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen; but that river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without apparent reason. When it was fordable, Crawford always withdrew his outposts, and concentrated his division, and his situation demanded a quickness and intelligence in the troops, the like of which has seldom been known. Seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under arms in the middle of the night, and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear; and this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain.

The 19th, General Ferey, a bold officer, desiring either to create a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or thinking to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close to the bridge of San Felices; and, just as the moon, rising behind him, cast long shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom of the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge and, with incredible speed ascending the opposite side, bayoneted the sentries, and fell upon the piquet so fiercely, that friends and enemies went fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great the confusion, that the British companies could not form, but each soldier encountering the nearest enemy, fought hand to hand, and their Colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, urged the contest with such vigor that in a quarter of an hour the French column was borne back and pushed over the edge of the descent.

This skirmish proved that while the Agueda was swollen, the enemy could gain nothing by slight operations; but it was difficult to keep in advance of the Coa, because the want of money had reduced the whole army to straits, and Crawford, notwithstanding his prodigious activity, was unable to feed his division; wherefore, giving the reins to his fiery temper, he seized some church-plate, with a view to the purchasing of corn. For this rash act he was rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed; and fortunately the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned.

When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter end of April, Lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his head-quarters to Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin

Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales ; but being there menaced by Kellermann's troops, he came down in May from the hills to Ituero on the Azava river, and connected his left with the light division, which was then posted at Gallegos Espeja and Barba del Puerco. Crawford and he then agreed that, if attacked, the British should concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and if unable to maintain themselves there, should unite with the Spaniards at Nava d'Aver, and finally retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to Guarda.

It was at this period that Massena's arrival in Spain became known to the allies ; the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak of the Emperor's commanding in person, and all agreed that serious operations would soon commence. No good information could be obtained ; but, as the river continued unfordable, Crawford maintained his position until the end of May, when certain advice of the march of the French battering-train was received through Andreas Herrasti ; and the 1st of June, Ney, descending upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw a bridge on trestles over the Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above, and a few days afterwards, a second at Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. This concentration of the French troops relieved the northern provinces of Portugal from danger ; sixteen regiments of militia were immediately brought down from Braganza to the lower Douro ; provisions came by water to Lamego ; the army was enabled to subsist, and the military horizon began to clear.

The 8th, four thousand French cavalry having crossed the Agueda, Crawford concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village ; and it was at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and when the eye could scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite Marshal Ney to desert !

Nothing could be more critical than Crawford's position. From the Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour's march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close upon the village, while wide plains behind almost precluded hope in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered indeed some security to his left, because the channel of the former river there became a chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side

of the bridge of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, the bank on the enemy's side was highest, and to obtain a good prospect, it was necessary to keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge of Marialva could be turned by a ford below the confluence of the streams.

The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but, as the enemy occupied himself with the raising of redoubts, to secure his bridge at Carboneras, and with other preparations for the siege of Rodrigo, Crawford, trusting to his own admirable arrangements, and to the surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous position. He thus encouraged the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and protected the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy's foraging parties.

On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices and other points, and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to the Douro, were occupied by the French army. The 23d, Julian Sanchez, breaking out of Ciudad, came into Gallegos. The 25th, the French batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the Azava, and Crawford withdrew his outposts to the left bank. The 26th, it was known that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and five hundred wounded; and the 29th a Spaniard, passing the French posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: "*O venir luego! luego! luego! a secorrer esta plaza.*" ("Oh! come, now! now! now! to the succor of this place.") On the 1st of July the gallant old man repeated his "*Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez.*"

Meanwhile, Lord Wellington, still hoping that the enemy, by detaching troops, would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, reinforced Crawford with the 14th and 16th light dragoons, and transferred his own quarters to Alverca, a village half-way between Almeida and Celerico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack, and Romana, quitting Badajos, came to propose a combined movement for carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English General had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of securing Rodrigo; he had, in a manner, pledged himself to make it a point in his own operations; his army was close at hand, the garrison brave and distressed, the governor honorably fulfilling his part. To permit such a place to fall without a blow struck, would be a grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonor to the British arms; the troops desired the enterprise; the Spaniards demanded it, as a proof of good faith; the Portuguese to keep the war away from their own country; finally, policy seemed to call for this effort, lest the world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana

returned without his object. Lord Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade, and thus proved himself a truly great commander, and of a steadfast mind.

It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand men; of these, twelve thousand were with Hill, and one-half of the remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could not, however, be brought into line, because Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, had, at this period, collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops were also crossing the Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged Lord Wellington to detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar, as a reserve; and these and Hill's corps being deducted, not quite twenty-five thousand men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty thousand French veterans. This enterprise would also have taken the army two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from that place: hence, a division must have been left at Guarda, lest Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first.

Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes of using them: 1. In an open advance and battle; 2. In a secret movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view of capturing the battering train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without dwelling on the fact that Massena's information was so good that he knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana's visit, such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the early part of the siege, and certainly not towards the end, when the enemy were on the Azava.*

An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, must have exposed its flanks to the enemy's bridges on the Agueda, because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope then for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers, when eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns should come pouring over the bridges on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry would have followed to the attack? What would even a momentary success have availed? Five thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would have ill supplied the

* Appendix 21.

ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual state of affairs in that country? The militia deserting in crowds to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the General, the measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and advanced to retrieve his honor, and who was to have withstood him?

Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English General, that he was afraid!—that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared to carry him away—that he was a man who, insensible to military honor, permitted his ally's towns to fall without risking a shot to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety failed; Lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. "If thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!"

Ciudad Rodrigo, left to its fate, held out yet a little longer, and meanwhile the enemy pushed infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired to the Dos Casas river; and Crawford, reinforced with the sixteenth and fourteenth light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, and concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear, from whence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida by San Pedro, or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. Obstinate however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks on the rising grounds, in the evening of the 2d of July, and then sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within sight of the enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come up to succor Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days, but on the 4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below the bridge, pushed at full speed towards Gallegos, driving back the piquets; the enemy then passed the river, and the British retired skirmishing upon Alameda, leaving two guns, a troop of the 16th and a troop of German hussars to cover the movement. This rear-guard was scarcely drawn up on a hill half-cannon shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed the road to Alameda, when a column of French horsemen was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as it approached the bridge,

but resolute to pass, and preserving the most perfect order, notwithstanding some well-directed shots from the guns. Captain Krauchenberg, of the hussars, proposed to charge those who first came over, but the English officer did not conceive his orders warranted it, and the gallant German, riding full speed against the head of the advancing columns with his single troop, killed the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from the third caçadores.

This skirmish not being followed up by the enemy, Crawford took a fresh post with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Conception; his cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera's divisions, were disposed higher up on the Dos Casas, and the French withdrew behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their marauding parties, however, entered the villages of Barquillo and Villa de Puerco for three nights successively, and Crawford, thinking to cut them off, formed two ambuscades, one near Villa de Puerco with six squadrons, another of three squadrons near Barquillo; he also placed his artillery, five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at Gallegos, and even in advance of it.

A little after daybreak, on the 11th, two French parties were observed, the one of infantry near Villa de Puerco, the other of cavalry at Barquillo, and the open country on the right would have enabled the six squadrons to get between the infantry in Villa de Puerco and their point of retreat; but this was circuitous, and Crawford preferred pushing straight through a stone inclosure as the shortest road. The inclosure proved difficult, the squadrons were separated, and the French, two hundred strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather steep rise of land, yet so far from the edge as not to be seen until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived galloped in upon them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, but failed; the troopers received the fire of the square in front and on both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French Captain, Guache, and his sergeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully. Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy's cavalry came out of Barquillo, and the two British squadrons having re-formed, rode against it, and made twenty-nine men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile Colonel Talbot, mounting the hill with four squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon Captain Guache; but the latter again opened such a fire, that Talbot himself and fourteen men went down close to the bayonets, and the

stout Frenchman made good his retreat. Crawford then returned to the camp, having had thirty-two troopers, besides the Colonel, killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair.

That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light division, and marching by the pass of Perales, rejoined Romana. Crawford then assumed a fresh position, a mile and a half from Almeida, and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington replied that he would give him two divisions if he could hold his ground, but that he could not do so, and knowing the temper of the man, he repeated his former orders *not to fight beyond the Coa*.

On the 21st, the enemy's cavalry again advanced, Fort Concepcion was blown up, and Crawford fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to cross the Coa, but nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving the whole French army, he had kept with a weak division for three months, within two hours' march of sixty thousand men, appropriating the resources of the plains entirely to himself; and this exploit, only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of sufferance, not real strength, with headstrong ambition, he resolved, in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his General, to fight on the right bank.

The British force under arms now consisted of four thousand infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns, and his position, one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his right was on some broken ground, and his left, resting on an unfinished tower eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant in the bottom of the chasm.

COMBAT OF THE COA.

A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before daylight, expecting to retire, when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy's approach; and as the morning cleared, twenty-four thousand French infantry, five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery were observed in march beyond the Turones. The British line was immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine; but meanwhile Ney, who had observed Crawford's false disposition, came down with the swoop of an eagle. Four thousand

horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain, the allied cavalry gave back, and Loison's division, coming up at a charging pace, made towards the centre and left of the position.

While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes were made on the English side; part of the troops were advanced, others drawn back, and the forty-third regiment most unaccountably placed within an inclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high, situated on the left of the road, about half-musket shot down the ravine, and having but one narrow outlet. While thus imprisoned, the firing in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the *caçadores* successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the ninety-fifth rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A few moments later, and the forty-third would have been surrounded, if here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion officers had not remedied the faults of the General. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful effort burst the inclosure, and the regiment, re-formed in column of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen. There was no room to array the line, no time for anything but battle; every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and joining as he could with the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no regular command, yet each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and left; and all regulating their movements by a common discretion, and keeping together with surprising vigor.

It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns, ranged along the summit, played hotly with grape, and their hussars, galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road sabring everything in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge him on; and indeed, so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment, that only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and as the attack was made without Massena's knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous situation. Falling back slowly, and yet stop-

ping and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in amongst the inclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks.

As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more open space; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded and some of the right wing distant. Major M'Leod of the forty-third, seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the ninety-fifth; and at the same time, two other companies were posted by Brigade Major Rowan on another hill flanking the road. These posts were maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers, made a second burst, when the companies fell back; but at that moment the right wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards the bridge, which was still crowded with the passing troops. M'Leod, a very young man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse round, called to the troops to follow, and taking off his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs, and the enemy's skirmishers, astonished at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover from their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, and M'Leod, following at full speed, also gained the other side without a disaster.

As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose order on the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the summit, and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom; and it was to be apprehended that, while the sixth corps was in front, the reserves, and a division of the eighth corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those places and get between the division and Celerico. The river was, however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat farther.

The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opened a biting fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling fuses of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and

thickly, his columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon was seen to try the depth of the stream above; but two shots from the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcasses, floating between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard. The next instant, the head of a noble column darkened the long narrow bridge, a drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform leaped forward together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the ravine at first deceived the English soldiers' aim, and two-thirds of the passage was won ere a shot had brought down an enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the killed and wounded rolled together, until the heap rose nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than gave back.

The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently answered, and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed and slain; ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was then renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the very foot of the bridge, merely waved his handkerchief and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was this touching appeal unheeded—every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. The impossibility of forcing the passage was, however, become too apparent, and this last effort, made with feebler numbers and less energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced.

Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French as a point of honor, to cover the escape of those who had passed the bridge. By the English, from ignorance of their object. One of the enemy's guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and many continued to fall on both sides until about four o'clock, when a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire, the men amongst the rocks returned, unmolested, to their own party, the fight ceased, and Crawford retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers, were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that Lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, which had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also captured; but that officer kept close until the evening, and

then, with great intelligence, passed all the enemy's posts, and crossing the Coa at a ford, rejoined his regiment.

In this action the French lost above a thousand men, the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold; but Massena claimed to have taken two pieces of artillery, and it was true, for the guns intended to arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, were lying dismounted at the foot of the building. They, however, belonged to the garrison of Almeida, not to the light division. That they were not mounted and the tower garrisoned, was certainly a great negligence; the enemy's cavalry could not otherwise have fallen so dangerously on the left of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have been retarded. In other respects, the governor, severely censured by Crawford, at the time, for not opening his fire sooner and more vigorously, was unblamable; the whole affair had been so mismanaged by the General himself, that friends and enemies were mingled together from the first, and the shots from the fortress would have killed both.

During the fight, General Picton came up alone from Pinhel. Crawford desired the support of the third division; it was refused, and excited by some previous disputes, the Generals separated after a sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly wrong, because Crawford's situation was one of extreme danger; he could not retire, and Massena might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello Bom, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it between the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawford were, however, not formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanor of the first, promised little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of the second; nor did they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command; both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from inferiors; and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory. They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising and intrepid, yet neither was remarkable for skill in handling troops under fire. This also they had in common, that both, after distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting gallantly, and being celebrated as generals of division while living, have, since their death, been injudiciously spoken of as rivalling their great leader in war.

That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and Crawford more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate command, and his opportunities were necessarily more cir-

cumscribed; but to compare either to the Duke of Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended the profound military and political combinations he was then conducting, the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa, and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support.

CHAPTER V.

Slight operations in Galicia, Castile, the Asturias, Estremadura, and Andalusia—Reynier passes the Tagus—Hill makes a parallel movement—Romana spreads his troops over Estremadura—Lord Wellington assembles a reserve at Thomar—Critical situation of Silveira—Captures a Swiss battalion at Puebla de Senabria—Romana's troops defeated at Benvenida—Lasey and Captain Cockburn land troops at Moguer, but are forced to re-embark—Lord Wellington's plan—How thwarted—Siege of Almeida—Allies advance to Frexadus—The magazine of Almeida explodes—Treachery of Bareiros—Town surrenders—The allies withdraw behind the Mondego—Fort of Albuquerque ruined by an explosion—Reynier marches on Sabugal, but returns to Zarza Mayor—Napoleon directs Massena to advance—Description of the country—Erroneous notions of Lord Wellington's views entertained by both armies.

DURING the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast. At the same time Mahi, coming down from the Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army under Toboado Gil occupied Puebla de Senabria, acting in concert with Silveira. Mahi's movements could not be well opposed by either Kellermann or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a strong detachment in Baños, and the troops of the latter were spread over too great an extent of ground; but, when the place fell, the eighth corps, being detached beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions, enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The latter were then driven into the mountains, and Toboado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla Senabria, drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; but Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons at Puebla, fell back to Zamora, and the eighth corps re-occupied the country between the Tormes and the Agueda.

Meanwhile Bonnet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol, on the frontier of Galicia, but returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the expedition to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña; the project of a larger armament, to be directed

against Santander itself, was adopted, and Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and ammunition were sent to him from England, he would clear the plains of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands were complied with; Sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend the naval expeditions against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a serious interruption of the French communications was planned, but never realized.

General Reynier now passed the Tagus with the second corps, but it appears that this movement should have been executed in June, for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the middle of that month; and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia, when Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment, at Los Santos, on the 23d, and Reynier immediately moved to its succor, with one division of infantry and all his cavalry. At this period the insurrection caused by Lascy's expedition to the Ronda, had drawn all the troops of the fifth corps from Seville to that side, the Duke of Aremberg and General Remond had fallen back behind the river Tinto, and Copons had advanced to collect provisions on the Odiel. In this threatening state of affairs, instead of returning to Merida, Reynier endeavored to surprise Imas, at Xeres de los Cavalleros, and failing in that, pushed across the Morena against Ballesteros, and the latter being at Campo Frio, beyond Aracena, and ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save himself by a hasty flight across the frontier of Portugal. Meanwhile, Lascy being beaten in the Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, D'Aremberg and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer, and Reynier, going back to Merida, resumed his design of passing the Tagus. His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected this opportunity of destroying them; but, as it was necessary to cover the operations both from Hill's division which was concentrated at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river, a strong rear-guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and the French division at Baños advanced to Coria to awe the latter.* Reynier then quitting Merida the 10th of July, marched, by Truxillo and Caceres, upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the passage, his rear-guard following on the 16th. This cautious operation saved him from an attack meditated by Hill, who had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the second corps back, with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. The passage of the Tagus being thus effected by the French, General Hill made a parallel movement, which, on his part, only required thirty-six hours; and meanwhile, Lord Wellington assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the command of General

* Plan 11. VOL. II.—Y

Leith, consisting of eight thousand Portuguese and two thousand British infantry, just arrived from England.

Reynier having reached Coria, detached a force, by Perales, upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill, having crossed the Tagus by Villa Velha, was at Castello Branco on the 21st. The two Generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by a strong body of Portuguese cavalry, under General Fane, encamped, with sixteen thousand men and eighteen guns, at Sarzedas, just in front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced guard was in Castello Branco, his horsemen on the line of the Ponçul; and a brigade of Portuguese infantry was posted at Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda, and to cover the Estrada Nova. Behind Hill, Leith occupied the line of the Zezere, and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, were in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus.

Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra, but being repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, divided his forces between Penamacor and Zarza Mayor; he also established a post of one hundred and fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio del Monte; and, by continual movements, rendered it doubtful whether he meant to repass the Tagus, or to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join Massena. Meanwhile, Ballesteros returned to Aracena; Imas to Xeres de los Cavalleros; O'Donnell entered Truxillo, and Carlos de España cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however, soon obliged to concentrate his troops again, for Mortier was on the Guadalquivir, with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the situation of the armies in the beginning of August; but Massena, when assured that Reynier had crossed the Tagus, directed the sixth corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which led, as we have seen, to the combat on the Coa, during which Loison, imagining the governor to be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the English—"that vile people, whose object was to enslave the Portuguese."

Lord Wellington's situation was now critical. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished the French with a place of arms: they might disregard Almeida, and their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of so doing. Massena's dispositions were such as rendered his true designs difficult to be discovered. The sixth corps and the reserve cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida, but, by telegraphic intercourse with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and the heads of the columns pointed towards Celerico. Loison's advanced guard was in Pinhel the day

after Crawford's action; the second corps, divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats, near Alcantara, on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. It was known by an intercepted letter, that Napoleon had ordered Reynier to invade by the line of Abrantes while the fifth corps entered the Alemetejo, and Massena acted by the valley of the Mondego; but as Reynier was by the same letter placed under Massena's command, and the fifth corps was not then in a condition to move against the Alemetejo, no certain notion of the enemy's intention could be formed. The eighth corps and the division of Serras and Kellermann, being between the Tormes and the Esla, might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while the sixth and second corps should hold the allies in check, and this was undoubtedly the surest course; because the taking of Oporto would have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, dispersed the northern militia, opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English General must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he attacked Ney; an unpromising measure, because of the enemy's strength in horse: in fine, although Massena was dilatory, he had one hundred and sixteen thousand men and the initial operations in his power, and Lord Wellington was obliged to wait upon his movements.

The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward, yet to retire at once would have seemed timid; hence Lord Wellington remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although the enemy's posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. The 28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, and the infantry withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, which remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celerico; the other divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the Portuguese troops were a day's march behind. The sick and wounded men were transferred daily to the rear, and the line of retreat kept free from encumbrance. The enemy then made a demonstration towards St. Joa de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but finally retired across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with the garrison on the 3d of August, left the communication with Almeida again free. At the same time, a detachment of Reynier's horse was encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by the Portuguese cavalry and ordenanza with a loss of fifty killed or taken, after which the French withdrew from Penamacor.

On the side of Galicia, Kellermann advanced from Benevente to Castro Contrijo, and detachments from Serras's division penetrated towards Monterey, ordering provisions for ten thousand men on the road to Braganza. Silveira then marched on Senabria, defeated a few of the enemy's cavalry there on the sixth; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and, on the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the moment when Serras, who had foolishly left them there and neglected to succor them in time, was tardily coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were taken, and Silveira, who did not lose a man, thought of giving battle to Serras, but Beresford alarmed at such rashness sent him imperative orders to retreat; an operation he performed by abandoning his rear-guard, which was under the command of Colonel J. Wilson, and which, being closely pressed, was saved by that officer under circumstances of such difficulty that he received the public thanks of the Marshal.

This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect Lord Wellington's counsels, were now less so than before, from the discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a place of arms, with leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he had shown him that Hill's departure greatly augmented the necessity of caution. Nevertheless, Romana joined Ballesteros, and, as their united force amounted to eighteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry besides partidas, the English General immediately foresaw that they would offer battle, be defeated, and lay open the whole frontier of the Alemtejo; he, therefore, directed Hill to send Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance.

Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th, but Romana's advanced guard under Mendizabel had been defeated on the 11th at Benvenida, and having lost six hundred men, was going to lay down its arms, when fortunately Carrera arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged it; the whole then retreated across the Morena, the Monte Molin and Fregenal, but the French pursued and slew or took four hundred more.* The following day Mortier entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. The enemy did not, however, press this advantage, because Lascy with three thousand men from Cadiz, convoyed by Captain Cockburn of the British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven the Duke of Arenberg towards Seville, while Copons drove Remond upon Za-

* Captain Carrol's Despatches.

lamea; and although the French soon rallied and obliged Lasey to re-embark, Mortier was withdrawn towards the Morena, and Romana again advanced to Zafra. This affair at Moguer was very contemptible, but the tumid nature of Cockburn's despatches on the occasion obtained for it a momentary celebrity.

It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier's movements to develop his own plans, for on the day that the latter entered Zafra, the sixth corps formally invested Almeida, and Lord Wellington immediately bringing up the Portuguese, recrossed the Mondego; the British being at Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese at Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this situation, expecting a vigorous defence from Almeida, he had good hopes to delay the enemy for six weeks or two months, when the rains setting in would give him additional advantages in the defence of the country. He had intended to keep the light division on the Cabeça Negro overhanging the bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication with the garrison, or force the French to invest the place with their whole army. Crawford's rashness marred this plan, and he himself was so dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena's tardiness, and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led Lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly forcing the bridge and the fords, and taking the French battering train, or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected and terrible disaster broke his measures.

SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.

This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions, ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered way, was extremely defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some near ground, on the side of the attack, the bottom of the ditch might be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of the town, contained three bomb-proofs, the doors of which were not secure; and with the exception of some damp casemates in one bastion, there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor, and his garrison, composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about four thousand men.*

On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, and in the morning of the 26th (the second parallel being commenced) sixty-five pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries

* Colonel Cox's Narrative.

opened at once. Many houses were soon in flames, and the garrison was unable to extinguish them; the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained, and little military damage was sustained. Towards evening the cannonade slackened on both sides; but just after dark the ground suddenly trembled, the castle, bursting into a thousand pieces, gave vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and only six houses left standing; the stones thrown out hurt forty of the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the governor beat to arms, and, running to the walls, with the help of an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained; but the French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the 27th, two officers appeared at the gates of the town, with a letter from Massena, offering terms.

Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, still hoped that the army would make a movement to relieve him, if he could impose upon the enemy for two or three days; and he was in act of refusing the Prince of Esling's offer, when a mutiny, headed openly by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo Costa, and secretly by José Bareiros, the chief of artillery, who had been for some time in secret correspondence with the French, obliged him to yield. The remainder of the native officers, disturbed by fear, or swayed by the influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose their dishonorable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution to hoist the white flag. The governor, seeing no remedy by force, endeavored to procrastinate, and, being ignorant of Bareiros' treason, sent him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros immediately informed Massena of the true state of the garrison, and never returned; and the final result was a surrender upon agreement that the militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars remain prisoners of war.

While the treaty was pending, and even after the signature of the articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. This act, unjustifiable, and strange because Massena's aide-de-camp, Colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing commenced, was excused, on the ground of an error in the transmission of orders; it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox also asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect

to the militia were violated.* Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that when the garrison, still amounting to three thousand men, perceived the Marquis d'Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under General Pamplona,† and the truth of this account is confirmed by two facts, namely, that the arganil militia were sent in by Massena the next day, and the 24th Portuguese regiment did certainly take service with the enemy in a body.‡ Yet, so easily are men's minds moved by present circumstances, that the greater number deserted again, when they afterwards saw the allied armies.

Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, but De Costa, being tried, was afterwards shot as a traitor, by the orders of Marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited this chastisement, yet the evidence on which he was condemned was an explanatory letter, written to Lord Liverpool by Cox, while a prisoner at Verdun.

The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, and cessation of fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp, but the surrender was first ascertained by Lord Wellington on the 29th, when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position behind the Mondego; and while these things were passing on the Coa, the powder magazine in Albuquerque, being struck with lightning, also exploded and killed four hundred men. Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, now suddenly reached Sabugal the 1st of September; and as the British piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the following day by the horsemen of the sixth corps, the enemy's plans seemed to be ripe for execution. Lord Wellington therefore transferred his quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed his cavalry at that place with posts of observation at Guarda and at Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and, throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved the French projects in obscurity.

Massena experienced considerable difficulty in feeding his forces, and he seemed at first either disinclined to commence the invasion or undecided as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only resisted for ten days, the French army was still behind the Coa, and it would seem

* Justification of Colonel W. Cox.

† Note by Gen. Pelet. *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.*

‡ Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS.

by a second intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, that he expected further inaction. "Lord Wellington," he observed to Massena, "has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on after having *well observed where the blow may be given*. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations. The Emperor is too distant, and the positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you should attack; but it is certain that the utmost force the English can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight thousand men." This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but Napoleon was ignorant how strongly Lord Wellington was thrusting Portugal forward in the press.

Massena had commenced the invasion before these instructions reached him; and to understand his operations it is essential to have a clear idea of the country in which they were conducted. The advanced positions of the allies extended from Almeida over the Sierra de Estrella, by Guarda to Fundao, Sarzedas and Castello Branco; no enemy could penetrate that line unless by force, and a serious attack on any one point was to be the signal for a gradual retreat of the whole, in concentric directions, towards the Lines. But, if Guarda were evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, could move either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate General Hill from Lord Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great as the enemy's perpendicular line of march would be. To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up, a Portuguese brigade was placed in Fundao, and General Leith's corps were stationed at Thomar, between two intrenched positions, which formed the second temporary line of resistance. The first of those positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies to the confluence of that river with the Tagus; the second behind the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella and falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcello closely hugs the left bank of the Alva.

During the spring and summer the Portuguese militia, now forming the second line of Zezere under Leith, had been kept in winter quarters, although with danger to the defence of the country; but the destitute state, with respect to money, in which the English

ministers kept Lord Wellington, prevented him from being able to bring these troops into the field until the last moment.

Hill's line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere has already been noticed, and from that river to the Alva, there was a military road constructed through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country from Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of about sixty miles, is one long defile, lying between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego; and the ridge upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, and encircled by a sweep of the Mondego, closes this defile in front. In like manner the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, closes it in the rear, and the intermediate parts are but a succession of smaller streams and lower ridges. The principal road was repaired and joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was also carried across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between Celerico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable; because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; and the enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra.

Lord Wellington keeping the head of his army one march behind Celerico, in observation of the routes over the Estrella, and his rear close to the Alva, was master of this line of retreat; and as the Mondego was fordable in summer and bridged at several points, he could pass it by a flank movement in a few hours. Now the right bank was also one great defile, lying between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or Caramula. This mountain, stretching with some breaks from the Douro to Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line; and in approaching Coimbra it sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the Sierra de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, and barring the way on the right bank of the Mondego in the same manner that the latter Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover this route to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and crossed by several deep tributaries of the Mondego, the most considerable of which were the Criz and Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage through the Alcoba near Viseu, and that way the French could gain the great road from Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra.

Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point was obviously towards the Estrella, and Lord Wellington kept the mass of his forces there. Massena was ill-acquainted with the military features, and absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras; indeed, so secretly and circumspectly had those works

been carried on, that only vague rumors of their existence reached the bulk of the English army. Nay, the Portuguese government and British envoy, although aware defensive works were constructing, knew not their nature, and imagined, until the last moment, that the intrenchments immediately round Lisbon were the lines! Many British officers laughed at the notion of remaining in Portugal, and the major part supposed the campaign on the frontier to be only a decent cloak to cover the shame of an embarkation. In England the opposition asserted that Lord Wellington would embark; the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it; and the British ministers seem to have entertained the same opinion, for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from Lord Liverpool, were unknown to Lord Wellington, and commenced thus:—"As it is probable that the army will embark in September."

CHAPTER VI.

Third invasion of Portugal—Napoleon's prudence in military affairs vindicated—Massena concentrates his corps—Occupies Guarda—Passes the Mondego—Marches on Viseu—Lord Wellington falls back—Secures Coimbra, passes to the right bank of the Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from Thomar—General Hill anticipates his orders, and by a forced march reaches the Alva—The allied army is thus interposed between the French and Coimbra—Daring action of Colonel Trant—Contemporaneous events in Estremadura and the Condado de Niebla—Romana defeated—Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry under General Madden—Dangerous crisis of affairs—Violence of the Souza faction—An indiscreet letter from an English officer creates great confusion at Oporto—Lord Wellington rebukes the Portuguese Regency—He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to offer battle—Chooses the position of Busaco.

THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

MASSENA'S command extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos; and the number of his troops present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. From these, however, must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, the reserve of Bayonne under General Drouet, nineteen thousand strong, which, organized as a ninth corps, entered Spain in August, and was replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under General Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed seventy thousand; and as every man,

combatant or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a French army, not more than fifty-five thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the eagles. The ninth corps had, however, orders to follow the traces of the Prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid was supplied by sixteen thousand of the Young Guard.

This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care. Here, he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication had been strengthened with three additional fortresses, namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept more than eighty thousand in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of the army destined to make what is technically termed a "point" upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain.

Massena's instructions were to convert Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. But either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult's army from Andalusia, he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot's march in 1807 warned him of the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu.

The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Covilhao to Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the French camp, with a singular ignorance, asserted that the road by Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered the latter town.* The French General, thus deceived, resolved suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days' bread to the soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before General Hill could join Lord Wellington.

In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier's at Guarda, Ney's and the heavy cavalry at Maçal da Chao, and Junot's at Pinhel. By this disposition all three roads were alike menaced, and the allies being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to gain one march; a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra

* Note by General Pelet. Vide *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*, vol. xi.

he was not more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill's distance from that town was longer. To cover the real object with more care, and to keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French General caused Guarda to be seized on the 12th by a detachment, which withdrew again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal.

On the 13th, the allies re-established their post at Guarda; on the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella; at the same time, the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious progress; and having ascertained beyond a doubt that the troops in Guarda were of Reynier's corps, despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva.

On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering the Mondego, and being there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun's horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico, drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço; but there, the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço the road branched off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea, and a French brigade took the latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. This feint was however closely watched, for there is a custom, peculiar to the British army, of sending mounted officers singly to observe the enemy's motions; and such is their habit, they will penetrate through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days on the skirts of his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the true direction of his march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring officers, being close on the left of Reynier's troops during this day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the baggage of a general.

As the French movements were now decided, Lord Wellington directed the first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva; withdrew his heavy cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao, in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred that night to Cea.

The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed

to pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard approached Mongualde. But the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for ten thousand militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigade of Trant, T. Wilson, and Miller, had been collected upon the Douro to harass the enemy's right flank and rear; and Trant, with about three thousand, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra, on both sides the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the mills were destroyed, the ordenanza were in arms, and the helpless population hidden amongst the highest mountains.

On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of Viseu. Pack's Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and General Pakenham, with a brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra to protect it from the enemy's scouting parties. On the 19th, Captain Somers Cocks, a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick men nor stores were left behind; hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital wagons, in one mass, upon the worst road in Portugal.

The allies were now in motion to cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, the truth being known, the third, fourth and light divisions, and the British cavalry passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places; the light division moved to Mortagao in support of Pack; the third and fourth entered the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao, and the horsemen occupied a plain between the light division and Pack's brigade. But the eighth corps pointed towards the valley of the Vouga, and it was still doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main road from Oporto to Coimbra. General Spencer, with the first division, therefore, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva, and General Hill was only one march behind; for having discovered Reynier's movements on the 12th, and at the same time getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed, he, with a ready decision, anticipating Lord Wellington's orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting his troops in motion that evening, reached Espisnal on the 20th. There he was joined by General Lecor, who, with equal vigor and judgment, had brought the Portuguese

brigade, by long marches, from Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy entered Viseu; and although the French horsemen were on the Criz, the bridges had been destroyed by Pack, and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled.

Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from day to day for his artillery, and it was still twenty miles from Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of destroying it. Quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five guns, on the 20th, he surprised a patrol of ten men, from whom he learnt that the convoy was at hand, and that Montbrun's cavalry was close in the rear. Nevertheless, as the defiles were narrow, he charged the head of the escort, and took a hundred prisoners and some baggage. The convoy then fell back, and Trant followed, the ways being so narrow that Montbrun could never come up to the front. At this time a resolute attack would have thrown the French into utter confusion, but the militia were unmanageable; and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men, and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of twelve troopers, the whole got into disorder, wherefore Trant, seeing nothing more was to be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally reach Viseu until the 23d, by which Massena lost two most important days.

While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged to re-embark, and Copons was defeated by General Remond, with the loss of three hundred men, on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville, whereupon Soult sent the fifth corps against him, and he retired, but was beaten at Fuente de Canto on the same day that Copons had been defeated on the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente de Maestre; and the whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden's Portuguese cavalry came up, and charging the pursuers with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida, to Montijo, on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions into

Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the Junta to repair to Valencia d'Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas.

Lord Wellington's anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthagera in pursuit of the Murcian army; a fresh insurrection had broken out in the mountains of Granada, and the castles of Motril and Almunecar were taken. Copons also advanced to the Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he was unable to bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra, a number inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo; because several British regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from England, had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve for the allies of more than five thousand good troops. Wherefore the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres de los Cavalleros and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis glided gently away. To understand its importance, it is necessary to show how increasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original plan of the English General.

The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favorable opportunity to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings. Falsely asserting that the provisions of that fortress had been carried away by the English commissaries, and as falsely pretending that Lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party hypocritically assumed that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the public despondency.* They vehemently insisted, also, on a defence of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, endeavored to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction on to the staff of Marshal Beresford, that they might the more readily embarrass the operations;† and even proposed to have the fleet and transports sent away from the Tagus! Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to increase the growing confusion. When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted that Massena was advancing in front with a hundred thousand French; and that eighty thousand more were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being made public, created

* Appendix 19, § 2. † Mr. Stuart's Papers; MS.

such a panic amongst the English merchants, that one and all they applied for ships to carry their families and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the commotion. To dry this source of mischief, Lord Wellington issued proclamations; and in the orders of the day, declared that he would not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any repetition of such hurtful conduct.

To the Regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and severe manner: he reproved them for the false coloring given to his communications; and informed them that he would never "*permit public clamor and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the only one likely to produce a good end.*" This remonstrance only increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct, that, before Lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell them "*their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his own government to withdraw the British army.*"

Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful, that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the lines, still contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing winter; and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to attempt a removal of their property.

Lord Wellington could but choose, then, between stopping the invaders on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated. But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of moral strength he was enabled to call forth; and he would have had to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent commander, his rear-guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to save them from famine; but where the violent and powerful faction in the Regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame the people's minds: and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion to show, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to fight, although Massena had seventy thousand veterans, and Lord Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more than half of whom were untried soldiers.

The consequences of such a battle were not however to be estimated by the result on the field. The French General might indeed

gain everything by a victory ; but if defeated, his powerful cavalry and the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent it from being very injurious ; or a serious check might induce him to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English General's resources could not be much improved ; and it was very doubtful if either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense.

Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon their General. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of the great road from Oporto ; the light division at Mortagao watching the road from Viseu ; and the remainder of the army was in reserve ready to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, Lord Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de Busaco for his position of battle.

This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the Mondego, and on the left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication ; and at Peña Cova, just behind the right-hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murcella ridge, behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for defence. The artillery of the allies, fixed on certain points, could play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit suitable for a small body of cavalry. But neither guns nor horsemen of the enemy had a fair field ; their infantry were to contend with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also unfavorable to an attacking army.

After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a wide order of battle, to Mortagao, but then a succession of ascending ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last by a chasm, so profound that the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that twelve-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boy-

alva, a village situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St. Antonio de Cantara; and a third, which was a branch from the second, followed the Mondego to Peña Cova.

When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed their fears that Massena would not assail it. "*But, if he does, I shall beat him,*" was the reply of the English General. He was well assured that the Prince would attack; for his advanced guard was already over the Criz, the second and sixth corps were in mass on the other side of that river; and it was improbable that so celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, make a retrograde movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna's and Panplona's false reports as to the nature of the country in his front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him.

CHAPTER VII.

General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao—Remarkable panic in the light division—The second and sixth corps arrive in front of Busaco—Ney and Reynier desire to attack, but Massena delays—The eighth corps and the cavalry arrive—Battle of Busaco—Massena turns the right of the allies—Lord Wellington falls back, and orders the northern militia to close on the French rear—Cavalry skirmish on the Mondego—Coimbra evacuated, dreadful scene there—Disorders in the army—Lord Wellington's firmness contrasted with Massena's indolence—Observations.

GENERAL PACK, on the 22d, destroyed the bridges over the Criz, and fell back upon the light division; but, the 23d, the enemy re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry were retained there by Lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth divisions to take their ground on the position, the former at St. Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. The light division, falling back only a league, then encamped in a pine wood,

where happened one of those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, were attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near, no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a phrensy, started from sleep and dispersed in every direction; nor was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror, until some persons called out that the enemy's cavalry were amongst them, when the soldiers mechanically ran together in masses, and the illusion was instantly dissipated.

The 24th, the enemy skirmished with the piquets in front of Mortagao; the light division, retiring four miles, occupied very strong ground, and in the evening, some of the enemy's cavalry approaching too close, were charged by a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, and overthrown with the loss of twenty or thirty men.

Early on the 25th, Crawford moved down from his strong post to the front, and appeared somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa. The enemy's cavalry were gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry columns were plainly descried on the tableland above Mortagao, coming on abreast, and with a most impetuous pace, while heavy clouds of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed that the whole French army had passed the Criz, and was in full march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging pistol-shots, when Lord Wellington arriving, ordered the division to retire, and taking the personal direction, covered the retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-fifth, the cavalry, and Ross's troop of horse artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose, for the enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both infantry and guns, and fell on so briskly that all the skill of the General and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear-guard, could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a sharp cannonade, and an hour's march brought everything back in good order to the great position; but almost at the same moment, the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the sixth corps, the French batteries opened as the English troops mounted the steep ascent on which the convent was situated, and Reynier, taking the left-hand route, along which a Portuguese battalion had retired, also arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third division. Before three o'clock, forty thousand French infantry were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath.

Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any

strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that a great part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another, with that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up of unknown ground. He therefore desired to make an early and powerful attack; but the Prince of Esling was at Mortagao, ten miles in the rear, and an aide-de-camp despatched to inform him of the state of affairs, after attending two hours for an audience, was (as I have been informed) told that everything must await Massena's arrival. Thus a most favorable opportunity was lost; for the first division of the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge, Leith's troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing the Mondego, and Hill was still behind the Alva. Scarcely twenty-five thousand men were actually in line, and there were great intervals between the divisions.

Reynier coincided with Ney, and they wrote in concert to Massena on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack. The Prince of Esling, however, did not reach the field until twelve o'clock.* He brought with him the eighth corps, with which and the cavalry he formed a reserve connecting the sixth and second corps, and then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded carefully to examine the position from left to right.

But the situation of the allies was now greatly changed. Hill's corps, having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over the Sierra to Peña Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve; Picton with the third division, supported by Champlemond's Portuguese brigade, was next to Leith; and Spencer with the first division occupied the highest part of the ridge, being between Picton and the convent. The fourth division closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, one heavy regiment only being kept in reserve on the summit of the sierra. Pack's brigade and some other Portuguese troops formed a sort of advanced guard to the first division, being posted half-way down the mountain. On their left, the light division, supported by a German brigade, occupied a tongue of land jutting out nearly half a mile in front of, and lower than the convent, the space between being scooped like the hollow of a wave before it breaks. Along the whole of the front skirmishers were thrown out on the mountain side, and about fifty pieces of artillery were disposed upon the salient points.

Ney was averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but Massena resolved to attempt carrying the position. Reynier thought that he had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies; and the Prince, whether partaking of this error, or confident in the

* Appendix 21, § 8.

valor of his army, directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps, the cavalry and the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack, the light troops, dropping by twos and threes into the lowest part of the valley, endeavored in the evening to steal up the wooded dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the piquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and caçadores checked this proceeding, but similar attempts made with more or less success at different points of the position, seemed to indicate a night attack, and excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it otherwise, none but veterans tired of war could have slept, for the weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses rising on either side were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered.

BATTLE OF BUSACO.*

Before daybreak on the 27th, the French formed five columns of attack; three under Ney, opposite to the convent, and two under Reynier at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three miles asunder. Reynier's troops had comparatively easier ground before them, and were in the midst of the piquets and skirmishers of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to be in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and six guns played along the ascent with grape, but in less than half an hour the French were close upon the summit; so swiftly and with such astonishing power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing everything that opposed their progress. The right of the third division was forced back; the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces, and the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions immediately established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, and a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit of the sierra; but at that moment Lord Wellington caused two guns to open with grape upon their flank, a heavy musketry was still poured into their front, and in a little time the forty-fifth and the eighty-eighth regiments charged so furiously that even fresh men could not have withstood them. The French, quite spent with their previous efforts, only opened a straggling fire, and both parties, mingling together, went down the mountain side with a mighty clamor and confusion. The dead and dying strewed the way even to the bottom of the valley.

Meanwhile the French who first gained the crest had re-formed their ranks with the right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse side of the sierra; thus the position was in fact gained if

* See Plan, p. 398.

any reserve had been at hand, for the greatest part of the third division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged, and a misty cloud capped the summit so that the enemy, thus ensconced amongst the rocks, could not be seen except by General Leith. That officer had put his first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he was now coming on rapidly ; but he had two miles of rugged ground to pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping the royals in reserve, he directed the thirty-eighth to turn the right of the French, and as the precipice prevented this, Colonel Cameron of the ninth, who had been informed by a staff-officer of the critical state of affairs, formed his regiment in line under a violent fire, and without returning a single shot ran in upon and drove the grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached, and yet with excellent discipline refraining from pursuit lest the crest of the position should be again lost, for the mountain was so rugged that it was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action. The victory was, however, secure. Hill's corps edged in towards the scene of action. Leith's second brigade joined the first, and a great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight.

Ney's attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper and more difficult than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawford, in a happy mood of command, had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third and fifty-second regiments, drawn up in line ; and a quarter of a mile behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, a brigade of German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments, some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures, in which the guns of the division were placed, and the whole face of the hill was planted with the skirmishers of the rifle corps and of the two Portuguese caçadore battalions.

While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry was heard in the deep hollows separating the armies, and when the light broke, three divisions of the sixth corps were observed entering the woods below and throwing forward a profusion of skirmishers ; soon afterwards Marchand's division emerging from the hollow, took the main road, as if to turn the right of the light division, Loison's

made straight up the face of the mountain in front, and the third remained in reserve.

General Simon's brigade, which led Loison's attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never disturbed, nor its speed in the least abated. Ross's guns were worked with incredible quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, and the enemy's shot came singing up in a sharper key, until the skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent, the artillery suddenly drew back, and the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit. Crawford, who standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching the progress of this attack, then turned, and in a quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge! the next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and eighteen hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They could do no more! The head of their column was violently overturned and driven upon the rear, both flanks were lapped over by the English wings, and three terrible discharges at five yards' distance completed the rout. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses and broken arms indicated the line of retreat. The main body of the British stood fast; but several companies followed the pursuit down the mountain, until Ney moving forward his reserve, and opening his guns from the opposite height, killed some men, and thus warned the rest to recover their own ground. The German brigade then spread over the hill, and the light division resumed its original position.

Loison showed no disposition to renew the attack, but Marchand's people, who had followed the main road, broke into several masses, gained a pine wood half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of their skirmishers against the highest part, at the very moment that Simon was defeated. Such, however, was the difficulty of ascending, that the Portuguese troops alone held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher up, Spencer showed a line of the royal guards, which forbade any hope of success. From the salient point of land occupied by the light division, Crawford's artillery also took the main body of the French in the wood, in flank; and Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous fire for an hour, relinquished the attack. The desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two o'clock, Crawford having

assented to a momentary truce, parties of both armies were mixed amicably together searching for the wounded men.

Towards evening, however, a French company having, with signal audacity, seized a village within half-musket shot of the light division, refused to retire, which so incensed Crawford that, turning twelve guns on the village, he overwhelmed it with bullets for half an hour. After paying the French captain this distinguished honor, the English General recovering his temper, sent a company of the forty-third down, which cleared the village in a few minutes. Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age, and very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain and driving an ass, loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her.

In this battle of Busaco, the French, after astonishing efforts of valor, were repulsed, in the manner to be expected from the strength of the ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them; and their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was great. General Grain-d'orge and about eight hundred men were slain; Generals Foy and Merle wounded; General Simon was made prisoner. The whole loss sustained may be estimated at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies did not exceed thirteen hundred, because the musketry and artillery of the latter were brought into full activity, whereas the French sought to gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire.

Massena now judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and to turn it by the Mondego impossible, as the allies could pass that river quicker than himself; but a peasant informed him of the road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula to Boyalva, and he resolved to turn Lord Wellington's left. To cover this movement the skirmishing was renewed with such vigor on the 28th, that a general battle was for some time expected. Yet an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the throwing up of intrenchments on the hill covering the roads to Mortagao plainly indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not until evening when the enemy's masses in front being sensibly diminished, and his cavalry descried winding over the distant mountains, that the project became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the Mondego, and re-

tired by Espinhal upon Thomar, while the centre and left of the army defiled in the night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this manner Busaco was evacuated before the 29th; the guns followed the convent road, and the light division furnished the rear-guard until they passed Fornos, where the open country enabled the cavalry to relieve them.

Massena's scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it has been erroneously asserted that Trant's absence from Sardao alone enabled the French General to execute his design. Trant was however at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva, before one o'clock on the 28th; but having, through a mistake of Baccellar's, marched from Lamego by the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could bring only fifteen hundred militia into line. Hence his absence or presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had, as Lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself. Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British horse, on the 29th cut off one of his patrols, and the next morning drove him, with the loss of twenty men, behind the Vouga.

When Massena's main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city, commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condeixa and Pombal. The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from Raiva de Peña Cova to Figueras, were then embarked at Peniché; the light division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the Mondego; and Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern provinces upon the Vouga. The foolish policy of the native government now became evident; notwithstanding the proclamations, and the urgent, and even menacing remonstrances of the English General, the Portuguese Regency had not wasted the country behind the Mondego. During the few days that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, only the richest inhabitants had quitted Coimbra; when the allied army retreated, that city was still populous, and when the approach of the enemy left no choice but to fly or to risk the punishment of death and infamy announced in the proclamation, so direful a scene of distress ensued, that the most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers, with children of all ages, the old, the sick, the bed-ridden, and even lunatics, went or were carried forth, the most part with little hope and less help, to journey for days in company with contending armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the most deplorable manner. And,

notwithstanding all this misery, the object was not gained; the people fled, but the provisions were left, and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined.

On the first of October, the outposts were attacked and driven from the hills bounding the plain of Coimbra to the north. The French, on entering this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the British cavalry was drawn up in line, but with no serious intention of fighting, and was soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet somewhat unskilfully, for the French, following briskly, cut down some men, even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented from forcing the passage by a strong skirmish, in which fifty or sixty men fell.

This scrambling affair obliged the light division to march hastily through the city to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at the end of the bridge; all the inhabitants who had not before quitted the place then rushed out, each with what could be caught up in the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with sick people or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the press was so great that the troops halted for a few moments, just under the prison; the jailor had fled with the keys; the prisoners, crowding to the windows, were endeavoring to tear down the bars with their hands, and even with their teeth, and bellowing in the most frantic manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, and the pistol shots of the cavalry engaged at the ford below were distinctly heard.

Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawford's staff, burst the prison doors and released the wretched inmates, and the troops forced their way over the bridge; but at the other end, the up-hill road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion; and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the division, wedged in as it was, in a hollow way, and totally incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side. At last, some of the infantry opened a passage to the right, and by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns; but it was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria.

Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions abundant; nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were plundered by the troops and camp-followers; at Condeixa

a magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat, was destroyed, or abandoned to the enemy; and, while the streets were flowing ankle deep with rum, the light division and Pack's Portuguese brigade, at the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor!

Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong band. Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot, and some regiments whose discipline was more tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine weather and the enemy's inactivity, restored order amongst the allies, while Massena's conduct, the reverse of the English General's, introduced the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French General permitted such waste that in a few days resources were dissipated which, under good arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months; and, during this licentious delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous flank march to Boyalva was lost.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. *"Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike."* This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon's letter of service, forms the test by which the Prince of Esling's operations should be judged.

2. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celerico, by the route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French General did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the tenth day after passing the Pinhel. This was not "*a vigorous attack.*"

3. Massena should have brought the allies to action in a forward position; and he might have done so either when Almeida fell, or before that event, because the complement of mules for the service of the army not being then full, the commissariat was dependent upon the country carts, and when the first retrograde movement took place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, producing infinite confusion in the rear. The Commissary-General Kennedy contrived, indeed, to procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but, intermediately, a brisk advance of the enemy would have forced the English General to fight, or retire more hastily than would have beseeemed his reputation, or suited his political position.

4. If the Prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that the line his adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and

jealously guarded, was more likely to afford advantages, than the circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The French General, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having the stronger and more movable army, should have followed closely.

A rapid pursuit through Celerico would have brought the French army on to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have joined Lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought with half his own army, or he must have retreated to the lines. If he offered battle with so few troops, his position could be turned either by the right or left; on the left, by the slopes of the Estrella; on the right, by crossing the Mondego, for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu being the longest and least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the difficulties of the way; and to gain Coimbra and force the allies to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects more readily to be attained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike was therefore not "*well considered*," and it is clear that Massena did not rightly estimate the greatness of his enterprise.

5. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with bayonets first rose on the Prince of Esling's view, two fresh questions were to be solved. Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until better combinations could be made? The last question has been already discussed; but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the conception; and the march by which that position was finally turned, a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military view, the English General may be censured for not punishing his adversary's rashness.

With respect to the attack, sixty-five thousand French veterans had no reason to believe that fifty thousand mixed and inexperienced troops, distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were impregvably posted. It would have been no overweening presumption in the French General to expect, that three corps well disposed, supported by a numerous artillery, and led on the first day, (as Ney desired,) might carry some part of the position, and it is an error, also, to suppose that guns could not have been used: the light division were constantly within range, and thirty pieces of artillery employed on that point would have wonderfully aided the attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle

in a position, makes his attacks without connection, and without artillery, and brings forward no reserve, success is impossible even with the valiant soldiers Massena commanded.

6. "*An army should always be in condition to fight.*"

"*A general should never abandon one line of communication without establishing another.*"

"*Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious.*"

These maxims of Napoleon, the greatest of all generals, have been illustrated by many examples: Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, Salamanca, attest their value. Now, Massena violated all three by his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances or desperate crisis of affairs should be shown, to warrant such a departure from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another art, says, "*genius begins where rules end.*" But here genius was dormant, and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate game. The conquest of Oporto was open to him, so was a march by Viseu upon the Vouga, which, though demanding time, was safe; in going by Boyalva, he threw his whole army into a single and narrow defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position; and that also (as I have been informed by an officer of Marshal Ney's staff) with much disorder: the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and sick, the artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed together; discord raging amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers, and in the night season when every difficulty is doubled. His "*army was not, then, in a condition to fight.*" He was making "*a flank march within reach of an enemy in position,*" and he was "*abandoning his line of communication without having established another.*"

7. Lord Wellington was within four hours' march of either end of the defile through which the French army was moving. He might have sent the first division and the cavalry (forming, with Portuguese regular troops, and Trant's militia, a mass of twelve or fourteen thousand men) to Sardao, to head the French in the defile, while the second, third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Mortagao, assailed the rear. That he did not do so, is to be attributed to his political position. His mixed and inexperienced army was not easily handled; war is full of mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was more critically dangerous than such an attack would have been, and in a military view the battle of Busaco should not have been fought: it was extraneous to his original plan, it was forced upon him by events, and was in fine a political battle.

8. Massena's march, being unopposed, was successful. The allied army could not cope with him in the open country between Busaco and the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field; hence Lord Wellington, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra and Espinhal roads. But the Prince of Esling was at Avelans de Cima and Milheada on the 30th; the allied cavalry and the right division being still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in many places below Coimbra. Had the French General, directing his march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly on to Leiria, by the route Sir Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808, against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut: terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the Patriarch's faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must have been risked before the lines could be reached.

9. When the allies had gained Leiria, and secured their line of retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French General's hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra; employed the ninth corps to seize Oporto; secured his line of communication with that city and with Almeida by fortified posts; and afterwards, extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south, not only would the campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary's political and military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and hailed the renewed advance of the French army, which like the rising of a heavy cloud discovered a clear horizon beneath.

Even at Coimbra, the Prince was unacquainted with the existence of the lines, and believed that, beyond Santarem, the country was open for the usage of all arms.* It is strange that, when Junot, Loison, Foy, and many other officers, who had served in Portugal, were present, better information was not obtained; but every part of this campaign illustrated Massena's character, as drawn by Napoleon:—"Brave, decided, and intrepid; dull in conversation, but in danger acquiring clearness and force of thought; ambitious, filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless of good administration, and consequently disliked by the troops; his dispositions for battle bad, but his temper pertinacious to the last degree; he was never discouraged!"

10. It appears that the French reached Coimbra at the moment when the fourteen days' bread, carried by the soldiers, was exhausted, and it is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to carry so much bread. Other nations, especially the English, would not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient

* Appendix 21, § 2.

Romans, and it ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous discipline and well-confirmed military habits; but, without it, men are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. The secret of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted, by previous habits, for military service, instead of being stretched as it were upon the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no resource but fear.

CHAPTER VIII.

Massena resumes his march—The militia close upon his rear—Cavalry skirmish near Leiria—Allies retreat upon the lines—Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra—The French army continues its march—Cavalry skirmish at Rio Mayor—General Crawford is surprised at Alemquer, and retreats by the wrong road—Dangerous results of this error—Description of the lines of Torres Vedras—Massena arrives in front of them—Romana reinforces Lord Wellington with two Spanish divisions—Remarkable works executed by the light division at Aruda—The skirmish at Sobral—General Harvey wounded—General St. Croix killed—Massena takes a permanent position in front of the lines—He is harassed on the rear and flanks by the British cavalry and the Portuguese militia.

FROM the 1st until the 3d, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the Prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida.

On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English piquets from Pombal, and the next morning pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to create some confusion. The road was however crossed at right angles by a succession of parallel ravines, and Captain Somers Cocks, taking advantage of one, charged the head of the enemy, and checked him until General Anson's brigade of cavalry, and Captain Bull's troop of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three columns, endeavored to bear down the British with the centre, while the others turned the flanks. The ravines were difficult to pass; Bull's artillery played well into the

principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the right by Thomar and Santarem; the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor; the left by Alcobaça and Obidos; and at the same time a native force, under Colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as daring and hardy as any performed by a partisan officer during the war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion to its base.

SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.

Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to unite with Miller and J. Wilson, the latter having made a forced march for that purpose, but they were still distant, his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, and he resolved to attack the French in that city without waiting for assistance. Having surprised a small post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, the enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance, and the convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion. Thus, on the third day after the Prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his dépôts and hospitals, and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, and picked up about three hundred more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto.

During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence on the prisoners, and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his uniform by encouraging this conduct, whereas his exertions repressed it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to Colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands.*

This disaster made no change in Massena's dispositions. He continued his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry piquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded

* Appendix 22.

the brigade, took no heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have taken the battery of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, and, finally, the British retreated.

Meanwhile the allied army was entering the lines—the first, fourth, and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill's corps on the right by Alhandra. The light division and Pack's brigade should also have entered by Aruda. But Crawford, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there at three o'clock p. m. on the 10th; and the weather being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of marching was given by the General. He knew that all the cavalry had already filed into the lines, yet he posted no guards, sent no patrols forward, and took no precaution against a surprise, although the town, situated in a deep ravine, was peculiarly exposed to such a disaster.

Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and, about four o'clock, observed some French dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon-shot. The alarm was instantly given, and the regiments got under arms; but the principal post of assembly had been marked on an open space, very much exposed to an enemy's guns, and from whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the mountain behind. The numbers of French increased every moment, they endeavored to create a belief that their artillery was come up, and although this feint was easily seen through, the General desired the regiments to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun range. In a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the first confusion had abated.

Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy's infantry descending the heights, endeavored, some to turn the town on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets in pursuit; and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear skirmishing, and night falling, Crawford commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained;

yet so uncertain is everything in war, that this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter.

The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the dark to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of the lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. In this state, the cavalry patrols from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was cut off; a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy's scouts on that side. This information alarmed General Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; he therefore made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas, according to circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained Alhandra before daylight on the 11th.

During this time the second and the eighth corps passed Alemquer, the former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier's movements on the French left were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of Alhandra, and his piquets did not enter Villa Franca until late the next day. But on the right General Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in the French army, coming upon Sobral, in the dusk, with the head of the eighth corps, dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some intrenchments close under the centre of the allies' position.

It is, however, time to give a more detailed description of those celebrated works, improperly called

THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

It has been already said, that they consisted of three distinct ranges of defence.*

The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine miles long.

The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.

* Memoranda of the Lines, &c., by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal Engineers, printed for private circulation.

The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from Passo d'Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand yards, inclosed an intrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather; within this second camp, Fort St. Julian's (whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army.

The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these works at Passo d'Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the embarkation.

Of these stupendous lines, the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal; the others were only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labor and from the fall of rain, that Lord Wellington resolved to abide his opponent's charge there.

The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into five parts, or positions, shall be described in succession from right to left.

1. *From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix.* This distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge, defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions under General Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun-boats, manned by British seamen.

2. *From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pe de Monte.* This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here, and the defence of the ground was intrusted to General Crawford and the light division.

3. *The Monte Agraça.* This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated from the Aruda position by a deep ravine which led to

nothing; the left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira; the centre overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around it. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack's brigade; and on the reverse of the position, which might be about four miles in length, the fifth division, under General Leith, was posted in reserve.

4. *From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras.* This position, seven miles long, was at first without works; because it was only when the rains had set in, that the resolution to defend the first line permanently was adopted. But the ground being rough and well defined, the valley in front deep, and watered by the Zizandre, now become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted, under the immediate command of Lord Wellington himself, whose head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the lines.

5. *From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre.* The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt mounting forty guns; secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the foot of the hills, ran along the whole front; that is, from Torres Vedras, by Ruña Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra.

This was the nature of the *first* line of defence; the *second* was still more formidable.

1. *From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra.* In this distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially scarped, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cinta.

2. *On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of Mafra.* Here there was some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labor and care

well considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of above; in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.

3. *From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas.* In this space of ten or twelve miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça or head of which is in the centre of, and overtopping all the other mountain masses. A road, conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front; and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right, must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches, and both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad mule road that led over them.

4. *From Bucellas to the low ground about the Tagus.* The pass of Bucellas was difficult, and strongly defended by redoubts on each side. A ridge, or rather a collection of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretched to the right for two miles without a break, and then died away by gradual slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts with the heights of Alhandra; but it was the weakest part of the whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.

There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the *first line* of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the *second line*, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favorable fighting

positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. Those were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the *first line* would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the *second and stronger line*, and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck carriages, and consequently immovable and useless to the enemy.

The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works. The movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass was commanded by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra, although not impassable, was difficult, and the movement, which would require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And this could be done with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by the engineers to all important points of the lines, and a system of signals was established, by which orders were transmitted from the centre to the extremities in a few minutes.

Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting the *Lines*; too little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works more in keeping with ancient than modern military labors; partly that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that Lord Wellington's measures of defence were not, as some French military writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position.

To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty forts, and to work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, and the militia and ordenanza of Estremadura furnished, all together, a powerful reserve. The native artillery and the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, and most of those on the first line. The British

marines occupied the third line; the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and aided, in various ways, the operations in the field. The recruits from the *dépôts*, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire to see in a dangerous crisis.

It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the appearance of strength; and Lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the latter joined the allies with two divisions. Yet the English General did not act thus, until he was assured that Massena's force was insufficient to drive the British from Lisbon. He felt that it would have been dishonest to draw Romana's troops into a corner, where they could not (from want of shipping) have escaped in the event of failure. The first division of Spaniards, led by Romana himself, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega the 19th, and the 24th was posted at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça; the other followed in a few days; and thus before the end of October, not less than one hundred and thirty thousand fighting men received rations within the lines; more than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely disposable and unfettered by the works.

Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army, reinforced by Madden's Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. Ballesteros at the same time moved upon Aracena; and Mortier, ignorant of Romana's absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, to be near Soult who was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined with the dispositions of the English General, to widen the distance, and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most important point.

Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights of Alhandra he judged inattackable; but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn Hill's position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the second line; yet the abattis and redoubts erected and hourly strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; the nature of the ground about Aruda also was such that he could not ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to oblige Crawford to show his force.

That General, by making the town of Aruda an advanced post, had rendered it impossible to discover his true situation without a serious affair; and, in an incredibly short space of time, the division with prodigious labor had secured the position in a manner really worthy of admiration. For across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, sixteen feet thick and forty feet high, was raised; and across the great valley of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts, dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed, so that no human strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence could easily have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men.

The next points that drew Massena's attention were the Monte Agraça and the vale of the upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period at which Lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first line, no outworks had been constructed; neither the valley of Zibreira, nor the hills above Ruña, had been fortified. Here it was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill's corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come into action.

Beyond Ruña, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras forbade any flank movement by the French General; and it only remained for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest points of the lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended its right along some open ground as far as Aruda; and being covered at that point by a force of cavalry, was connected with the eighth corps, the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre as far as Duas Portas on the road to Ruña; the outposts of each army being there nearly in contact.

Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond Otta, and his dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially near

Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, where, attempting to dislodge the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his troops were repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which were held until evening; and only evacuated because the whole of the eighth corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted to one hundred and fifty, of which the greatest part fell at Sobral; that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English General Harvey was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed the French General St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and promise.

The war was now reduced to a species of blockade. Massena's object was to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; Lord Wellington's to starve the French before succor could arrive. The former spread his movable columns in the rear to seek for provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his principal dépôt was established; but the latter drew down all the militia and ordenanza of the north upon Massena's rear, putting them in communication with the garrison of Peniché on one side, and on the other with the militia of Lower Beira. Carlos d'España also crossing the Tagus, acted between Castello Branco and Abrantes. Thus the French were completely inclosed without any weakening of the regular army.

To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia of the north, Obidos, surrounded by old walls, had been put in a state of defence; but the Portuguese government having neglected to furnish it with provisions, it had been evacuated. Nevertheless, Major Fenwick again occupied it temporarily with three hundred militia, and being supported by a Spanish battalion and by a strong detachment of British cavalry posted at Ramalhal, hemmed in the French on that side; and a movable column under Colonel Waters, issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy's marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable quantities.

Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet, although Massena's right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington had four British divisions and Romana's corps, forming a mass of twenty-five thousand men close round Sobral; and, by directing the greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions at Bucellas upon Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten thousand men there also; these last, advancing a short distance into the plain,

could, in conjunction with Hill, have kept the second corps in check, while the twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraça, from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps long before the sixth could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious and complicated web! and while the purely military part was thus happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness and alarm. Scarcely could the English General maintain a defensive attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their "earnest and manly co-operation."*

CHAPTER IX.

State of Lisbon—Embargo on the vessels in the river—Factional conduct of the Patriarch—The desponding letters from the army—Base policy of ministers—Alarm of Lord Liverpool—Lord Wellington displays the greatest firmness, vigor, and dignity of mind—He rebukes the Portuguese Regency, and exposes the duplicity and presumption of the Patriarch's faction—Violence of this faction—Curious revelation made by Baron Eben and the editor of the *Braziliense*—Lord Wellesley awes the Court of Rio Janeiro—Strengthens the authority of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart—The French seize the islands in the river—Foolish conduct of the governor of Setuval—General Fane lent to the left bank of the Tagus—Lord Wellington's embarrassments become more serious—The heights of Almada fortified—Violent altercation of the Regency upon this subject—The Patriarch insults Mr. Stuart and nearly ruins the common cause.

THE presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed the finances, and the Regency applied to England for an additional subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself to direct the house of Sampaio to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving.† Corn, to be purchased at any price, was sought for in all countries, from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade with Spain through the Alemtejo.

See *Annals of the Peninsular War*, Vol. II. p. 331.
Mr. Stuart's Papers, MS.

Small craft were sent up the Tagus to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands, and from the left bank; and post-vessels were established along the coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war; a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of Lisbon; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an imperious necessity ruled.

All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his faction; and that nothing might be wanting to show how entirely the fate of the Peninsula depended in that hour upon Lord Wellington's firmness, the fears of the British Cabinet, which had been increasing as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. Their private letters contained hints at variance with their public despatches. They evidently wished their General to abandon the country, but threw the responsibility upon him; they were unable to comprehend his genius; they thought him rash, and were themselves unequal to the crisis. They had not the manliness either to resign the contest or to carry it on with vigor, and cast their base policy with a view only to their own escape in case of failure. During the retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their feelings; the letters of General Spencer and General Charles Stewart appeared so desponding to Lord Liverpool, that he transmitted them to Lord Wellington, and by earnestly demanding an opinion upon their contents, showed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind.

Thus beset on every side, the English General rose like a giant. Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these letters, he took a calm historical review of the circumstances which had induced him to defend Portugal, and which he had before explained to the very minister he was addressing; then showing that, up to that period, his opinions had been in every instance justified by the results, he assumed that it was reasonable to confide in his judgment for the future. Having thus vindicated his prudence and foresight, he traced out the probable course of coming events, discussing both his own and the enemy's designs, and that with such sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other records of Lord Wellington's genius to be lost, it would alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity.

Having with conscious superiority replied to his own govern-

ment, he, with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the Patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly that they were unfaithful servants of their country and their Prince; and threatened to *withdraw the British army altogether*, if the practices of which he complained were not amended.*

"The King of England and the Prince Regent of Portugal had, he said, "intrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he would not alter his plans to meet the *senseless suggestions of the Regency*. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil." "With Principal Souza," he said, "it was not possible to act, and if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either the Principal or himself must quit their employments; if himself, he would take care that the world should know the reasons; meanwhile he would address the Prince upon the conduct of the Regency."

"He had hoped," he resumed in another letter, "that the Portuguese government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of endeavoring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure the tranquillity of that capital. But, like other weak individuals, they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own troops while employed in the lines, and to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and their families who were obnoxious to the enemy." "I have," he said, "little doubt of final success, but *I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain, even with the best arrangements.*"

These reproaches were neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to show the justice of Lord Wellington's complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of those intrigues which have been before touched upon. Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed that the struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they should have been removing the people and the provisions from the line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon the General, although they knew that he

* Appendix 19, § 4, 8.

was ignorant even of the names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders.

When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves, but made the execution referable to the General, without his knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy's advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, had alone enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were addressed. But it was the object of the Regency, by nourishing and soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from the odium; he avowed in his proclamations, that he was the author of the plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the fruit of his responsibility, nor content that those whose courage did shrink from the trial, "should seek popularity with the populace at the expense of the best interests of the country."

After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English government, convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of Portugal, permitted their envoy, Mr. Stuart, to have a seat in the Regency, and, influenced by Lord Wellington, insisted that the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead of the native authorities. Lord Wellesley also gave assurances that if the army was forced to quit Lisbon, the Portuguese troops should be carried to Oporto, and the war recommenced in that quarter; but Mr. Stuart very prudently reserved this information until the necessity should arrive, well knowing that the Patriarch and Souza, who had already proposed to go there themselves, would eagerly seize the occasion to urge the evacuation of Lisbon. The 2d of October, Mr. Stuart took his seat, and together with Doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the Marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas' faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct) proceeded to control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and Principal Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every measure proposed by Lord Wellington.

They were deeply offended by the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was incorporated with the regular forces; they had openly declared that the Portuguese troops should

not retreat from the frontiers; and that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, fell back to the lines, Souza proposed that the Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The dispute was then referred to Lord Wellington, and on the 6th of October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract has been given above. When the army approached the lines, Souza proposed that the Portuguese troops should remain outside while the British took shelter within! a notion so preposterous as almost to justify Marshal Beresford's observation that he knew not whether the proposer were more fool, rogue, or madman.

The restless Principal however pursued his designs with activity, and in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established a regular and systematic opposition to Lord Wellington's plans of defence. Faction in council, they were also clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their sentiments, from anger at some wanton ravages, that in despite of the General's utmost efforts, had marked the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; and Antonio Souza, getting the superintendence of the succors for the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the fidalgos, who endeavored to spread discontent as widely as possible, there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war.

To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite the Prince Regent against Lord Wellington; and the Patriarch himself wrote to the Prince of Wales and to the Duke of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against the English General. But the extent and nature of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time by Baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper, called the *Brazilense*.

Those persons, abandoning the faction, asserted that the Patriarch the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to Lord Wellington, Marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and were then seeking to remove them from their situations, and to get the Duke of Brunswick appointed generalissimo in place of Beresford. This part of

the project was very naturally aided by the Princess of Wales; and the caballers in London had also sounded the Duke of Sussex, but he repulsed them at the outset. Part of their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in London as the "*Braziliense*" was in Lisbon; and in their correspondence they designated Lord Wellington by the name of *Alberoni*; Lord Wellesley, *Lama*; Beresford, *Ferugem*; Mr. Stuart, *Labre*; the Patriarch, *Saxe*; Antonio Souza, *Lamberti*; Colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, the under-secretaries of state, *Thin* and *Bythin*; Sir Robert Wilson, *De Camp*; Lord Liverpool, *Husband*; Mr. Villiers, *Fatut*; Mr. Casamajor, *Parvenue*; and so on of many others. After Mr. Villiers' departure, the intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a different plan; for, overborne by Mr. Stuart's vigor in the council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and transmit that which suited their purpose to the Conde de Linhares and the Chevalier Souza, who undertook to represent the information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of St. James and Rio Janeiro.

Mr. Stuart, having thus obtained their secret, was resolute to suppress their intrigues; but first endeavored to put them from their mischievous designs, by the very humorous expedient of writing a letter to Domingo Souza, in his own cipher, warning him and his coadjutors not to proceed, as their party was insecure, while Mr. Stuart, Lord Wellington, Beresford, and Forjas, being united and resolved to crush all opposition, might be made friends, but would prove dangerous enemies! This had apparently some effect at first, but Principal Souza would not take any hint, and the violent temper of the Patriarch soon broke forth again. He made open display of his hostility to the English General; and it is worthy of observation, that, while thus thwarting every measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom they denominated well-wishers to the French, provided they were not of the Fidalgo faction. By a decree of the Prince Regent's, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations in cases of disaffection were permitted, the informer's name to be kept secret; and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. Some might have been guilty; and the government pretended that a traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a London house, which they indicated; but it does not appear that a direct crime

was brought home to any, and it is certain that many innocent persons were oppressed.

All these things showing that vigorous measures were necessary to prevent the ruin of the general cause, Lord Wellesley dealt so with the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed, Lord Wellington's power in Portugal was confirmed, and his proceedings approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza, and even to remove Lord Strangford, the British envoy at Rio Janeiro, who had been the contriver of the obnoxious change in the members of the Regency, and whose proceedings generally were in unison with the malcontents, and mischievously opposed to Lord Wellington's and Mr. Stuart's policy in Portugal. The subsidies were placed under Lord Wellington's and Mr. Stuart's control, and Admiral Berkeley was appointed to a seat in the Regency; in fine, Portugal was reduced to the condition of a vassal state; a policy which could never have been attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been willing to acquiesce. But, firm in their attachment to independence and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption of command; and fully justified the sagacity of the man who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other.

Although so strongly armed, Lord Wellington removed no person, but with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely necessary. This remedy for the disorders above related was however not perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal, of which notice shall be taken hereafter.

From the strength of the Lines, it was plain that offensive operations were more to be dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely retreat upon his own resources. Lord Wellington had therefore repeatedly urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants to carry off their herds and grain from that side, and from the numerous islands in the river, and above all things to destroy or remove every boat. To effect this, a commission had been appointed; but so many delays and obstacles were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy was close upon the river, both banks being still stocked with cattle and corn, and what was worse, forty large boats being on the right side. This enabled the French to seize

the islands, especially Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions; and while the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of Palmella, St. Felipe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines.

Lord Wellington, thinking that the ordenanza on the left bank, of whom five hundred were, contrary to his wishes, armed with English muskets and furnished with two pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel any plundering parties attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the Lines: he wanted numbers there, and he also judged that the ordenanza would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their allies. Meanwhile Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the Tagus, and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his garrison to Salvatierra on the river side.

This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy's attention, and Lord Wellington, fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succored, peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenanza, and consternation reigned in the Alemtejo; the supply of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send General Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zézere, kept a strict watch upon the enemy's movements.

Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; for the Admiralty, pretended to be alarmed at a fever generated by the infamous treatment the prisoners received at the hands of the Portuguese government, refused permission to have them transported to England in vessels of war, and other ships could not be had. Thus the rights of humanity, and the good of the service, were alike disregarded, for had there been real danger, Lord Wellington would not have continually urged the measure. About this time also, Admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada, he could not injure the fleet in the river, admitted that he was in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary lines on that side.

Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been relieved from the British magazines.* Ten thousand soldiers of the line deserted between April and December, and of the militia two thirds were absent from their colors; for, as no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great.

Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the Regency. Lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the Prince Regent, and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his passion in the most indecent language against the General. Soon after this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the feeding of the troops; and in that critical moment the Patriarch, whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion to declare that "he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the people which were evidently for no other purpose than to *nourish the war in the heart of the kingdom.*"†

But it was his and his coadjutors' criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Collegao, and Santarem was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained, the mills, but little injured, were quickly repaired, and Lord Wellington had the deep mortification to find, that his well considered design was frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe that the Prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. "*It is heart-breaking,*" was the bitter reflection of the British General, "*to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly.*"

* Appendix 19, § 7. † Appendix 19, § 10.

CHAPTER X.

Massena's pertinacity—He collects boats on the Tagus, and establishes a *défilé* at Santarem—Sends General Foy to Paris—Casts a bridge over the Zezere—Abandons his position in front of the lines—Is followed by Lord Wellington—Exploit of Sergeant Baxter—Massena assumes the position of Santarem—Lord Wellington sends General Hill across the Tagus—Prepares to attack the French—Abandons this design, and assumes a permanent position—Policy of the hostile Generals exposed—General Gardanne arrives at Cardigos with a convoy, but retreats again—The French marauders spread to the Mondego—Lord Wellington demands reinforcements—Beresford takes the command on the left of the Tagus—Operations of the militia in Beira—General Drouet enters Portugal with the ninth corps—Joins Massena at Espinhal—Occupies Leiria—Claparede defeats Silveira and takes Lamego—Returns to the Mondego—Seizes Guarda and Covilhao—Foy returns from France—The Duke of Abrantes wounded in a skirmish at Rio Mayor—General Pamplona organizes a secret communication with Lisbon—Observations.

THE increasing strength of the works, and the report of British deserters, (unhappily very numerous at this period,) soon convinced Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have long made war, the French General maintained his forward position, until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert; and then, reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched more distant countries for food.

Early in October artillery officers had been directed to collect boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere; Montbrun's cavalry, stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions, and stored them at Santarem; and both there and at Barquina (a creek in the Tagus, below the mouth of the Zezere) rafts were formed and boats constructed with wheels, to move from one place to another, but, from the extreme paucity of materials and tools, the progress was necessarily slow. Meanwhile, Fane, reinforced by some infantry, watched them closely from the left bank; Carlos d'España came down from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of Ourem, and Wilson's Portuguese militia so infested the country from Espinhal to the Zezere, that Loison's division was detached upon Thomar to hold him in check.

Towards the end of October, however, all the hospital stores and other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem;

and, on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body, four hundred infantry and two hundred dragoons, under General Foy, moved against Abrantes, and, after skirmishing with the garrison, made towards Sobreira Formosa, when the allies' bridge at Villa Velha was foolishly burnt; but Foy, with a smaller escort, immediately pushed for Peña Macor, and the 8th had gained Ciudad Rodrigo, on his way to France, having undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon; a task which he performed with singular rapidity, courage, and address. The remainder of his escort, retiring down the Zezere, were attacked by Wilson, and suffered some loss.

The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th of November, but the enemy having intrenched the height over Punhete, restored it, and cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. Massena then commenced his retrograde march, but with great caution, because his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, it was an operation of some danger to withdraw from before the Lines. To cover the movement from the knowledge of the partisans in the rear, Montbrun's cavalry marched upon Leiria, and his detachments scoured the roads to Pombal, on the one side, and towards the Zezere, on the other. Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, reinforced by a brigade of dragoons.

These dispositions being made, General Clausel withdrew from Sobral during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the eighth corps passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of some cavalry, left in front of Aruda, and of a strong rear-guard on the height covering Alemquer. The second corps then retreated from Alhandra by the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the eighth corps marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas.

This movement was not interrupted by Lord Wellington. The morning of the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after daybreak ere he perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability of the French General's operations. Fane had reported on the 14th that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy's intention was not clearly developed. It might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, while the allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the principal part of the

army stationary, but directed the second and light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer; at the same time he called up his cavalry, and requested Admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the other bank, if necessary.

Early on the 16th the enemy was tracked, marching in two columns, the one upon Rio Mayor, the other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, it was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether he was in retreat to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete and Martinchel, or making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear, before the reinforcements and convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo, could be met with. The first division was immediately brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division and cavalry marched in pursuit, and four hundred prisoners were made, principally marauders. A remarkable exploit was performed by one Baxter, a sergeant of the sixteenth dragoons. This man, having only five troopers with him, came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men, who were cooking, but instantly running to their arms, killed one of the dragoons; nevertheless Baxter broke in amongst them so strongly, that with the assistance of some countrymen, he made forty-two captives.*

The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, and the head of the second corps reached Santarem, when Fane, deceived by some false movements, reported that they were in full retreat, and the troops at Santarem only a rear-guard. This information seeming to be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus, which were left covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known that he had cast a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to cross the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, and move upon Abrantes, either to succor that fortress or to head the march of the French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack's brigade upon Cartaxo, and the light division reached El Valle on the Rio Mayor. At this village there was a considerable rear-guard formed, and as General Crawford had not profited from the lesson on the Coa, an unequal engagement would have ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the Commander-in-Chief. In the evening the enemy joined their main body on the heights of Santarem.

Hitherto, Lord Wellington, regarding the security of the lines

* Private Journal of the Hon. Captain Somers Cocks, 16th Dragoons.

with a jealous eye, had acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was even slack, although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the lines, or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed the first, second, and light divisions and Pack's brigade vigorously against the enemy's rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, the English General, whether deceived by false reports, or elated at this retrograde movement, this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, with a small force, to assail what he then thought the rear-guard of an army in full retreat. But the French General had no intention of falling back any farther; his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his situation, he had carried off his army with admirable arrangement, and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution.

Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising almost precipitously from the Tagus, extends about three miles inland. In front, a secondary range of hills formed an outwork, covered by the Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side to within a mile of the Tagus, where they unite and flow in a direction parallel with that river for many miles; the ground between being an immense flat, called the plain of Santarem. In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the allies ascended the Rio Mayor, until they reached the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, eight hundred yards long, leading to the foot of the French position. On the right hand of this causeway as far as the Tagus, a flat sedgy marsh, not impassable, but difficult from deep water-cuts, covered the French left. On the left, the two streams of the Rio Mayor overflowing, presented a vast impassable sheet of water and marsh, covering the French right, and, in the centre, the causeway offered only a narrow line of approach, barred at the enemy's end by an abattis, and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking down the whole length. To force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary step; the secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, the town, with its old walls, offered a fourth point of resistance.

In this formidable position, the second corps covered the rich plain of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison's division of the sixth corps, placed there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of communication with Punhete. On Reynier's right, in a rugged country, which separated Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de Alcoberte, the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous line with the second, but having the right pushed for-

ward to Alcanhete, the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where Massena's head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, the cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at Thomar, in reserve, having previously obliged Wilson's militia to retire from the Zezere upon Espinhal.

Massena thus inclosed an immense tract of fertile country; the plain of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de Alcoberte with cattle. He presented a formidable head to the allies at Santarem; commanded the road, by Leiria, to Coimbra, with the eighth corps and the cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra, with the sixth corps; and, by his bridges over the Zezere, opened a line of operations towards the Spanish frontier, either through Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. He also preserved the power of offensive operations, by crossing the Tagus on his left, or of turning the Monte Junta by his right, and thus paralyzing a great part of the allied force, appeared, even in retreating, to take the offensive.

His first dispositions were, however, faulty in detail. Between Santarem and the nearest division of the eighth corps there was a distance of ten or twelve miles, where the British General might penetrate, turn the right of the second corps, and cut it off from the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing such an attempt, hurried off his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected the allies to penetrate between him and the eighth corps, and then calling upon Junot for succor, and upon Massena for orders, proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this march of Reynier's baggage, that led Fane to think the enemy was retreating to the Zezere, which, corresponding with Lord Wellington's high-raised expectations, induced him to make dispositions, not for a general attack, by separating the second corps from the rest of the army, but, as I have before said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear-guard.

On the 19th, the light division, entering the plain between the Rio Mayor and the Tagus, advanced against the heights by the sedgy marsh. The first division, under Spencer, was destined to attack the causeway, and Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry were ordered to cross the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira, to turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack, and the skirmishers of the light division were exchanging shots with the enemy in the sedgy marsh, when it was found that the guns belonging to Pack's brigade had not arrived; wherefore Lord Wellington, not quite satisfied with the appearance of his adversary's force, after three hours' demonstrations, ordered

the troops to retire to their former ground. It was, indeed, become evident, that the French were determined to maintain the position. Every advantageous spot of ground was fully occupied, the most advanced sentinels boldly returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were descried, some in arms, others cooking; the strokes of the hatchet, and the fall of trees, resounded from the woods clothing the hills, and the commencement of a triple line of abattis and the fresh earth of intrenchments were discernible in many places.

On the 20th, the demonstrations were renewed; but, as the enemy's intention to fight was no longer doubtful, they soon ceased, and orders were sent to General Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left bank of the Tagus. General Crawford, however, still thought it was but a rear-guard at Santarem, his eager spirit was chafed, he seized a musket, and, followed only by a sergeant, advanced in the night along the causeway; thus commencing a personal skirmish with the French piquets, from whose fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last that the enemy were not yet in flight.

Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from Alcanhete close up to Santarem, and Massena, carefully examining the dispositions of the allies, satisfied himself that no great movement was in agitation; wherefore, recalling the baggage of the second corps, he directed Clausel to advance towards Rio Mayor; a feint which instantly obliged Lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and Pack's brigade to Cartaxo, the light division being also held in readiness to retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the second corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes; but heavy rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of Santarem was maintained for several months, and many writers have rashly censured the conduct of both Generals, it may be well to show here that they acted wisely and like great captains.

It has been already seen how, without any extreme dissemination of his force, the French General contrived to menace a variety of points, and thus to command two distinct lines of retreat; but there were other circumstances that equally weighed with him. He expected momentarily to be joined by the ninth corps, which had been added to his command, and by a variety of detachments; his position, touching upon Leiria and upon the Zézere, enabled him to give his hand to these reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; at the same time he was ready to communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance. He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem and Alcanhete; but

he judged that his adversary would not venture on such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements, with an army composed of three different nations, and unpractised in great evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience of war, he calculated upon moral considerations with confidence, and he that does not understand this part of war is but half a general.

Like a great commander, he calculated likewise upon the military and political effect that his menacing attitude would have. While he maintained Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon; he prolonged the sufferings of that city; and it has been estimated that forty thousand persons died from privations within the lines during the winter of 1810: moreover he encouraged the disaffected, and shook the power which the English had assumed in Portugal, thus rendering their final success so doubtful in appearance, that few men had sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject. At this period also, as the illness of George the Third, by reviving the question of a Regency in England, had greatly strengthened the opposition in Parliament, it was most important that the arguments of the latter against the war should seem to be enforced by the position of the French army. It is plain therefore that, while any food was to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in holding his ground; and it must be admitted that, if he committed great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander.

On the side of the British General, such were the political difficulties, that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle incessantly against their fears. Desirable, to relieve the misery of the Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible suffering; but, above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and again shut up the allies in their works.

Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that the disputes in the Regency, relative to the lines at Almada, were most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the Patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency in England, seeing that any serious military check would have caused the opposition to triumph, and the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. So powerful, indeed, were the opposition, and so much did the minis-

ters dread their cry for economy, that forgetting the safety of the army in their keen love of place, they had actually ordered Lord Wellington to send home the transports to save expense! In fine, Mr. Percival, with that narrow cunning that distinguished his public career, was, to use an expression attributed to him, "*starving the war in Portugal*," in despite of Lord Wellesley's indignation and of Lord Wellington's remonstrances. In this balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon which so many great interests hung, should not be fought, except on terms of advantage. Now those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who had received some reinforcements from Halifax and England, had indeed more than seventy thousand fighting men under arms, and the enemy at this time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, if we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found that the latter, from the advantage of position, could actually bring more soldiers into the fight.

In the Portuguese army, since the month of April, the deaths had been four thousand, the disbanded four thousand, the deserters ten thousand, the recruits thirty thousand;* the numbers were therefore increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions rather decreased; and every department under Beresford was at its last gasp from the negligence of the government, which neither paid the troops nor provided them with food. The Spanish auxiliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at open discord with the Portuguese; and their General was neither able in war himself nor amenable to those who were.

While the heights of Almada were naked, the left bank of the Tagus required twelve thousand men; and two British divisions were kept in the lines, because the French at Alcanhete were nearer to Torres Vedras than the allies were at Cartaxo. During an attack on Pernes, Reynier might break out from Santarem, and ten thousand men were therefore necessary to hold him in check; thus the disposable troops, comprehending soldiers of three nations, and many recruits, would have fallen short of forty-five thousand, while Massena could bring nearly all his force together on one point; because a few men would have sufficed to watch the British division on the left of the Tagus and at Santarem.

Lord Wellington's experience in the movement of great armies was not at this period equal to his adversary's, and the attack was to be made in a difficult country, with deep roads, where the Alvielly, the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, furnished a succession of defensive lines to the enemy, and in case of defeat the means of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Vic-

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MS.

tory might crown the attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If Lord Wellington failed, the Lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula. He judged it better to remain on the defensive, to strengthen the Lines, and to get the works at Almada sufficiently forward; meanwhile to perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, improve the organization of the militia in rear of the enemy, and above all to quiet the troubles and remedy the evils occasioned by the Patriarch's faction. Amongst these evils the destitute state of the fortresses, especially Abrantes, was prominent. Lord Wellington at one moment seriously thought of withdrawing the garrison from thence to prevent the men from starving.

In this view, the light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle and the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the English end of the causeway was mined, and a sugar-loaf hill, looking straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery and laced in front with a zig-zag covered way, capable of containing five hundred infantry: the causeway being thus blocked, the French could not, while the inundation kept up, make any sudden irruption from Santarem.

On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the inundation to Malhorquija; thence by a range of heights to Rio Mayor; and behind the latter place, Anson's cavalry was stationed in observation of the roads leading from Pernes and Alcanhere. In rear of Anson, a position was intrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the Lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which, the other divisions were disposed in succession. The first and the head-quarters were at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of Valle, the remainder at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, however, always occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round the Monte Junta.

Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued to build boats, fortified a post at Tancos, on the Tagus, and expected, with impatience, the arrival of a convoy escorted by five thousand men, with which General Gardanne was coming from Ciudad Rodrigo. This reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in Castile when the army entered Portugal, had marched by Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and the 27th was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of the French bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on either side would have opened the communications, and secured the junction; but, at that moment, Gardanne,

harassed by the ordenanza, and deceived by a false rumor that General Hill was in Abrantes, ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal, with such haste and blindness, that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost many men.

Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by the ninth corps, greatly strengthened his position at Santarem, which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner. General Perey, with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, crossing the Zezere, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without difficulty, and returned without loss; Junot occupied Leiria and Ourem with detachments of the eighth corps; and on the 9th of December a battalion endeavored to surprise Coimbra; Trant, however, baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet avowed a design to invade the *Tras os Montes*, but the 22d of December occupied the line of the Coa with the ninth corps, while Massena's patrols appeared again on the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the spies likewise reported that a great reunion of forces from the south was to take place near Madrid.

These things gave reason to fear, either that Massena intended to file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto; or that the reinforcements coming to him were so large that he meant to establish bridges over the Mondego, and occupy the northern country without quitting his present position. It was known that a tenth corps was forming at Burgos, and the head of the fifth corps was again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquina were numerous and large; and in all parts there was evidence of great forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the Tagus.

It was calculated that, before the end of January, more than forty thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena, and preparations were made accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes, Palmella, and St. Felipe de Setuval had been at last provisioned; and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Traffaria. Laborers had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, which were now nearly impregnable, soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could be brought against them. To procure these, Lord Wellington wrote earnestly to Lord Liverpool on the 29th of December, demonstrating the absolute necessity of reinforcing the army, wherefore five thousand British troops were ordered to embark for Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily.

Sickness had obliged General Hill to go home in December,

but, it being known that Soult was collecting a disposable force behind the Morena, the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and Marshal Beresford assumed the command, for the Portuguese army was now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force, composed of eighteen guns, two divisions of infantry, and five regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d'España's brigade, which, being at Abrantes, was also under his orders.

To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept all communication between Massena and Soult; to join the main body of the army, by Vellada if in retreat, and by Abrantes if in advance; were the instructions given to Beresford. He fixed his quarters at Chamusca, disposed his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, established signals between his different quarters, and scouring the roads leading towards Spanish Estremadura, established a sure and rapid intercourse with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses. He also organized good sources of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and at Thomar, and, in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere; but against the advice of the engineers, he placed them at too great distance from the river, and in other respects unsuitably, and offering nothing threatening to the enemy; the French craft dropped down frequently towards Santarem, without hindrance, until Colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth regiment, moored a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, and disposed fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that nothing could pass without being observed.*

Meanwhile on the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhete and the Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of both armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson's cavalry, however, acting in concert with Major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy's foraging parties; and in the Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the militia, which it is time to notice as forming an essential part of Lord Wellington's combinations.

It will be remembered that the ninth corps, being ordered to scour Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier of Portugal, was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the communications of Massena free, and securing his base, Drouet lost all connection with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the partidas of Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras' division that the Tras os Montes were unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to the lower Douro, appeared, on the 29th of October, before

* Appendix 24, § 1.

Almeida. Its former garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately deserted to their countrymen, and Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and made an attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices, but failed.

In November, however, the head of the ninth corps reached Ciudad Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions, collected in Castile, for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this from reaching its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible, and ordered Miller on the 16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th, General Gardanne, with four thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, took possession of Pinhel, and, supported by the ninth corps, conducted the convoy towards Sabugal and Penamacor. The 16th, he was between Valverde and Pereiro Gavillos, but Silveira falling upon him killed some of his men, took many prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, united with Miller, who took post at Guarda. Nevertheless, Gardanne pursued his march, but finally, as we have seen, retreated from Cardigos in a panic.

Drouet had not yet received the orders to put himself under Massena's command, but, at the representation of Foy, moved forward into Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed, of his intention to penetrate the *Tras os Montes*. The 17th December, he passed the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the 18th, encamped near Gouvea the 22d. Thence the cavalry and one division under General Claparede marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied Trancoso; while Drouet with eleven battalions, and the troops under Gardanne, which he had rallied, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th.

Hitherto Lord Wellington's communications with Baccellar had been carried on through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to avoid being inclosed; and Drouet, effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal, established his division at Leiria, and spreading towards the sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern provinces. On the 2d of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival, and of the state of Massena's army; intimating, also, that a great operation was in contemplation, and that the fifth corps was daily expected in the Alemtejo; he directed Claparede to seize Guarda, to forage the neighboring villages, to watch the road of Belmonte, and if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him.

Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and inflated with his

former successes, had already attacked Claparede, and was defeated with the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad, on the side of Trancoso, and Baccellar, alarmed for the safety of Oporto, recalled Miller and Wilson. The first immediately moved upon Viseu, and the last, who had already repassed the Mondego and taken a hundred stragglers of Drouet's division, marched hastily towards the same point. Meanwhile, Silveira had again provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, from the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove him with loss over the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before any troops could concentrate to oppose him. However, when Baccellar brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller's and Wilson's corps reached Castro d'Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira, closely followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the arrival of the ninth corps having relieved the French troops in Leon, the latter again menaced Tras os Montes, which obliged Silveira to march to Braganza, and as Miller died at Viseu, only Wilson and Trant continued to harass the enemy's parties.

Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to his instructions, seized Covilhao, while Foy, who in returning from France had collected about three thousand infantry and cavalry, convalescents, was marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped innumerable perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the partidas, with the loss of his despatches and half his escort; and now at Enxabarda entering the Estrada Nova, notwithstanding Claparede's vicinity, he was harassed by Colonel Grant with a corps of ordenanza from the Lower Beira, and although he suffered nothing by the sword, three hundred of his men died on the mountain from cold. On the 2d of February he reached Santarem, where affairs were coming to a crisis.

During December and January, the country being always more or less flooded, the armies had continued in observation; but Massena's positions were much strengthened, his outposts were reinforced, and his marauding excursions extended in proportion to his increasing necessities. The weak point on either side was towards Rio Mayor; any movement there created great jealousy, especially as the season advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, on the 19th of January (some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre had induced Junot to drive the outposts from Rio Mayor to probe the state of affairs, and a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish he returned with a wound, which disabled him for the rest of the campaign.

Early in February, a column of six thousand French again

scouring all the country beyond the Zezere, got much concealed food near Pedragoa, while other detachments arriving on the Mondego below Coimbra, carried off four hundred oxen and two thousand sheep intended for the allies. These excursions gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle, and brought in a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp of General Clausel's.

Meanwhile, Massena organized a secret communication with Lisbon, through the Portuguese General Pamplona, who effected it by the help of the fidalgos in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa. Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained a French officer of rank, and it is certain that both Generals had excellent information.

In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events hitherto unnoticed bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject of another book.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. "*War is not a conjectural art.*" Massena, forgetting this, assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon, and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra; but the battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would re-embark if pressed: the Lines put an end to that dream; yet once awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shows what thirty thousand additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus could have done. Had they arrived on the heights of Almada before Admiral Berkeley's error was discovered, the supply of provisions from Alemtejo and from Spain would then have been transferred from Lisbon to the French armies; the fleet would have been driven from the Tagus, and the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the British Cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little chance of final success, would probably have induced the British General to embark.

2. It has been observed, that Massena, in the first week, might have easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alem-

tejo, and driven the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy ; the fords impassable ; the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge ; a weak detachment would have been useless, a strong detachment would have been dangerous ; to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the intrenchments necessary to defend it, in the face of the allied forces, would have been neither a safe nor sure operation ; moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps.

3. Lord Wellington, conjecturing the French to be in full retreat, had like to have received a severe check at Santarem ; he recovered himself in time, and with this exception, it would be difficult to support essential objections to his operations ; yet many have been urged : as, that he might have straitened the enemy's quarters more effectually at Santarem ; that Hill's corps, passing through Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, and lining the Zezere, have cut off Massena's reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon his positions, or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced at the time by Colonel Squires, an engineer of great zeal and ability, perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination.

As a simple operation it was feasible, but the results were not so certain ; the lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of leaving the Tagus unguarded before an enemy who possessed eighty large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere, is apparent ; Hill's corps must then have been replaced, and the army before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras Lines. Nor was the forcing of the French works at Punhete a matter of certainty ; the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, and the sixth corps, being within a short march, might, by passing at Martinchel, have taken Hill in flank.

4. The same officer at a later period, miscalculating the enemy's numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy thousand regulars, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march upon Golegao, while Lord Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. It was no common head that conceived this project, by which seventy thousand men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst of the enemy's extended quarters ; but the hand of Napoleon could scarcely have launched such a thunder-bolt. Massena had still fifty thousand fighting men ; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought down to pass the Tagus ; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor would scarcely have escaped

the enemy's notice, an exact concert, in point of time, was essential. But the eighth corps could have held the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier, from Santarem, and Ney, from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and the Tagus : moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable from rain during December, and in January, Soult, of whose operations I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo. Any disaster happening to the allies would have relieved the enemy's difficulties, when nothing else could. A campaign is like other works of art ; accessories, however splendid, must be rejected when not conducive to the main object. That judgment, which duly classes the value of every feasible operation, is the best quality of a general, and Lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree ; to it, his genius and his courage were both subservient ; without it, he might have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but he could never have conducted the war to a successful end.

JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.

[Letter to the Author since the publication of the First Volume.]

Major-General F. Ponsonby to Colonel Napier.

AFTER the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve.

The whole of your account of the charge made by General Anson's brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German bussars; the other respecting myself.

The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the French column, from the impracticability of the ravine where they charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third attacked, headed by General Anson and Colonel Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the column, and was repulsed, and no rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under Captain Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general attack on our line.

You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the twenty-third.

Believe me, very sincerely yours,

Malta, Dec. 30, 1829.

F. PONSONBY.

[Obtained after publication of First Volume.]

Note sur la Situation actuelle de l'Espagne.

1°. Les évènements inattendus du Général Dupont sont une preuve de plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne conduite, et de l'expérience du général.

2°. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d'Affry, on avoit diviné tous les évènements ; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de concentrer l'armée et d'évacuer Madrid.

En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu'ils se sont passés, on est convaincu : premièrement, que le général Castaños n'avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de quinze mille paysans ; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général Dupont les eut attaqués, ou se fut battu avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complètement défaits.

3°. On pense qu'on aura tout le temps d'évacuer les blessés de Madrid qui arrivent à Aranda ; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu'il sera possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au Maréchal Bessières, de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice ; qu'il faut réorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province de Navarre ; elles comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine d'être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre.

4°. On pense que l'armée doit être divisée en trois corps, *le corps principal*, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu'on porteroit à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda ; le corps de droite, du Maréchal Bessières, d'environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit arriver de Gallice ou d'Estremadure, occupant Valladolid par une division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les circonstances ; enfin le *corps de gauche*, ou d'Arragon, destiné à maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logroño et Tudela, et liant sa droite en corps du centre, par une division qui au besoin renforcerait ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps volant.

Les corps du centre et le corps de droite doivent s'appuyer sur Burgos, et le corps d'Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune.

5°. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce but, on croit qu'on doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu'on tireroit du corps devant Saragosse ; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4^{me} légère, 15^{me} légère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon ; de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43^{me}, et du 51^{me} de ligne, du 26^{me} de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon ; enfin de 4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d'une régiment Polonais de la garde ; on réunirait le 3^{me} bataillon aux deux premiers, de tous les régimens d'infanterie, et on mélerait les jeunes soldats aux anciens.

On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevrait le corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé : savoir des 18,000 qui le forment à présent

Du renfort évalué à..... 18,000

Du renfort évalué à..... 10,000

Le détachement du dépôt du 4^{me} légère, 15^{me} légère.

14^{me}, 44^{me}, 43^{me}, et 51^{me} de ligne, le 2^{me} et 12^{me} légère rejoindront in sensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000 hommes.

Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleures mains, que sous les ordres du Maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général Saligny, ou avec le général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire.

Le corps du centre se tiendrait à la hauteur d'Aranda, ses communications

bien assurées avec le Maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se nourrira par Burgos, et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logroño.

Le corps du Maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d'Estremadure et de Castille ayant ses trois divisions en échellons, et se nourrissant de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon.

On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du général Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de la Biscaye et de tous les derrières.

On estime qu'on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit être formé en trois divisions, et destiné à maintenir la Navarre. La position de Logroño est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu'à Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans l'ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée sur l'armée.

6°. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun rassemblement armé à deux marches d'aucun corps d'armée. Si l'ennemi s'approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s'est passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre. L'ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte: il y sera réduit du moment qu'il aura eu quelque exemple.

Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu'on seroit sérieusement attaqué par l'ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du maréchal Bessières. Ce maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre, et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi, pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes.

7°. Il faut débiter par des coups d'éclat, qui relèvent le moral du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l'habitant qu'il doit rester tranquille; un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui seroit utile pour reléver l'opinion et compenser l'évacuation de Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} qu'on rappelle de Saragosse, aidée d'un détachement du corps du centre, soumette Soria, le désarme, et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter tout ce qui se présentera doit être l'instruction générale, donnée au maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de sorte qu'à une marche, ou à une marche et demi du corps François, il n'y ait aucun rassemblement d'insurgés; on est d'opinion que si l'avant garde du général Castaños s'avance sur l'Aranda et dépasse les montagnes de Buitrago, il faut, avec tout ce qu'on réunira dans un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s'y établir sérieusement, le culbuter, le jeter au delà des montagnes, et si l'affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L'ennemi doit essayer de déloger l'armée Française de cette position, par trois points, par la Gallice et l'Estremadure, par la droite d'Aranda, et enfin par les rassemblemens des provinces d'Arragon, de Valence, et autres de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l'ennemi, et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu'ils se formeront sur tous les points et qu'on les tiennent à distance d'une ou deux marches du cantonnement François; si alternativement les François prennent l'offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le maréchal Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position derrière la

rivière, et à l'abri de toute attaque; tantôt au centre avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers du corps de gauche, l'ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande circonspection.

8°. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui s'y trouve, du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, de la brigade du général Mouton, de celle du général Le Febvre, qui en dernier lieu a été renvoyée au maréchal Bessièrès, et enfin du renfort qu'amène le maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de 14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l'ennemi eut voulu se mesurer avec des forces aussi considérables et s'exposer à une perte certaine.

9°. Si de fortes raisons obligeoient d'évacuer Aranda, on perdrait l'espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le cas où un événement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le maréchal Bessièrès, le corps du général Verdier peut communiquer par l'Ebre, et avoir toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir l'Aragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route principale. Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers arriveront à l'armée, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin les divisions de la grande armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrénées.

On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est nécessaire de l'occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne d'Ebre, c'est une vedette d'autant plus utile qu'elle domine la plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l'ennemi s'en emparoit.*

10°. La troisième position que se présente à l'armée, c'est la gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement être de quelque utilité, les événemens modifient nécessairement les dispositions, tout dépend d'ailleurs de saisir un moment.

11°. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est possible.

Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en occupant le ligne du Duero.

Le troisième, de conserver l'Ebre.

Le quatrième, de conserver ses communications avec de Pampelune et St. Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés.

LE GEN. BERTRAND.

Rochefort, 6 Août, 1808.

Note on the Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.

DUPONT's proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled, "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.*"

Upon the authority of General Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, calls it "*a gratuitous atrocity,*" and "*an inhuman butchery,*" and, no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that *capacity and cruelty are rarely*

* [Note in Napoleon's own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu'en approchant de France tout favorise la désertion.

united; that *Dupont was a fool*, and that *Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon*, but that he must have "*dragged on a miserable existence, exposed to universal scorn and hatred.*"

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became Minister of War at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of "*The Annals*" as *the era of good government in France*.

I rejected Foy's authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye-witness, and his relation, at variance with the *official journal of Dupont's operations*, was also contradicted by the testimony of a *British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event*.

"Some time after the victory, order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police."—*Journal of Operations*.

Cordoba was not pillaged, being one of the few places where the *French were well received*.—Letter from a British general to Colonel Napier.

On this point therefore I am clear; but the author of the "*Annals*," after contrasting my account with Foy's, thus proceeds, "It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier *without any quotation of authority.*"

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, *six months previous to the publication of the "Annals,"* Colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inclusive to the author of that work, *because there was no quotation of authority*, transmitted through a common friend an assurance that he had authority for every statement, and would willingly furnish the author with any or all of them: no notice was taken of this offer.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR. J. CRADOCK'S PAPERS.

WANT OF SUPPLIES.

Commissary Rawlings, Deputy Commissary-General, to Cradock, Dec. 22.

"Your Excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country. The difficulties encountered by Sir J. Moore were of the most serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much drained as they now are."

WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES.

Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, March 17.

"I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and commissariat department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of horses from the Barbary coast; and such is our actual want, that the proper movement of even the force we have is nearly impracticable."

Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, March 26.

"The means of transport are so confined that I must not expose anything to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with the greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter being of a very inferior description."

Commissary Rawlings to Sir John Cradock, March.

"The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an advantageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases, might necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from hand to mouth."

Colonel Robe to Sir J. Cradock, March 20.

"It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the deputy commissary-general; from the exhausted state of the country, and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more than two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these are much too slight for the general service of the artillery."

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 20.

"From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them" (horses and mules) "at

any price or by any means, but the adequate supply for even the former small number of the British army could not be obtained. I have also made repeated representations to England."

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.

"I want eight hundred horses and mules for the common conveyance of provision, and the equipment of the artillery."

Commissary Rawlings to Sir J. Cradock, April 9.

"Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops have returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment must be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the north, from whence our supply has hitherto been obtained."

Sir J. Cradock to Marshal Beresford, Caldas, April 18.

"You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single day. The country appears to be without the ability to furnish straw."—"In short, the supply is just for the day, and barely sufficient."—"I have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the Regency would send a person, in special authority, to this district to furnish supplies, if they are to be found. I shall act like the French, and make requisition, with this difference, that we are ready to pay for everything to the utmost."

Cradock to Berkeley, Caldas, April 17.

"Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers are sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We cannot advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to Lisbon; and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed."—"If there is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to Peniché, I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in that case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to be fed from thence."

Cradock to Villiers, April 17.

"This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are sent, even at a risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position, and must retreat."—"If the articles are in the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be dispensed with. The enemy would have them without paying for them: we must equally exact and pay."

Cradock to Beresford, April 20.

"All the recommendations you point out upon the assistance to be derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the utmost of my exertion; but the difficulties started by the Admiral and the Commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much dependence upon immediate aid."

General Cotton to Cradock, April 21.

"I wish I could once see the cavalry together; but I much fear that before that happens they will be very much out of condition. The fourteenth have already fallen off very much, owing to the frequent want of straw and their being supplied with Indian corn, which they will not eat; added to

these circumstances, the commissary obliges the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three days' forage."

G. Harrison to Mr. Rawlings, Treasury-chambers, February 25.

"It having been represented to the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their lordships' commands," &c., &c.

Sir J. Cradock to Colonel Willoughby Gordon, Military Secretary, February 11.

"I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state of the clothing and the great coats in particular of his Majesty's troops serving in this country."

Lord Castlereagh to General Sherbrooke, January 12.

"Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you make for horses for your guns, or any other species of supply the service may, from time to time, require."

No. II.

SECTION I.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to Sir J. Cradock, Lisbon, January 19, 1809.

"I left Sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been advised by Col. Guard to fall back; and, from his information, he imagines that Sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through Galicia. On the other hand, he has received *positive orders from you* to defend the frontiers*, and pressing letters to that effect from the Bishop of Oporto."

Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, January 30.

"The Regency and the Bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his" (Sir R. Wilson) "quitting the bounds of Portugal."

Ditto to Ditto, March 6.

"I had a letter from Sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo, (24th February,) wherein he says, that many French prisoners state their expectations that the French army will retire behind the Ebro. Sir Robert's own persuasion is *that the French will retire altogether from Spain.*"

SECTION II.

General Cameron to Sir J. Cradock, Lamego, January 16.

"I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging to Sir John Moore's army, whom I found scattered in all directions, without neces-

* Note by Sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but quite the contrary; it must have been the Bishop.

saries, and some of them committing every possible excess that could render the name of a British soldier odious to the nation."

Sir J. Cradock to Admiral Berkeley, March 16.

"There are about one hundred and twenty persons confined on board the *Rosina*, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to the army."

SECTION III.

Captain Brotherton to Sir J. Cradock, Oimbra, Head-Quarters of Romana, February 21.

"The Marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious *intention of the enemy is to retreat from Galicia altogether*; and even that he will find much difficulty in *extricating himself*. I must confess that *I am not so sanguine*; and I judge that the present retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an intent to advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction."

Captain Brotherton to Sir J. Cradock, March.

"I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and join himself to the Portuguese army. *His troops had been much vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese*, and a cordial co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should separate altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive. He suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. He had just received a letter from Silveira, which he also answered to that effect, and which created no small surprise, as a plan of operations had already been settled between them."

Major Victor Arentschild to Sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16.

"General Silveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your Excellency as the opinion of the public. . . . The Marquis of Romana's army is retreating to Orres, in Galicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good."

Mr. Commissary Boys to Mr. Commissary Rawlings, Almeida, January 13.

"Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten thousand men had deserted from the Marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the country."

Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23.

"No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbor."

Lord Castlereagh to Marshal Beresford, February 15.

"The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general officer should be appointed to command and organize their army, his Majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this important trust."

No. III.

EXTRACTS FROM MR. FRERE'S CORRESPONDENCE.

(N. B. The Italics are not in the original.)

Mr. Frere to Sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14.

"Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished by the defeat of General Reding, that I should much doubt whether any reinforcement, such as we could now send there, would enable us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at home."—"On the other hand, there seems reason to apprehend, that General Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance he has experienced, *desist from his unaccountable project of entering Portugal and occupying Galicia.* His return would, of course, add largely to the disposable and movable force of the enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that description."—"In this view of the subject there are two points for the employment of a British force; one, *by making a push to drive the enemy from Salamanca and the neighboring towns,* while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communication between the northern and southern province. The other, by moving from the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in concert with General Cuesta, to attack and *drive the enemy from Toledo, and consequently from Madrid.* In the latter alternative, the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start of any reinforcement from the army of General Soult, supposing him to abandon Galicia for the sake of moving southward; and these movements would not tend in the same degree to draw him from his present position, in which, for so many reasons, *it is desirable he should continue.* It would, I should imagine, at the same time, cover Andalusia, and the points of the greatest interest and importance in this province, more effectually than the same force employed in any other manner."

Mr. Frere to Sir J. Cradock, March 22.

"The fortieth remains here: under the present circumstances I could not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force from Elvas."

Mr. Frere to Sir A. Wellesley, Seville, May 4.

Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

"As it was my object to obtain *a diversion in La Mancha as the price of co-operation* on your part, and the impression which they (the Junta) received from Colonel Alava's report was that your intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Galicia, to come down upon Estremadura to attack General Victor, I was under some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined that the point which I wanted to make a condition was already conceded."

No. IV.

EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ.

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16.

"The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. The orders from England are to send it, if the Supreme Junta shall make the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate the demand or not?"

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29.

"This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its adoption, Mr. Villiers, Admiral Berkeley, and myself, could not well hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us, as addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavorable termination of the campaign in the north of Spain."—"The force in Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British regiments, that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to the arrival of the force of five thousand men, announced to be on their way; and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be but fair to replace the present detachment from them."

Sir J. Cradock to General Mackenzie, March 9.

"I yesterday received orders from his Majesty's government to press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of the forces under your command to the Tagus."

Sir John Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, March 9.

"Your Lordship will find, by the present communication, that Major-General Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of Mr. Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force, (the fortieth regiment, from Seville, will be united,) and proceeded to Tarragona, unless your Lordship's orders may have overtaken Major-General Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago (without any communication). It may be presumed that he will follow the same course, upon the same motives that influenced General Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered upon in that part of Spain."

No. V

NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE'S DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ.

The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, 1809, and arrived in Cadiz harbor on the 5th, at night. I immediately waited on Rear-Admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are some difficulties started by the Marquis Villet (the commissioner from the Central Junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on Sir George Smith, on shore, where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but Sir George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started. Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who was acting under a diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with him and Sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders, and it was determined to wait on the Marquis Villet. Mr. Stuart explained to the Marquis that the object of my coming was to offer our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act from this side against the common enemy. The Marquis hesitated, and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central government; and, in the mean time, said he could permit our landing at port St. Mary's. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for the decision of the Central Junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from Sir J. Cradock.

The decision of the Junta was received on the 8th; and I received a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the Junta was of the most flimsy nature, viz., "That they had ordered two of their own battalions to occupy Cadiz;" a measure which was evidently the thought of the moment, and a mere pretext.

Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded to by Mr. Frere, yet I had every reason to believe, as well from the opinion of Sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and occupying the place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere's letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the cantonments offered to us. On consulting with Sir G. Smith and Mr. Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere, whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England, the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in the harbor under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere proposed by a landing.

I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for without reckon-

ing the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary's, I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national honor. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain, and thus have involved our country in its support, without having obtained the object for which it was detached,—the possession of Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial approbation of Sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavorable appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would be carried. I therefore wrote to Sir J. Cradock, by the *Hope* brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should remain in Cadiz harbor (with Mr. Frere's approbation) until we received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same conveyance, to the same purport, to Lord Castlereagh.

On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose Sir G. Smith, who died that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere, in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with the rest to join Cuesta's army; that, as a force was expected from England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I left behind might follow me on their arrival.

I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the place; but as it had not been laid before the Junta, I considered it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his Majesty's ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure until the arrival of troops from England, which might be looked for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance, in some point, respectably towards the enemy. If, however, Mr. Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately, I further informed him, that I was ready to move on as soon as we could obtain the necessary equipments.

Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the *Ambuscade*, on a secret mission. On the 22d, and before I received any further communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the Junta had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town, as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to by the gov-

error, for the interference of some British officers as mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the people were favorable to our landing and occupying the town, for it was frequently called for during the tumult.

As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (Captain Kelly, Assistant Quartermaster-General) with a detail. The *Fisguard* sailed on the 24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed Sir J. Cradock, as well as Lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since my last; and just at that time Colonel Roche arrived from Seville. He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr. Stuart's mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere's decision, on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped it for the present; and conceiving that something favorable to the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state of things, I had a full conversation with Colonel Roche on the subject. He told me the Junta were dissatisfied with our not having accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment. I asked his opinion as to the practicability of General Stuart's being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment, thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche was of opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr. Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops, and the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I thought it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival of General Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution of the orders he might bring from home.

This proposition certainly exceeded anything authorized by my instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to warrant it.

After Colonel Roche's departure for Seville, Captain Kelly returned from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from Mr. Frere, stating that Marshal Soult was marching from Galicia into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th I received this promised letter, inclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph Bonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz.

Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that nothing else than succors from home could enable Sir John Cradock to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation succeeded, I had arranged with Admiral Purvis to send a frigate with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, everything was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for, although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken, yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome addition.

On the morning of the 2d of March I received a letter from Colonel Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet been

decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French interest.

The morning of the 3d having passed without any letter from Mr. Frere or Colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed (although he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received shortly afterwards from Colonel Roche, confirmed this failure. Mr. Frere's letter entered very minutely into the state of the Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult's attempt to penetrate into Portugal by the Minho and the improbability of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army, assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms, the essential use my detachment could be of at Tarragona, in giving spirit and vigor to the cause in that country, where it is most in need of support.

As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case of resisting the enemy, would not have a favorable appearance; and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently show our determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish government without any excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr. Frere's solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn, without committing any other British force for its support; and the motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely thought myself ridiculous in hesitating to comply.

I accordingly wrote, on the night of the 3d March, to this effect to Mr. Frere, Sir J. Cradock, and Lord Castlereagh. But on the 4th, in the evening, Captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards, arrived from England with despatches for General Sherbrooke, who had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the Eclair brig of war, and had stopped at Lisbon, which he again left on the evening of the 2d, and brought me a message to the following purport from Sir J. Cradock, viz., "That he was determined to defend Portugal to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea, prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon."

This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to this effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary winds detained us in Cadiz harbor the whole of the 5th, but on the 6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th.

I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the apprehensions and disunion of the Central Junta, and not from the inclinations of the people at Cadiz.

(Signed)

J. R. MACKENZIE,

Major-General.

Lisbon, March 13, 1809.

No. VI.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS—NEGLECT OF
PORTUGAL.

SECTION I.

Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809.

"You are aware by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December, inclosing copies, &c. &c., that in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, by the force under Sir J. Cradock's command, an event rendered the more probable by the transactions in Galicia."

Lord Castlereagh to Sir J. Cradock, February 6.

"Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal," &c.

Admiral Berkeley to Sir J. Cradock, February 6.

"The period of the British army's stay in this place appearing to draw near to its conclusion."

SECTION II.

Sir J. Cradock to Colonel Guard, January 3.

"The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most serious thoughts."—"But, as they were occupied by the command of his Majesty's ministers, and we remain without any fresh instructions under the present critical circumstances."

Sir J. Cradock to General Richard Stewart, January 10.

"I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, but I obey the original orders of government."

Sir J. Cradock to General Richard Stewart, January 12.

"We are still without any instructions whatever from England."

Sir J. Cradock to Captain Halket, January 13.

"Though we cannot say when it may take place, and it shall be deferred to the last moment, in hopes of hearing from England, yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare everything for the event of an embarkation."

Sir J. Cradock to Admiral Berkeley, January 17.

"I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the resolution to remain in Portugal to the last proper moment awaiting orders from England."

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 19.

"With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, we are determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of receiving orders from England."

Sir J. Cradock to Admiral Berkeley, February 9.

"The orders we daily expect may be either for immediate embarkation, or to maintain Portugal."—"I am persuaded we have but this one wish,

which is to act for the credit of our country, and endeavor, under the *want of all information, to discover what may be the object of the government we serve.*"

Sir J. Cradock to General Mackenzie, February 26.

"Since the 14th of January we are without instructions from England."

SECTION III.

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 15.

"What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the *army in Portugal should remain to the last moment.*"

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 15.

"I am just favored with your communication about the dangerous effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing the troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oyeras, Passo d'Arcos, &c. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position in question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders from England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such a proceeding."—"What I must object to is to take up a false position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach and seek another, bearing the appearance of flight and yet not securing our retreat. The whole having announced the intention to defend Lisbon, but giving up that idea upon the appearance of the enemy: for positions liable to be turned on every side cannot be persevered in by an inferior force."—"My political reasoning upon this subject was contained in the letter I wrote the Admiral, and, I must repeat, it continues unweakened," &c.—"After your strong representations of this morning, I shall certainly not persevere; and, as there is no instant necessity for the measure, will await the progress of events."

No. VII.

STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER SIR JOHN CRADOCK, JANUARY 6, 1809.

Extracted from the Headquarter States.

Disposable for the Field.

Garrisons.	Artillery. Cavalry.		Infantry.	
	Men.	Men.	Men.	
Santarem	68	199	2,492	General Richard Stewart.
Saccavem	97	169	1,450	General M'Kenzie.
Lisbon	..	519	..	General Cotton.
	..	..	236	attached to different battalions.
	165	887	4,178	
Total			5,232	

Brought over, 5,232			
Garrisons.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
	Men.	Men.	Men.
Almeida	38	..	1,440
Elvas	33	..	679
Oporto	..	..	379
Lisbon & Forts	315	..	2,682
Total,	386	..	5,566
			General total, 10,798

NOTE.—Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this state.

ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL 6, 1809, CALDAS.

Sir J. Cradock, Commander-in-Chief.

Major-General Sherbrooke, second in command.

Artillery.—Major-General Howarth.

Cavalry.—Major-General Cotton

Under arms.

	Men.
First line, five brigades	10,418
Second line, three brigades	3,810
Reserve, one brigade	1,858
Cavalry	800

Total, 16,886

STATE OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR A. WELLESLEY, APRIL 22

Head-quarters, Leyria.

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Effective.
	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
Artillery	441	88	408	937
Cavalry	1,439	13	418	1,870
Infantry	16,539	1,957	314	18,790
Total,	18,419	2,038	1,140	21,597
	6 lb.	8 lb.	Howitzers.	
Number of guns,	20	6	4	Total, 30

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, MAY 1, 1809.

Head-quarters, Coimbra.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Wagon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,418	3,074	19,510	230	24,227
Deduct { Hospital				2,357
{ Absent				1,217
Total present under arms,				20,653

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, JUNE 25, 1809.

Head-quarters, Abrantes.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Wagon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,586	3,736	21,267	406	26,995
Deduct {				Hospital 3,246
				Commands 1,896
30 Pieces of Artillery.				
Total present under arms,				22,853

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, JULY 25, 1809.

Head-quarters, Talavera.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Wagon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,584	3,734	29,694	398	35,410
Deduct {				Hospital 4,827
				Commands 1,596
Total present under arms				28,987
Deduct regiments on march				9,141
30 Pieces of Artillery.				
Real present under arms,				19,846

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1809.

Head-quarters, Badajos.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Wagon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,947	4,273	28,409	389	35,018
In Hospital		8,827	Deduct total absent	
Command and missing		2,526		
Total present under arms				23,665

No VIII.

MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK.

March 29, 1809.

SIR,—I have the honor to annex your Excellency a copy of requisitions, from their Excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the speedy securing of Oporto, which your Excellency is informed is so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army, whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town.

I annex, for the information of your Excellency, the instructions which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the general commanding beyond the Douro, but the object of which has been frustrated by events at once unfortunate and melancholy.

The corps of Brigadier-General Victoria, consisting of two battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent danger in the north, I had

directed to cross the Douro, are now in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, part of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia; but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed population, which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten thousand men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at Oporto, as far as I can get information, that your Excellency may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add, that there prevails in the town the greatest anarchy and insubordination, and that in short, by the latest accounts, the populace entirely govern the law, civil and military.

Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your Excellency's consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is no certainty) between the Marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one, before the other could give his co-operating aid, to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able to do this, would be merely a matter of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our arrival at Leyria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army pushing from Leyria to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principal object, and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either the destruction of Cuesta's army, to enter more securely into Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that Soult does not think that of his army from Galicia and that from Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected co-operation,—whilst the army from Salamanca will probably satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating.

It is for your Excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for the British troops, but also of those of the allies, as, by my instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies; and the time is now certainly arrived for what efforts they can make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate projects will cause each failing separately, and without advantage to the common cause.

I would, however, certainly under present circumstances, be unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army, between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and indeed, the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just received a second report and complaint from General Miranda, would render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question to your Excellency, &c.

I have the honor, &c.,

W. C. BERESFORD.

SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD.

Lisbon, March 29, 1809.

DEAR SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your Excellency's letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the Regency, &c., that I should move the British troops to the succor of Oporto, at this moment menaced, &c.

Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all my reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the government in England, and the part I am now called upon to act is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved state of affairs seems to confirm and give no reason to alter in any part.

It has always appeared, to my judgment, that the enemy has but two objects to attain in this kingdom, the possession of Lisbon and Oporto. I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior value of the former above the latter. There are such positive local disadvantages attached to Oporto, independent of its remote position, that no military disposition, in which a small English army is to bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline obedience to an application from so high an authority as the governors of the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request, though I much doubt if their judgment goes along with it; but it appears to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under my command, (totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the defence of this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succor of a place two hundred miles distant, and by a movement to the north with this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a general invasion.

I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual situation, leaving to your judgment how far it may be necessary to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army, and lay before the governors and your Excellency the best ideas I can form for the employment of the British

auxiliary force, in conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances.

It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto; there is reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place, or to act in conjunction with General Soult, by an advance into the upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state, with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of Generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing General Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal, from whence, to the heights of Almada, opposite to Lisbon, through the whole of the Alentejo, except the weak garrison of Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt their immediate passage.

Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from the contingency of General Cuesta's army; for, besides the general disinclination he had so strongly marked to the British character, he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well acquainted with Portugal and the circumstances of the present hour, as your Excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at twelve thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain possession of the maritime forts, is left. It may be increased to fourteen thousand, if these points are risked; but even to gain the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not more than two and a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British army sets out with the declared object to succor Oporto, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I confess that the best reasoning of my judgment, upon every public and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation, is, that the British troops should never make one retrograde step: from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid, military as well as civil. The British army, from its description, may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded in the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be vain, and that it would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the whole future conflict.

I have now only to state what my inferior judgment points out; and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation

of the Portuguese force, and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation. They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise, a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether our general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attend the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly embraced, and always leave some part exposed.

Allow me to conclude with the solemn expression of my own conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude, determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful diversion in favor of Spain.

It will give me the sincerest pleasure, &c.

JOHN CRADOCK.

No. IX.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT, MSS.

*Captain Brotherton to Colonel Donkin, (Quartermaster-General,) Lamego,
March 17, 1809.*

"The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts which Frenchmen are so expert in—circulating proclamations and insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror, plunder, and desolation, *treating the inhabitants with feigned moderation and kindness.*"

Sir J. Cradock to Lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas.

"It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate himself with the populace of Oporto, *by even feeding them and granting other indulgences.*"—"It is also said that a Portuguese legion, to consist of *six thousand* men, has been instituted."

Extract from Soult's Official Report of the Expedition to Portugal.

"Dans quinze jours, les villes de *Braga, Oporto, Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Pova de Barcim, Feira*, et *Ovar*, eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations se rendirent à Oporto pour les remettre au maréchal Soult et le prier de la faire parvenir à l'empereur. Des adresses qui renfermaient l'expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de trente mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians, et du peuple."—"Pendant

son séjour à Oporto, le M. Soult fit des proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l'administration et la police de la province *Entre Minho e Douro*. Il nomma au nom de l'empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans, et après avoir reçu la manifestation politique des habitans, il organisa le garde national ainsi qu'une légion de cinq battalions.—"*Aucune contribution ne fût frappée*; les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales suffirent pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, et même pour donner de secours aux Portugais."

Intercepted letter of the Duke of Dalmatia's to General La Martinière, Orense, March 2, 1809.

"J'ai reçu votre lettre du 27 Jan. J'approuve toutes les dispositions que vous avez faites. Je vous ai déjà dit que vous pouviez disposer pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse royale de Tuy. Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que vous pourriez. Si de Valence on vous tiroit de coups de canon envoyez leurs des bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert, mais faites les garder. Dans les équipages qui sont à Tuy, il y a douze cent paires de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre, et un peu de drap; vous pouvez en disposer pour votre troupe. Ralliez au dépôt général tout ce qui appartient au corps d'armée et qui étoit resté en arrière, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée qui se soutiendra d'elle-même et faire la police dans la province dont vous devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hôpitaux et n'envoyez personne sur Ribadavia. J'espère que sous peu je vous aurai ouvert une autre communication, le province d'Orense est en très grande partie pacifié; je marche sur les débris du corps de Romana pour en finir avec eux; ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si après cette expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles, je reviendrai avec tout mon armée pour les appaiser, et alors malheur à ceux qui les auroient occasionné; *je veux la paix et la tranquillité, que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la campagne, qu'ils soient protégés et que la troupe se conduise bien. Les mutins et les malintentionnés François et Espagnols doivent être sévèrement punis.* Il faut de tems en tems des exemples. Je crois que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays. Mais il faut bien leur payer ou leur promettre, qu'en arrivant près de moi ils le seront généreusement, et prendre de gages pour répondre de leur fidélité; donnez de vos nouvelles au général Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au colonel l'Abbeville de bien mettre en état son artillerie.

"MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE."

No. X.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK, MS.

Lisbon, April 23.

Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor; how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British

will be to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country.

All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I fear, in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the northward unwillingly; and I should be glad to talk them over with you.

In order to consider of some of them, and to make various arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested Marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to let you know whether he will come or not.

It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case, it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet you here. I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however, choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will bring with you the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general, the chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the commissary.

Ever yours, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

N. B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted.

No XI.

Extracts of a letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809.

"I arrived here on Saturday, and found that Sir John Cradock and General Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, with the troops under their command respectively; the former to Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving forward; on the contrary indeed, he appears, by his letters to Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should hear that Victor's movements were decided, and, therefore, I consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in which, if I found them, it was the intention of the King's minister that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to assume it as soon as I shall communicate with Sir John Cradock. I have written to him, and to General Beresford, to apprise him that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has done nothing in Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been most probably apprised; but he has some posts on the river Tamega, which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General Silveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General Lapisse, who commands the French corps which, it was supposed, when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal, has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese frontier to Alcantara,

where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with, indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he is either fortifying that post, or making an intrenched camp there. Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is said, will soon be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the Marquis de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede or delay Victor's progress, in case he should come in while I am absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of this kingdom and of the favorite town of Oporto, of which it is most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor, connected with Cuesta's movements, did not require time to concert it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable, for many reasons, into which I need not enter at present, to act upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire the officer commanding them to endeavor to get intelligence, as he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in operations to the northward, and if he should not already have received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third dragoons might also receive directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude, have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here; now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward constant convoys will be necessary, and the Admiral does not appear to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of him. The twenty-fourth regiment arrived this day, &c., &c.

(Signed)

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

No. XII.

LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLE-REAGH.

Abrantes, June 22, 1809.

MY LORD,—When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat Sebastiani has also fallen back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his head-quarters at Truxillo on the 19th. I am apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources for the trans-

port of our own supplies, either by land or by water. Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and shoes, and to be furnished up in different ways; and I am well aware that, if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French were retreating, (as appears by my letters to your Lordship,) and that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them, even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I repeat that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include £40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty thousand men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, debts of Sir John Moore's army still due in Spain, which I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c., &c. (Signed) "ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

No. XIII.

LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

Badajoz, October 30, 1809.

MY LORD,—I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's despatch (marked I.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in answer to your Excellency, of the 3d of October.

I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavor to attribute to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to their exertions for the scanty supplies it received.

From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay's note it would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies; particularly the quotation of a letter from General Cuesta, of the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed to have made, that the Spanish troops and *their prisoners* were better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could not have been occasioned, by the inexperience or irregularity of the English commissariat.

I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide provisions and

means of transport for the British army on its passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such orders were sent, it was obvious that the Central Junta, as a government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay's account of these orders, that the Central Junta had taken a very erroneous view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even for one day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to General Venegas by General Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to a general action with the enemy's concentrated force. The effect of their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:—

As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavor to procure mules to attend the army, in concert with Don Lozano des Torres, that city and its neighborhood being the places in which the army commanded by the late Sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M. de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government that the British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding this expression of astonishment, he informs your Excellency, in the name of the government, that they had given orders to the provincial juntas of Badajoz and Castile (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport; and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want at that moment.

The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, drawn by bullocks which are unable, without great distress, to move more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and there were none to carry provisions.

Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the neighborhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote to General O'Donoghue, on the 16th of July, a letter in which, after stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them, I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue my co-operation with General Cuesta, after I should have performed my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz., the removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat across the Tagus on the 4th of August, but even previous to the commencement of the operations of the campaign.

Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was communicated

to the Central Junta, both by Mr. Frere and General Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance of this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2d of September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of forty each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades of carts which were intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day on which, after five weeks' notice, I was obliged to separate from the Spanish army.

It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from Spain, as then carried into execution, was "sudden," or ought to have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain.

I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the means required; but having, on the 11th of July settled with General Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by the armies under the command of General Venegas, General Cuesta, and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint General Cuesta. I believed that General Venegas would have carried into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his army, although I was afterward disappointed in that expectation; and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience than that General Venegas' corps should be exposed alone to the attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I should be supplied.

Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Placentia, the soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on which day a junction was formed with General Cuesta's army; and, from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their horses did not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency, both in quality and quantity, were so great, that I considered it a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations.

The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that, exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost, in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand five hundred horses.

I have no knowledge of what passed between General Cuesta and Don Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the Spanish army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first time on the 22d of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which had been brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example of the preference which was given to the British troops while they were in Spain.

The orders stated to have been given by the central to the provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the different villages of the Vera de Placentia, a country abounding in resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on different days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty thousand rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French army have since subsisted on these resources.

The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labors, nor was the supposed magazine of four hundred thousand pounds of biscuit ever formed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed, of the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can bear testimony. I assure your Excellency, that not only have the supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts due to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army under the command of the late Sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated, to let the people know that all demands upon the British government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged.

I beg to refer your Excellency to my despatches of the 21st of August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and provisions at that period, Lieutenant-Colonel Waters had, by my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and detail of that arrangement. But if the British army only received one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,) but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement made by Lieutenant-Colonel Waters, was to be the sole source of the supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a sufficiency to supply one day's demand upon it.

But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an order from him, (of which your Excellency has a copy,) addressed to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the headquarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British commissary had

ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by Lieutenant-Colonel Waters.

As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause (as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from Spain, I beg to observe to your Excellency that I was not mistaken in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed, General Eguia's army suffered the greatest distress in the neighborhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the British army.

In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve; some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive agreements.

M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the Marquis de Romana were framed in conformity with suggestions from Marshal Beresford; and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were approved of by me.

The Marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estremadura retired across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates shows that there was, and could have been no connection in the operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of the Marquis of Romana's operations; and till I heard, on the 3d of August, that Marshal Ney's corps had passed through the mountains of Estremadura at Baños, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe that that part of the enemy's army had quitted Astorga, or that the Marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Galicia.

Marshal Beresford's corps was collected upon the frontiers of Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming the troops: and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy's corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on the left of the British army; and I particularly requested Marshal Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps under Marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an operation in which that corps was to be concerned.

In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded.

I expected, from the communications I had with General Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, that the Puerto de Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.

It was agreed, between General Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July, that General Venegas, who was under his command, should march by Tembleque, Ocaña, Puente Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid; where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when the combined armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had been foreseen) occurred; viz., that the combined armies were engaged with the enemy's concentrated force. I have

heard that the cause of the non-performance of this agreement was that the Central Junta had countermanded the orders which General Venegas had received from General Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I shall make no observation upon this proceeding, except that the plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into execution, by General Venegas, in this instance.

It was agreed, by General Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that when I marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at Talavera. That agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that if General Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if General Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.

When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting the assistance afforded by General Cuesta to remove the hospital from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, and to unload the treasury, and employ the carts in the removal of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of August, M. de Calvo and Don Lozano de Torres being in the town.

In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I am of opinion, that if General Bassecour had been detached towards Placentia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement, and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here again the hospital would have been saved.

He was not detached, however, till the 2d; and then I understood, from M. de Garay's note, that it was General Cuesta's opinion that the movement was useless.

It could not have been considered as useless by General Cuesta on the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could not have been considered as useless even on the morning of the 2d, as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence of the arrival of Soult at Placentia. A reference to the date of the period at which the General considered this detachment as useless would have been desirable.

I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by General Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa, on the morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the morning of the 3d, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3d, of the enemy's position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and of

General Cuesta's intended march on that evening, leaving my hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight on the 4th; shortly after which time, General Cuesta arrived at Oropesa.

Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that every moment's delay must expose them to the risk of being cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, showed that they were not equal to any great contest.

M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.

When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy at Placentia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move towards Placentia, to attack the enemy's corps which had passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered only when I heard of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found that, by General Cuesta's movement from Talavera, the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, to join or to attack us in separate bodies.

It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier intelligence of their approach.

The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the Junta of Castile, if they knew of the collection of the enemy's troops at Salamanca, sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and the post of Talavera was abandoned, the Central Junta will find it difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of our march.

But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from the offensive to the defensive: the march was retrograde; and if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were forwarded, untouched, to their destination.

I have sent to Marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de Garay's

note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which I propose to forward to your Excellency. I shall here, therefore, only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.

Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to show the fallacy of M. de Garay's calculations of the relative numerical strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the same opinion respecting the expediency of co-operating with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in a state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those blessings for which they are contending. I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed)

WELLINGTON.

No. XIV.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Camp, August 17, 1809.

SIR,—I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of repeating them for your Excellency's information.

My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads, a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The assistant-commissary of my division likewise states to me, that the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed)

R. HILL, Major-General.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUT.-GEN. SHERBROOKE.

Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809.

SIR,—I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to know what am to do, in order to get some for the horses.

(Signed) E. STOPFORD, Second Brigade of Guards.

No. XV.

SECTION I.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA,

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

King Joseph commanding, 1st October, 1809.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effectives.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Prisoners.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught
180,814	28,091	10,407	8,165	46,109	4,124	237,880	28,196	8,060
		Deduct for the governments.....				10,407		3,165
		Real total.....						28,091
								226,923

15th July, 1810.

278,408	52,386	29,462	7,846	47,107	4,915	849,972	41,848	18,834
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In march to join.

6,121	736	...	...	636	...	6,757	736
279,524	53,072	29,462	7,846	47,743	4,915	856,729	60,918

15th August, 1810.

279,639	52,068	25,340	6,017	46,982	5,995	851,961	41,446	16,634
In march to join						1,957	681	511
Total effective in Spain						853,918	42,127	17,145
Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the frontier						16,006	1,447	...
Grand total.....						869,924	43,574	17,145

Note.—By this state it appears that allowance being made for casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men.

15th January, 1811.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effectives.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.		Men.	Cavalry.	Draught
295,227	52,462	17,780	4,714	48,881		861,888	41,189	15,987

15th April, 1811.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
276,575	46,990	15,121	2,166	40,079	831,776	87,855	11,801

These states show a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barosa, and Fuentes Onoro took place. Hence if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of its greatest activity, the guerilla system was more harassing than destructive to the French army.

SECTION II.—STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

April, 1810.—Head-quarters, Caceres. Massena, Prince of Essling, commanding.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hosp. Pris'rs.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
2d corps d'armée....	18,372	4,449	1,119	132	1,628	7	21,126	8,520	1,061
6th ditto	33,759	10,159	496	110	5,086	349	39,690	7,140	3,129
8th ditto	28,045	7,070	25	..	5,976	99	34,145	5,812	1,753
Total active army...	80,176	21,678	1,640	242	12,690	455	94,961	15,972	5,948
Imperial guards	17,380	8,800	174	15	733	..	18,287	2,831	934
Province of St. Ander	13,464	752	276	..	1,774	377	15,391	752	..
Prov. of Valladolid..	4,509	124	123	..	859	145	6,186	..	124
Total under Mas- sena's command, }	115,529	26,354	2,213	257	16,056	977	135,275	19,555	7,056

15th May, 1810.

Etat major et gens-d'arme. }	229	241	..	..	..	..	229	241	..
2d corps Reynier..	16,903	2,921	992	231	1,337	42	19,232	2,186	966
6th do. Ney.....	28,383	5,421	1,224	964	4,940	357	35,067	2,152	4,233
8th do. Junot....	20,782	4,228	7	80	5,642	75	26,431	2,142	2,116
Reserve of caval- ry, Montbrun,.. }	4,776	4,851	246	189	95	..	5,117	5,040	..
Total active army..	71,573	17,662	2,469	1,414	12,014	474	86,347	11,761	7,315

15th August, 1810.

Etat major, &c....	199	222	..	..	8	..	202	222	..
2d corps.....	16,418	2,594	2,494	397	3,006	..	21,913	1,969	1,304
6th corps.....	23,456	2,466	1,655	577	5,541	193	30,862	1,701	1,372
8th corps.....	18,808	2,959	436	169	4,996	98	24,235	2,016	1,112
Reserve of cavalry	4,146	4,322	1,138	331	157	81	5,441	4,997	246
Artillerie et genie du siege, ...	2,724	2,969	206	159	409	..	3,389	..	3,123
Total active army..	65,746	15,862	6,139	2,119	14,112	302	85,997	10,815	7,162
6th Government, Valladolid,....	12,693	3,045	639	20	1,775	641	15,107	2,931	134
Division Serras, Asturias et St. An- der. Bonnet, ..	12,913	..	1,394	15	1,573	107	14,885	434	..
Total under Mas- sena, ...	91,352	18,907	8,172	2,154	17,465	1,050	115,959	14,180	7,296
9th corps, Drouet, Comte D'Erlon,	19,144	2,436	24	..	3,147	..	22,315	2,436	..
General total	110,496	21,343	8,196	2,154	20,612	1,050	138,304	16,616	7,296

Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th October.

The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st September only

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
Etat major.....	192	219	..	..	4	196	219	..
2d corps.....	16,575	2,921	2,397	287	2,214	21,186	1,872	1,336
6th ditto.....	23,224	2,478	1,708	600	5,418	30,350	1,780	1,348
8th ditto.....	18,807	2,958	663	140	4,656	24,126	2,027	1,071
Reserve of cavalry.....	4,146	4,322	1,188	831	157	5,441	4,907	246
Artillery of siege.....	3,022	3,115	206	159	409	3,637	146	3,123
Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 22d of October.....	..	..	474	16	..	474	16	..
Total.....	65,966	16,013	6,586	2,083	12,858	85,410	10,917	7,129
9th corps.....	19,062	2,072	418	..	3,516	22,991	1,755	817
Division Serras.....	8,586	1,015	269	35	1,750	10,605	1,050	..
Grand total	93,614	19,100	7,268	2,068	18,124	119,006	13,722	7,446

Army of Portugal—1st January, 1811.

Head-quarters, Torres Novas.

Second corps, Head-quarters, Santarem.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
Merle's division, 9 battalions.	4,368	..	150	..	1,549	6,067	..	..
Heudelet's do. 12 do.	5,718	..	451	..	2,646	8,815	..	..
Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrs	1,146	993	523	537	231	1,900	1,530	..
Artillery and engineers.....	1,284	1,121	52	9	89	1,425	112	1,018
Total.....	12,516	2,114	1,176	546	4,515	18,207	1,642	1,018

Sixth corps, Thomar.

Marchand, 11 battalions....	4,987	28	529	..	1,121	6,637	28	..
Mermet's, 11 do.	6,252	..	743	..	1,077	8,104	..	..
Loison, 12 do.	4,589	..	1,037	..	8,291	8,917	..	..
Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons.	652	651	663	663	117	1,432	1,814	..
Artillery and engineers, 28 companies.....	1,769	1,372	47	78	165	1,981	52	1,896
Total.....	18,249	2,051	3,019	741	5,771	27,071	1,894	1,898

Eighth corps, Pernes.

Clausel, 11 battalions.....	4,007	18	484	..	3,989	8,627	18	..
Solignac, 14 do.	4,997	..	1,953	..	3,337	10,346	..	..
St. Croix's dragoons, 12 squadrons.....	981	1,024	698	698	233	1,917	1,722	..
Artillery and engineers.....	1,106	859	24	4	392	1,522	151	712
On leave.....	..	..	..	..	..	206	..	..
Total.....	11,091	1,901	3,159	702	7,956	22,618	1,391	712

Montbrun, Ourem.

Reserve of cavalry, 24 squadrons with artillery. }	2,729	2,871	1,486	1,466	178	4,533	4,337	
Artillery, engineers and equipage of the army ... }	1,546	614	..	..	283	2,090	614	

Ninth corps Leiria.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Dr'ght.
Claparede, 15 battalions, } Almeida.....	7,868	11	369	..	482	8,714	..	
Conroux, 12 do., Leiria....	7,592	27	447	..	1,299	9,338	27	
Fournier's cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro.....	1,698	1,591	60	67	114	1,872	1,658	
Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo.....	670	464	..	72	742	..	464	
Total	17,828	2,098	876	189	2,637	19,924	2,149	

Note.—Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the sick men, stragglers, equipages, and dépôts of the army of Portugal. The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses.

	Present under arms.	
	Men.	Horses.
General total of the army of Portugal in the position of Santarem.....	46,171	9,551
Ninth corps	17,828	2,098
	63,994	11,644
Deduct troops of the ninth corps not in Portugal	10,281	2,066
Real number under Massena.....	53,763	9,578

Army of Portugal—1st April, 1811.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.		
5th corps, Junot.....	13,448	..	992	..	5,719	20,159	..	
6th do. Marmont.....	13,984	..	1,374	..	1,576	16,934	..	
2d do. Reynier.....	10,887	..	1,350	..	4,318	16,505	..	
Artillery and Engineers, bruns.	{ Dragon, 23 squadrons.....	4,173	4,404	..	..	4,173	4,404	
	{ Light cavalry, 14 squadrons... 8,636	3,906	..	..	83	8,636	3,906	
	{ 1 squadron of gens-d'armes... 190	72	..	..	5	102	72	
	{ Foot ar- } Almeida and } 986	..	..	..	83	1,055	..	
	{ tillery. } Rodrigo... }							
	Horse artillery.....	410	425	..	..	23	453	425
	Artillery of the train.....	2,181	2,378	..	..	237	2,443	2,378
	Workmen.....	259	..	..	..	25	295	..
	Engineers.....	1,448	60	..	..	140	1,623	..
	Military equipage.....	596	897	..	..	60	668	897
Total artilleries, engineers, &c.....	5,969	8,335	..	..	573	6,542	2,760	
Total of infantry.....	37,269	..	3,716	..	11,613	52,598	..	
Total of cavalry.....	7,999	8,932	..	..	43	7,911	8,362	
General total	51,237	11,717	3,716	..	12,229	63,051	11,142	

Note.—In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of Portugal for May. Two divisions of the ninth corps, directed to be added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, and the Prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry as he pleased, provided the brigade of General Fournier, from the ninth corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes Onoro, at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, engineers, &c., are deducted.

Note.—Since the above was published, Massena's letters in Belmas' Journals of Sieges have appeared; he calls his army only 35,000 of all

arms; because Clausel's division was detached to keep up the communication between Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca; the whole present must however have been stronger, if Bessières' troops be reckoned; yet I have certainly set the cavalry too high—there could not have been more than *four* thousand in the field.

SECTION III.—ARMY OF THE SOUTH—SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Dr'ght.
1st of January	55,002	12,092	5,744	1,999	6,412	67,758	10,868	3,223
15th of May	75,138	13,124	8,915	4,836	11,420	90,468	12,156	2,304
Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north {	11,917	1,619	..	..	..	13,810	1,220	899
Real total of the army of the south.....	63,216	11,505	8,915	1,836	11,420	77,158	10,936	1,905

SECTION IV.

Fifth corps, 15th January.

<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
18,766	6,153	8,035	640

16 Decembre, 1810, le duc de Dalmatie va faire le siège de Badajos, avec tout le 5^{me} corps d'armée, 8 regiments de cavalerie, formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les 1^{ere} et 5^{me} corps d'armée sous les ordres de général Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63^{me} regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d'artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de sapeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie Espagnol.

SECTION V.

First corps before Cadiz.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Train.
15th February, 1811	20,572	1,886	1,331	681	1,254	23,457	1,495	1,072
Reinforcement in march from the Governments.....	5,209	775	..	..	743	5,952	712	63
Total.....	25,781	2,661	1,331	681	1,997	29,409	2,207	1,035
4th corps, 15th February.....	16,703	4,007	741	397	1,699	19,143	3,612	792
Reinforcement in march from the Governments.....	6,020	1,457	..	..	873	6,890	1,457	..
Total.....	22,723	5,464	741	397	2,577	26,033	5,069	792

Note.—A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise joined the fifth corps while in front of Badajos.

SECTION VI.—ARMY OF THE NORTH—BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>	<i>Hospital.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Train.
1st February, 1811.....	58,515	8,874	1,992	6,860	67,767	7,979	1,079
15th April, 1811	53,143	6,930	2,221	5,350	60,719	6,065	879

SECTION VII.—ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L'ESPAGNE, 1^{re} CORPS.

Situation des présens sous les armes à l'époque du 22nd Mars, 1811.

Designation des Divisions.	Régimens	Dans les		Emplacement des Troupes dans les Forts et		Disposables.	
		Eint des présens sous les armes.	Foris et Redoutes.	Redoutes.	Redoutes.		
1	9 ^{me} Infanterie ligne...	1,000				1,000	Sta. Maria.
	24 ^{me} do. do. ...	800	400				
	96 ^{me} do. do. ...	1,100				400	Do.
	16 ^{me} do. do. ...	350	350			1,100	Do. San Lucar, Est, Chi-
	8 ^{me} do. do. ...	713				..	[piona la Viala Atta.
2	45 ^{me} do. do. ...	1,072	744			713	Port Reale au Trocadero.
	54 ^{me} do. do. ...	820				328	Port Reale.
	Bataillon d'Elite.....	236				820	Chiclana.
	27 ^{me} Infanterie ligne....	1,400				236	do.
	63 ^{me} do. do. ...	845				1,400	do.
3	94 ^{me} do. do. ...	1,500	650			845	Port Reale.
	95 ^{me} do. do. ...	1,414	472			850	Chiclana.
	43 ^{me} Bataillon de Marine	900	900			942	do.
	2 ^e do. d'Ouvriers do.	615	615				
	5 ^e Chasseurs.....	320	50			820	Vejer et Conil.
Régiment de Marine.	1 ^{re} de Dragons.....	230	72			180	Xeres.
	2 ^e do.	218	500			146	Arcos.
	à pied à Cheval.....	678	323			178	Santa Maria, Puerto
	Sapeurs	823	77				[Reale, et Chiclana.
	Mineurs	77	77				
		14,611	5,153			9,458	

By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but was found amongst Colonel Lejeune's intercepted papers, it appears that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days after the battle of Barrosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne's detachment being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle.

SECTION VIII.—STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S RETURNS.

	<i>Under arms.</i>	<i>Sick.</i>	<i>Detached.</i>
	Men.	Men.	Men.
Cavalry 4 regiments.....	1,525	274	542
Infantry 41 battalions.....	20,700	8,880	3,214
Artillery.....	1,378	144	1,156
Total of all arms.....	23,603	9,298	4,912

Guns.....24 British, 18 Portuguese.....Total, 42

Note.—There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese and the partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms.

No. XVI.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL

SECTION I.

“November 30, 1809.

“I inclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the Duke of Albuquerque and the Duke del Parque in this plan of diversion.

“Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his Majesty's ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of General Areizaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

“The first official information which I had from the government of the movement of General Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which I now inclose a copy.

“I was at Seville, however, when the General commenced his march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my conviction that General Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated, and accordingly your Lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to think it necessary to endeavor to make a diversion in favor of General Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the General's own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.”—“I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any im-

portant object, and which best answers for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the Duke d'Albuquerque's corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move."

SECTION II.

"December 7, 1809.

——— I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the Duke d'Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the Duke d'Albuquerque, which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the Duke del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government have given orders to the Duke d'Albuquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it."

SECTION III.

"January 31, 1810.

——— There is no doubt that, if the enemy's reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favor of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the inclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances will permit."

SECTION IV.

"January 12, 1811.

"My former despatch will have informed your Lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry."

SECTION V.

"January 19, 1811.

"At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville General Ballesteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condado de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza.

"The circumstances which I have above related will show your Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with corps so ill-organized, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which General Mendizabel received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the Regency, to detach General Ballesteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville"

SECTION VI.

"February 2, 1811.

"The various events of the war will have shown your Lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, (the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on this service."

SECTION VII.

"February 9, 1811.

"General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late Marquis de la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don't believe that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year."

SECTION VIII.

"February 23, 1811.

"Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which

they would have been, if the misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-General Madden did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain."—"The operations of the guerillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one."

SECTION IX.

March 21, 1811.

"It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the Marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honorable engagements to defend the place into which the Marquis entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that Marshal Bessières has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Galicia, in which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under General Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that General will make no defence, and that Galicia will fall into the hands of the enemy."

SECTION X.

"May 7, 1811."

"Your Lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don't know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the Prince Regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged."

"I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have been obliged to write to Marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence."

"Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies."

SECTION XI.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellesley, relative to Disputes with the Patriarch and Souza.

"Sept. 8, 1810.

"I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, that the Regency should send an order to Marshal Beresford to dismiss his Quarter-master-General and military secretary, followed by a reflection on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purpose respecting the Portuguese who are attached to Lord Wellington."

SECTION XII.

Letter from Sir J. Moore to Major-General M'Kenzie, commanding in Portugal.

Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

SIR,—The armies of Spain, commanded by Generals Castaños and Blak, the one in Biscay and the other in Aragon, have been beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with Sir David Baird's corps impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head against it.

I have ordered Sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by taking up such positions as offer, endeavor to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now with you and that which I am bringing.

We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; Colonel Murray wrote on this subject to Colonel Donkin yesterday, that supplies might be sent to us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired Sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the Commissary-General will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the *Tras os Montes*. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, together with Colonel Murray's letter to Colonel Donkin, will be sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from England,

to join us through Portugal; this will do at first, but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

J. MOORE.

P. S. Elvas should be provisioned.

No. XVII.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF VARIOUS PERSONS RELATIVE TO CADIZ, MSS.

SECTION I.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. C. B. Vaughan, Secretary of Legation at Cadiz, to Mr. C. Stuart.

"March 6, 1810.

"I received your letter of 22d February. It was indeed time that a little common sense should be substituted in that country (Portugal) for that supreme humbug with which the Portuguese have hitherto been treated."*

"When the French *passed the Morena*, 20th January, the Supreme Junta gave orders for the provincial Juntas to *provide for the defence of the provinces, and permitted the demolition of the forts commanding the bay of Cadiz*; at the same time the Junta stole away from Seville for Isla de Leon. Romana and Bartholomew Frere remained till 24th January, Seville being in commotion, demanding that the Supreme Junta should be abolished. Montijo and Palafox released from prison, and the former sent an order to Romana to appear before the revolutionary Junta. He was desired to take the command of Seville; according to B. Frere's account a most perilous post, as the people had no arms. Why was this fact not known after the defeat of Ocaña? And why also were the immense stores of cannon, ammunition, &c., &c., accumulated at Seville, not moved to Cadiz? Romana, to avoid the defence of Seville, got appointed to bring down Del Parque's army to the defence of the city, and the people appointed a military Junta, namely, Castaños, Montijo, Palafox, and Romana.

"Frere set off for Cadiz, and at Xeres found the *President, Vice-President* and Cornel, imprisoned by order of the people of Seville. January 26th, the authority of the Supreme Junta of Seville was disavowed at Cadiz, and a Junta of defence elected, and on the 30th, the Supreme Junta assembled to nominate a Regency, namely, Castaños, Escano, Savaedra, Bishop of Orense, and Lardizabal, a deputy to the Cortes recently arrived from Mexico. 3rd. Cadiz saved from being surprised by the French by the arrival of Albuquerque. 4th. The French appeared at the bridge of Zuazo."—"I never felt so little hope of Spanish independence as at this moment. It is not the rapid advance of the French into Andalusia that makes me despair, but the manner in which they have been received by the people. Seville, Cordoba, Jaen, Granada, and Malaga surrendered to them without firing a shot, by the inhabitants, Joseph Bonaparte studiously endeavoring to profit from this dispirited state of the people to conciliate them. Three thousand Spaniards, well paid, well clothed, and well fed, at this moment doing duty at Seville

* This refers to Mr. Canning's system of diplomacy.

in his service; while upon this last spot of ground that remains, a government has been established professing indeed to act upon very different principles to the last, but without having yet accomplished one single act that can tend to procure them the confidence of the people; protected by a Spanish force, wretchedly clothed, their pay in arrear to an immense amount, and by no means well fed. We now hear of disciplining an army, but very little has been done towards it since the arrival of the troops in the Sota. Depend upon it *Cadiz must be defended by the English.*"

SECTION II.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

"Cadiz, March 28, 1810.

"The quarrel between the Duke of Albuquerque and the Junta has ended. The Duke is going to England on a special mission, and Whittingham proposes to go with him. Depend upon it they will do their best to get out to South America. But the Duke is so weak a man, so hasty, and so much the dupe of others, that I cannot think it prudent to give him any assistance in such views."

SECTION III.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

"The pontoon ran upon the French coast with 34 staff-officers, 337 officers, and 348 soldiers, French prisoners of war. The boats were under the beastly necessity of firing into her, while the poor devils were attempting to escape, and at last she was set fire to before all the prisoners had been able to get ashore. To me this is a most disgusting event in war; there were also eleven officers' wives on board!"

General Graham to Mr. Stuart.

"May 18, 1810.

"You will hear of the escape of a great number of French officers by the pontoon, they were confined in going adrift in a gale the other night."—"The Spaniards are very angry, and *regret that this hulk was not set on fire before the prisoners got on shore.* I am afraid our gun-boats fired into her, but I was glad to hear that our officer of artillery at Puntales, who had the care of the upper batteries, (where the only two guns of the fort that could be brought to bear on the hulk were,) refused to fire on the poor devils, *many of them most unjustly confined since the battle of Baylen!*"

Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart.

"June 2, 1810.

"Another pontoon went on shore a few days ago, on the French side of the bay. It was the hospital-ship, and so severe a fire was kept up on it *by our boats* that few of the prisoners escaped, and many were burnt to death when the hulk took fire. I like not such scenes, but we always continue to get the greatest possible share of odium for the least possible good."

SECTION IV.

Extract from the Correspondence of an Officer of Engineers employed at Cadiz.

"May 7, 1810.

"We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a loss

to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning works, that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute either stores or workmen to the general cause, have kept us so long inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools."

SECTION V.

"Isla, June 1, 1810.

"We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence, if all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we have only British troops at work on this important position, and our numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs requires."—"We have in our respected General (Graham) a confidence which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted to encounter difficulties which less favored dispositions could not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and kept an enterprising enemy off with very inadequate means, should be rewarded by his country's good opinion, although none but those who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not security; to animate resistance, though not to promise victory."

SECTION VI.

"June 29, 1810.

"I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery-officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose, although we offer to perform the labor for them. On a barren spot they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is not attended to? We have now been here three months, and although they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of."—"We have now one thousand three hundred laborers of the line, and eighty carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with from our ally is so bad that these artificers produce not more than one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials were good. To judge from their conduct, it is impossible to suppose them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself."—"Of our seven subalterns of engineers, two are generally

ill; we are obliged, therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army."

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE
BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ.

SECTION VII.

General William Stewart, March 13, 1810.

"The enemy's force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the Spanish troops."

General Graham, March 26, 1810.

"The Isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, very precarious."

May, 1810.

"General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards have been very deficient."

October, 1810..

"The progress made by the enemy at Trocadero assumed a very formidable character, while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line."

January 2, 1811.

"—— As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant contests."

No. XVIII.

EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH'S CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTION I.

The Duke of Santa Fe to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810.

[Translation from the Spanish.]

"Will your Majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have arrived at saying, that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards attached to your Majesty will rise against them. Let your Majesty consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial it might be to us if it

succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgment, and that it will soon subside, being void of probability."

SECTION II.

Ministerial letter from the King to the Marquis of Almenara.

[Translated from the Spanish.]

"September 21, 1810.

"The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid; the Governor, Kellermann, has taken possession of them. Those archives, from the time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, and privately to individuals."

SECTION III.

The Spanish Secretary of State to the Duke of Santa Fè.

"Madrid, September 12, 1812.

"—— Si l'Andalousie n'est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte de Cadix existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l'attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, et aux trames ourdies par la junte et l'Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Février, qui établit des gouvernemens militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l'Aragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques gouverneurs Français ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie."

"—— Mais combien n'est il pas démenti par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent s'obstiner à prolonger l'insurrection d'Espagne plutôt qu'à la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d'exclure toute idée de l'autorité du roi, en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l'empereur, mais ce qui est pire, on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia prêtassent serment de fidélité et d'obéissance à sa majesté impériale comme si la nation Espagnole n'avait pas de roi."

SECTION IV.

Memorial from the Duke of Santa Fè and Marquis of Almenara to the Prince of Wagram.

[Translation from the Spanish.]

"Paris, September 16, 1810.

"—— The decrees of his Majesty the Emperor are the same for all the generals. The Prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces to

the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; and this speaks in favor of the Spanish people, for the Prince of Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless vexations."

SECTION V.

Intercepted letter of Comte de Casa Valencia, Counsellor of State, written to his wife, June 18 1810.

"Il y a six mois que l'on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons.

"—— Avant hier j'écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le priant de m'accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures dans son antichambre espérant une réponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut qu'il n'avait rien.

"—— Rien que la faim m'attend aujourd'hui."

No. XIX.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON, MSS.

SECTION I.

"Celerico, May 11, 1810.

"—— I observe that the Minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the inconvenience, on which I had the honor of addressing you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the Regency and the Ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have no doubt of the ability or the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am

of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. They must be forced to perform their duty, and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the Regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his Majesty's government, which I have communicated to them, that the continuance of his Majesty's assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to mention, however, that since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head-quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay. I inclose a proclamation which I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follows:—1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly, refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrate to proceed to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th, desertion from the service either with or without carriages, &c.; 5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:—1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them."

SECTION II.

Lord Wellington to M. Forjas.

"Gouvea, September 6, 1810.

"MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,—I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you have placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succor the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succored the

place, and I now request the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the Prince Regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamor or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end.

(Signed)

WELLINGTON."

SECTION III.

"Gouvea, September 7, 1810.

"——— In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that *I will not stay* in the country, and that I will advise the King's government to withdraw the assistance which his Majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of Marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with Marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I propose, also, to report to his Majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago, and Marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, lying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavor to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of the enemy's force in the country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong: they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power, I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to

the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the Prince Regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the Regency.

(Signed) "WELLINGTON."

SECTION IV.

"Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810.

"—— You will do me the favor to inform the Regency, and above all the Principal Souza, that his Majesty and the Prince Regent having intrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or anybody else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz, to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained his Majesty's leave to resign my charge, if Principal Souza is to remain either a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will; and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the Prince Regent shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavoring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure.

"WELLINGTON.

"P. S.—All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands."

SECTION V.

"Pero Negro, October 28, 1810.

The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the Secretary of State, Don M. Forjas, who

was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature; first, they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon information that they are absent from their corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures without favor or distinction of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bonâ fide* upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but if we are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that they look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the enemy at Villa Novo de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there were no law for the government of the army than that the existing laws should continue without being executed.

WELLINGTON."

SECTION VI.

"October 29, 1810.

"——— In answer to Lord Wellesley's queries respecting the Portuguese Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short every power which the Prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The Prince ought to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it excepting Principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any official intercourse. The Patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing the Principal (which *must* be done), I think the Patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency or anybody else. If there is, I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Prince Regent should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the Regency or anybody else. I should like to see Principal Souza's detailed instructions for his '*embusados*' on the left bank of the Tagus. If Principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in the wrong direction given to the deliberation of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost, because the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, everything which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. In answer to M. de Forjas' note of the 22d, inclosed in yours (without date), I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by the Commissary-General, and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c.; many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this

must be left to the Commissary-General of the army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point.

WELLINGTON."

SECTION VII.

"*Pero Negro, October 31, 1810.*

"——— I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alentejo as the desertion of the militia. The *ordenança* artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No. — of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts; the French could not have stayed here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places from which there existed means of removing everything, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements which have been made are useless, if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!

WELLINGTON."

SECTION VIII.

"*Pero Negro, November 1, 1810.*

"I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the inclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is, that the government, after the appointment of Principal Souza to be a member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz., that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing with me the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure, and, moreover, I have put one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present situation long before the

order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of idolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government. I avowed in my proclamation, that I was the author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of astonishment by the Secretary of State that the measure should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service; not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego and their dependent streams were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks, the inhabitants have fled from their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have left behind them everything that could be useful to the enemy and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz., the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security, has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus; they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ———, to which I propose to draw the attention of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent and of his Majesty's government. His Royal Highness and his Majesty's government will then see in what manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the inclosures from M. Forjas, show the sense which the Regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original in

structions to the Diserabargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and Principal Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will show what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their Prince, to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and I regret that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent should have been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and the allies. In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the *ordenança* would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the *ordenança* would disperse. The truth is that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different descriptions of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable if the government would leave, exclusively, to Marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the *ordenança* as usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus."

SECTION IX.

"December 5, 1810.

"All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: first,—That by my appointment of Marshal-General of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in the late Duc de la Foëns, I hold the command of the army independent of the local government of Portugal. Secondly,—That, by the arrangements made by the governors of the king-

dom with the King's government, when Sir Will am Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force. Thirdly,—That, supposing that my appointment of Marshal-General did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly,—It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, undoubtedly, his Majesty's government never intended to give over the British army to the government of the kingdom to make ducks and drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by me and Marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of Principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

WELLINGTON."

SECTION X.

"Cartaxo, January 18, 1811.

"It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meeting of the Regency. It appears that his Eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, "which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom." It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his Eminence the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been mistaken hitherto. His Eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of his Royal Highness's armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom, in 1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio Saltar de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with safety

in the neighborhood of the capital only, and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their part, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his Eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon his Majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his Majesty has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on the 'inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' The Patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions which have principally involved his country in the contest, when he talks of discontinuing it, because it has again, for the third time, been brought into 'the heart of the kingdom.' Although the Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war, which has since occurred, I admit that his Eminence, or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's position in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have been alleviated, and I observe that it is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object the deliverance of the whole. The Patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring his Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of these

armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his Eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure, all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment, although all the corps are concentrated in the neighborhood of their magazines, with means of transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores and funds of the British army. It may likewise occur to his Eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in any manner. By desiring his Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his Eminence would endeavor to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his Majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in order that his Royal Highness may see that I have given his Eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the independence of his country.

WELLINGTON."

No. XX.

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL.

SECTION I.

"Seville, August 4th, 1810.

"PAR une décision de l'empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier S. M. détermine qu'à compter du 1^{er} Janvier toutes les dépenses d'administration générale du génie et de l'artillerie seraient au compte du gouvernement Es-

pagnol ; aussitôt que j'en fus instruit je sollicitai S. M. C. d'assigner à cet effet une somme ; mais je ne pas obtenir que 2,000,000 de réaux (533,000f.) et encore le roi entendait il que les payemens ne remontassent qu'au mois de Février ; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n'ai cessé d'en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l'Intendant Général ; nos demandes n'ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir autant que possible la différence j'ai dû avoir recours aux recettes extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. J'espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques sommes. L'état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvrements qui ont été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000f. du crédit mensuel à l'époque du 1^{er} Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour au moins 500,000f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses d'administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J'avais fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l'Intendant Général, des valeurs pour plus d'un million qui devait servir à payer une partie de l'armée. Mr. l'Intendant Général justifie de l'emploi de toutes ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. n'admettent pas les comptes que je présente ; d'abord ils ne veulent pas allouer la somme de 500,000f. qui a été reportée à l'article des dépenses d'administration générale, s'appuyant sur ce sujet sur la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu'au mois de Février, quoique l'empereur ait expressément entendu que le mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris ; ils ne veulent pas non plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000f. ; il n'est pas dans mon pouvoir d'admettre leurs motifs ; la décision de l'empereur est expresse, et tant que je serai dans la situation délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m'obligera de pourvoir aux besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes qui ont eu lieu en Andalusie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de l'artillerie, du génie, des état majors et de l'administration générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu'on ait absolument rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j'ai en même temps pu faire payer trois mois de solde à l'armée ; c'est sans doute bien peu quand il est du 8 à 10 mois d'arrière à la troupe et que l'insuffisance des moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien je crois qu'il m'était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle-même convaincue si elle veut s'arrêter un moment sur l'aperçu que je vais lui donner des charges que l'Andalusie supporte. On consomme tous les jour près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations de fourrage ; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l'Alhambra de Grenade, au dessus duquel on a construit un grand camp retranché ; tous les châteaux sur les bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu'à Fuengirola, le château d'Alcala la Real, la place de Ronda, les châteaux d'Olvera et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de Los Guardias et plusieurs autres postes sur les frontières de l'Estremadura qu'on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses que les travaux devant Cadix et la construction d'une flotte occasionnent. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique d'armes, laquelle jusqu'à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la fonderie et l'arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et d'affûts. J'ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait exploiter toutes les nitières de l'Andalusie. A présent on compte aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu'aux bombes de 12 pouces ; tout le vieux fer a été ramassé ; on a construit les affûts nécessaires pour l'armement des batteries devant Cadix. On a

fait des requisitions en souliers et effets d'habillement dont la troupe a profité. J'ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules qui ont été données à l'artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au génie. J'ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets et vont être repartis dans tous les corps d'armée. La totalité de ces dépenses ainsi qu'une infinité d'autres dont je ne fais pas l'énumération sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays les supporte indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000f. et des recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu'il y a possibilité dont l'application a lieu en faveur de l'administration générale de l'armée, du génie, de l'artillerie, des états majors, des frais de courses et des dépenses secrètes. Ces charges sont immenses, et jamais le pays n'aurait pu les supporter si nous n'étions parvenus à mettre de l'ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses et consommations ; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être même y aurait-il du danger de chercher à la faire ; c'est au point que malgré que nous soyons à la récolte il faut déjà penser à faire venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l'Andalousie étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de l'armée. Cependant S. M. C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid les revenus de l'Andalousie : je dis les revenus, car leurs demandes dépassaient les recettes ; des ordres ont même été expédiés en conséquence aux commissaires royaux des Préfectures, et je me suis trouvé dans l'obligation de m'opposer ouvertement à l'effet de cette mesure dont l'exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l'armée, mais occasionné peut-être des mouvemens séditionnaires ; d'ailleurs il y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V. A. extrait d'une lettre que j'eus l'honneur d'écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier, et copie de celle que j'adressai à Monsieur le Marquis d'Almenara, ministre des finances, le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait l'état désespérant des finances de S. M. C. Je supplie avec instance V. A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du présent rapport à S. M. l'empereur.

« J'aurai voulu pour que S. M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s'est fait en Andalousie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus ; mais j'ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les détails se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur l'Intendant Général sur l'administration. Cependant d'après ce que j'ai dit S. M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l'état de ces troupes et des embarras de ma situation : elle est telle aujourd'hui que je dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S. M. au nom même de son service de daigner la prendre en considération : j'ai des devoirs à remplir dont je sais toute l'étendue, je m'y livre sans réserve mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où je me trouve je puisse la soutenir ; en effet j'ai à combattre des prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec ceux de l'armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l'empereur ; je suis forcé par mes propres devoirs de m'opposer à l'exécution des divers ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J'ai aussi constamment à lutter contre l'amour propre des chefs militaires, que souvent peuvent différer d'opinion avec moi et naturellement prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations me font regarder la tâche qui m'est imposée comme au dessus de mes forces et me portent à désirer que S. M. l'empereur daigne me faire connaître ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l'Espagne, un chef plus capable que moi d'en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai

seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de l'empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont dans le midi de l'Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu'aux deux mers suivent le même système d'opérations, et soient par conséquent commandés par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de l'empereur, et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui serait fait opposition d'une manière quelconque, il puisse se conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué; tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionnera inévitablement des désagrémens qu'on peut autrement éviter.

"J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé)

"LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE."

SECTION II.

Intercepted Letter from Marshal Mortier to the Emperor, 13th July, 1810.

"SIRE,—L'état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, major-général, a pris l'initiative de tous les mouvemens même le plus minutieux de 5^{me} corps rend ici ma présence tout-à-fait inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir excellentes troupes animées du meilleur esprit, disséminées dans tout l'Andalusie et perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. Dans cet état des choses je prie V. M. de vouloir bien me permettre de me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres il ne juge pas à propos de m'accorder en congé pour retourner en France, congé que reclame ma santé à la suite d'une maladie grave dont je suis à peine convalescent.

"J'ai l'honneur, &c. &c.

"LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE TREVISE."

No. XXI.

SECTION I.

Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated July 10, 1810.

"Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to Lord Wellington's headquarters, but the latter has not abandoned his lines."

General P. Boyer to S. Swartz, July 8, 1810.

"We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its position and works, and which has been attacked with but little method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons, does not move: we compose the corps of observation, we are on the look-out for them."

Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du maréchal prince d'Essling.

"1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.—Le capitaine du génie Boucherat arrive du 2^e corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807. Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu'il en adressé. Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées, et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d'eau, doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien difficiles, et en certains endroits il n'y a pas plus

de 20 toises de largeur ; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos) ; mais la rivière n'est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La route d'Idanha, Castelbranco, &c., mauvaise, cependant non absolument impraticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, profond jusqu'à Abrantes * * * * * Au dessus de cette ville, ou plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le pays devient plat ; le lit du Tage s'élargit ; il n'y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout est très praticable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines peu élevées, praticables sur leur sommet, peu propres à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu'à la mer pour celles de Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute les armes ; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les directions. J'ai fait copier cet itinéraire."

"1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.—Causé avec le général Loison des position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince."

"1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor.—On dit que l'ennemi se retranche à Alhandra et Bucellas. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de Riomajor à Lisbonne ; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d'après de bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais copier."

SECTION III.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heures $\frac{1}{2}$.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir du général Reynier et copie d'une réponse.

Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier adressé à votre excellence.

Je vous renouvelle, prince, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé)

LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Elchingen. St. Antonio, le 26 Septembre, à 8 heures du matin.

Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on aperçoit sur le Serra au delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s'est éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon et un détachement d'infanterie Anglais, et à mi-côte une ligne de tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s'étend depuis le chemin qui monte du village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du 6^e corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font face au 6^e corps ; mais comme on ne les aperçoit que de revers, on ne peut juger de leur nombre.

On ne peut deviner s'il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d'après l'organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes sont étroites, et qui a des pentes rapides de chaque côte, il ne doit pas avoir de terrain pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me paraît une arrière garde, mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des dispositions pour l'attaquer avec succès. J'attends des nouvelles de ce que l'ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement ; si vous jugez que c'est une arrière garde et que vous l'attaquez, j'attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d'attendre les ordres de Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, j'attendrai aussi ; comme je pense qu'il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d'agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

(Signé)

REYNIER.

A Monsieur le général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heures $\frac{1}{2}$ du matin.

Je reçois à l'instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. Je pense qu'une grande partie de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de Moira. Un paysan dit qu'il existe de l'autre côté de ces montagnes une plaine assez belle d'une demi-lieue d'étendue, et très garnie d'oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l'ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d'Operto; cependant il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc que couvre le couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre une 12^{me} de pièces d'artillerie. Le chemin de Coimbra passe très près de ce couvent.

J'ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d'Essling pour lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu'il serait nécessaire qu'il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j'avais le commandement, j'attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je crois, mon cher général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant sur la droite de l'ennemi, et en poussant ses avant-postes, car c'est véritablement par ce point qu'il faudrait le forcer à faire sa retraite.

Je vous renouvelle, &c.

(Signé)

LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

SECTION IV.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810.

MONSIEUR LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.—Le général Foy que vous avez expédié est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à sa majesté et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s'est passé et votre situation.

Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d'Almeida avec un corps de 6000 hommes. Le comte d'Erlon avec les divisions Claparède, Controux, et la division Fourrier a dû se trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Novembre.

L'empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage et que vous en avez un sur le Zézère, défendu sur les deux rives par de fortes têtes de pont. Sa majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position que vous occupez devant l'ennemi; qu'Abrautes se trouvant à 800 toises du Tage, vous l'aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le siège. L'empereur vous recommande d'établir deux ponts sur le Zézère, de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux du Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d'opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère, passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera pour faire des vivres.

Je viens de donner de nouveau l'ordre déjà réitérée plusieurs fois au duc de Dalmatie, d'envoyer le 5^{me} corps sur le Tage entre Moutalveo et Villafior, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L'empereur croit qu'il serait nécessaire de s'emparer d'Alcantara, de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage, d'assurer toutes vos communications en saisissant les points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes, soient à l'abri des incursions des milices.

Vous sentirez, Monsieur le prince d'Essling, l'avantage de régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour l'obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d'organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et Almeyda.

L'armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas difficiles.

Deux millions 500 mille francs destinée à la solde de votre armée sont déjà à Valladolid ; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation.

Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, indépendamment d'une consommation énorme d'hommes et d'argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut donc, prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde ; ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions dans le pays.

Vous trouverez ci-joint des Moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l'Angleterre, datées du 12 Novembre.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,

Major-général,

(Signé)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION V.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Decembre, 1810.

Je vous expédie, prince, le général Foy que l'empereur a nommé général de division ; je vous envoie les Moniteurs ; vous y verrez que nous apprenons par les nouvelles d'Angleterre qu'au 1 Décembre, vous vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem.

L'empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous avez des ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage ; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles des journaux Anglais, il paraît qu'il y a beaucoup de malades dans leur armée, ils ne comptent que 27 à 28 mille hommes sous les armes et un effectif de 31 mille, y compris la cavalerie et l'artillerie. La situation de l'armée Anglaise en Portugal tient Londres dans une angoisse continuelle, et l'empereur regarde comme un grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de leur faire perdre du monde dans les affaires d'avant-gardes, jusqu'à ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je réitère encore au maréchal duc de Trévise l'ordre de marcher sur le Tage avec le 5^{me} corps.

Le comte d'Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, va profiter de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l'offensive et battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se trouvent sur vos communications et sur vos flancs.

Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos opérations la plus naturelle paraît devoir être par la rive gauche de cette rivière.

Le général Foy, à qui l'empereur a parlé longtemps, vous donnera plus de détails.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION VI.

A Monsieur le maréchal d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811.

Je vous prévien, prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de ce mois, l'empereur a formé une armée du Nord de l'Espagne, dont le commandement est confié à Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie qui va établir son quartier général à Burgos.

L'arrondissement de l'armée du Nord de l'Espagne est composé :—

- 1°. De la Navarre formant le 3^e gouvernement de l'Espagne.
- 2°. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, formant le 4^e gouvernement.
- 3°. De la province des Asturies.
- 4°. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5^e gouvernement.
- 5°. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, Toro, et Zamore, formant le 6^e gouvernement.
- 6°. De la province de Salamanque.

Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de l'arrondissement des armées du centre et de l'Arragon.

Cette disposition, en centralisant le pouvoir, va donner de l'ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d'activité aux opérations dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l'Espagne ; et Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida.

Je vous engage, prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service.

D'après les ordres de l'empereur je prévien Monsieur le duc d'Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer l'armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours ; je le prévien aussi que le 9^{me} corps d'armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce corps rentrerait en Espagne.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION VII.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1811.

Vous verrez par le Moniteur d'hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, que les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l'année dernière dans la même position. L'empereur me charge de vous renouveler l'ordre de vous porter au secours du prince d'Essling, qui est toujours à Santarem ; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que les eaux soient diminuées pour en jeter un sur le Tage. Il paraît certain que le 9^{me} corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord, c'est à-dire, par Almeida.

L'empereur espère que le prince d'Essling aura jeté un pont sur le Tage ; ce que lui donnera des vivres.

Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupé par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Taragone sera tombé entre nos mains, comme l'a fait la place de Tortose ; alors sa majesté *pense que le 5^{me} corps et une partie du 4^{me}* pourront se porter au secours du prince d'Essling.

Le major-général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE

SECTION VIII.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811.

Je vous prévien, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie s'est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 5^{me} corps d'armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz ; je mande au duc de Dalmatie qu'après la prise de cette place il doit se porter sans perdre de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous donner les moyens d'assiéger et de prendre Abrantes.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE

SECTION IX.

Au prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, le 6 Fevrier, 1811.

Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le Moniteur d'aujourd'hui au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général Belliard, au duc d'Istrie, aux commandans de Ciudad-Rodrigo et d'Almeida, au général Thiébaud, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au duc d'Istrie en lui envoyant le Moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu'il y trouvera les dernières nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du 13 ; que tout paraît prendre une couleur avantageuse : que si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc de Dalmatie a pu se porter sur le Tage, et faciliter l'établissement du pont au prince d'Essling : qu'il devient donc très important de faire toutes les dispositions que j'ai ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du prince d'Essling. Ecrivez en même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire connaître la situation du duc d'Istrie, et lui réitérer l'ordre de favoriser le prince d'Essling pour son passage du Tage ; que j'espère que Badajoz aura été pris dans le courant de Janvier ; et que vers le 20 Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage, avec le prince d'Essling ; qu'il peut si cela est nécessaire retirer des troupes du 4^{me} corps ; qu'enfin tout est sur le Tage. Sur ce je prie Dieu, mon cousin, qu'il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde.

(Signé) NAPOLEON.

P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d'Istrie, faites le partir.

SECTION X.

A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Fevrier, 1811.

Je vous envoie, prince, le Moniteur du 6 ; vous y trouverez les dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal ; elles vont jusqu'au 13 Janvier, et

annoncent que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marcher des troupes sur le Tage, et vous faciliter l'établissement d'un pont. Je lui en ai donné et je lui en réitère l'ordre; l'empereur espère que la jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous sur le Tage. Les deux divisions d'infanterie du corps du général Drouet vont rester entièrement à votre disposition d'après les ordres que je donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, commandant-en-chef l'armée du nord de l'Espagne; je lui mande de porter son quartier général à Valladolid, d'établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la province de Salamanque afin d'assurer d'une manière journalière sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Ciudad Rodrigo, et Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui pourront parvenir à l'armée de Portugal.

Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo un corps du 6000 hommes qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo et d'Almeyda, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guarda, empêcher qu'il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du 9^{me} corps, et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette frontière du Portugal.

De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamore d'où elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle se trouvera d'ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant les circonstances.

De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle sera en mesure d'appuyer la première; et de réunir le reste de la garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos.

Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d'infanterie du 9^{me} corps seront entièrement à votre disposition, et avec ce secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtemps la position que vous occupez; de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin d'agir comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur le nord de l'Espagne, puisque le duc d'Istrie sera à portée de marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire.

Dès que le duc d'Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra un officier au général Drouet, pour l'en instruire et lui faire connaître qu'il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer.

Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec 4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,

Major-général,

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION XI.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Guarda, le 20 Mars, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,—Vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du Portugal; l'armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné; et avec toute ma volonté et la patience de l'armée, je crains de n'y pouvoir tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne.

J'écris à M. le ct^e. d'Erlon pour qu'il fasse approvisionner Almeyda et Rodrigo; ces deux places n'auraient jamais dû cesser d'avoir pour 3 mois de vivres aux quels on n'aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d'apprendre qu'il n'y a que pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui écris aussi de prendre une position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions; vous sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu'il se place à portée de marcher au secours d'Almeyda.

Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières d'Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l'ai dit, je ne vois guère la possibilité d'y rester, ...

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XII.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,—Le pays que l'armée occupe ne pouvant au aucune manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et l'itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d'armée.

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XIII.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,—Je suis arrivé avec toute l'armée sur Ciudad Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain; et je suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnements de Rodrigo 200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d'ordonner de remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j'ai eu soin de vous faire connaître. J'espère que vous aurez bien voulu faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d'y faire préparer des vivres, seul moyen d'y faire maintenir l'ordre.

Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l'ennemi ne s'approcherait pas des places.

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XIV.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,—Ma position devient toujours plus allarmante; les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de réponses de vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de chose se prolonge, je serai forcé de faire prendre à l'armée des cantonnements où elle puisse vivre, et d'abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de défendre et encore bien moins d'approvisionner, mes troupes manquant absolument de vivres.

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XV.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811.

Le général Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, ainsi que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d'Essling, le capitaine Porcher, et le chef d'escadron Pelet. Il paraît que le prince d'Essling avec son corps d'armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte, Alfayates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid et l'Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s'établir facilement avec l'armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu'on ne prévoit pas, le prince d'Essling étoit vivement attaqué

par l'armée Anglaise, l'empereur pense que *vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15^{me} de mille hommes*. L'Armée du centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur Alcantara. L'armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà fait partir, et d'après le prince d'Essling, elle va se trouver assez forte pour ne rien craindre de l'ennemi.

(Le reste est sans intérêt.)

Le major-général,

(Signé)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION XVI.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,—Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise ont pris position aux environs d'Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait encore des vivres pour une 20^{me} de jours, et que les Anglais et les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l'armée de Portugal n'étant en état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de plus une division d'infanterie pour placer en reserve. Vers le 24 ou le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir de l'armée de Portugal pour attaquer l'ennemi, s'il nous attend dans ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins à celles de l'armée de Portugal, pour attaquer l'ennemi; si on ne peut leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l'eau de vie de l'armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces d'artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d'état de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l'ennemi ne soit déposé et chassé hors des frontières de l'Espagne et au delà de la Coa. Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour de jour; je suis sans le sol, vous pouvez tout; il faut donc nous envoyer du biseuit, de l'eau de vie, du pain, et de l'orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrons manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de marcher au secours d'Almeyda. C'est à vous à donner vos ordres; et vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M. (Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XVII.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL,—J'ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi s'évanouissent donc dans le moment où j'en ai besoin; ravitailler Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1^{re} opération et la seule qui peut nous donner la faculté de rendre l'armée de Portugal disponible, lorsqu'on n'aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l'armée d'Andalousie. Mais ne serait-il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, en présence de deux maréchaux de l'Empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l'impossibilité de se trouver les chevaux d'artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi

que je dois envoyer le 9^{me} corps en Andalusie; je voulais aussi le faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez-vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m'envoyer de la cavalerie, et des attelages d'artillerie, si vous voulez garder votre matériel? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement le 26? et vous paraissiez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à la guerre est beaucoup; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses qu'on ne répare plus.

Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunirais que 6 divisions, c'était pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importants occupés par les corps d'armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie sont un secours dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie à marches forcées. Réfléchissez qu'une fois les places réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des $\frac{2}{3}$ de l'armée, et que cette opération passe avant tout.

En m'offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal, y comprendre ceux nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces.

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XVIII.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 Avril, 1811.

MON CHER MARECHAL.—Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l'armée sera réunie le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d'Almeida est du plus haut intérêt pour les armes de S. M.; et il eut été bien à désirer que les secours que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous demander nous eussent été envoyés. L'ennemi paraît avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de cette place. Vous dire que je n'aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l'armée, c'est vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m'eût été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et pour la tranquillité du nord de l'Espagne. Je n'ai pas ménagé mes instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n'étaient pas heureux, votre dévouement pour le service de l'empereur, vous ferait certainement regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous m'aviez fait espérer, avant que j'en eusse besoin.

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XIX.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811

MON CHER MARECHAL,—Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22 vous me dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle que je reçois à l'instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière de Salamanque; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini; et vous me témoignez vos regrets de n'avoir pu y coopérer. Convenez, mon cher maréchal, que si l'armée de Portugal recevait un échec, vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de l'artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la cavalerie; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu'il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la défense et de l'ap-

provisionnement des places d'Almeida et de Rodrigo. Je n'aurais pas mieux demandé que d'employer l'armée de Portugal sous mes ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l'armée du midi ; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres ?

Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J'ignore quelle pourra être l'issue de ce mouvement ; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après demain 1^{er} Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans s'arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n'aurez pas manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces ressources comme beaucoup d'autres arrivent à Rodrigo ; cette place n'aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d'ici, il faudra que des convois considérables y soient envoyés.

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XX.

A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE,—Vous trouverez ci-joint l'ordre de l'empereur qui vous donne le commandement de l'armée du Portugal. Je donne l'ordre au maréchal prince d'Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée. Saisissez les rênes d'une main ferme ; faites dans l'armée les changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L'intention de l'empereur est que le duc d'Abrantes et le général Reynier restent sous vos ordres. S. M. compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses généraux, pour être persuadé qu'ils seconderont de tous leurs moyens.

L'empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince d'Essling en quittant l'armée n'emmené avec lui que son fils et un de ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d'état-major, le général Fririon, le colonel Pelet, ses autres aides-de-camp, tous les officiers de son état-major doivent rester avec vous.

Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une confiance entière.

Le Major-général, &c.

(Signé)

ALEXANDRE.

No. XXII.

Les Officiers Français, prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le général Trant, Gouverneur de la Ville et Province d'Oporto.

MONSIEUR LE GENERAL,—Chacun des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu'il vous a, désirerait vous offrir individuellement l'expression de sa reconnaissance. C'est nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur organes, et nous sommes d'autant plus flattés de cette commission agréable qu'il n'y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier n'ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter que vous agréerez favorablement ce foible témoignage de notre gratitude et les sincères remerciements que nous venons vous présenter pour toutes les bontés que vous avez

eus pour nous. Ce n'est pas sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ, mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que votre sollicitude s'étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets.

Ce n'est pas, monsieur le général, d'après l'étendue de notre lettre qu'il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnaissance; nous sommes mieux en état de sentir que d'exprimer ce que nous vous devons, et lorsque des circonstances plus heureuses nous ramèneront vers notre patrie, nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous êtes données pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d'agréer l'assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles nous avons l'honneur d'être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et très obéissants serviteurs,

Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre,

FALLOT,

Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au
grand quartier général de l'armée de Portugal.

Le colonel, sous inspecteur aux revues des troupes Françaises,

CATELOT.

H. DELAHAYE,

C^om^e de la Marine.

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